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Abstract
This  thesis  explores  the advocacy strategies  and influence of  interest  groups in  EU
foreign  policy.  It  examines  in  particular  the  impact  of  institutional  factors  on  the
strategies  and  lobbying  outcomes.  Conceptually,  it  contributes  to  the  literature  on
interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation
in international organisations.
Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires
into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to
the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external
relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis
compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern
neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine. 
The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those
policy  areas  that  are  ruled  by  the  intergovernmental  method.  Intergovernmentalism
limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for
informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this
allows interest  groups to  exert  some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in
which  intergovernmental  arrangements  prevail.  In  such  policy  domains,  groups
opposing  change  do  not  always  succeed,  despite  the  veto  opportunities  that
intergovernmentalism provides. 
While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is
most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy
cycle.  Moreover,  the  study  emphasises  that  institutional  structures  are  not  the  only
8
relevant  factor  in  explaining  group  influence.  Group-level  characteristics,  including
material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU
foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture
the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.
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Introduction
International relations and foreign policy conduct have long been seen as dominated by
states. Even in the world of interdependencies and interconnections, a multiplicity of
actors and heterarchy, foreign policy, border control, security and defence have been
described as the last outposts of state sovereignty. Since the late 1990s the realist and
neorealist  visions of state dominance in international politics have been increasingly
challenged.  Non-state  actors  ranging from transnational  organised crime groups and
terrorist  organisations  to  NGOs,  churches  and  solidarity  movements,  as  well  as
multinational corporations have emerged breaking the state monopoly on the exercise of
power in international relations.
Similar processes have taken place in Europe, where European integration has created a
web of interdependencies between economies and societies and opened the door to non-
state actors to move from the domestic political scene to the supranational level. Driving
integration or trying to deal with its consequences, all kinds of organised interests have
lobbied  EU  policymaking  in  the  areas  of  the  common  market,  international  trade,
agriculture,  regional  policy  and  other  spheres  of  European  integration.  Multi-level
governance, which emerged in Europe, is seen as especially conducive to interest group
involvement in politics at the EU level as in addition to lobbying their governments they
can also shift their focus to supranational venues. 
The proliferation of interest groups at the European level followed the adoption of the
Single European Act (1986), which expanded the powers of the European Community
to new policy areas and decreased the influence of national governments in Community
decision-making (Mazey & Richardson 1993). Business groups of all sorts – European
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and  national  industry  associations  and  individual  firms  –  were  first  to  organise
themselves in Brussels. Labour and citizens groups came later, but their presence has
been  growing  as  more  policymaking  is  done  at  the  EU  level  and  the  European
Commission has sought to boost participatory democracy in the EU by increasingly
consulting  with,  and  providing  funding  to,  civil  society  actors.  Citizens  interest
associations  are  the  second  largest  group  in  EU  politics,  after  EU  trade  and
professionals associations, counting for one third of all associations constituted at the
EU level (Greenwood 2007). The key question about participation of interest groups in
EU  politics  is  “who  wins  and  who  loses”.  Media  observers  and  researchers  argue
whether business interests are more successful in lobbying than citizens interests. The
research results from larger-N studies do not provide evidence for the systematic win of
corporate interest  in EU legislation-making battles  (Dür et  al.  2015; Klüver  2013b).
However, the EU interest mediation system is seen as biased towards resourceful actors,
despite the fact that it provides access to different types of actors, with the labels elite
pluralism (Eising 2007b) and chameleon pluralism (Coen & Katsaitis 2013), reflecting
its constantly changing nature. 
Unlike in many other policy domains, the EU member states have been reluctant to give
up  their  powers  and  genuinely  integrate  foreign  policies.  Despite  multiple  treaty
changes in which more and more policy areas have been communitarised – meaning
that  the  Community/Union has  acquired  more  powers  – EU foreign  policy  remains
largely intergovernmental and with little involvement of the supranational institutions.
However, this  does not mean that this area of European integration remains entirely
outside of the interests of non-state actors. Whereas there are less lobby groups with
interest in EU foreign, security and defence policy than in the areas of internal market,
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trade  or  regional  policy  (see  Figure  1),  in  which  the  EU produces  legally  binding
regulation  and  distributes  funds,  this  policy  area  is  not  immune  to  interest  group
involvement. 
The EU develops and constantly reviews its foreign policies in the areas of visas and
migration, development aid, promotion of human rights, crisis management and conflict
resolution. These policies are important for organised interests in the EU and they also
affect non-state actors outside the Union, especially in those countries with which the
EU relates and aims to assist or enable change. Participation of interest organisations in
EU policymaking is crucial for the input and output legitimacy of EU foreign policy. On
the one hand, the EU promotes participatory governance by trying to be more accessible
and understandable to EU citizens.  On the other hand,  the Union seeks information
about the current and potential impacts of its policies in order to improve its external
performance and EU policymakers reach out to experts and interest groups for ideas and
expertise. While EU participatory governance has become ‘business as usual’ in EU
internal  policies  such  as  environment,  energy  or  common  market,  the  question  is
whether  there are  channels  of  access  to  policymakers  for  organised  interests  in  EU
foreign policy. It is assumed that there is not much space for interest group involvement
in  intergovernmental  policymaking  in  which  the  Commission  and  the  European
Parliament  traditionally  open  to  societal  interests  have  limited  powers.  Is  this
assumption correct? 
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Figure 1. Transparency Register: registrants in fields of interest1
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The statistical data from the EU Transparency Register – a voluntary register for lobby
groups in Brussels – shows that all  kinds of groups seem to take an interest  in EU
foreign, security and defence policies and, more broadly, defined EU external relations
(see Figure 2).2 Furthermore, media coverage also shows how the links between foreign
and domestic policies in the EU and the member states are reflected in the mobilisation
and lobbying of different types of interests on such issues as international sanctions,
arms  exports  and military  interventions.  By influencing  the  public  debate  or  inside
lobbying, publicly or covertly, different groups mobilise to protect their interests and
advance their causes; and the more external policies are made at the EU level, the more
often EU institutions become targets of non-state actor advocacy. But who wins and
who loses in EU foreign policy battles? 
1 The data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 come from EU Transparency Register, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do. Retrieved on 27 May 2015.
2 The data of EU Transparency Register should be seen as a tentative indicator of the number of interest 
groups with interest in EU foreign policy issues and these figures should be treated with cautiousness for 
a number of reasons (see Greenwood & Dreger 2013).
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Figure 2. Transparency register: fields of interest by group type
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Students of the EU know very little about lobbying and the influence of interest groups
in policy areas dominated by intergovernmental arrangements with the leading role of
the Council of the EU and the European Council. Traditionally the most lobbied and
accessible EU institutions – the Commission and the Parliament – had limited or no
powers  in  EU foreign  policy. Given that  there  has  been minimal  integration  in  the
foreign policy area, and following intergovernmentalist accounts (Moravcsik 1999), one
may expect that interest groups would rather act according to ‘the two-level games’
logic,  lobbying  their  national  governments  and  then  expecting  the  governments  to
negotiate  in  line  with  their  position  at  the  intergovernmental  level.  However,  these
expectations  no longer seem to reflect the reality in Brussels. Moreover, the growing
presence and involvement of non-state actors in Brussels-based foreign policymaking is
in line with a theoretical shift in the analysis of EU foreign policy, which has moved
from intergovernmentalism towards governance approaches that argue that powers are
increasingly shared both vertically between  sub-state, state, European and even global
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levels, and horizontally between state and non-state actors. However, while governance
approaches envisage interest group mobilisation at the EU level, they do not say how
their mobilisation translates into influence on EU policy.
In this thesis, I aim to examine non-state advocacy in EU foreign policy which, on the
one hand, is seen as one of the last bastions of nation-state sovereignty, and, on the
other, is one of the most rapidly developing areas of European integration. The central
research question of my study is how and to what extent interest groups influence EU
foreign policy. 
By studying  lobbying  and  interest  group  influence  on  EU foreign  policy,  I  aim  to
contribute to two sets of literatures. Firstly, this study will be a novelty in the literature
on interests groups in the EU by focusing on a policy area that has received very little
scholarly attention. Following the curve of interest group mobilisation at the EU level,
researchers  have  focused  mostly  on  lobbying  in  those  policy  areas  where  the
Community/Union has powers and produces legislation. Thus, the research has centred
mainly on the Commission and the European Parliament as lobbying targets, whereas
these  institutions  are  largely  excluded  from intergovernmental  policymaking.  Is  the
existing knowledge about lobbying and interest group influence in the EU valid for EU
foreign policy?  This thesis aims to make an empirical contribution through exploring
what advocacy strategies groups use in EU foreign policy lobbying, on what kinds of
issues they engage, whom they target among policymakers, with whom they ally, to
what extent they succeed in achieving their goals and what factors it depends on.
Secondly, this thesis  will be a unique and valuable contribution to EU foreign policy
studies  by focusing  on the role  of  interest  groups in  the  policymaking process.  EU
foreign  policy  scholars  have  mainly  focused  on  the  role  of  state  actors  –  national
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governments and parliaments – and   supranational institutions, the EU bureaucracy and
nascent  diplomacy.  Despite  some  recent  exceptions  (Joachim  &  Dembinski  2011;
Dembinski  &  Joachim  2014;  Voltolini  2013;  Voltolini  forthcoming) interest  group
participation and influence remains a largely unexplored agenda of the literature on EU
foreign policymaking,  while  studying non-state  actor  involvement  helps  us  to  better
understand how EU foreign  policy  is  made  (see  K.  E.  Smith  2010).  The empirical
findings of a study on interest groups will also be helpful to those trying to theorise EU
foreign  policy  in  terms  of  governance  approaches  and  the  mechanisms  pushing
European integration in this area. Participation of interest groups and the successful of
their advocacy can serve as an indicator of heterachy and the inclusion of non-state
actors, which are important in governance approaches. Finally, though this work does
not try to address normative issues such as to what extent interest group involvement
contributes  to  the democratic  legitimacy of  the EU  (for intergovernmental  decision-
making in the EU see, for example, Dembinski & Joachim 2014), it can shed light on
the  issue  of  whether  the  intergovernmental  institutional  framework  which  still
characterises a  number of EU policy areas (e.g.  foreign policy, monetary and fiscal
policy)  works  to  disadvantage  the  participatory  governance  which  the  EU  tries  to
promote. 
On a  theoretical  level,  by  looking at  the  case  of  EU foreign  policy  the  thesis  will
contribute to the literature on interest groups in the EU through examining institutional
determinants  on  lobbying  and  influence.  Another  major  question  which  this  thesis
attempts to answer is  whether institutional design(s) of  the EU determine(s) interest
group lobbying patterns and influence over policy outcome. Does intergovernmentalism
matter in the sense that it limits space for interest group involvement at the EU level? Or
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have advocacy groups found ways to (successfully) represent their interests at the EU
level despite the absence of a genuine multi-level governance framework in areas of EU
foreign policy in which intergovernmentalism prevails such as the CFSP/CSDP?
Given that interest group scholars have focused on Community policy areas and the
legislation making process, they have lacked the necessary variation to examine the
relationship between institutional factors and interest group influence in the EU. From
comparative studies of lobbying in the EU and the US (Mahoney 2008) and in the EU
and the UN (Joachim & Locher 2009c), we know that the institutional context seems to
impact the choice of lobbying tactics and group influence. Moreover, the literature on
non-state  actor  participation  in  international  organisations  shows  that  institutional
arrangements  may  favour  or  severely  constrain  the  access  of  outsiders  and  that
institutional access may vary across but also within international organisations as well
as stages of the policymaking process. By conceptualising EU foreign policy  as multi-
level and multi-pillar (Stephan Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 29-32) that includes
not only CFSP/CSDP, but also former first and third pillar issues, I will explore the
relationship between institutional conditions and interest group influence and examine
whether and how interest groups adapt their lobbying strategies to different decision-
making modes in EU foreign policy.  In such a conceptualisation, EU foreign policy
offers a mix of institutional arrangements which differ in terms of the involvement of
supranational  institutions,  decision-making  rules  in  the  Council,  and  participatory
mechanisms for non-state actors’ involvement.  Studies show that certainty of access
affects how interest groups frame their issues or the resources they choose to rely on; in
other words, the advocacy strategies they adopt (Joachim & Locher 2009a). Moreover,
access is seen as an important, though not always sufficient, pre-condition of influence
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(Tallberg et al. 2014).
Methodologically I also want to tackle the difficult question of measuring interest group
influence.  Although  many  studies  on  interest  group  politics  in  the  EU  have  been
conducted  during the two last decades, the influence and power of interest groups in the
EU remains  an  underexplored  area  (Bunea & Baumgartner  2014;  Dür 2008a). This
seems to be a result of how difficult it is ‘to operationalise the concepts of ‘influence’
and ‘power’, to construct reliable indicators, and to measure them empirically’ (Dür &
De Bièvre,  2007:  2). Whereas  interest  group scholars  have  opted  for  the pragmatic
approach of measuring interest group influence conceptualised as control over policy
outcome,  focusing  on  its  visible  manifestations  and  advancing  significantly  in
measurement methods, many difficulties in measuring, collecting and validating data
remain.  Being  conscious  of  these  difficulties,  I  do  not  want  to  avoid  the  issue  of
influence given that the question of who wins and who loses remains central to our
understanding of  politics  in  the  EU and  further  afield.  In  approaching the  issue  of
influence, I will not attempt to reinvent the wheel, but instead apply tested methods in
order  to  explore  the  benefits  of  methodological  triangulation  in  a  new  case.  The
difficulty  in  measuring  influence  in  EU  foreign  policy  is  that  in  the  absence  of  a
legislation-making  process,  with  a  more  secretive  policy  environment  and  the
confidentiality clause on many policy documents, an inquiry into influence has to rely
on observations made by policy participants and stakeholders. Whereas this may impede
an ‘objective’ measurement of influence (Bernhagen et al. 2014), such an exercise may
also tell us more about how advocacy success and interest group influence are perceived
by group representatives and policymakers. Thus, it will add to our understanding of the
nature of lobbying and influence. 
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In order to study advocacy and the influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy, I
will look at the issue areas most prominent in EU foreign policy such as democracy and
human rights promotion and peace and state building. By doing so, I will focus on the
EU policy towards neighbourhood regions and countries. The EU policy towards its
neighbourhood is central to EU foreign policy: the EU’s neighbourhood has been set as
one of the three key priorities of EU external relations  (Ashton 2010). There is also a
web of relations between the EU and neighbouring countries at the member state and
sub-state levels, as well as between different actors, including non-state actors such as
business companies, NGOs, political parties, citizens groups, and solidarity movements.
To examine  institutional  determinants  of  lobbying  and  influence,  I  will  conduct  a
comparative  case  study analysis.  Focusing  on three  cases  which  represent  different
policy  regimes  (independent  variable),  I  will  examine  whether  and  how  lobbying
strategies  (dependent  variable)  and  group  influence  (dependent  variable)  change  as
policy  dossiers  or  issues  move  on  the  axis  from  the  Community  method  to  the
intergovernmental method of policymaking. The cases have been selected to vary upon
the key independent variable – the type of policy regime –  and be most similar on other
variables  which  may account  for  the  variation of  influence.  However, some control
variables (e.g. group-level characteristics) are unknown, thus, in addition to a cross-case
analysis, a within-case analysis is applied to add to our understanding of the effect of
the cause and explore how the institutional design affects lobbying outcome, if at all.
The selected cases are visually presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Case study analysis
Given the above aims and context, the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I
discuss the main literature on which this study draws and to which it aims to contribute.
I  start  by  reviewing  the  role  prescribed  to  interest  groups  in  the  main  theories  of
European integration. I then examine how the issue of influence and its determinants
has been tackled in the study of interest groups. Whereas the interest group literature in
the  EU  offers  some  insights  into  the  relationship  between  institutional  factors  and
lobbying,  I  will  also  turn  to  the  literature  on  non-state  actors’ participation  in
international governance, which devotes significant attention to the issue of institutional
arrangements. Finally, I discuss lobbying in the case of EU foreign policy and insights
on  interest  group  strategies,  influence  and  its  determinants  provided  by the  limited
existing studies.
In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical framework and research design of this study. I
introduce  the  main  concepts  used  in  this  thesis  such  as  interest  groups,
lobbying/advocacy, interest group influence, and EU foreign policy. I also present the
institutional context of lobbying in the Union and introduce the concept of policy modes
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in the EU which will be further used to study the link between institutional conditions
and interest group influence in EU foreign policy. I also outline the case study research
design and methodology and discuss the difficulties of measuring influence and how I
will try to overcome them in this study.
In Chapters 3-5, I present the research findings of each of the case studies. In each
chapter, I will describe lobbying strategies (answering the question how interest groups
influence EU foreign policy) by analysing their advocacy objectives, levels and targets
of lobbying, coalition building patterns, and choice of tactics. I will also discuss the
results  of  measuring  (the  degree  of)  their  influence  (answering  the  question  what
influence they have) and what kind of issues and the factors upon which the influence is
dependent. In Chapter 3, I show how groups lobbying on EU visa liberalisation policy
towards the Eastern neighbours have been successful in keeping the issue of visa-free
travel on the EU agenda,  even though their  influence is  mostly visible  on technical
issues  during  the  implementation  and evaluation  policy  stages.  In  Chapter  4,  CFSP
sanctions  policy  towards  Belarus  emerges  as  a  battlefield  of  divergent  organised
interests in which business groups exploit the veto powers of EU member states in the
Council,  whereas  public  interest  groups struggle  to  overcome internal  divisions  and
build broader advocacy coalitions for policy change involving the European Parliament
and  the  Commission.  Their  influence  is  mostly  visible  in  the  recalibration  of  EU
sanctions. In Chapter 5, interest groups are shielded from access to crisis management
structures  in  Brussels.  They  therefore  aim  to  increase  space  for  their  involvement
through building channels of informal communication with policymakers. Groups also
engage with the CSDP missions on the ground, but achieve influence on rather minor
issues related to implementation of the mission mandate.
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In  the  Concluding  chapter,  I  review  the  overall  findings  of  this  thesis  and  offer
empirical,  theoretical  and  methodological  reflections.  In  particular,  I  discuss  how
institutional factors affect interest  groups’ strategies and influence. Finally, I point out
future areas for research based on the central findings of the thesis.
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Chapter 1. Literature review
Introduction
The main theoretical approaches to European integration view the role of interest groups
in this process differently. Liberal intergovernmentalism views European integration as
primarily  driven  by economic  interests;  more  precisely, the  commercial  interests  of
domestic producer groups who influence their governments, with the main focus of the
theory on state behaviour. National governments are seen to have ultimate power over
the  integration  process.  The role  of  non-state  actors  is  limited  to  domestic  politics.
Domestic groups are engaged in the process of national preference formation, while a
national  government  may  use  supranational  institutions  to  reduce  opposition  from
unsupportive domestic groups (Moravcsik 1999: 73, 473; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig
2009). This approach is guided by the logic of two-level games, in which only national
politicians  participate  at  both  domestic  and  international  levels,  whereas  domestic
groups pursue their interests by pressuring their governments (Putnam 1988).
In contrast, neofunctionalism puts an emphasis on the role of non-state actors – interest
associations  and social movements formed at the European level. According to this
theory,  once  member  states  initially  decide  to  cooperate  within  the  regional
organisation, supranational institutions and interest groups become the main drivers of
European integration. Neofunctionalists hypothesised that integration would lead to the
formation of regional interest groups that would be active at the regional and/or national
levels  (Haas  1968: 354, 388;  Schmitter  1970:  856) and that an increase of regional
interest groups would be instrumental in overcoming national resistance to expand the
scale  and  the  level  of  integration  (Schmitter  1970:  858).  Regional  groups  would
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enhance  the  reform-promoting  role  of  supranational  institutions  in  the  process  of
integration. A change would also occur on the domestic level: national actors would
appear differentiated in classes, status groups, subregions, etc., and these sub-national
actors would form transnational coalitions of opposition and support  (Schmitter 1970:
864). 
Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism is criticised for its failure to recognize the role of
interest groups both at the domestic and European level in EU integration and day-to-
day policymaking  (Cowles 2003), neofunctionalism is accused of going too far in its
estimations  of  interest  group  power  in  the  integration  process  and  assumptions  of
excessive homogeneity in the pressures that would be brought by interest groups upon
national governments (Niemann & Schmitter 2009). Nonetheless, neofunctionalism has
inspired such conceptual approaches as multi-level governance (see George 2004).
Governance approaches to European integration share a common understanding that
power does not form the monopoly of state and is shared between different actors and
levels.  As  Pierre  (2000:  3-4) notes,  “[In]  much  of  the  public  and  political  debate,
governance refers to sustaining co-ordination and coherence among variety of actors
with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate
interests,  civil  society,  and  transnational  organisations.  What  previously  were
indisputable roles of government are now increasingly seen as more common, generic,
societal  problems  which  can  be  resolved  by  political  institutions  but  also  by  other
actors. The main point here that political institutions no longer exercise a monopoly of
the orchestration of governance” (Pierre 2000: 3-4).
The  concept  of  EU  governance  focuses  on  distinct  features  of  EU  polity  and
policymaking. Some  scholars underline its regulatory character, while others focus on
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its multi-level nature, and on segmentation and differentiation. There is also debate as to
the  level  of  democratic  deficit  in  the  EU  (for  an  overview,  see  Kohler-Koch  &
Rittberger 2006; B. G. Peters & Pierre 2009). A common thread in these concepts is an
emphasis on the role of non-state actors in the EU. 
According  to  the  multi-level  governance  (MLG)  perspective,  decision-making
competences are no longer monopolised by state authorities, but are instead shared by
various actors at different levels – subnational, national and supranational. The MLG
approach implies that political arenas at different levels are interconnected rather than
nested as state-centric approaches argue. This means that subnational actors, including
interest groups, operate at both a domestic and European level, creating transnational
coalitions  (Marks et  al.  1996; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch
2004).  Multi-level  governance  scholars  describe  EU  decision-making  as  less
technocratic and more “politicized-participatory” where the stakes of political conflict
are  higher,  the  scope  of  authoritative  decision-making  broader,  and  there  are  more
avenues for interest group influence and political mobilization (Hooghe & Marks 2001:
126).
Whereas MLG has been criticised on many accounts, including for lacking a causal
motor of integration and set of testable hypotheses (Jordan 2001), with regard to non-
state actors, this theoretical approach is thin in explaining how and why substate actors
mobilise (Warleigh 2006) and the difference between mobilisation of substate actors and
their power to shape policy outcomes  (Jordan 2001). To address the participation vs.
power issue, some scholars distinguish between multi-level governance and multi-level
participation, where the latter notion would mean greater involvement without effective
influence  for  at  least  some types  of  new actors  (Bache  & Flinders  2004).   Others
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suggest the use of the  MLG approach in combination with policy networks analysis in
order to explore the extent to which participation equals  influence and  multi-level
governance is present in a policy area  (Warleigh 2006: 93-94).  Rhodes defines policy
networks as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental
and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in
public policymaking and implementation. These actors are interdependent and policy
emerges  from  the  interactions  between  them”  (Rhodes  2008:  426). Analysing  EU
governance  through policy  networks  analysis  can  explain  EU policy  outcomes in  a
particular  sector  through the influence of different  actors,  including non-state  actors
(Peterson 2009).
Whereas  the  key  theoretical  approaches  explaining  European  integration  have
something to say about the role of non-state actors in this process, there is no unity
among them as to when and at what level interest groups mobilise to lobby and what
influence they have on EU policymaking. Instead, a growing literature on lobbying and
interest groups in the EU has taken a closer look at interest group mobilisation and the
maintenance, density and diversity of the interest group population as well as issues of
lobbying strategies and influence on policy outcomes.
This  literature  has  come out  of  the  MLG assumption  viewing European integration
among the “main causes for the changing nature, and growing importance of interest
group  politics  in  Europe”  (Beyers  et  al.  2008:  1111).  Thus,  the  bulk  of  studies  on
interest groups in the EU focus on those policy areas in which European integration has
advanced most,  and the supranational  institutions  have significant  competencies,  for
example,  EU  trade  policy,  internal  market,  common  agricultural  policy  or
environmental policy. In contrast, few studies examine interest group involvement in
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those areas in which intergovernmenalism is a dominant method for policymaking such
as EU foreign policy. Equally, the literature on EU foreign policymaking also largely
omits the issue of participation and the influence of non-state actors (K. E. Smith 2010).
Nevertheless, there is a growing number of interest groups in the EU foreign policy
arena, as the EU Transparency Register and their public activity in Brussels reveal. 
This thesis aims to explore non-state actor advocacy in EU foreign policymaking and, in
particular, examine the relationship between institutional factors on the one hand, and
interest group strategies and influence on the other. Therefore, in the following sections,
I provide an overview of the main literature to which it aims to contribute and on which
it draws. First, I turn to the literature on interest groups in the EU focusing on the issues
of influence and factors determining it. Given that the literature on lobbying in the EU
has largely avoided areas of intergovernmental politics, I then explore the literature on
participation of non-state actors in international intergovernmental organisations which
provide some insight on why intergovernmental organisations open or restrict access to
non-state  actors.  Finally,  I  present  the  literature  theorising  EU  foreign  policy,  in
particular  those studies  that  signal  that  EU foreign policy may be conducive to  the
involvement of non-state actors. I also review what the few existing studies on non-state
actors’ involvement in EU foreign policymaking reveal about advocacy strategies and
influence. I conclude by outlining my main contribution to the literatures reviewed. 
1. Lobbying and influence of interest groups in the EU
Whereas the EU interest group literature accounts for slightly over two decades, many
theoretical assumptions, research questions and hypotheses have been borrowed from a
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century-old corpus of US literature on interest groups directly or via European national
studies on interest groups (for example, from UK literature on British interest groups).
The  US literature  has  focused  on  interest  mobilisation,  organisational  maintenance,
lobbying strategies and, of particular significance to this study, the influence of interest
groups (for an overview of the US interest groups literature see  Hojnacki et al. 2012;
Lowery & Gray 2004; Baumgartner & Leech 1998). One of the key debates that has
been also brought to the EU interest groups literature concerns the power of money in
politics and whether resource-rich interests tend to define outcomes of public policy.
Whereas an overview of the literature on EU interest groups has been done elsewhere
(see Bunea & Baumgartner 2014; Beyers et al. 2008; Eising 2008b; Coen 2007), in this
section I focus on the bulk of studies which examine the issue of influence. 
The influence and power of interest  groups in the EU still  remains a comparatively
under-researched area (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014; Dür 2008a; Dür 2008b; Dür & De
Bièvre 2007b). Reviewing the EU interest groups literature, Bunea and Baumgartner
(2014:1422) calculate that merely 11% of studies focus on influence. The reason given
for this is the difficulty “to operationalise the concepts of ‘influence’ and ‘power’, to
construct  reliable  indicators,  and  to  measure  them empirically”  (Dür  &  De  Bièvre
2007b: 2).
Most studies of interest groups in the EU have been conducted  in the case study mode
testing hypotheses stemming from the literature on interest  groups in the US, Great
Britain and other Western countries. These studies have generated  many insights on
lobbying  and  influence  in  the  EU,  however,  they  have  also  reached  contradictory
conclusions  as  to  what  types  of  groups  are  influential  in  the  EU and  what  factors
determine their influence  (Dür 2008a; Eising 2008). Quantitative studies of lobbying
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and  influence  have  started  to  appear   recently.  In  her  book,  Klüver  studied  key
conditions of lobbying success by looking at 56 policy issues and over 2500 interest
groups  participating  in  the  European  Commission’s  online  consultations  (Klüver
2013c). Other examples of ongoing large-N research projects are ‘Intereuro’3 conducted
by nine European universities that examines interest groups lobbying strategies, their
impact on policy outcomes and their networks by focusing on 100 legislative proposals
in  the  EU;  and  ‘Interarena’ that  analyses  group  influence  towards  the  bureaucracy,
parliament and the media in three EU countries (Denmark,4 UK and Germany) (see also
the special issue of Journal of European Public Policy “Legislative lobbying in context:
the policy and polity determinants of interest group politics in the European Union”
2015, 22:4). 
However, the scholarship of interest group influence centres on policy areas or issues
that belong to the former first pillar, in which the Community method applies. In respect
to a policy area, case studies focus on EU trade policy (Cowles 1995; Dür 2008a; Dür &
De Bièvre 2007a; De Bièvre & Eckhardt 2011), environmental policy (Bugdahn 2008;
Zito & Jacobs 2009; Bunea 2013), common agricultural policy (Grant 1978; Egdell &
Thompson  1999),  competition  policy  (García  &  Meier  2012),  and  services  (e.g.
information  technologies,  telecommunications,  transport)  (Michalowitz  2007;  Woll
2007). Studies on interest groups influencing intergovernmental decision making in the
EU are rare (Voltolini 2013; Dembinski 2009; Joachim & Dembinski 2011 on the CFSP;
Friedrich 2008 and Uçarer 2009 on the former third pillar). 
The focus  of  the  literature  is  predominantly  on the  legislation  making process  (see
Klüver et al. 2015), which is not only the most  productive and socially important area
3 See the project website http://www.intereuro.eu/.
4 For Interarena in Denmark see the project website http://interarena.dk.
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of EU policymaking, but also has clear  decision-making procedures and timeframes
and, in most cases, results in tangible policy outcomes – legislative acts. Moreover, the
studies tend to focus on the agenda setting and policy formulation stage and groups
influencing the Commission (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014), with some of them looking
specifically at interest group participation in the consultations run by the Commission
(Klüver 2013; Bunea 2013). Such a focus is justified as agenda-setting is the first  phase
of the policy cycle and groups try to influence policy as early as possible. Moreover, the
availability of initial consultation documents and final legislative proposals as well as
published positions of interest groups enable the collection of data necessary for a more
‘objective’ measurement of influence. However, stronger research designs that look at
specific modes of influence and produce robust findings limit the scope of our inference
about  influence  (Lowery 2013: 19). While studies looking at  influence on decision-
making in the European Parliament (EP) have become more frequent  (Wessels 1999;
Bouwen 2004b; Marshall 2010; Marshall 2012; Marshall 2015; Rasmussen 2015), this
is not the case for the Council of the EU and other EU institutions and bodies. Research
looking at  participation  of  lobbying groups in  decision-making,  implementation and
evaluation of EU policies is equally scarce (Bunea & Baumgartner 2014).
The  research  debate  in  the  EU (and the  US)  focuses  on  exploring  the  relationship
between influence and various factors that determine it, or, in other words, the focus of
the research is on the lobbying context. Following the appeal of Baumgartner and Leech
(1998: 134), instead of only focusing on the question of “whether interest groups are
ever influential” or not, researchers also try to find out “when, why, and to what extent
they are powerful on what types of issues”.
The lobbying context is a wide term to describe different kinds of factors that affect the
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choice of lobbying strategies and influence. Three types of context that attract major
attention of researchers studying what determines lobbying success or failure are group
characteristics, policy issue characteristics and institutional environment in which the
groups lobby (Hojnacki et al. 2012; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b). In addition to the three
main types of influence determinants,  Dür includes the fourth cluster –  interest group
strategies – which is the most unexplored in the study of interest groups’ influence (Dür
2008b: 1213). Empirical studies on interest group influence determinants have produced
some insightful and valuable but also often contradictory results, partly due to the fact
that they examine influence across different policy areas and focus on different sets of
variables operationalising them differently (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Dür 2008a). 
One of the most frequently posed research questions concerns the impact of resources in
interest  groups lobbying and influence in the EU. Following the US interest  groups
literature, students of the EU repeatedly ask the question of who wins and who loses in
EU politics. Control over resources which Dahl defined as “anything that can be used to
sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual” (Dahl 1961: 225) has
been one of the most common conceptualisations of power, which can be indirectly
represented  by  resources  (Simon  1953;  Hart  1976).  Consequently, more  resourceful
groups are seen more influential. 
Taking into account the technocratic character of EU decision-making, information is
seen  as the most important resource which interest groups exchange for access and
influence, whereas lobbying in the EU is often conceptualised as information exchange
drawing on resource  dependence theories  (Bouwen 2002;  Bouwen 2004a;  Chalmers
2011;  Klüver  2013b).  According  to  Bouwen’s  theory  of  access  which  has  become
extremely widespread in EU lobbying studies, private actors require access to the EU
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institutions, while the EU institutions demand certain ‘access goods’ in return (Bouwen
2002). Most common ‘access goods’ are different types of information which a group
can provide. Each EU institution favours a certain type of ‘access good’ that certain
types  of  interest  groups  are  more  likely  to  provide,  therefore,  different  institutions
provide access to different interest groups depending on their specific resource needs
(Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004). However, other types of resources such as financial and
membership resources, group size, reputation also matter.
The  central  discussion  in  the  literature  has  been  whether  the  EU system is  biased
towards resource-rich business interests to the detriment of citizens interests. Larger-N
studies reveal that business groups are “overall, less successful than citizen groups” in
the legislative decision-making process in the EU or at least no single type of interest
dominates policy outcomes in the EU (Dür et al. 2015). Different types of interests –
citizens  groups,  foundations,  trade  and business  associations  – are  likely to  achieve
influence in the EU (Mahoney 2008; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2013a). 
However, the EU interest mediation system still seems to be based toward resource-rich
groups.  A larger-N  research  reveals  that  business  groups,  especially  resource-rich
associations, active in policy areas with high competence of the EU are more involved
in  EU-level  lobbying  (‘Europeanised’)  than  other  types  of  groups  (Dür  &  Mateo
2014b). This conforms with previous findings showing that there is the business group
bias in representation in Commission’s consultations (Klüver 2013a), that well-endowed
corporate actors, large firms are more likely to become multi-level players than national
business  associations  (Cowles  2001;  Eising  2004), that  well-resourced  and
professionalised NGOs are more likely to directly lobby in Brussels than smaller groups
(Fairbass & Jordan 2002; Joachim & Locher 2009a), and that social movements are
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much less Europeanised that organised interests (Imig & Tarrow 2001).
Issue characteristics have also received significant attention in the literature on interest
groups in the EU (as well as in the US). Scholars argue that issue characteristics, such as
policy type, degree of technicality, degree of conflict, salience of the issue affect interest
group influence and choice of strategies (Dür 2008a; Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Beyers
2008; Mahoney 2008). Studying lobbying across a larger number of policy issues in the
EU and the US, Mahoney argues that the larger an issue is in scope and salience and the
higher the level of conflict, the less likely lobbyists are to achieve their aims (Mahoney
2007; Mahoney 2008). Klüver contests this finding arguing that the effect of salience is
not  constant  and  that  there  is  a  relation  between  salience  and  the  size  of  lobbying
coalition:  if  interest  groups  belong  to  the  relatively  larger  coalition,  salience  has  a
positive effect on lobbying success, whereas if interest groups belong to the relatively
smaller coalition, then salience has a negative effect  (Klüver 2011). A recent research
shows that groups representing diffuse interests are more likely than business interests
to share views with Commission officials of what is at stake in EU legislation when
many interest groups  are involved in lobbying and when the degree of media publicity
is low (Boräng & Naurin 2015). The conflict expansion filters out narrow self-regarding
frames  benefiting  civil  society  groups,  whereas  media  dominated  by  resourceful
business actors has the opposite effect (ibidem). 
The studies examining how institutional environment conditions lobbying and interest
group influence in the EU are less common.  This may be explained by the lack of
variation  across  institutional  set-ups  given the  scholarly  attention  to  the  legislation-
making under the Community method.  At the same time, it is argued that institutions
may  empower  certain  types  of  groups   directly  (e.g.  by  providing  funding  or  a
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privileged access) or indirectly (by having demand in a certain type of resources that
groups  possess  –  money  for  re-election,  information  or  expertise  necessary  in
policymaking process) (Dür & De Bièvre 2007b; Dür 2008a). 
Borrowed from the literature on social movements and political protests, the concept of
‘political  opportunity  structure’  is  frequently  used  in  the  interest  group  literature.
Broadly defined, political opportunity structure is “the set of characteristics of a given
institution  that  determines  the relative  ability  of  (outside)  groups influence decision
making  within  that  institution”  (Princen  &  Kerremans  2008:  1130).  Thus,  political
opportunity structure includes formal elements, such as voting or participation rules,
and  informal  elements,  such  as  norms,  common  practices  and  institutional  culture
(Joachim & Locher 2009b:9). In a narrower sense, political opportunity structure refers
to  access  for  political  actors  and the  receptivity  of  the  political  system  (Princen &
Kerremans 2008: 1131). “Opportunity structures” are mainly studied from a perspective
that views them as a fixed external constraint on interest groups behaviour. The other
perspective considers “opportunity structures” as the defined and formed as part of the
political process in which political actors identify and construct opportunity structures
(for overview see Princen & Kerremans 2008).
Research that highlights the role of institutional determinants of lobbying and influence
is conducted through comparative studies of the EU with other political systems such as
the  United  States  (Mahoney 2008;  Woll  2012) and the  United  Nations  (Joachim &
Locher  2009c).  Comparing  lobbying  in  the  EU and  the  US,  Mahoney  (2008:  193)
concludes  that  “institutional  design  emerges  as  a  factor  in  understanding  lobbying
success”. First,  she reveals  that  the EU system, though less  electorally  accountable,
appears to be more responsive to interest groups’ views: a larger share of groups achieve
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some level of influence than in the US. Second, given that in the EU a policy change is
more likely once the Commission makes a proposal for legislation than in the US, more
lobbyists are more likely to achieve some degree of success in the EU than in the US,
where the system producers clear winners and losers. This may explain, as Mahoney
argues, the fact that the EU system is less biased to any type of interests than the US
system is in which business interests are clearly more likely to win than to lose. Finally,
given that there is no pan-European media system, advocates in the EU deploy outside
lobbying tactics to a lesser degree than advocates in the US do (Mahoney 2008). 
Lastly, the influence of interest groups depends on strategies they employ to use their
resources, existing political opportunity structures and issue characteristics effectively
(Dür 2008b: 1218). Yet, little research exists on the relationship between interest groups
strategies and influence. 
What is evident from the literature is that the choice of strategies also seems to depend
upon the political institutions which groups target. Beyers demonstrates that in the EU
actors with access to the European Parliament combine it with voice strategies more
often  that  actors  seeking  access  to  the  Commission,  whereas,  while  lobbying  the
Commission, groups with access to the political cabinets of the Commissioners tend to
use voice more often than those with access to the Commission General Directorates,
purely technocratic units (Beyers 2004: 234-235). However, in addition to institutional
factors, group characteristics and issue characteristics also affect how interest groups
lobby  (Mahoney  2008). For  instance,  civil  society  groups  are  more  inclined  to  use
outside lobbying than business groups (Kollman 1998: 41; Mahoney 2008: 163). 
Chalmers argues that “the medium is more important that the message” showing that
lobbying tactics are even more important that the content of information provided by the
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groups in  exchange for  access to EU policymakers  (Chalmers  2013).  Moreover, his
study shows that despite the fact that inside tactics are more spread in the EU, as they
are seen by lobbyists as “less costly” and “more expedient”, outside tactics are “not
inherently less effective” and applied by groups “disadvantaged at the policy process”
as the previous studies argued (see Beyers 2004: 216). As Chalmers (2013: 54) explains,
“standing  out  from  the  crowd”  by  adopting  tactics  which  are  “not  thoroughly
institutionalized” such as media campaigns and public events creates “very important
paths of access to the EU”. 
There are  few more recent  studies focusing on framing as  an important  element  of
lobbying strategies  (see Klüver, Mahoney, et  al.  2015;  Eising et  al.  2015).  Framing
involves selecting and emphasizing some aspects of an issue while deliberately ignoring
others in order to shape policy debates in favour of a group’s interest. While frames tend
to be dependent upon a group type (public interest groups tend to rely on public frames
such as environment, human rights and consumer protection, while sectional groups are
more  likely  to  use  economic  frames),  institutional  context  such  as  which  European
Commission DG a group lobbies also seems to play a  role in  the choice of frames
(Klüver, Mahoney, et al. 2015). 
Finally, the literature points out that choice of lobbying strategy and tactics may relate
not only to intended  influence on policy outcome, but also be based on other needs of
interest groups, such as  their organisational survival (see Lowery & Gray 2004: 170).
Use of particular lobbying tactics can influence the life chances of lobby organisations,
thereby influencing the structure and size of interest communities (Lowery 2007:42). As
Lowery notes, lobbying on one issue that is less than central to an organisation may be
vital to secure support from political elites or coalition allies on issues the organisation
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cares  about,  or  alternatively  an  organization  with  a  poor  reputation  may  choose  in
favour of outside lobbying to create a more favourable public opinion environment.
Berkhout (2013) argues for studying exchange relationships of interest groups not only
with public officials, but also with interest group supporters and media in order to add
the ‘logic of support’ and the ‘logic of reputation’ to the ‘logic of influence’ to our
explanations of interest group behaviour.
To conclude, there is a growing body of literature focusing on lobbying and influence in
the EU. Researchers are keen to learn not only whether interest groups are influential in
the  EU,  but  also  what  types  of  groups  systematically  win  or  lose  in  the  EU
policymaking and under what contextual conditions. The literature has developed a mix
of variables that may account for the choice of lobbying strategies and lobbying success
and some of them have been examined empirically, including in the larger-N studies.
Whereas the research has focused on group-level and issue-level characteristics, studies
on the institutional determinants of influence have been less frequent. This is partly due
to the fact that the literature looks at legislative policymaking and, in particular, agenda
setting and policy formulation stage led by the Commission. However, there are EU
policy  domains  which  lie  outside  legislation  making  and  in  which  participation  of
supranational institutions is limited and intergovernmental politics prevails. Given that
the foreign policy of the EU is one such policy area, institutional characteristics may be
the most distinctive conditions which impact upon lobbying patterns and influence in
comparison with other policy areas.
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2.  Institutional  determinants  of  participation  of  non-state  actors  in
international organisations 
Before turning to the overview of the few studies that examine lobbying in EU foreign
policy,  I  will  briefly  overview  the  insights  from  the  studies  of  participation  and
influence  of  non-state  actors  (NSA) in international  intergovernmental  organisations
which have a particular focus on the role of institutions. 
This literature examines participation of the NSA in global governance. In particular, it
focuses on the issue of broadly defined access which international intergovernmental
organisations  provide  for  the  NSA,  examining  formal  rules  and  informal  practices
(Steffek et al. 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c; Jönsson & Tallberg 2010; Irrera 2013;
Tallberg et al. 2014). The research focus is more on the demand side of lobbying: it
explores how opportunity structures of international  organisations benefit  or restrain
participation of NSA in their policies.
This literature has addressed the issue from different theoretical perspectives  (for an
overview see Tallberg 2010). Some scholars argue on sociological institutionalist and
constructivist grounds that access is increasingly provided to the NSA due to the spread
of  participatory  governance  norms  (Saurugger  2010).  Drawing  on  rationalist
assumptions,  other  scholars  maintain  that  functional  logic  and  resource  exchange
models better explain why access is provided to the NSA (Mayer 2008; Steffek 2010;
Tallberg et al. 2014).
What is important for this study is that having a variety of institutional arrangements,
the literature has examined what factors accounts for differences in NSA access  across
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and within international organisations  (Steffek et al. 2008;Tallberg et al. 2014). In the
study of the institutional mechanisms through which non-state actors may take part in
the  policy  process  across  298  organisational  bodies  from  fifty  international
organisations between 1950 and 2010,  Tallberg and his collaborators argue that three
causal factors – demand for resources and services of transnational non-state actors,
domestic democratic standards in the member states of international organisations and
state concerns with national  sovereignty explain the variation of access  within and
across international organisations  (Tallberg et al. 2014). The functional advantages of
NSA participation account for the expansion of access over time and for variation across
and  within  international  organisations  with  democratic  membership  being  another
source of additional openness toward NSA. Sovereignty  costs of associated with NSA
involvement have been a principal  constraint  on access and contributed to variation
across  issue  areas  and  policy  functions  (ibidem).  They  find  only  limited  empirical
support for the constructivist argument about the spread of participatory norms of global
governance,  according  to  which  policy-makers  have  been  either  socialised  into
believing in the appropriateness of NSA participation or have strategically adapted the
institutional arrangements to boost organisational legitimacy. 
Moreover, there are also variations of levels of access across policy fields (Steffek et al.
2008;  Steffek  2010;  Tallberg  et  al.  2014).  Human  rights,  development  and
environmental  policies  are  more  open  to  NSA,  whereas  security  is  more  closed
(Tallberg et  al.  2014).  The research points out that issue areas and policy functions
which are associated with high sovereignty costs are likely to be closed to the NSA
participation. Furthermore, it is argued that there is also a significant variation across
stages of the policymaking process: implementation, evaluation and policy formulation
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stages  are  more  open  to  NSA,  whereas  the  decision-making  stage  is  more  closed
(ibidem). 
Even within the security realm, variation in terms of access and transparency exists
between different international organisations. A comparative study shows that NATO is
closed to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whereas the OSCE has been open
and supportive of civil society since its foundation  (Mayer 2008). As Mayer argues,
rationalist and functional logics helps to explain the difference. If one adopts the lens of
resource exchange, one can see that differences in the tasks and capabilities of the two
international organisations translate into “an unequal demand for resources” provided
by the NSA such as knowledge, legitimacy and personnel (ibidem: 119). Mayer argues
that the OSCE’s focus on the civilian side of conflict  prevention,  peacekeeping and
post-conflict peacebuilding, extension of security provision towards human rights and
democratisation and more limited resources account for more favourable conditions for
NSA participation compared to those granted by NATO. 
This  literature  also  examines  the  relationship  between  opportunity  structures  of
international  organisations  and  NSA  strategies.  Comparing  formal  and  informal
elements of access provided to NGOs at the UN and the EU, researchers conclude that
despite  institutional  differences  between  these  organisations  and  variation  of  access
across organisational  bodies, issues at stake and the policy cycle, the EU and the UN
are also “worlds together” in how they shape NGO strategies understood as mobilising
resources and frames (Joachim & Locher 2009c). Both organisations favour certain type
of NGOs – more professionalised and resourceful actors  – which rely on “institutional
as  opposed  to  voice  and  protest  strategies  preferring  conventional  lobbying  over
contentious action” (Joachim & Locher 2009a: 176).  At both organisations, NGOs also
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frame issues in an easy-to-comprehend manner which appeals to diverse constituencies.
The more NGOs are unsure about access, the more they rely on more consensual issue
framing  (ibidem).  Furthermore,  Joachim  and  Locher  argue  that  international
organisations not only impact the choice of strategies employed by NGOs, but they
shape their constitution – “their organizational features by encouraging the formation of
networks and platforms” and “professionalization and bureaucratization of NGOs by
asking  for  and  privileging  scientific  expertise  and  information  over  other  forms  of
knowledge on specific issues” (ibidem: 178). 
In sum, the literature on non-state actors’  participation in global governance suggests
that different institutional arrangements translate into different participation patterns of
NSA, and that  rationalist  accounts,  and in  particular  resource exchange models,  are
potent  tools  to  explain  the  variation.  The literature,  however, has  not  examined the
question  of  influence  conceptualised  as  a  control  over  policy  outcome.  Whereas
Tallberg and his collaborators (2014) argue that access may serve as an institutional pre-
condition for NSA influence, they do not assume a linear relationship between access
and influence and leave the issue of influence for future research. 
3. The case of EU foreign policymaking
Whereas  the  participation  and  influence  of  non-state  actors  in  world  politics  and
international  governance  has  been  increasingly  recognized  and  researched  (Keck  &
Sikkink 1998; della Porta et al.  1999; Josselin & Wallace 2001; Jönsson & Tallberg
2010; Vasconcelos 2011; Scholte 2011), focus on interest groups is less prevalent in the
literature on EU foreign policy. Early studies naturally focused on such actors as the
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Member  States  and  the  Commission  (Hill  1996).  With  a  flourishing  debate  on
democratic  legitimacy  in  the  EU,  scholars  have  started  to  look  at  the  role  of
representative bodies such as the European Parliament and national parliaments in EU
foreign policy (Barbé & Herranz 2005; Barbé & Herranz 2007; Diedrichs 2004; Zanon
2010; Caballero-Bourdot 2011; Peters et al. 2010; Huff 2015). More recent inquiries
have been made into the roles of EU bureaucratic and diplomatic actors (Dijkstra 2008;
Dijkstra  2009;  Duke  2012;  Grevi  2007;  Vanhoonacker  et  al.  2010;  Carta  2012;
Vanhoonacker & Pomorska 2013) and public opinion  (Dumoulin & Manigart 2010).
Few have recognised a role of interest groups as constituencies of EU foreign policy
(Hill  2003) and the existence of a variety of non-state  actors in  agenda setting and
participation  in  policy  implementation  of  EU  foreign  policy  (Keukeleire  2003;
Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008). Meanwhile, reviews of the state of art in EU foreign
policy studies have pointed to the need to pay attention to the roles of interest groups
with regards to research into the formation of EU foreign policy (Smith 2010) and the
democratic legitimacy of EU foreign policy (Smith 2008). Moreover, the departure from
intergovernmentalism  and  application  of  governance  approaches  in  theorising  the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) implies that EU foreign policy should not be devoid of non-state actor
involvement. 
Norheim-Martinsen argues that  such phenomena as “the impact of ‘Brusselization’ on
CSDP, the role of individual entrepreneurship in the ‘Solana era’, the socializing effects
of institutions and the presence of a European security identity or culture […] all fit
intriguingly  well  with  the  five  features  of  security  governance  (Norheim-Martinsen
2010: 1352). Identified earlier by a team of scholars (Webber et al. 2004), these features
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are: (1) heterarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of power; (2) the interaction of
multiple actors, both public and private; (3) formal and informal institutionalization; (4)
relations between actors that are ideational in character; and  (5) a collective purpose.
Mérand and his collaborators (2011) go further in applying the governance approach in
conjunction with social network analysis as a method to analyse the CSDP. They find
that CSDP governance is more heterarchical and two-level than intergovernmentalists
acknowledge,  yet  state  power is  not  diluted but  reconstituted at  the European level
(Mérand et al. 2011: 140).
Michael Smith argues that MLG is applicable to the realm of the CFSP, even though
supranational institutions have been marginalized in this policy area. In his view, this
approach  can  explain  “how  common  general  interests are  defined,  prioritized,  and
translated into  concrete policy actions   through institutionalized behaviours at the EU
and domestic levels” (M. Smith 2004b: 743, italics in original). According to Smith, the
applicability  of  the  MLG approach  varies  depending  on an  issue  within  the  CFSP.
Factors that define the degree of MLG approach to the CFSP are inherent characteristics
of the policy problem/issue; stages of the policymaking sequence; novelty of the policy
decision; and domestic factors. Smith hypothesizes that “the multi-level governance of
the CFSP will be most optimal in situations where: the issue conforms to a European
Council mandate; the decision is reached by QMV (or no insistence on a consensus),
has a long time horizon, and does not involve violence; the policy involves explicit
delegation to EU organizations or a pre-existing framework; funding is provided by the
EU budget;  and  the  European  Parliament  provides  input  as  required  by  the  policy
decision. In addition, governance will be improved in cases of follow-on policies (or
where  there  is  enough time  for  deliberation  on  more  complex problems,  especially
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where a mandate and/or consensus are lacking) and where the issue is covered by an
existing CFSP group”  (M. Smith 2004b: 753). Conversely, he argues that multi-level
governance is most difficult where there is no European Council mandate for a given
issue, whether in geographical or functional terms; little consensus/use of veto in case of
QMV; a probability of violence and a short term horizon; national implementation and
funding; and a lack of mechanisms for democratic oversight (ibidem).
Indeed, few studies focusing on non-state actors in EU foreign policy show that non-
state actors mobilise to lobby on EU foreign policy, including on the CFSP issues. A
study  on  NGO  involvement  in  the  development  of  the  European  Code  of
Conduct/Common  Position  on  Arms  Export  shows  that  NGOs  engage  and  exert
influence at the EU level on EU foreign and security policy under the CFSP, whereas
the  Europeanization  of  arms  export  regulations  increased  the  voice  opportunities  of
NGOs  (Joachim  &  Dembinski  2011).  Joachim  and  Dembinski  find  that  NGOs
contributed to the adoption of a legally binding framework for arms export control at
the EU level in 2008 which substituted the legally non-binding Code of Conduct of
1998: “[a]lthough weapons sales have not yet declined significantly, NGOs have used
the Code to change the rules of the game through which they are approved” (Joachim &
Dembinski  2011:  1152).   These  findings  are  in  line  with  an earlier  assumption  put
forward by the literature that expanding scope of areas of EU governance stimulates the
mobilisation of more diverse sets of interests (Beyers et al. 2008: 1116).
This  case  study reveals  that  institutional  conditions  did play a  role  in  the lobbying
success, along with particular characteristics of interest groups’ movement (the degree
of their multi-level cooperation and professionalisation). In an earlier work, Dembinski
argues that the CFSP decision-making system is less favourable to NGOs than the first
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pillar, mainly due to the lack of an equivalent of the Commission’s supportive role in
the second pillar  (Dembinski 2009). Whereas the powers of the Commission and the
Parliament are weaker, the Commission is also less inclined to accept NGOs as partners
in CFSP. It does not consider NGOs as proper stakeholders, but as “the self-declared
advocates of the common good” (Dembinski 2009: 165). The consultation culture with
NGOs was less developed and institutionalized in DG External Relations than in other
DGs. Contrary to a shared belief,  the Council and its members interact with NGOs.
However,  it  does  not  substitute  the  support  of  the  Commission  in  the  first  pillar
(ibidem).
The institutional constraints did not prevent NGOs from engaging in EU action on the
issue of arms export control from the early 1990s. However, until the Code of Conduct,
a first political document regulating arms exports at the EU level, was adopted in 1998,
their impact was limited  (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1156). Tracing the process of
NGOs’ activities  on  the  issue  across  almost  two  decades,  Joachim and  Dembinski
argued that Europeanisation, access points and norms facilitated NGO involvement and
contributed to their success. 
First, the EU-level governance of arms export control established by the 1998 Code of
Conduct  reinforced  the  Europeanisation  of  NGOs  coalition  (Joachim  & Dembinski
2011: 1163). Whereas initially it had been dominated by British NGOs, groups from
other member states became involved over time. The UK-based organisations launched
a  Europe-wide  campaign  and managed to  attract  over  600 NGOs across  Europe  to
support a Code of Conduct on arms exports (ibidem: 1158). Although many of these
groups were rooted at the domestic level, they coordinated their efforts at the European
level and informed their national audiences about developments in the EU. As Joachim
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and Dembinski state, “[t]hese cross-level interdependencies added to the strength and
leverage of NGOs vis-a-vis governments”(ibidem). 
Second, access points have multiplied as the role of the Commission has turned from an
observer into an active participant of the CFSP, with NGOs allied with the EP using its
democratic oversight power. Formal and informal rules encouraging cooperation with
NGOs  have  appeared  at  the  Council’s  level.  The  changes  in  the  positions  of  key
governments – the UK (due to the victory of the Labour party in the elections) and
France (due to scandals connected to arms trade with repressive regimes and strategic
calculations to keep US influence at bay on the arms export policies of its allies)  – were
critical (ibidem: 1159). 
Third, NGOs benefited from the gradual expansion of norms established by the EU in
the defence policy area, allowing them to scrutinise further the  behaviour of member
states with regards to weapons sales. NGOs used normative arguments and called for a
greater degree of responsibility to be placed upon arms exporters while also providing
advice to policymakers on how to improve current European regulation.
The strategies adopted by NGOs did not differ significantly from those of the first pillar.
NGOs mainly relied on insider  strategies  providing information and expertise.  They
successfully engaged at both domestic and European levels at all stages of the policy
process. Besides supranational actors such as the EP and the Commission, NGOs also
lobbied the Council, its Secretariat and EU presidencies. As the case of Spanish NGOs
demonstrates, the organisations put pressure on a national representative in the COARM
(Council’s Working Party of Conventional Arms Exports) to become a spokesperson for
increased  transparency  rules  at  the  EU  level  and  used  the  1998  Code  of  Conduct
together with what they perceived as best practice in other EU states as a lobbying tool
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to  exact  from the national government far-reaching transparency and reporting rules
(Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1163).
Despite these insights into NGO participation in CFSP policymaking, the case study
lacks an analysis of the involvement of a second possible group of actors, namely arms
industry  representatives.  It  remains  unknown the  degree  of  influence  NGOs had  in
comparison to this second group. We do not know whether the counter-lobbying efforts
of the European defence industry, or lack thereof, affected NGOs’ success during the
two stages of the policy process (prior to and  post the adoption of the 1998 Code of
Conduct).  With just  a  single  case  study it  is  impossible  to  establish  to  what  extent
interest  group  influence  is  determined  by  institutional  factors  as  opposed  to,  for
instance, issue characteristics (e.g. novelty of issue). A comparative case study analysis
could shed more light on the relationship between political institutions and  influence.
A recent book-length study of lobbying in EU foreign policy focusing on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict stands apart from the interest group literature as it approaches the
issue of lobbying from a different theoretical perspective exploring how constructivist
insights help to understand lobbying in the EU (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming). 
While  interest  group  scholars  have  argued  for  a  more  pragmatic  approach  toward
measuring  influence  and  thus,  assuming  that  interest  groups  have  clear  and  stable
preferences which do not change in interaction with other actors and focusing on more
“visible” faces of power  (Dür 2008b; Dür 2008a) and viewing lobbying as exchange
relationship  based  on  resource  dependencies  between  groups  and  policymakers
(Bouwen 2002; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2013b), Voltolini takes a “thin” constructivist
line arguing that influence is not unidirectional and that identities and preferences of
both  non-state  actors  and  EU  institutions  are  shaped  in  the  process  of  interaction
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between them, putting emphasis on knowledge and its social construction rather than on
information. In this view, groups are not expected to adapt their lobbying tactics and
strategies  to  the  venues  they  lobby,  but  their  behaviour  is  seen  as  an  effect  of
socialisation with other actors. Thus, at the theoretical level, assuming in line with the
constructivist view that lobbying is embedded in social interactions between the non-
state actors and policymakers, Voltolini examines what roles non-state advocates play in
EU foreign policy, what frames they use and at what levels.
First of all, Voltolini refutes “the ‘null hypothesis’ of no or limited lobbying activities in
EU foreign policy” and EU foreign policy as a domain “predominantly in the hands of
EU member states (and EU institutions), which are more autonomous in taking their
decisions” (Voltolini  2013:  101).  She maps nearly 300 groups active in  EU foreign
policy towards  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  and three cases which present  heavily
lobbied arenas attracting different types of organised interests.
Second,  Voltolini’s  findings  show  that  the  majority  of  non-state  advocates  play  a
‘consensual and median’ rather than ‘adversarial’ role which allows them to “establish
cooperative interactions with EU officials and policymakers and develop a dialogue that
can  lead  to  the  achievement  of  a  shared  understanding  of  the  situation  at  stake”
(Voltolini 2013: 251). The advocates also rely on ‘technical/legal frames’ when lobbying
the EU, rather than on ‘political frames’ which are more recurrent in the EU member
state  lobbying along with  more  confrontational  forms  of  social  interaction  (ibidem:
253).  Additionally, analysing national level lobbying in the UK, France and Germany
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Voltolini finds a partial Europeanisation of lobbying
by groups from the member states, though the EU and national level lobbying are seen
as disentangled arenas in terms of roles and frames applied by the advocates which she
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explains by differences between political systems in the EU and the member states.
Whereas  Voltolini’s  constructivist  approach  sees  influence  as  a  circular  process  in
which both the EU institutions and non-state actors are “reciprocally affected by the
social interactions they develop” (ibidem: 40), her findings add some fuel to the debate
on who wins and loses in the sphere of EU lobbying. Voltolini shows that the most
influential actors are those deeply embedded in the EU political system, who understand
and adopt EU rules and norms and recognise EU legitimacy.  What seems to matter is
not the material resources which groups possess, but their readiness to learn and adapt
to the EU rules and not challenge them. Furthermore, it appears from her study that
interest  group  influence  lays  within  the  domain  of   providing  technical  and  legal
information to the EU rather than confronting EU strategic approaches towards foreign
policy issues.
However, Voltolini  does not examine the institutional determinants of lobbying. Her
study  says  little  about  lobbying  under  the  CFSP institutional  set-up.  Following  the
constructivist  assumptions,  Voltolini  argues  that  interest  groups  do  not  adapt  their
advocacy strategies to venues which they lobby, but that their behaviour is a result of
social interaction with policymakers  (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming). Thus, the
choice of her cases studies is not driven by the variation of institutional contexts of
lobbying. Instead, conceptualising the EU foreign policy after Hill (2003: 4) “as the sum
of what the EU and its members states do in international relations”, Voltolini focuses
on the most lobbied issues in EU policy towards the conflict. Two of these relate to EU
trade policy towards Israel in which the Community method is applied and the groups
studied in her research focus their lobbying on the Commission and the Parliament. The
third case studies lobbying on the EU stance on the UN Report following the war in
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Gaza of 2008-2009 which is an example of weakly institutionalised intergovernmental
cooperation in the EU. It lies outside EU foreign policy as it has been defined for the
purpose of the present study: there is no single EU seat at the UN and while member
states do coordinate their positions at the UN, they are not obliged to vote as a block.
Unsurprisingly, Voltolini does not say much about the lobbying of member states in the
Council and devotes more attention to groups lobbying in the European Parliament and
national governments via capitals.  Though the EP does not have any powers on the
issue, being open to different kinds of interests, it seems to serve as a locus for EU-level
public  debate.  Lobbying at  the  EP in  an intergovernmental  setting  is  an  interesting
insight to develop through this thesis and uncover interest groups’ logic when lobbying
less powerful venues which nevertheless give groups access and visibility. Given that
Voltolini  focuses  on  few  groups  in  each  case,  mostly  restricted  to  those  based  in
Brussels or the EU member states, there is no insight into how non-state actors interact
with EU institutions on the ground where EU policies are implemented. 
Still, the findings generated by Voltolini on the dominance of non-confrontational roles
and technical and legal frames in interest groups’ interactions with EU policymakers,
especially the Commission and the Parliament speak to the findings of this research, as
we will see further. They underline the dominance of inside lobbying and information
on technical and legal issues provided by the groups to the EU institutions. The choice
of  the current  thesis,  nonetheless,  is  to  apply rationalist  assumptions  and functional
explanations of logic of access and influence, on which the main bulk of literature on
interest groups and non-state actors participation in intergovernmental organisations has
been developed. To this end I would like to contribute to the mainstream literature on
interest groups in the EU and show that this theoretical approach can explain interest
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groups’ involvement in EU foreign policymaking too, despite the little interest paid to
the policy area in which intergovernmental politics prevails. The constructivist-driven
explanations  provided  by  Voltolini  affirm  that  groups  do  not  adapt  strategically  to
advocacy venues, but that their lobbying strategies are a result of socialisation. Without
questioning the validity of these findings on  theoretical grounds, I argue that strategic
adaptation  plays  a  significant  role  in  group lobbying strategies  and can  explain  the
variation of participation patterns. As we will see further, in the process of lobbying the
EU groups can adapt how they formulate their preferences and choose lobbying tactics,
but  they  do  it  strategically  exploiting  different  opportunity  structures,  rather  than
changing their preferences and identities, as Voltolini has argued. Whereas socialisation
and learning indeed play an important role in non-state actor lobbying and influence, I
emphasise  the  instrumental  and strategic  character  of  lobbying both  for  groups  and
policymakers.  In  sum,  by  applying  the  rationalist  lens,  a  more  complete  story  of
lobbying and influence in EU foreign policy can be narrated.
Conclusion
Interest groups have different roles to play in European integration depending on the
theoretical  lenses  applied.  Whereas  intergovernmentalists  limit  the  role  of  interest
groups  to  the  domestic  level,  neofunctionalists  see  interest  groups as  forming
transnational  coalitions  and  pushing  together  with  supranational  institutions  for
European integration to spill over new policy areas. The multi-level governance concept
views interest groups as participating in decision-making at both national and European
levels. However, the grand theories say little about interest group influence and how it is
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exercised  in  the  EU, unlike  the  interest  group literature  which  attempts  to  tackle  a
challenging  task  of  operationalising  and  measuring  influence  and  examining  its
determinants.   Students  of  influence  focus  mostly  on  Community  policymaking
(legislative policymaking on the former ‘first pillar’ issues), specific institutions (the
European Commission and the European Parliament) and earlier stages of policymaking
process. Few studies explore influence on intergovernmental policymaking, which still
dominates certain areas  of  European  integration  such  as  foreign  policy.  This  also
partially  explains  why  the  focus  of  the  literature  on  institutional  determinants  of
influence remains limited to the lobbying of particular EU institutions, adaptation of
lobbying strategies to the EU level of governance and comparison of the EU with other
political systems. This study will try to add further material to fill this gap. 
The underlying research question to be answered in this study is how and to what extent
interest  groups  influence  EU foreign  policy. In  carrying  out  this  project,  I  hope  to
contribute to the two sets of literature in EU studies. First, this study intends to enrich
the literature on interest groups in the EU. It will be a novelty in the research on interest
group politics  in  the EU by focusing on a  policy area in  which member states  still
preserve strong and sometimes nearly exclusive competences and veto power. There is
scarce research on how interest groups engage in intergovernmental decision-making in
the EU such as the CFSP/CSDP. 
This study will also add to the literature on interest group influence by attempting to
measure it and explore the role of institutional determinants. By conceptualising EU
foreign policy  as  multi-level  and multi-pillar  (Stephan Keukeleire  & MacNaughtan
2008: 29-32) that includes not only CFSP, but also former first and third pillar issues
(see also K. E. Smith 2003: 67), I will be able to examine the power of institutional
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factors on interest group influence and how interest groups strategies are trying to adapt
to different policy regimes in EU foreign policy. 
Second, the study will be a valuable contribution to EU foreign policy studies, in which
the role  of interest  groups remains  largely an unexplored area.  Most  studies on EU
foreign policy look at such actors as the Commission, member state governments, the
European  Parliament  and  national  parliaments  and  the  role  of  EU bureaucracy  and
diplomacy.  Studying  interest  groups’  participation  and  influence  is  helpful  in
understanding how EU foreign policy is made. It is also important for addressing the
issue of democratic legitimacy as the departure from intergovernmentism breaks the
link  with  national  procedures  for  accountability  and  authorization  (Sjursen  2011).
Though it is not a central task of my study, its findings will hopefully add a brick into
this debate.
My  point  of  departure  asserts  that  intergovernmentalist  theories  cannot  explain  the
increasing number of interest  groups active in foreign policy area at  the EU level.  I
argue that governance approaches to EU foreign policy better  describe the nature of
integration and policymaking in  this  area and interest  group mobilization at  the EU
level.  Multiplication  of  decision-making  centres  and  actors  (including  non-state)
involved,  Europeanisation  of  national  foreign  policies,  the  role  of  informal
arrangements, the role of norms and values and the constitution of identity of the EU as
an actor in the international arena – these all go beyond the intergovernmentalist logic.
However, while governance approaches,  such as the multi-level governance concept,
predict that interest groups mobilize at the EU level, they have nothing to say about how
mobilisation translates into influence.
In turn,  the interest  group literature has developed a number of hypotheses on how
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interest group influence is conditioned by a set of factors, including institutions which
groups  interact  with.  Bridging  the  assumptions  about  the  degree  of  (multi-level)
governance in  EU foreign policy and the hypothesised relationship between interest
group influence and political institutions, I will develop a set of hypotheses on interest
groups influence in different areas across the multi-pillar and multi-level structure of
widely defined EU foreign policy. In particular, by looking at three cases that represent
different  institutional  set  ups  and  decision-making  modes  (corresponding  to  the
Community competences, the CFSP and the CSDP), I will examine how opportunity
structures  of  a  given  policy  case,  in  which  interest  groups  involve,  determine  their
success and how interest groups develop their strategies in order to minimise threats and
maximise opportunities. Thus, this study does not only look into policy area of the EU
which  has  received  little  scholar  attention,  but  also  adds  to  the  debate  on  the
institutional context of lobbying and influence in the EU.
Theoretically my research draws on the growing body of interest group literature in the
EU adopting its theoretical assumptions and developing and testing hypotheses relevant
to the major scholarly debates. Thus, I accept the theoretical grounds upon which this
literature has been built and which are presented in a greater detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and research design
Introduction
Interest group scholarship in the EU has mostly focused on groups’ involvement in the
Community  policy  areas.  In  these  areas,  supranational  institutions  such  as  the
Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  appear  the  most  lobbied  targets  in  EU
policymaking machinery due to their agenda-setting and decision-making powers and
relative  openness  to  interest  groups  (Coen  &  Richardson  2009;  Greenwood  2007;
Joachim  &  Locher  2009a).  Furthermore,  one  can  find  patterns  of  pro-integration
alliances  between  transnational  interest  groups  and  supranational  institutions, as
theorised by neofunctionalists (Haas 1968).
We know very little  about the extent to which these patterns of interaction and group
influence are present in other policy domains in which European integration has been
less  developed  and  the  EU  system of  multi-level  governance  has  arguably  not  yet
emerged  (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999). EU foreign policy is one of such domains in
which the dominance of the nation state and state actors has been largely resistant to the
logic  of  neofunctionlist  spillover.  In  this  policy  area  in  which  intergovernmental
arrangements have been left largely intact, one may expect that interest groups would
rather act according to the ‘two-level games’ logic, lobbying their national governments
and leaving them to represent their positions at the intergovernmental level. However,
existing studies as well as the reality in Brussels show that interest groups do actively
lobby EU foreign policy. This is in line with a shift in theorising EU foreign policy from
intergovernmentalism towards  the  application  of  governance  frameworks  (M.  Smith
2004b;  Norheim-Martinsen  2010;  Mérand  et  al.  2011;  Cross  2011;  Howorth  2012;
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Kaunert & Leonard 2012) which expect interactions between public and private actors.
 In addition to answering the underlying research question of this study “How and to
what extent do interest groups influence EU foreign policy?” I also aim to contribute to
scholarly  debate  on  the  determinants  of  influence  by  asking  the  question:  “Do the
institutional  designs  of  the  EU determine  advocacy  strategies  and  influence?”.  The
multi-level governance which has emerged in many areas of European integration is
seen  as  conducive  to  interest  groups’ involvement  in  policymaking,  but  what  about
policy  areas  in  which  European  integration  has  not  yet  advanced  so  far?  Is
intergovernmentalism an  insurmountable  obstacle  to  interest  group  engagement?  Or
have groups found ways to (successfully) represent their interests at the EU level even
in the areas ruled by the intergovernmental method of policymaking? Is our knowledge
about lobbying and interest groups influence in the EU, which stems from the studies of
communitarised policy areas, valid for EU foreign policy too?
Armed with these questions, this chapter outlines the main theoretical framework of this
study which draws on the literature on interest groups in the EU and, more specifically,
on the studies of  influence. This study will aim to explore the relationship between
institutional factors on the one hand, and interest group strategies and influence on the
other. As was shown in Chapter 1, lobbying strategies and influence are seen to depend
on the political institutions with which interest groups interact  (Dür 2008a; Dür & De
Bièvre  2007b;  Mahoney  2008).  However,  studies  trying  to  examine  the  role  of
institutional determinants in the EU are scarce and chiefly focus on the impact of the
institutional context  on groups influence on the Commission in the process of drafting
legislative proposals  (Bernhagen et al. 2015). Focusing on Community policymaking,
interest groups scholars suffer from a single-case problem as the EU’s political system
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is treated as a ‘sui generis’. By including intergovernmental policymaking in the study
of lobbying and interest group influence, we add a variation on the institutional design
which allows us comparing the EU with itself. Therefore, such a study is of added value
to the bulk of interest groups literature, which has thus far focused on determinants of
group influence.
EU foreign policy represents a useful case for studying the role of institutional factors as
it  provides  a  variety  of  institutional  set-ups  depending on a  policy  issue.  I  use  the
concept of EU foreign policy as multi-pillar and multi-level, which is not confined to
the EU activities under the CFSP but encompasses the foreign policy developed across
all former three pillars  (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 29-32; K. E. Smith 2003:
67). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) situate EU foreign policymaking between two
regimes  the  ‘Community  method’  and  the  ‘intergovernmental  method’.  The
‘Community  method’  is  a  policy  mode  which  dominates  the  vast  majority  of  EU
policies on which interest groups lobby, including trade and development cooperation.
The ‘intergovernmental method’ is  best  represented by the CSFP/CSDP. In practice,
there is  a  whole range of  methods on the continuum between the two extremes,  as
foreign policy dossiers often involve both policy regimes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan
2008: 67).
I  use  the  type  of  policy  regime  as  a  key  explanatory  variable  for  interest  group
influence.  The  prime  utility  of  Keukeleire’s and  MacNaughtan’s typology  is  that  it
incorporates institutional characteristics such as access points, institutional receptivity to
interest group involvement and decision-making procedures which have been identified
by  the  literature  to  be  factors  determining  interest  group  influence  (Princen  2007;
Princen  &  Kerremans  2008;  Joachim  &  Locher  2009c;  Dür  &  De  Bièvre  2007b;
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Mahoney 2008). It is hypothesised that the position of a policy issue on which interest
groups lobby on the continuum between two policy regimes determines the degree of
influence which they are likely to achieve. It is thus expected that the closer an issue lies
to the intergovernmental extreme, the lower the degree of influence they are likely to
achieve and that this policy regime will largely favour the groups defending the status
quo rather than promoting policy change. 
However, it  may be the case that  interest  groups engage in  multi-level lobbying on
intergovernmental issues too and that their influence does not depend on the type of
policy regime. First, groups make use of multiple venues that the EU system offers,
including those which are more receptive to them. Second, rather than fixed institutional
characteristics  such  as  the  type  of  policy  method,  more  dynamic  characteristics  of
political opportunity structures determine lobbying success or failure. The literature on
social  movements  argues  that  the  presence  or  absence  of  elite  allies  facilitates  or
constrains collective action  (McAdam 1998). The literature on NSA participation  in
intergovernmental organisations indicates that demand for the resources and services of
non-state actors opens up their institutions to outside groups. Thus, alliances with key
policymakers may serve as an alternative explanation for interest group influence. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce key concepts used in this study
such  as  interest  groups,  lobbying/advocacy,  advocacy  strategies  and  interest  group
influence.  Second, I present the key findings regarding interactions between the EU
institutions and interest groups which stem from studies on lobbying in the Community
policy areas. I furthermore discuss how the institutional mosaic of EU foreign policy
differs  from that  of  Community  policymaking and what  specific  EU foreign  policy
institutions are. Finally, I present the research design of this study. I set out the main
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hypotheses which are tested in this study, key variables and their operationalisation, the
choice of cases for a comparative analysis,  methodology and data collection methods
employed in this study.
1. Key concepts
1.1. Interest groups
One of the first problems encountered by students of interest groups is that of definition.
As  Jordan,  Halpin  and  Maloney  point  out,  the  study  of  interest  groups  requires  a
disambiguation of the concept  (Jordan et al. 2004). The interest group literature uses
various  labels  (e.g.  interest  organisations,  special  interest  organisations,  non-
governmental organisations, civil  society organisations etc.)  to mark different bodies
representing  societal  interests.  As  a  result,  it  is  very  difficult  to  draw  general
conclusions concerning the organisational structures, the functions, or the influence of
interest groups (Beyers et al. 2008). To avoid this definition confusion, Beyers, Eising
and  Maloney  introduce  three  key  features  to  define  an  actor  as  an  interest  group:
organisation, political interests and informality  (2008: 1106). Based on these criteria,
interest groups are aggregated individuals and/or organised forms of political behaviour
aiming  to  influence  policy  outcomes,  but  normally  not  seeking  public  office  or
competing in elections. This definition is used in this thesis, and along with this term, I
also use organised interests, advocacy groups, lobby groups, advocates as synonyms.
In popular perceptions, the word ‘advocacy’ appears to take precedence when one wants
to speak of citizens’ participation in policymaking, whereas the term ‘lobbying’ suggests
a narrower sense of influencing policymaking from inside (a lobby!) and is arguably not
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free of negative connotations associated with the lack of transparency and power of
moneyed groups in politics.  Such a differentiation seems to be borrowed from the US
practice in which lobbying is regulated by the state and, in its legal definition, consists
of a communication to legislators intended to influence specific legislation which means
either a proposed or pending law or bill  (Manzo 2001). In this context, advocacy is
indeed  used  to  refer  to  a  broader  phenomenon.  Instead  of  addressing  “specific
legislation”, advocates focus on a broad policy issue and target non-legislative bodies
too  (executive,  bureaucracy,  courts)  (ibidem).  The  California-based  Center  for
Nonprofit Management concludes that most advocacy would not legally-speaking be
considered lobbying. In legal terms, such a distinction is important as under the US
Internal Revenue Service regulation most non-profit organisations are prohibited from
lobbying, except to an “insubstantial degree”, otherwise, they endanger their tax exempt
status for contributions made to them. As one US consultant for the non-profit sector
summarised,  “[a]dvocacy  is  more  of  a  generic  term,  while  lobbying  has  a  legal
definition  and  legal  and/or  tax  consequences”  (Hessenius  2007:5).  As  a  result,
‘lobbying’ in the US barely refers to non-profit groups and rather refers to associations
and consultancies representing the profit sector. Despite the fact that European practices
of lobbying regulation differ from those of the US (Holman & Luneburg 2012), public
perceptions appear to associate lobbying with for-profit associations and consultancy
firms and to a lesser extent with the non-profit sector.5
In the academic literature, the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobbying’, as well as ‘lobbyists’
5 According to the survey of European policy elites carried out by Penn, Schoen & Berland (PSB) in
2009,  the word ‘lobbyist’ is first of all associated with trade associations (61%) and public affairs
agencies (57%), while NGOs, trade unions and companies are less frequently mentioned as lobbyists
(50%,  46%  and  43%  respectively). See  Burson  Marsteller,  “A Guide  to  Effective  Lobbying  in
Europe”,  2009.  Accessed  17  July  2015  at  http://www.oursocialmedia.com/wp-
content/uploads/effective-lobbying_light_07102009.pdf.
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and ‘advocates’, are frequently used as synonyms. For example, in her book Mahoney
(an American herself) uses advocacy and lobbying interchangeably: she speaks of the
advocacy process ending up with a lobbying success (or lack of it),  though she has
chosen the word ‘advocacy’ for the title of her book  (Mahoney 2008). I also use the
terms synonymously.
This study covers interest groups based in the EU and non-EU countries, as well as
international  non-state actors.  There is  as yet little  known about  how foreign actors
perceive and try to influence the EU (for an overview see  Rasmussen & Alexandrova
2012:  615).  A  large-N  study  about  foreign  interest  groups  participating  in  the
Commission’s consultations show that bias is in favour of actors from economically
well-connected markets with high levels of resources (ibidem: 629). Nevertheless, we
may  expect  that  a  broad  variety  of  foreign  interest  groups  try  to  engage  with  EU
decision-makers  on  foreign  policy  issues.  First,  EU  policies  on  a  certain  issue  or
towards a certain country affect the interests of foreign non-state actors too. Given the
role of the EU on the global stage, many international non-state actors have an interest
influencing EU foreign policy. Second, the EU policymakers are interested in expertise
non-EU actors can potentially provide regarding their countries and regions of origin.
Moreover, during recent years the EU has been involved in a structured dialogue with
foreign interest groups on a number of issues such as foreign commercial policy, human
rights, EU development and democracy aid policies. 
1.2. Lobbying and advocacy strategies
Most definitions of lobbying underline influence on public policy as an ultimate goal.
To this end one of the most quoted definitions in the literature views lobbying as “the
informal exchange of information with public authorities, as a minimal conception on
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the one hand, and as trying informally to influence public authorities, as a maximal
description  on  the  other  hand”  (Van  Schendelen  1994:  3).  In  his  later  work,  Van
Schendelen defines lobbying even more broadly as “all sorts of unorthodox actions of
interest groups intended to bring desired outcomes from government” (Van Schendelen
2007: 230, italic original).
Mahoney defines advocacy as a process that aims to influence public policy (Mahoney
2008):
The process is initiated with an advocate’s decision to mobilize for a political
debate, at which point the advocate determines his or her position on the issue.
Once  the  advocate  choose  to  engage  on  an  issue,  a  series  of  additional
decisions  need  to  be  made  about  the  advocacy  strategy,  including  what
arguments  to  use,  what  targets  to  approach,  what  direct  or  inside  lobbying
tactics to employ, what public education or outside lobbying tactics to engage
in,  and  which  allies  to  work  with.  The  process  concludes  when  the  policy
debates ends, and this determines the advocate’s lobbying success (many times
leading to a new advocacy process because issues carry on through time). 
Mahoney  underlines  the  many  decisions  interest  groups  have  to  make,  which
collectively  compose  an  advocacy  strategy  as  it  is  viewed  in  this  study. Advocacy
strategies are essentially approaches to seeking influence (Binderkrantz & Krøyer 2012:
124). The interest group literature distinguishes between inside and outside lobbying
(Kollman  1998;  Mahoney  2008),  or  access  and  voice  strategies,  in  other  typology
(Beyers 2004).
Inside lobbying, or access strategies, targets the venues where political bargaining takes
place,  for  example,  advisory  bodies,  technical  committees,  agencies  and,  to  certain
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extent, parliamentary committees (Beyers 2004: 213). Access strategies are better suited
to the transmission of operational and technical information (ibidem). Inside lobbying
tactics  include  participating  in  hearings,  consultations;  drafting  legislation  and
amendments;  sending  position  papers,  letters  and  faxes;  personal  meetings  with
policymakers  and  their  staff;  presenting  research  to  government;  serving  on  public
advisory  boards;  participating  in  litigation  over  policy;  organizing  cocktail  parties,
seminars and conferences,  and other  similar activities  (Kollman 1998:  35; Mahoney
2008: 127).
Voice strategies, or outside lobbying, such as media campaigns or protests, relate to
activities  taking  place  in  various  public  spheres,  where  the  communication  among
societal  interests,  policymakers  and  citizens  becomes  visible  to  a  broader  audience
(Beyers  2004:  213).  Outside  lobbying  organized  by  interest  groups  aims  at
“mobiliz[ing]  citizens  outside  the  policymaking  community  to  contact  or  pressure
public  officials  inside  the  policymaking  community”  (Kollman  1998:  3).  So  the
message an interest group wants to convey is not channelled to policymakers directly,
unlike  in  the  case  of  inside  lobbying.  Voice  strategies  are  less  effective  for  the
transmission of technical and detailed information and, if access is gained, it  is less
costly  to  communicate  information  directly  to  policymakers  (Beyers  2004:  2014).
Outside lobbying tactics range from public advertisement and talking with the press,
holding  press  conferences,  organizing  letter-writing  campaigns,  publicizing  voting
records  of  elected  officials,  to  grass  roots  meetings  to  demonstrations  and protests.
Some scholars also make a further distinction between media (information politics) and
protest strategies (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz & Krøyer 2012), indicating their different
uses within outside lobbying.
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Another distinction concerns the number of levels to be targeted by interest  groups.
Lobbying  strategies  may  focus  on  one,  two  or  more  levels  (domestic,  which  may
include  local,  regional  and  national;  EU  level  and  international  level  to  include
international organisations such as the UN or international negotiations). With regards
to EU foreign policy this distinction is important, as interest groups may play the logic
of  two-level  games  in  international  politics  (Putnam 1988),  lobbying  their  national
governments  and leaving  them to  represent  their  positions  at  the  intergovernmental
level. However, a growing number of students of EU foreign policy point out that even
security and defence policy that has long been a domaine réservé of the member states
moves beyond intergovernmentalism (Norheim-Martinsen 2010; Sjursen 2011) towards
(multi-level/supranational) governance (Mérand et al. 2011; Kaunert & Leonard 2012;
Howorth 2012). Thus, we expect interest groups to be increasingly involved in multi-
level advocacy at both member state and EU level. In the interest group literature such
advocacy is termed multi-level venue shopping (Beyers & Kerremans 2012). 
Birkland defines venue shopping as “the efforts groups undertake to gain a hearing for
their  ideas  and  grievances  against  existing  policy”  and  a  venue  as  “a  level  of
government  or  institution  in  which  the  group is  likely  to  gain  the  most  favourable
hearing” (Birkland 2007: 69). Venues can be seen horizontally as different institutions at
the same level  (legislature,  executive or  judiciary, or  different  institutions  or bodies
within the EU system) or vertically, as levels of governance (international, EU, national,
subnational, local). 
Multi-level  (vertical)  venue  shopping  depends  on  many  factors,  such  as  domestic
political context, group characteristics and collective beliefs and values, as the literature
points out. As far as institutional characteristics are concerned, groups, first of all, lobby
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more receptive venues  (Guiraudon 2000; Princen 2007) and those more proximate to
them (Beyers & Kerremans 2012).
Venue  shopping  is  mostly  applied  in  agenda-setting  studies  (Baumgartner  &  Jones
1993; Pralle 2003; Princen 2009; Stephenson 2012) and closely linked to the concept of
issue framing: “[d]ifferent  issues  may be assigned to  one venue rather  than another
because of  how they are  framed” and “different  venues  reinforce different  ways of
considering  the  issue”  (Baumgartner  2007:  484). Baumgartner  and  Jones  (1993)
theorise that policy change occur when actors shift debates and decision-making on a
policy issue to new venues which are more susceptible to alternative definition of issue
than ‘old’ venues (Princen 2009: 27). Venue shifting often requires issue redefinition, as
“changes in  image are used purposefully, in an effort  to  attract  the attention of the
members of a particular  venue” (Baumgartner  and Jones 1993: 36,  quoted in  Pralle
2003:  242). Issue  framing  is  about  highlighting  some  dimensions  of  an  issue  and
downplaying others (Princen 2009: 34). 
Venue shopping and issue framing are important components of advocacy strategies, at
least at the initial stages of policymaking, though issues are constantly redefined and
policies  are  reviewed  and  modified  which  means  these  elements  are  continuously
present in the advocacy process. In the context of EU foreign policy it  implies that
national  groups,  if  they  are  unsuccessful  in  advocating  their  cause  at  home  or  for
normative reasons, may seek venues at the EU level and frame their issues in a way to
demand European policy action.
1.3. Interest group influence
Studies on interest group influence in the EU most often conceptualise influence as an
actor’s ability to reach desired policy outcomes. For example, in a special issue of the
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Journal of Public Policy (2007, 27:1) dedicated to interest group influence, the authors
conceptualise  ‘influence’ as  control  over  policy  outcomes,  following  Jeffrey  Hart’s
suggestion, as opposed to influence as control over resources and control over actors
(Hart 1976). As a political outcome can come in the form of the official position taken
by public authorities or the actual  implementation of that  policy  (Dür & De Bièvre
2007b: 3), this approach assumes that actors have clear preferences over outcomes that
do not change in the course of interaction with other actors. Though this limits possible
research outcomes, the “influence as control over outcomes” approach is argued to be
“the  epistemologically  most  sound  and  empirically  most  pragmatic  route  towards
assessing interest  groups influence” (ibidem).  Such conceptualisation of  influence is
adopted for the purpose of this study. Below, I briefly discuss its benefits and limitations
as well as other ways of seeing influence and power in the policymaking process.
Hart (1976) argued that the conceptualisation of power as a control over events and
outcomes  is  superior  to  two  other  approaches  for  the  measurement  of  power  in
international politics, namely power as a control over resources and power as a control
over  actors.  According to  Hart,  power as  a  control  over  resources has a number of
limitations. It is not clear whether actors will be able to use their resources and what
types of resources are crucial to affect the outcomes of a conflict. Furthermore, some
types of resources are difficult to measure. Lastly, such a conceptualization of power
does not allow us to deal with interdependence, coalitions, and collective action (Hart
1976:  290).  Adopting  Hart’s  argument,  interest  group  influence  cannot  be
conceptualised as access or institutionalised participation in the decision making process
or structural power of business actors. Indeed, empirical studies on lobbying in the EU
show  that  access  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  achievement  of  interest  groups’
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objectives  (Dür & De Bièvre 2007a; Bugdahn 2008), whilst  business groups do not
always define policy outcomes, and the context specific conditions matter (Woll 2007;
Michalowitz 2007; Dür & Mateo 2014a; Dür et al. 2015; Rasmussen 2015). Dür argues
that access or structural power are pathways to influence rather than actual influence,
calling on researchers to make cautious claims about group influence or lack of thereof,
unless possible pathways to influence have been taken into account (Dür 2008: 1223). 
Power conceptualised as control over actors is based on Robert Dahl’s (1961) definition
of power as the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do
(behavioural approach). Hart argues that the main problem with this definition of power
is  that  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  information  to  measure  power  given  the  highly
psychological nature of power relations (Hart 1976: 293). Thus, control over outcomes
is seen as the preferable form of conceptualisation given the measurement issues.
Another  benefit  of  conceptualising  interest  group  influence  as  control  over  policy
outcomes  is  that  researchers  have  developed  and  tested  methods  of  measuring  it.
Process-tracing,  assessing  attributed  influence  and gauging the  degree  of  preference
attainment  have been most frequently applied in the literature (Dür 2008a; Dür 2008b).
I have been able to use the accumulated knowledge on the methodology of measuring
influence in this research (see Section 3.3).
When  measuring  interest  group  influence,  I  focus  primarily  on  the  ‘first’,  a  more
observable, face of power while being aware of other rather invisible manifestations of
it. Criticising Dahl’s approach to the observation of power by establishing who wins and
who loses on a certain issue, Bacharch and Baratz point to the ‘second face of power’,
namely a power to keep unwanted issues off the agenda (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). In
his  three-dimensional  view of  power,  Lukes  goes  further, speaking of  power  as  an
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actor’s capacity  to  prevent  other  actors  from recognising  their  real  interests  (Lukes
1974;  Lukes  2005).  However,  the  difficulty  Lukes  himself  recognised  is  that  of
empirically ascribing real interests to social actors, especially given that these interests
are not “unitary or dual, but multiple and conflicting” (Lukes 2005: 145). As a result the
study of the second and the third dimensions of power is seen as extremely difficult
(Dür 2008a), for the former takes into account non-decisionmaking and the latter also
focuses on latent (unobservable) conflict “which consists in a contradiction between the
interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (Lukes
2005: 28, italics in original). A potential solution suggested by  Dür  is to “consciously
focus  on specific  aspects of the concept,  therefore making it  amenable to  empirical
research”,  rather  than  to  “conced[e]  defeat”  in  the  face  of  the  difficulties  of
conceptualisation (Dür 2008: 1221).
Conceptualisation  of  influence  as  control  over  policy  outcomes  stands  closest  to
relational power in the  typology of power in policymaking developed by Arts & Van
Tatenhove (2004).  Relational power “concerns the capacity of agents to  ‘name’ and
‘frame’ societal problems as political and policy problems, and to mobilise resources to
formulate  and  realise  the  most  desirable  solutions.  In  doing  so,  policy  agents  may
decide  to  ‘do  things  otherwise’,  and  renew  policymaking,  either  by  overruling
‘conservative forces’ that defend the status quo (transitive power), or by collectively
changing rules of the game and/or policy discourses (intransitive power)” (ibidem: 351).
Thus, it does not account for dispositional power which reflects positions of agents in
organisations mediated by rules and resources and “these positions co-determine what
agents may achieve in terms of relational power” (ibidem: 350). It is also different from
structural  power  which  is  “the  way  macro-societal  structures  shape  the  nature  and
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conduct of agents, being both individuals and collectivities (organisations)” (ibidem).
Arts and Verschuren  also make an explicit distinction between “power as the general
ability  to  influence”  and  “influence  as  the  realisation  of  a  single  effect”  (Arts  &
Verschuren 1999: 413), while other use two concepts as synonyms (Dür 2008a). In this
thesis, I adopt the latter approach.
2. Institutional context of lobbying and influence in the EU
2.1. Lobbying EU institutions
Comparative  studies  of  lobbying  in  different  political  systems  demonstrate  that  the
particular characteristics of institutions with which groups interact affect both lobbying
strategies and influence  (Mahoney 2008; Joachim & Locher 2009c). However, these
studies say little about how lobbying and influence vary within the EU depending on the
institutional framework in which groups try to influence policymaking. The focus of
prevailing research on lobbying on issues that belong to the former first (Community)
pillar does not allow for this kind of analysis.
We know from the literature that the Commission and the European Parliament are the
most lobbied EU institutions due to their relative openness to interest groups, whereas
the  Council  remains  more  closed  to  outside  interests  (Coen  &  Richardson  2009;
Greenwood 2007; Joachim & Locher 2009a).
Unsurprisingly,  the  Commission  is  the  most  popular  research  focus  for  scholars
studying  lobbying in  the  EU  (see  Bunea  & Baumgartner  2014),  with  the  emerging
studies focusing on the European Parliament reflecting the gradual empowerment of this
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institution by the subsequent treaties. 
Given the Commission’s right of legislative initiative, this institution has always been a
target for interest  groups. Its  organisational ideology has pushed the Commission to
develop  an  EU level  interest  group system  (Mazey  & Richardson  2006:  279).  The
Commission’s symbiotic  relationship  with  interest  groups  is  driven  by  its  need  for
technical information and advice and the support of cross-national advocacy coalitions
for  the  introduction  of  the  Commission’s  proposals  (ibidem:  280).  As  Mazey  and
Richardson point out, by demonstrating openness to societal interests the Commission
enhances its own legitimacy. Given the Commission’s role as a legal guardian, early
involvement of interest groups is also instrumental for smooth implementation of the
Commission’s  proposals  once  they  become  legislative  acts  (Tanasescu  2009:  56).
Moreover, consultations with interest groups is a legal obligation for the Commission
stated in the Protocol No. 7 to the Amsterdam Treaty and, recently, the Lisbon Treaty.
The latter stresses that “the Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties
concerned in  order to  ensure that  the Union’s actions are  coherent  and transparent”
(quoted  in  Tanasescu 2009:  58).  The Commission has  gradually institutionalized  its
consultative  practices  outlining  the  main  principles  and  norms  in  a  number  of
documents (e.g. White Paper on European Governance of 2001, General principles and
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission of 2002).
The Commission and  European Parliament took steps to increase the transparency of
lobbying in the EU by establishing a joint  Transparency Register  in 2011, in which
voluntary registration of interest representatives is incentivised by a promise of greater
inclusion in consultation schemes and 12 months accreditation for a 1-day access pass
to the EP (Greenwood & Dreger 2013: 142). Moreover, organised groups can submit
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proposals for legislation to the European Commission in the sphere of its competences
via  the  European  Citizens  Initiative   –  “the  world’s first  transnational  participatory
mechanism” (Bouza Garcia & Greenwood 2014: 247) .
The Commission shapes EU-level interest  representation by funding the activities of
certain groups (favouring diffuse interests, organised at  the EU level and promoting
European identity, democracy and civic engagement, see Mahoney & Beckstrand 2011)
and by institutionalizing consultation practices  (see  Tanasescu 2009) and extensively
relying  on  committee  governance  (Bouwen  2009).  This  goes  in  line  with  the
neofunctionalist  prediction  that  supranational  institutions  and  transnational  interest
groups will ally to promote further integration.
With a gradual expansion of its budgetary and legislative powers since the early 1990s,
the European Parliament (EP) has become a popular target for lobbyists (Kohler-Koch
1997; Lehmann 2009). As directly elected representatives, members of the European
Parliament  (MEPs)  are  more  open  to  these  groups  that  “either  represent  a  broad
constituency such as trade unions, social movements, or political parties, or those that
can provide them with an aggregate view on the most efficient ways to deal with the
problems and economic consequences”  (Lehmann 2009: 58). Interest groups play an
important role in transmitting and translating “often complex and technical information
into accessible data for busy elected representatives” (Earnshaw & Judge 2002: 63).
The EP appears as  both a national  and European route of interest  representation as
MEPs have contacts with national interest groups from their countries and European
level groups (Wessels 1999; Bouwen 2004b). The EP is the only institution attentive to
outside strategies that are more often deployed by civil society organisations  (Eising
2007a).  
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The alignment of parties and interest  groups in the EP reflects  a left-right cleavage
familiar  at  the  national  level.  Business  tends  to  side  with  Christian  democrats,
conservatives and liberals, whereas NGOs are strongly aligned with Social democrats,
the left parties and the Greens (Beyers et al. 2015). Still, groups lobby non-natural allies
if they hold influential positions: if they are members of the largest political groups,
members of policy relevant committees and active legislators (Marshall 2015). Interest
groups also lobby EP Secretariat officials as another pathway to influence rapporteurs
(Marshall 2012) and influential committee members during the open amendments phase
(Marshall 2010).
The lobbying of MEPs may not be a goal in itself but a way to reach other institutions,
the Commission and the Council  (Kohler-Koch 1997). This can be especially the case
for EU foreign policy in which interest organisations and the EP form a “coalition of the
weak”, as Kohler-Koch puts it.
The Council  of the EU and European Council  are  considered the “least  accessible”
institutions,  though  “not  inaccessible”  (Hayes-Renshaw  2009) and  less  lobbied
(Greenwood  2007).  First,  the  Council’s  role  is  crucial  at  the  later  stages  of  the
legislation-making process when there is less possibility to shape the EU acquis  (see
Klüver  2013).  Second,  the  Council  primarily  deals  with  ‘high-politics’  issues  that
involve inter-state bargaining, thus making it extremely difficult to influence decision-
making processes. It is also clear that interest representation in the Council’s machinery
remains largely unresearched (Greenwood 2007: 28). 
The difficulty in approaching the Council is due to several features that distinguish this
institution  from  the  other  two.  Despite  the  efforts  to  improve  transparency, the
atmosphere  of  secrecy  remains  deeply  embedded  in  the  Council’s  work  (Hayes-
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Renshaw 2009:  73; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 67). The Lisbon Treaty requires
the Council to “meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act”
(TEU Art. 16(8)). This constitutes a change compared to the pre-Lisbon situation where
only the discussion of the legislation under co-decision was subjected to public meeting,
whereas  Council’s  transparency  in  this  regard  was  regulated  through  its  Rules  of
Procedure which could be amended by simple majority voting (Peers 2008). Since the
Lisbon  Treaty  “[t]he  opening  to  the  public  of  Council  meetings  relating  to  the
‘Legislative deliberations’ part of its agenda shall be made through public transmission
by audiovisual means, notably in an overflow room and through broadcasting in all
official  languages  of  the institutions  of  the  European Union using video-streaming”
(Council 2009, Art. 7(2)). 
However, this  transparency provision does not  extend to non-legislative acts,  which
constitute the majority of EU foreign policy decisions (e.g. CFSP decisions, Council
declarations).  The Council’s  Rules  of  Procedure merely  envisage that  the  results  of
votes related to external action and the CFSP shall be made public by  a unanimous
Council or the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) decision taken at
the request of one of their members, which in practice may appear as difficult to achieve
as  an  adoption  of  the  decision  itself. In  general,  the  Council  decided  that  its
deliberations “shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, except in so far
as the Council decides otherwise” (ibidem, Art. 6 (1). There is no such a thing as a
transparency register regulating access to the Council or institutionalised consultation
practices. 
This body is governed by many informal rules for the sake of efficiency and consensus
building; and, for example, when voting does not take place it is  more difficult for
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lobbyists  to  know the  parties’ positions  and  the  extent  to  which  promises  given  to
interest  groups have been kept (Hayes-Renshaw 2009:  75).  The Council  is  a multi-
layered institution that includes not only ministers from twenty eight members states
that  gather  in  different  configurations,  but  a  network of  preparatory  bodies  such as
committees  and  working  groups  also  consisting  of  national  representatives  of  all
member  states.  As  Hayes-Renshaw  points  out,  even  for  a  resource-rich  interest
organization it is costly to monitor “the detailed work of hundreds of actors and multiple
layers” (ibidem: 74). Frequent rotation and the fact that many national representatives in
the Council and its bodies are not based in Brussels is another obstacle to the building
of the long-term personal relationships necessary for effective lobbying (ibidem: 75).
Finally,  EU  level  groups  find  it  difficult  to  gain  access  to  the  Council  because,
essentially, it is a part of a national route of interest representation (Greenwood 2007:
27).  Indeed,  empirical  studies  of  business  lobbying  show  that  national  business
associations and important national firms have better access to the Council than EU-
wide associations (Bouwen 2004a: 357).
These obstacles do not mean that interest groups do not approach the Council and its
bureaucracy. There are various ways in which the Council can be accessed: there are
some practices of giving access to the Council  to selected groups (e.g. dinners with
environmental  NGOs  within  the  margins  of  Environmental  Council’s  meetings,
Tripartite  Social  Summit  preceding the European Council  meetings dedicated to  the
Lisbon agenda); through the national governments, including permanent representations
in Brussels; through the Council’s presidency which play an important role in setting the
Council’s agenda; through the Secretariat bureaucracy that assists the Council work; and
through  the  Council’s  preparatory  bodies  in  which  real  work  takes  place  (Hayes-
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Renshaw 2009).
The Court of Justice of the European Union (EUCJ) is seen as “a highly successful
venue in which to seek policy change and many organized interest have long cultivated
strategies for targeting it, albeit with varied success” (McCown 2009: 89). While there
are hardly any studies concerning  choices of combination of lobbying or/and litigation
strategies by interest groups in the EU, it is hypothesized that litigation strategies are
likely to be pursued by narrowly focused and well resource-endowed interest groups in
a  situation  when  the  EU fails  to  produce  legislation   (Bouwen  & McCown 2007).
Litigation may empower individuals and groups who are often disadvantaged in their
own systems (Cichowski 2007: 6). On the one hand, judicial rulings “may create new
rights for individuals or groups that can enable direct access or be utilized by movement
activists  to  make  subsequent  claims  through  litigation”;  on  the  other,  the  EUCJ
decisions “may change the rules and procedures in a way that makes the policy process
a more open to a particular group” (Cichowski 2007: 11). The EUCJ in its turn benefits
from litigation as the clarification and construction of new EU rules is instrumental in
strengthening  the  Court’s  position  in  EU  rulemaking  (Cichowski  2007).  Organised
interests  use  the  EUCJ  preliminary  reference  mechanism  to  challenge  national
legislation and practices with which they do not agree (McCown 2009: 93). Litigation
strategies are often reinforced by lobbying efforts in which groups provide technical
expertise  to  rule-makers,  frame  policy  issues  and  raise  the  awareness  among  new
potential litigants (McCown 2009; Cichowski 2007; Bouwen & McCown 2007).
2.2. Institutional mosaic of EU foreign policy
Lobbying patterns described in the previous section take place in the institutional design
of  EU legislation  making,  whereas  a  large  part  of  EU foreign  policy  is  conducted
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outside this framework. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan situate EU foreign policymaking
roughly  between two regimes:  the  ‘Community  method’ and the  ‘intergovernmental
method’.  The Community  method is  “operationalized  through a  system designed to
maintain institutional equilibrium between a supranational Commission which has a key
role  in  defining  and  defending  common  interests;  a  Council  of  Ministers  with
representatives of the member states which decides by majority voting on a wide range
of decisions; a directly elected EP; and a supranational ECJ. The Community method
applies to trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and other competences that
fall under the EC” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 67).
Under the intergovernmental method “governments retain control over policymaking”
which  may  take  the  form  of  intergovernmental  cooperation  or  intergovernmental
integration  (ibidem).  The  former  implies  cooperation  and  coordination  of  national
foreign policy within the EU framework. The latter  means that member states have
transferred competences to the EU but still control policymaking through the dominant
position of the Council and the rule of unanimity in its decision-making. CFSP/CSDP is
an example of the intergovernmental method (ibidem). However, in practice, there is a
range of methods on the continuum between these two, as foreign policy dossiers often
involve both policymaking regimes (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 67).
These  two  regimes  correspond  to  what  Helen  Wallace  (2010)  distinguishes  as  the
regulatory mode and intensive transgovernmentalism, according to her typology of five
policy  modes  in  the  EU.  Wallace  asserts  that  the  regulatory  mode  is  the  most
widespread policy mode in the EU, in which the Commission is the principle agenda-
setter, while the Council and the Parliament are involved as co-legislators and the role
of  EUCJ  is  significant,  in  addition  to  that  of  regulatory  agencies  at  European  and
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national levels. The regulatory mode offers an “extensive opportunity for stakeholders,
especially economic actors, but sometimes other societal actors, to be consulted about,
and to influence, the shape and content of European market rules” (Wallace 2010: 96).
In  Wallace’s classification,  this  policy  mode  applies  to  competition,  single  market,
environment,  new aspects  of  trade  and  the  common  agriculture  policy  (CAP),  and
aspects  of  social  and  employment  policies.  At  the  other  extreme,  there  is
intergovernmental  policy  cooperation  between  national  policymakers  with  little
involvement by the EU institutions. Wallace terms it ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’
as  it  better  corresponds  to  “the  greater  intensity  and  denser  structuring  [...],  where
member states governments have been prepared cumulatively to commit themselves to
rather  extensive  engagement  and  disciplines,  but  have  judged  the  full  institutional
framework to be inappropriate or unacceptable, or not yet ripe for adoption” (Wallace
2010: 101). The policy process is dominated by the Council of Ministers, with the active
involvement of the European Council in setting the policy direction. The Commission’s
involvement is limited, while the Parliament and ECJ are excluded. The policy process
is not transparent to national parliaments and citizens. CFSP/CDSP is an illustration of
this policy mode. Wallace visualises the two policy modes (see Table 1) describing the
roles played by the EU institutions, member state governments and other actors in each
of them.
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Table 1. Policy modes in the EU
Regulatory Mode Intensive
transgovernmentalism
Degree of centralization Varies Low
Role of European Council Rare (overcoming log jams) Sets direction
Role of Commission Agenda-setting and policing Marginal
Role of Council of Ministers Co-legislator(QMV) Predominant (agenda-setting and
decision-making)
Role of European Parliament Co-legislator Excluded
Impact of ECJ Significant Excluded
Member governments Implementation and enforcement
(regulatory networks)
Key players
Engagement of other actors Policy networks and some self-
regulation
Excluded
Resources No budgetary costs Increasing importance of funding
for ‘public goods’
Prime Examples competition, single market,
environment, aspects of social
and employment policies,
new aspects of trade and CAP 
CFSP, JHA
Source: Wallace (2010: 92-93).
Wallace underlines that these policy modes are ideal types, whereas “individual policy
areas do not fall neatly within a single policy mode and there is strong variation over
time, both within policy sectors and in response to events and contexts” (Wallace 2010:
91).  Studying  EU  foreign  policy  through  the  prism  of  policy  modes  allow  us  to
understand how policy is made, what kind of actors participate in it and, to a certain
degree, what kind of policy outcomes one may expect. This approach also helps us to
look beyond state actors in the policymaking process and to examine the participation of
non-state actors in EU foreign policy. 
I  build  on  the  assumption  derived  from the  existing  literature  that  the  Community
method is relatively open to interest group involvement and influence (Eising & Kohler-
Koch 1999), while the intergovernmental mode is least favourable to them (Mérand et
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al. 2011 on CSDP; Uçarer 2009 on JHA). Thus, as we will see further in this chapter,
this  research  is  designed  to  explore  whether  involvement  and  influence  of  interest
groups varies, increasing the closer a policy dossier is to the Community method, and
decreasing the stronger intergovernmental arrangements are. 
2.3. EU foreign policy machinery
In  EU  foreign  policy,  in  order  to  bring  their  issues  onto  the  agenda  or  influence
decision-making, interest groups have to deal with a different institutional environment
which  may  be  less  conducive  to  their  involvement.  Still,  the  dynamic  institutional
changes in EU foreign policy offer multiple venues which groups can approach. This
section overviews EU foreign policy machinery which forms part of the institutional
context in which groups lobby. 
The Commission’s role in EU foreign policy varies significantly according to the issue
at  hand.  It  has  an  exclusive  right  to  set  the  EU’s  trade  agenda  policy,  negotiate
international trade and other agreements, and manage EU foreign aid and preparation of
EU aspiring countries to the accession. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission’s role
in CFSP was limited to the non-exclusive right of initiative, which since the Lisbon
Treaty is tied to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (HR): the Commission may support the HR initiatives on CFSP or submit joint
proposals  (Piris  2010:  263).  Furthermore,  the  Commission  is  involved  in
implementation  of  CFSP  decisions,  given  that  they  require  Union  (formerly
Community)  measures  (e.g.  some types  of  sanctions),  or  EU funding.  The External
Relations  family  within  the  Commission  (Commissioners  and  their  respective
Directorates  General  (DGs) dealing with international  cooperation and development;
humanitarian aid and civil protection; neighbourhood and enlargement; and trade) is the
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main venue for groups with interest in EU foreign policy. 
The EP’s involvement in EU foreign policy is largely consultative, with real powers
limited to a budget veto, consent for international agreements covering fields to which
the  ordinary  legislative   procedure  applies  and  the  holding  to  account  of  the  High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the capacity of a
Vice-President of the Commission. The Parliament has a number of institutional venues
on  EU  foreign  affairs  potentially  attractive  for  interest  groups,  which  include  the
Committees  on  Foreign  Affairs,  on  Development,  on  International  Trade,
Subcommittees on Human Rights and Security and Defence as well as Committees on
Budgets  and on Budgetary  Control.  The EP develops  its  international  contacts  with
counterparts  in  third  countries  through  dozens  of  delegations  to  parliamentary
assemblies and joint parliamentary committees. The EP takes an active position on a
wide range of foreign policy issues adopting non-binding resolutions, publishing reports
and  studies,  organising  public  hearings  and  other  events,  and  posing  parliamentary
questions to other institutions.
Whereas  the  Council  is  regarded by some scholars  as  a  part  of  a  national  route  of
interest  representation  (Greenwood  2007),  it  is  argued  that  its  working  bodies  and
bureaucracy  with  a  permanent  presence  in  Brussels  have  through  ‘normative
socialization processes’ developed ‘a trans-European strategic culture’, ‘a supranational
culture’ emerging from an intergovernmental process (see Howorth 2011 on the Political
and Security Committee; see also Cross 2011 on transnational epistemic communities of
COREPER and CSDP bodies). Thus, it is to be expected that EU-level interest groups
will also approach the Council bodies, though relying primarily on normative arguments
and bringing forward European values, as opposed to national interest groups which
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mainly transmit information limited to one member state.
The Lisbon Treaty created new institutions to represent the EU abroad and manage its
external relations. The Permanent President of the European Council chairs the summit
of heads of state and governments which became an EU institution in the Lisbon Treaty
with a strategic role in EU foreign policy. The Permanent President  ensures external
representation of the EU on CFSP issues, “without prejudice to the powers of the High
Representative”  (for  an  overview  see  Piris  2010).  In  practice,  the  first  Permanent
President  Herman Van Rompuy took an active stance on foreign policy issues  (e.g.
launching the EU’s strategic partnership debate), though he was seldom involved in the
CSDP (Helwig et al. 2013: 19).
The High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has
become  ‘triple-hatted’ carrying out tasks formerly attributed to the High Representative
for CFSP/Secretary General of the Council, the Commissioner for External Affairs and
the President of the External Relations Council. As Vice-President of the Commission,
the  HR  ensures  consistency  and  coordination  regarding  all  aspects  of  the  Union’s
external  action  (Piris  2010:  244).  The  new  representative  also  acquired  new  tasks
involving agenda-setting, implementation and coordination of foreign policy issues as
well external representation of the Union, which transforms her “from an assistant to a
manager for the whole range of European external action” (Rüger 2012: 155). 
The HR exercises authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU
Special  Representatives  and  Delegations  abroad.  The  EEAS  is  a  functionally
autonomous body of the EU, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and
from  the  Commission,  with  its  own  budget.  It  has  been   composed  of  officials
previously working in the Council  Secretariat  (former Policy Unit,  CSDP and crisis
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management  structures,  Directorate-General  E)  and  the  Commission  (DG  External
Relations) and seconded from the Member States foreign ministries (see Laursen 2012:
189-190). Thus, at least two different organizational cultures are expected in the EEAS:
the  Commission’s  culture  imbued  with  ‘supranational  ethos’  and  interpretation  of
‘common interest’ (more integrated institutional culture) and an institutional culture of
the  Council  Secretariat  and  diplomats  of  the  member  states  with  practices  of
intergovernmental  negotiation  and meditation  spirit  (more  negotiated  culture)  (Carta
2012: 152). This implies that openness to non-state actors will depend on a policy issue:
in such areas as crisis management the prevalence of the Council Secretariat routines is
anticipated (Duke 2012: 58-59), making the work of advocates more difficult.
In  the  post-Lisbon  EU,  the  Commission’s  delegations  abroad  were  upgraded  to
represent  the  Union,  which  boosts  their  political  role.  The  delegations  have  also
strengthened  their  political  sections  and  attempted  to  coordinate  the  actions  of  the
member states’ embassies in the third countries (Helwig et al. 2013).
The EEAS is tasked to support the HR, the Council and the Commission, as well as to
serve the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission in
exercising their external representation functions. This boosts the EEAS’s political role
in the EU’s external policies as the service appears as “a bridge-builder between the
institutions, sharing information and acting as a common source of expertise” and has
the  potential  to  become  “a  true  inter-institutional  ‘decision-shaping  body’,  working
towards greater coherence in EU external action”  (Blockmans & Laatsit 2012: 157).
The EEAS functions are multiple: it plays a role of “a Presidency, diplomatic service,
ministry  of  development  and defence,  as  well  as  coordinating  overall  coherence  of
external  action”  (Helwig et  al.  2013:  7).  We may expect  that the EEAS becomes a
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central lobbying target for foreign policy advocates at the EU level. 
To conclude, EU foreign policy machinery differs from other areas of EU policymaking.
First, the Lisbon Treaty did not overcome the dichotomy between the former first and
second  pillars.  The  CFSP remains  largely  intergovernmental  with  no  revolutionary
changes made. As one scholar put it, “[t]he role of the Member States in definition and
decision-making process of CFSP still is huge and clear; in the area of implementation
and  representation,  however,  supranational  level  becomes  more  influential”  (Radtke
2012: 52). The key EU institutions – the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of
Ministers  –  have different decision-making roles in EU foreign policy, depending on
whether  a  policy  issue  is  dealt  with through  the  Community  or  intergovernmental
method.  This  is  expected  to  impact  upon  interest  group  engagement  with  these
institutions. Second, there  are a number of institutions specific to EU foreign policy
established  or  reformed  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty.   They  include  the  institutionalised
European Council and its Permanent President, the ‘new’ High Representative of the
Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  to  overcome  the  first/second  pillar
dichotomy, the EEAS which is to support not only the HR, but other institutions on the
issues related to foreign policy and representation.  We might assume that these new
institutions are targets to advocates on EU foreign policy, though to varying degrees
given their respective roles and receptivity.
3. Research design
3.1. Hypotheses and key variables 
 As we know from the few studies on EU foreign policy lobbying, interest groups seem
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to advocate the EU across a variety of issues ranging from the ‘communitarised’ area of
international trade to the  intergovernmental security and defence. The EU Transparency
Register  provides  additional  evidence  of   groups  with  interest  in  the  latter  domain.
However, the question remains of the extent to which limited communitarisation and the
intergovernmental  character  of  a  major  part  of  EU  foreign  policy  decision-making
restricts interest groups involvement and influence.
We know from the interest group literature that political opportunity structure defined as
“the set of characteristics of a given institution that determines the relative ability of
(outside)  groups  influence  decision  making  within  that  institution”  (Princen  &
Kerremans 2008: 1130) determines both interest group strategies and the likelihood of
influence. One of the key institutional characteristics affecting influence,  though not
determinant, is access granted by policymakers to interest groups  (Dür & De Bièvre
2007b;  Dür  & De Bièvre  2007a).  Access  means  “either  a  successful  attempt  of  an
interest group to approach the EU institutions or the incorporation of an interest group
into EU policymaking by these institutions” (Eising 2007b: 386).
Multi-level governance in the EU multiplies the number of  access points for interest
groups, providing them with better chances to be heard  (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch
2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001). Groups can venue shop navigating between different
access  points  at  national,  EU or  even  international  level  (Princen 2007;  Princen &
Kerremans 2008).  But not all access points are equal in terms of their openness and
receptivity to outsider inputs  (Joachim & Locher 2009a).  In the EU, the Commission
and the Parliament  are  more open to interest  groups,  while  the Council  is  the least
accessible, given the secretive culture of intergovernmental decision-making  (Coen &
Richardson 2009). So, hypothetically, interest groups are likely to exert influence when
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they deal with the Commission (or former Commission’s units within the EEAS) and
the Parliament than with the Council. In EU foreign policymaking, if an issue at stake is
to be decided on the basis of consensus by the EU intergovernmental institutions and
implemented by the member state governments (the intergovernmental method), interest
groups are  less  likely to achieve influence than,  if  the supranational  institutions are
involved in policymaking and implementation and the Council decides by QMV (the
Community method). This informs our first hypothesis:
H1 (institutional  set-up  –  degree  of  influence):  On the  continuum between  the
Community method and the intergovernmental method of decision-making in EU
foreign policy, interests groups are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence for
an  issue  which  lies  closer  towards  the  Community  method;  and  are  likely  to
achieve  lower degrees  of  influence  for  an  issue  which  is  situated  closer  to  the
intergovernmental extreme.  
As presented above, institutional characteristics may change over time with the changes
of the Treaties, however, they are relatively static.  A more dynamic characteristic of
political opportunity structures identified by literature on social movements and interest
groups is the presence or absence of elite allies which facilitates or constrains collective
action. As Baumgartner puts it, “[m]any of those acting as policy advocates are in fact
government officials themselves, acting as allies of others and sharing their interests”
(Baumgartner  2007:  483).  This  statement  finds  confirmation  in  Joachim  and
Dembinski’s case  study of  lobbying on a  CSDP issue:  a  shift  of  Great  Britain  and
France to the camp of supporters of European Code of Conduct in Arms Exports made
NGO lobbying easier and more influential (Joachim & Dembinski 2011: 1159). In Great
Britain this shift came as a result of a change of government, whereas in France it was
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driven by strategic government calculations (ibidem). Moreover, from the literature on
NSA access to international organisations, we also know that some bodies are more
open to non-state  actors due to  their  functional  needs  (Steffek 2010;  Tallberg et  al.
2014). They rely on information which non-state actors provide or other services.
Therefore,  it  is  hypothesised  that  alliances  with  key  decision-makers  may  facilitate
interest groups influence on EU policy, even if the case upon which they lobby is close
to the intergovernmental method.  In other words, interest groups are likely to achieve
their goals if they have allies among key decision-makers such as the member states in
the Council, the HR or a member state holding the presidency (for non-CFSP issues),
the EEAS and the Commission (when it is involved in policy formulation on the non-
CFSP issues  or  implementation),  and  the  EP if  it  has  any  powers.  Allies  here  are
understood broadly: they may be ideological allies sharing the same position, or the
same objective, or they may simply have overlapping interests with groups.
H2 (alliance building – degree of influence): If interest groups have allies among
key decision-makers, they are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence.  
We can also expect that policy regime has an impact on a type of influence groups try to
achieve. Namely, we distinguish between organised interests defending the status quo
and those promoting change. It is expected that it  will be more difficult  to promote
change  under  intergovernmental  policymaking  arrangements.  In  line  with  an
intergovernmentalist account, the member states tend to adopt foreign policy decisions
based on the lowest common denominator, which implies a policy of   “the status quo
(agreement  not  to  change  an  existing  policy)  or  a  new  policy  that  reflects  the
preferences of the veto player”  (Thomas 2011: 20-22; see also Jupille 1999; Meunier
2000). By this  logic, if the Council decides unanimously, efforts of national interest
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groups from one member state will suffice to block the decision and protect the status
quo. If the Council decides by QMV, a coordinated effort of national groups from a
blocking minority member states is needed to keep the status quo.  
H3 (institutional  set-up  –  type  of  influence).  The intergovernmental  method of
policymaking  mostly  favours  groups  that  defend  the  status  quo  rather  than
promoting change.
At the same time, studies show that the lowest common denominator is not always the
case and other theoretical frameworks are better in providing an explanation for EU
foreign  policy  decisions  (M.  E.  Smith  2004a;  Thomas  2011b),  whereas  status  quo
defenders are more likely to achieve success in the Community policy areas too (Bunea
2013; Mahoney 2007). In this case, we will not see a clear win for groups protecting the
status  quo  over  those  pushing  for  change  as  the  closer  an  issue  lies  to  the
intergovernmental extreme.
Given that the number of interest groups with interest in foreign policy is growing (as
illustrated by the EU Transparency Register) and that even the most intergovernmental
parts of EU foreign policy such as the CSDP can be viewed through the prism of (multi-
level) governance frameworks characterised by heterarchy, or the existence of multiple
centres of power; formal and informal institutionalisation and interaction of multiple
actors,  both  public  and  private  (M.  Smith  2004b;  Webber  et  al.  2004;  Norheim-
Martinsen 2010; Mérand et al. 2011), we expect that interest groups adopt multi-level
strategies targeting policymakers both at the EU and national levels  (see Joachim &
Dembinski 2011).
H4  (multi-level  vs.  national  level  strategies):  Groups  tend  to  adopt  strategies
targeting actors at both EU and member state level, even when policymaking is
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closer to the intergovernmental method.
An  opposite account argues that the two-level games logic is still  prevalent in those
areas where intergovernmental arrangements are strong (CFSP/CSDP), therefore, there
is little or no lobbying at the EU level. If this is so, we will see no confirmation of this
hypothesis. 
3.2. Case selection
The hypotheses outlined above are tested through a comparative analysis of three case
studies,  which are selected on the basis of a number of criteria.  First, they represent a
variation on the key explanatory variable – the policy regime, and thus range from the
Community method to the intergovernmental method. I apply Mill’s (1875) “method of
difference” (Leuffen 2007: 149) by looking for “comparable cases” in Lijphart’s (1975)
terminology  (Blatter  & Haverland 2012:  42).  Thus  I  intend to  have  other  variables
potentially explaining lobbying and influence of similar value, and either kept constant
or controlled. Second, while focusing on the same time period, I opt for cases with a
longer timeframe in order to take into account a more dynamic characteristic of alliance
building.  Finally,  cases  should  cover  a  whole  policy  cycle  (agenda  setting,  policy
formulation and decision-making, implementation and evaluation). This will allow us to
look at influence as a “continuous” rather than “dichotomous” variable, following  the
suggestion  of  Baumgartner  &  Leech  (1998:  138) and  not  to  miss  interest  group
influence  by focusing on a  particular  stage of  the policymaking process.  Moreover,
given that few studies on the participation of non-state actors in EU foreign policy are
available, we cannot really know where (at which stage of the policy cycle) to look for
their influence.
Geographically, all the cases concern countries situated in the EU neighbourhood. The
91
EU’s neighbourhood has been named a top priority in terms of EU’s relations with the
world, along with building of external relations architecture and strategic partnerships
(Ashton 2010). This also implies that neighbouring countries are of similar importance
for  EU foreign policy and there is  also a  web of  relations between the EU and its
neighbourhood at various levels (supranational, state, sub-state) that includes both state
and non-state actors. Ideally, it  would be good to look at the same country, but it is
difficult to find such a case in the real world with all criteria being fulfilled.
In this study, policy dossiers do not represent the most lobbied cases or issues in EU
foreign policy, the approach which has been adopted in the previous study  (Voltolini
2013). The preference is for cases which represent sub-policy areas that are typical of
EU relations with the neighbourhood and in which the EU applies a standard set of
foreign policy tools. At the same time, I opt for cases which have been in the spotlight
of EU policy towards the regions and countries, thus they are likely to attract attention
of interest groups.
A detailed overview of the selected cases is presented in Table 2. The case closest to the
Community  method  concerns  EU  visa  policy,  with  all  supranational  institutions
involved  and  QMV  in  the  Council,  though  the  member  states  are  responsible  for
implementation. The focus is on the EU’s eastern neighbours given that visa facilitation
and liberalisation have been key objectives of the Eastern dimension of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative and as a
means to promote security and reforms at the EU borders. The second case is closer to
the intergovernmental extreme and centres on CSFP sanctions, with the Commission’s
involvement in implementation and the EUCJ’s jurisdiction, if the Union measures are
envisaged.  While  the  EU  has  applied  CSFP  sanctions  to  many  countries  in  its
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neighbourhood (Belarus, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine) as a
response to a sudden degradation of governance and human rights standards or as a part
of conflict management strategy, the case of Belarus is chosen given it has the longest
history of EU sanctions policy towards this country. The third, ‘the hardest case’ from
which  supranational  institutions  are  excluded  represents  the  CSDP.  The  EU  has
deployed CSDP missions in  the conflict-affected neighbouring countries  of Georgia,
Lybia, Palestinian territories and Ukraine, all of which are civilian. The case turns to the
CSDP  missions  in  Palestine  and  Georgia  as  the  oldest  ongoing  missions  in  the
neighbourhood.  According to  the  hypothesis  H1,  we expect  that  interest  groups are
more likely to achieve the highest degrees of influence in the first case, lower degrees in
the second and the lowest degrees in the third case. 
The cases relate to the time period between 2004/2015 and 2014/2015. Such a decade-
long time frame should enable us to examine advocacy and eventual group influence on
policy change from a longitudinal perspective, which is rather rare in interest groups
studies in the EU. According to the literature on advocacy coalitions, a time perspective
of a decade or more is necessary in order to understand the process of policy change to
check  against  external  factors  such  as  socio-economic  and  technological  changes,
changes in governing coalitions,  as well as decisions and impacts from other policy
sectors that affect a policy under question that vary substantially over the course of a
few years or a decade (Sabatier 1988).
Within the studied period, there have been treaty reforms which have amended the insti-
tutional design of EU foreign policy. In particular, new foreign policy institutions have
been created by the Treaty of  Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It
is assumed that these institutions have affected institutional set-ups in all cases in a sim-
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ilar way. There were also a number of legal changes to the decision-making powers of
the supranational institutions in all the selected cases. However, I maintain that they
have not affected the type of policy regime in place.
Table 2. Description of cases
Visa liberalisation 
(EaP countries)
CFSP sanctions
(Belarus)
CSDP missions
(Palestine and Georgia)
Time period
Since 2004 Since 2004 Since 2005
Institutional characteristics
Access Points
Council
High
Representati
ve
Commission
EP
EUCJ
Decides  by  QMV  (art.  77
TFEU)
Responsible  for  overall
coordination with other  EU
external policies
Commission conducts a visa
liberalisation  dialogue;
drafts  Visa  Liberalisation
Action  Plan  (VLAP);
reports regularly to the EP &
the  Council  on  the
implementation  of  the
VLAP. Makes a proposal to
the EP & the Council for the
lifting of the short-stay visa
obligation,  through  an
amendment  of  Regulation
539/2001  (ordinary
legislative procedure)
Co-decides  (ordinary
legislative
procedure)/consent  for
international agreements
Conducts judicial review on
fundamental  rights-sensitive
areas  of  migration,  border
control  and  asylum  and
Decides unanimously
Implements by QMV
HR and Commission make a
joint  proposal  for
implementation
Commission  can  be
responsible  for
implementation  (e.g.  aid
suspension,  trade  bans)  or
supervise implementation by
member  states  if  Union
(formerly  Community)
measures are concerned
Informed by Council
Reviews  the  legality  of
sanctions  implemented
through the  measures of the
Union  competence;
Decides  unanimously  upon
a  proposal  of  HR  or  a
member  state  initiative.
Exercises, through the PSC,
political  control  and
strategic  direction  over  a
CSDP mission.
Proposes  to  initiate  a
mission;  exercises  overall
authority  over  civilian
missions
Commission  is  involved  in
implementation  if  the
Union’s resources are used
Informed  by  Council  and
HR  regularly.  Approves
CSFP  budget  from  which
civilian missions are funded
Excluded
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National 
government
s
related  to  four  freedoms,
esp.  freedom  of  movement
of  services  (e.g.  Turkish
cases  on  freedom  of
movement of services)
Implement (e.g. issue visas,
control borders)
addressed  by  natural  and
legal  persons  in  respect  of
restrictive  measures
affecting them
Responsible  for
implementation  of  certain
measures,  e.g.  arms
embargoes,  visa  bans,
diplomatic  &  cultural
sanctions
May initiate a mission.
Funding of civilian missions
if nationals are seconded
Funding  of  military
missions
Issue characteristics
Time frame
(Crisis vs. 
long-term) 
 
Involves
violence 
Novelty of 
issue
Salience
Scope
Types  of
interests
affected
Long-term
Unlikely
Well-established
Low
High  politics
(It is seen as one of the key
offers in the EaP. A number
of  EU  members  have  a
special relationship with the
countries  in  the  region.
There  are  also  migration
flows  to  a  number  of  EU
states  –  labour,  tourism,
asylum seekers) 
human  rights,  business,
solidarity, security 
Short/mid-term  towards
long-term.  Spurred  by  an
external crisis
Unlikely
Well-established
Low
High politics
(Belarus has been dubbed as
‘last dictatorship’ in Europe.
There  is  well-developed
political interest of a number
of  member  states  in  this
country.  Human  rights  and
democracy  promotion
agenda  of  the  Council  of
Europe, OSCE, US)
democracy,  human  rights,
business
Short/mid  term  towards
long-term.  Spurred  by  a
crisis 
 
Rather likely (low intensity
conflicts) 
Well-established
Low
High politics
(The  Israeli-Palestinian
conflict  of  the  most  long
standing  conflicts  in  the
world.  EU  member  states
have  a  long  history  of
involvement  in  conflict
resolution,  though
secondary  to  the  US.  The
conflicts in Georgia have an
international dimension due
to Russia’s involvement)  
human  rights,  security,
solidarity 
Changes in the Treaty of Lisbon
In force 
since 1 
December 
2009
EP has acquired co-decision
powers (‘ordinary legislative
procedure’ and  consent,
before  consultation
procedure)
EUCJ  became  fully
competent
Commission  has  no  longer
has an autonomous right of
initiative on CFSP issues. It
may  support  the  HR  or
submit joint proposals.
EUCJ  powers  slightly
enlarged  with  regards  to
better protection of rights of
individuals  (Art.  275
TFEU)
The  Council  can  entrust  a
group of member states with
a  CSDP mission  (Art  42.5
and  44  TEU).  Member
states  are  to  make  civilian
and  military  capabilities
available  to  the  Union  for
the  implementation  of
CSDP.
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While examining the relationship between institutional conditions and interest  group
influence,  we have  to  take  into  account  other  determinants  of  influence.  The  issue
characteristics  such  the  scope  and  salience  of  the  issue,  the  level  of  conflict,  the
newness, the presence of focusing event are seen as having impact upon the probability
of achieving lobbying success (Mahoney 2008; Kluver 2013). 
It is assumed that all three foreign policy dossiers chosen for this study are similar in
scope: they are high politics issues which concern EU values such as democracy, peace,
security  and  economic  freedoms  and  constitute  relations  with  important  for  EU
countries in the neighbourhood. They are expected to attract different kinds of interests. 
The degree of salience of the issues which refers to visibility or importance of the issue
to the public  (Mahoney 2008; Kollman 1998) is assumed to be similar and relatively
constant.  In  general,  foreign  policy  issues  are  considered  to  be  low salience  issues
compared to domestic policies.
New issues  are  more  difficult  to  lobby  on  (Mahoney  2008;  Joachim & Dembinski
2011). The selected foreign policy issues are well established rather than new, in the
sense that they are part of portfolios of the existing structures at the EU level or conform
with well-developed EU policies.
The time frame  and the degree to which violence may be involved in pursuing the
policy is  assumed to define to what extent multi-level  governance extends to  CFSP
decision-making (M. Smith 2004b). This largely coincides with what Mahoney (2008)
calls a focusing event – “a crisis or disaster” that affects the probability of lobbying
success. It is hypothesised that these two characteristics may have impact on interest
groups ability to participate in the policymaking process. 
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The time frame is defined as “a degree of urgency surrounding the issue: crises must be
decided within weeks at most (more often days or even hours); short-term/medium-term
policies  may be  decided over  months  or  a  few years;  long-term problems must  be
decided over several years or even decades” (M. Smith 2004b). Given the time shortage,
interest  groups  can  hardly  be  involved  in  policymaking  on  urgency  issues.  CFSP
sanctions  and  CSDP missions  are  often  deployed  as  a  reaction  to  crises  or  armed
conflict in a third country or region. This contrasts with visa liberalisation which may
seen as a more gradual policy development not enacted as an urgent response to an
external  crisis.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of  Belarus,  first  sanctions  were  introduced  as  a
reaction to crisis, but then they were revised in a short/medium term perspective, and
given EU sanctions towards Belarus have not been fully lifted since their introduction in
2004, we could argue that they have become a long-term solution. So we will be able to
control for the time-frame factor examining several time periods. In the case of Georgia,
the CSDP mission EUMM was deployed to monitor the ceasefire in the Russia-Georgia
war of 2008. But we will be able to control for this factor having EUPOL COPPS in
Palestine which was considered at least a year in advance. 
Finally, in the case of CDSP missions, there is a possibility of violence, given that they
are situated within conflict  zones,  though these missions are  far from being combat
military operations. Thus, we assume that this variation is not significant to explain the
degree of interest group influence in comparison with the institutional set-up. 
However, there are some issue-level characteristics that are not known in advance (for
example, the degree of conflict on the issue). Moreover, group-level characteristics (e.g.
financial  resources,  membership  resources,  information  on  constituencies  interests,
expertise) will vary too given that I do not have theoretical reasons not to expect both
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resource-rich  and  resource-poor  groups  involved  in  lobbying. Thus  I  also  employ
within-case  analysis  to  trace  possible  causal  links  and  configurations  of  the  many
factors that impact on lobbying strategies and influence. Nevertheless, it is still expected
that overall interest group influence will vary across three institutional contexts for all
types of groups, even though resource-rich groups may be indeed more able to adapt to
less favourable environments than resource-poor groups.
The combination of the cross-case and within-case analyses  complement  each other
(Blatter & Haverland 2012: 212).  Through the cross-case analysis I aim to answer the
question  of  whether   institutional  design  matters  when  seeking  influence.  Whereas
within-case analysis allows  us to understand the effect of the institutional design on
lobbying and influence. This method is also needed to answer the underlying research
question of how and to what extent interest groups influence EU foreign policy, or, in
other words,  what the consequences  are of (intergovernmental)  policymaking on the
lobbying and influence of interest groups. 
3.3. Operationalisation and data collection
Influence is conceptualised here as control over a policy outcome  (Dür & De Bièvre
2007b:  3).  What  specifically  constitutes  a  policy  outcome  differs  across  the  policy
cycle. At the agenda-setting stage it means an issue that groups have been promoting is
raised to the EU agenda (or is kept out of it if this was the intended goal). At the policy
formulation  and  decision-making  stage,  it  implies  that  adopted  policy  or  decision
reflects a desired outcome which interest group lobbying has intended to achieve. At the
implementation  stage,  an  actual  implementation  of  policy  again  reflects  a  desired
outcome, whereas if groups are involved in evaluation, control over a policy outcome
would imply that their inputs were reflected in the policy evaluation exercise which
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feeds back to the earlier stages (agenda-setting or policy reformulation).
In order to measure interest group influence, I apply methodological triangulation as
suggested by interest group researchers (Dür 2008b; Helboe Pedersen 2013): I combine
process-tracing and assessment of attributed influence. The combination of two methods
helps to correct biases of each of them, at least to a certain degree. A similar model has
been used by Arts & Verschuren (1999) who combine assessment of influence by non-
state actors (ego-perception) with cross-assessment by policymakers (alter-perception)
and researcher’s analysis. 
Through  process  tracing,   researchers  “try  to  uncover  steps  by  which  causes  affect
outcomes.  With  respect  to  measuring  interest  groups  influence,  scholars  scrutinize
groups’ preferences, their influence attempts, their access to decision-makers, decision-
makers’ responses to influence attempts, the degree to which groups’ preferences are
reflected  in  outcomes and groups’ statements  of  (dis)satisfaction with the outcome”
(Dür 2008: 562). The process tracing method is suitable for small-N studies  (Cowles
1995; Neuman et al. 2006; Kautto 2007; Joachim & Dembinski 2011) as this is a time
consuming exercise  which requires  good knowledge of  a  case,  including all  factors
which  may  have  impacted  upon  a  policy  outcome.  Process  tracing  also  requires
thorough data collection to provide accurate and detailed information to uncover all
steps  of causal  process  (Dür 2008:  563).  For example,  a  study on tobacco industry
lobbying against strict advertisement regulation relied on confidential internal industry
documentation which had been disclosed in a legal case  (Neuman et al. 2006). Other
studies have been based largely on interviews (Kautto 2007; Bugdahn 2008; Joachim &
Dembinski 2011). The key advantage of this method is that it helps us to open the black
box of policymaking and show how groups lobby. The primary disadvantage however is
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that it does not allow for the establishment of the degree of influence, as one can usually
only assess whether a group was influential  or not.  It  is  also easy to underestimate
interest  group influence for those actors who did not engage in any active lobbying
(Lowery 2013). 
To assess the degree of influence, I apply the attributed influence method. This has been
applied  in  both  large  and small  N interest  groups  studies  in  which  data  have  been
collected mainly through surveys (Egdell & Thompson 1999; Mahoney & Baumgartner
2008; Heinz et al. 1993; Dür & De Bièvre 2007a; Helboe Pedersen 2013; Binderkrantz
& Rasmussen 2015). Applying this method, I ask interviewed groups to assess their own
influence, namely to what degree they achieved the intended outcomes planned in their
strategy (rephrasing the question by Heinz et al. (1993) “To what extent did you achieve
your  advocacy  objectives:  all  objectives,  most,  about  half,  few,  or  none”).  I  view
influence  as  the  achievement  of  a  group’s  objective  as  a  result  of  the  group’s
intervention,  which  implies  that  a  policy  outcome should  be  more  in  line  with  the
group’s objective than would have been the case had the latter not intervened (Arts &
Verschuren 1999: 413). Thus, primarily groups which have mobilised for lobbying are
approached for interviews.  However, it may still be difficult to distinguish fully goals
which were achieved purely due to luck –  “the intervention of others, due to external
events, or due to autonomous developments” (ibidem) –  rather than due to the group’s
intervention. By asking groups to explain factors beyond their advocacy success and by
introducing cross-assessment by policymakers, I hope to obtain a clearer picture of what
has enabled advocacy objectives to be achieved.
The literature speaks of the expansiveness bias evident in expert interviewing, whereby
less  powerful  actors  tend to  inflate  their  status  while  more  powerful  actors  tend to
100
underreport their influence (Beyers et al. 2014). There is however little evidence that
this  occurs  in  practice.  Triangulating   survey  and  documentary-based  measures  of
preference attainment,  Helboe Pedersen (2013) finds that resourceful  groups tend to
overstate their influence and activity slightly more than other groups (public interest
groups and other types of citizen groups), nevertheless, she finds no clear difference
among resourceful  groups (e.g.  business  groups vs.  trade  unions,  for  instance).  She
explains that interest group respondents may lack precise information on their success,
providing general  evaluations  of their  levels of  influence and suggests posing more
concrete questions about specific activities and successes. I take steps to integrate this
advice into the process  of  preparing interview questions and while  carrying out  the
interviews themselves.
Furthermore, to mitigate the bias of self-estimation and the fact that advocacy groups
may  find  it  difficult  to  attribute  policy  outcomes  to  their  lobbying  efforts,  I  also
complement their answers by the cross-assessment by policymakers (who are asked to
name lobby groups which have been most influential in their advocacy and which have
provided most  valuable  input).  Policymakers  may still  be  tempted  to  systematically
overrate the influence of highly visible actors (the attractiveness bias, see Beyers et al.
2014). But careful phrasing of interview questions (for example, eschewing potentially
sensitive words as suggested by Beyers at al. (2014)) and cross-validation of interview
findings with interest groups and policymakers should help to mitigate the measurement
bias.
Another  limitation  of  the  attributed  influence  method is  that  it  measures  perceived
influence  as  opposed  to  actual  influence  (Dür  2008:  566). Such  a  measurement  is
termed ‘subjective’ as it relies “on policy actors’ subjective assessments of the extent to
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which they actually attained what they wanted” (Bernhagen et al. 2014: 204, italics in
original). While interest  group scholars increasingly measure influence as preference
attainment spatially, arguing that it is more ‘objective’ (ibidem), this method cannot be
applied here in full. First, it is suitable when lobbying takes place through one venue
and through one  strategy (for  example,  the  Commission  and participation  in  online
consultations during the policy formulation stage as in Klüver (2013)), while this study
is exploratory in the sense that it attempts to examine who interest groups lobby when
attempting to influence EU foreign policy, and how they do so. Moreover, many EU
foreign policy documents are not publicly available, consultations with interest groups
are not formalised and there is no analogy to the Commission in the legislative making
process which is responsible for drafting and possesses knowledge on the positions of
decision-making actors and interest groups. It is thus extremely difficult to find a valid
primary source for positional data necessary to measure influence spatially. 
Given  the  lack  of  publicly  available  (or  disclosed)  information  on  foreign  policy
decision-making and the dominance of informal communication between advocates and
policymakers in this area, the study draws on interviews as a source of primary data on
aspects of the political process, lobbying and influence. Whereas data collection through
interviews introduces a number of biases which are difficult to eliminate completely, I
follow the advice of experienced interest group scholars who believe “that a judiciously
prepared and well-conducted set of interviews can contribute significantly to research
on political mobilization, strategies and policy influence” (Beyers et al. 2014: 177).
The  primary  data  have  been  collected  through  161  semi-structured  interviews  with
interest  groups representatives,  policymakers  and expert  observers  conducted by the
author between May 2013 and January 2015 in Brussels, a number of EU member states
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and the neighbouring countries covered by each case.  The interviews were conducted
face-to-face, and only in a few cases was interviewing done via Skype or telephone. The
average interview length was 60 minutes. All interviewees were offered the principle of
anonymity  in  order  to  allow for  more  open and frank answers.  In  order  to  further
enhance  rapport  with  the  interviewees,  interviews  were  not  voice-recorded,  instead
written notes were taken down and typed soon after the interview. 
My data collection strategy has involved interviewing representatives of all key groups
advocating on the case and all key policymakers (representatives of key member states
in the Council, key MEPs or their staff, Commission and EEAS officials responsible for
the  dossier  and  contacts  with  outside  actors).  Initial  potential  interviewees  were
identified through background research based on the analysis of secondary (specialist
literature on each case) and primary resources (documents produced by interest groups,
their websites, media reports, interviews with independent experts in each policy area).
Further potential interviewees were added to the list through the ‘snowball effect’ (by
asking groups to name other groups who lobbied on the same issue and policymakers
whom they target and by asking policymakers to name other policy actors and advocacy
groups). 
In  addition  to  interviews,  documentary  analysis  (policy  documents  where  publicly
available, minutes of parliamentary debates, position papers and reports produced by
advocacy  groups)  and  analysis  of  media  reports  (English  language  online  media
specialised  in  EU  politics,  such  as  EUObserver  and  EurActiv,  and  national  media
covering  the  countries  in  focus)  were  employed.  These  data  were  analysed  in
preparation for interviews and afterwards to corroborate interview findings.
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Conclusion
This chapter has introduced main concepts, theoretical assumptions, research design and
methodology.  In  this  thesis,  I  apply  the  definition  of  influence  which  has  been
predominantly  used  in  the  interest  group  literature  and  which  regards  influence  as
‘control over policy outcomes’. When assessing interest group influence, I also follow
the rationalist  assumptions that  actors  have clear  and stable  preferences  that  do not
change in the course of interaction with other actors and act to maximise their utility.
Such conceptualisation  of  influence  mostly  refers  to  the  first  and second ‘faces’ of
power which are decision-making and controlling the agenda, with the second ‘face’
being  more  difficult  to  observe.  Despite  possible  criticism  of  such  a  definition  of
influence on theoretical  grounds,  an advantage of  this  conceptualisation is  that  it  is
accompanied  by a  developed methodology for  measuring  influence  which  has  been
widely used and referenced in the literature on interest groups both in the EU and the
US. Moreover, without downplaying the importance of socialisation underlined by the
constructivist  views  on  lobbying  in  EU  foreign  policy,  I  argue  that  the  rationalist
account has the potential to provide a more complete picture not only of interest group
influence, but also the reasons behind lobbying strategies and tactics.
This thesis focuses on the role of institutional factors in determining lobbying strategies
and interest group influence. From the literature on lobbying in the EU, we know that
some EU institutions are lobbied more than others due to their powers in the policy
process  and openness  to  input  from interest  groups.  However, the  literature  mainly
draws on the roles of EU institutions in policy areas under the Community method in
which the Commission sets the agenda and the Council and, increasingly, the Parliament
co-decide within the structured legislative process, resulting in a clear policy outcome –
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a piece of EU legislation.  In many areas of EU foreign policy, policymaking is still
dominated by intergovernmental arrangements. The most lobbied EU institutions – the
Commission and the Parliament – have little role to play, whereas the members states
control the agenda, decide through consensus and implement the resulting decisions.
Moreover,  there  are  specific  EU  foreign  policy  institutions  set  up  to  assist  in
intergovernmental cooperation and to ensure inter-institutional coherence in managing
the EU’s external action. 
Few  insights  on  how  interest  groups  interact  with  institutions  under  the
intergovernmental method  were presented in the Chapter 1. From the case study of
advocacy on a  CSDP policy  issue  (Joachim & Dembinski  2011) we learnt  that  the
intergovernmental set-up does not prevent group involvement, but affect their advocacy
strategies and success. Non-state actors act at both EU and member state levels and their
advocacy is facilitated by the presence of EU level norms and powerful allies among the
decision-makers. They can on occasion be successful in achieving their advocacy goals
(ibidem). But one case study presents a limited story. It does not allow us to examine
whether interest groups’ strategies and influence have been determined by institutional
factors  as  opposed  to,  for  instance,  issue  characteristics.  Thus,  I  will  conduct  a
comparative  study  to  shed  more  light  on  the  issue  of  whether  variation  in  the
institutional conditions of lobbying leads to varying advocacy strategies and influence. I
will test four hypotheses:
H1: On the continuum between the Community method and the intergovernmental
method of  decision-making in  EU foreign policy, interests  groups are  likely to
achieve  higher  degrees  of  influence  for  an  issue  which  lies  closer  toward  the
Community method; and are likely to achieve lower degrees of influence for an
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issue which is situated closer to the intergovernmental extreme. 
H2: If interest groups have allies among key decision-makers, they are likely to
achieve higher degrees of influence. 
H3: The intergovernmental  method of policymaking mostly favours groups that
defend the status quo rather than promoting change.
H4: Groups tend to adopt strategies targeting actors at both EU and member state
level, even when policymaking is closer to the intergovernmental method.
Key independent and dependent variables are summarised in Table 3. Three cases have
been selected for this study to present a variation on the key explanatory variable – type
of policy regime. Selection criteria have been applied to ensure that cases deviate as
little as possible on issue-level characteristics that can also be responsible for variation
of  advocacy strategies  and influence.  The impact  of group-level  characteristics  (e.g.
material and nonmaterial resources) will be controlled through a within-case analysis.
Aside  from  testing  the  main  hypotheses  through  the  cross-case  analysis,  I  use  the
within-case analysis to generate more insight into groups’ strategies and influence  on
EU foreign policy, including key factors which condition it.
Table 3. Key variables
Independent variables Dependent variables
Policy regime
(Community method◄-►Intergovernmental
method)
Allies among key decision-makers
(presence/absence)
Degree of influence
(advocacy objectives achieved)
Type of influence 
(status quo vs. policy change)
Type of strategy
(multi-level vs. national-level)
I  apply  a  combination  of  process  tracing  and  assessment  of  attributed  influence  to
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measure interest group influence. The latter method grasps influence as it is perceived
by groups themselves (self-assessment) and by policymakers (cross-assessment). The
former  method  helps  to  establish  a  broader  picture  of  the  policy  process  in  which
decision-making  and  advocacy  efforts  take  place  and  to  analyse  the  effect  of
institutional  conditions  on  lobbying as  well  as  other  conditions  that  may determine
policy outcomes.
Given the scarcity of the literature and limited number of publicly accessible policy
documents from which positions of decision-makers and groups can be extracted, the
study  draws  extensively  from  161  semi-structured  interviews  with  interest  group
representatives, policymakers and expert observers conducted in Brussels, EU member
state  capitals  and third  countries.  Analysis  of  EU policy  documents  and documents
produced by groups and media articles allows us to supplement and cross-check where
possible information provided during interviews. The strength of a methodology relying
on interviews is that it allows us to ask interest groups directly about their influence and
how they perceive and assess it as well as to see how interest groups’ advocacy is seen
by policymakers. The weakness is that it introduces inevitable biases on how facts are
presented and interpreted by interviewees.
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Chapter 3. Visa liberalisation policy towards Eastern
neighbours
Introduction
This chapter analyses interest groups’ advocacy and influence in EU visa policy towards
the Eastern neighbours.  This  case largely conforms with the Community method of
policymaking in the EU. It is hypothesised that interest groups tend to engage in multi-
level lobbying as supranational institutions have significant decision-making powers in
this domain (in line with H4 hypothesis outlined in the Chapter 2) and that groups are
likely to achieve some degree of influence (as hypothesized in H1). Thus, the research
findings  in  this  case  are  expected  to  be  largely  in  line  with  the  major  bulk  of  the
literature on lobbying in the EU, which focuses mainly on interest groups’ involvement
in  Community  policymaking.  I  expect  that  groups  with  powerful  allies  among
policymakers are likely to achieve higher degrees of influence (H2) and that groups in
favour of the status quo do not tend to be more successful than those promoting a policy
change (H3).
The literature on EU visa policy towards the neighbouring countries focuses on the
Western Balkan countries, Turkey, Russia and to a lesser extent on other East European
neighbours of the EU (Trauner & Manigrassi 2014; Hernández i Sagrera 2013; Finotelli
& Sciortino 2013; Bürgin 2013; Voinikov & Korneev 2013; Hernández i Sagrera &
Korneev  2012;  Hernández  i  Sagrera  2010;  Trauner  2009;  Trauner  &  Kruse  2008).
However, the studies omit the role of non-state actors. An exception is a study focusing
on member state implementation of EU visa policy, which reveals the impact of the
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tourism industry in  Spain on the easing of  Schengen visa issuance practices  by the
consulates of this country (Macías-Aymar et al. 2012). 
In  contrast,  studies  on  immigration  and  asylum policies  of  the  EU have  examined
lobbying  of  pro-migrant  NGOs at  the  EU level  and shown that  these  groups  exert
influence to varying degrees  in these policy domains  (Uçarer 2009; Hoffmann 2012;
Hoffmann 2013; Kaunert et al.  2013). Assessing influence on the legislation making
process in EU immigration and asylum policies, Hoffmann (2013) concludes that pro-
migrant  NGOs  seem  to  be  more  successful  during  the  drafting  stages  with  the
Commission than during the negotiations in the Council. After the introduction of the
ordinary legislative procedure in the Lisbon Treaty, the groups approached the European
Parliament, which became co-legislator; however, the research has shown mixed results
as to whether the increased role of this institution led to a growing influence of pro-
migrant groups  (Hoffmann 2013). Her findings seem to be in line with another study
that shows a high degree of continuity in EU asylum policy and explains that this is due
to  the  success  of  an  advocacy  coalition  in  favour  of  more  restrictive  and  weakly
integrated EU policy, led by the member states’ interior ministers who co-opted pivotal
actors within the Commission and empowered the EP against a more liberally oriented
advocacy coalition of pro-migrant actors  (Ripoll Servent & Trauner 2014). Hoffman
explains that the interest group influence is due to the dependence of the Commission
and the Parliament on expert knowledge provided by groups, while no evidence has
been found of the importance of such knowledge for the Council  (Hoffmann 2013).
Moreover, factors such as political support and legitimacy that groups may provide to
EU policymakers do not matter at all for the EU institutions, according to her results. 
This study looks at EU visa policy towards the neighbours as an element of migration
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management policy and of foreign policy to promote other goals. This policy represents
a mix of different tools applied by the EU to promote desired policy changes in the EaP
countries in exchange for the abolition of visa obligation for their citizens travelling to
the  Schengen  zone  for  the  purpose  of  short-term  stay.  Visa  facilitation  and  visa
liberalisation were offered to the Eastern neighbouring countries within the ENP and
later these promises were further developed under the EaP. In a nutshell, the EU offers
to its neighbours a greater freedom of movement for their citizens through Schengen
borders  in  exchange  for  sharing  responsibility  for  migration  management  (through
readmission agreements and other measures) and domestic reforms which go beyond
migration and border control. While the offer of visa-free travel is given to all six EaP
countries as a region, the EU negotiates specific conditions for the visa regime lifting
with each country individually and treats the progress towards visa liberalisation on a
country basis. Thus, this case study focuses primarily on Moldova and Ukraine and to a
lesser extent on Georgia as the first EaP countries to advance in this process.
The EU visa policy towards the EaP countries includes elements of the EU legislation
making,  namely  amendments  to  the  Council  Regulation  (EC)  539/2001  in  order  to
abolish  visa  requirement  as  a  final  step,  but  there  are  also  other  non-legislative
documents adopted by the EU within this  policy as intermediary steps (e.g.  binding
agreements between the EU and the neighbouring states on visa facilitation; political
documents  between  the  EU  and  the  neighbouring  states  agreeing  the  necessary
conditions  for  visa  liberalisation).  Therefore,  EU  visa  policy  towards  neighbouring
states offers a distinct lobbying environment than EU legislation making on Schengen
visas or other home affairs issues which envisage clear roles of the decision-making
actors and legislation-making procedures, including the time frame. 
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This chapter draws on 44 interviews with interest group representatives, policymakers
and  experts  conducted  between  May  2013  and  January  2015  in  Brussels,  Berlin,
Warsaw, Vilnius, Madrid, Kyiv, Chisinau, Tbilisi and other locations. In addition, the
EU policy documents, documents produced by groups and media articles have also been
analysed.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section  analyses the development
of  EU  visa  policy  towards  Eastern  neighbours  and  describes  the  decision-making
environment in which interest groups operate breaking EU policy down into distinct
policy processes and policy stages at which groups may engage in lobbying. It also
provides an overview of groups which have lobbied in this policy domain and have
been interviewed for this  study.  The second section focuses on advocacy strategies
analysing advocacy objectives, the start of advocacy activities, advocacy targets, tactics
and allies. The third section provides findings on interest group influence in the studied
case and factors explaining it.
1. Case description
1.1. Evolution of EU visa policy towards Eastern neighbours
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 communitarised EU policy on visas. It also envisaged
specific  arrangements  for  the  UK  and  Ireland,  who  completely  opted  out  of  the
Schengen  acquis,  and  Denmark  who  reserved  the  right  to  opt  out  of  the  new
developments of the Schengen acquis (for an overview of EU integration in visa policy
see  Meloni 2006). On the basis of the Treaty, the EU established ‘black’ and ‘white’
visa lists, the uniform format of visas and the Visa Identification system. While the
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member states remain responsible for implementation of visa policy at consular level,
the Union concludes visa facilitation agreements with third countries that aim to ease
issuance of visas for certain categories of travellers. The Commission can also launch
infringement procedures against member states who fail to comply with common rules
on visa issuance.
Post-soviet countries, with the exception of the three Baltic candidate states, appeared
on the first EU-wide ‘black list’ of third countries whose nationals needed a visa to
cross  the  external  borders  of  the  member  states  which  was  annexed  to  Council
Regulation  (EC)  No  2317/95  of  25  September  1995  and  superseded  by  Council
Regulation (EC)574/1999 of 12 March 1999. They reappeared on the ‘black list’ in the
Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 which has also introduced the
‘white list’ of third countries whose citizens are exempt from visa requirement, as  was
envisaged  by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty.  The  criteria  which  govern  a  third  country’s
position on either  the  ‘black’ or  ‘white’ lists involve concerns  of  illegal  migration,
public policy and security, EU’s relations with the third country  and considerations of
the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity (Council 2001). Most commonly
the countries are treated in groups as a region, thus, visa policy reflects the EU vision of
regionalism (Guild & Bigo 2005: 212).
The idea of easing the visa regime for the European post-soviet countries takes root in
the  EU’s  Eastern  enlargement.  Ahead  of  the  accession  to  the  EU  and  later  to  the
Schengen zone, Central and Eastern European states had to introduce visa regimes or
stricter  visa  requirements  for  their  non-EU  neighbours.  It  went  against  historical,
cultural, human and trade links across the borders and limited the ability of the ‘new’
member states to use visa policy as a foreign policy tool. Thus, they have become the
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main advocates for EU visa liberalisation with the Eastern neighbours.  Their  voices
against a new “paper curtain” in Europe have been joined by the non-state actors –
NGOs,  think-tanks,  the  media  –  protesting  against  the  visa  hurdles  and  proposing
measures to alleviate the impact of the strict visa regulations (Jileva 2004). 
The  European  Commission  also  supported  and  contributed  to  the  idea  of  greater
people’s mobility  between  the  enlarged  EU and  its  new neighbours. Proposing  the
policy  framework  for  EU  relations  with  the  new  neighbourhood  in  2003,  the
Commission  for  the  first  time  mentioned  visa  facilitation  in  the  context  of  border
crossing for bona fide third-country nationals living in the border areas and suggested
the EU “examine wider application of visa-free regimes” (European Commission 2003).
In autumn 2004, the EU started negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement (VFA)
envisaging a simplified regime of visa issue for certain groups of travellers with Russia
and  a  year  after  with  Ukraine.  A VFA was  offered  as  a  reward  for  a  readmission
agreement through which the EU member states wanted to control illegal migration but
which was resisted by the neighbouring countries who feared its negative consequences
(Trauner & Kruse 2008: 415). Afterwards, other neighbouring countries (the Western
Balkans and Moldova) were offered to conclude a package of a readmission agreement
and a visa facilitation agreement (ibidem). The Commission further included an offer of
visa facilitation with the EU neighbours in the ENP design as part of cooperation on
home affairs (European Commission 2004; European Commission 2006a).  
At  the  same  time,  the  EU’s  eastern  neighbours  were  asking  for  more  than  visa
facilitation. They wanted the EU to grant them a visa-free regime. In 2005, Ukraine and
Georgia abolished visas for EU citizens, and Moldova did the same in 2007, hoping that
such an asymmetric step would invite the EU to respond with reciprocity. Russia kept
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visas for EU citizens but the parties established a dialogue to examine conditions for
visa-free travel as a long-term perspective in 2007. The EU VFAs signed with the East
European countries recognised the introduction of a visa-free travel regime for their
citizens as a long term perspective. 
Whereas VFAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkan countries entered into force
on 1 January 2008, soon afterwards the Western Balkans countries were offered visa
dialogues leading to abolition of visa regimes. The EU used visa policy as a foreign
policy instrument to give a new impetus to the creeping enlargement process (Renner &
Trauner  2009;  Trauner  2009).  By the end of 2010,  the EU abolished visas  with all
Western Balkan countries except Kosovo.
After  the  VFA entered  into  force,  Ukraine  asked  for  a  visa  liberalisation  dialogue
arguing that this was the path followed with the Western Balkan countries. In September
2008, the EU launched a visa dialogue with Ukraine, but it did not offer Ukraine a
Roadmap for visa liberalisation which would outline reforms necessary for abolishment
of the visa regime as it had granted to the Western Balkan countries. 
While EU-Russia visa dialogue took a different path (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina
2013),  the  EU  adopted  a  regional  approach  to  visa  liberalisation  with  the  Eastern
neighbours covered by the EaP initiative launched in 2008. The European Commission
(2008:  6) envisaged  that  for  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Moldova  and
Ukraine “[v]isa policy would follow a phased approach, leading to visa liberalisation
under  specific  conditions  and  with  accompanying  measures,  including  financial
assistance for our partners”. The phases included visa facilitation as a first step; revision
of existing VFAs introducing additional facilitations, e.g waiving the visa fee for all
citizens; a coordinated plan to improve member states’ consular coverage; and “[o]nce
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visa  facilitation  and  readmission  agreements  are  effectively  implemented,  open
dialogues on visa-free travel with all cooperating partners. Dialogues would establish
roadmaps leading to visa waiver, dealing with four main blocks of issues: document
security; fight against irregular migration, including readmission; public order issues;
and external relation issues, including human rights of migrants and other vulnerable
groups” (ibidem).
The EaP Prague Summit Declaration in May 2009 confirmed full visa liberalisation as a
long term goal for  all the EaP countries. In November 2010, Ukraine as the first EaP
country  received  an  Action  Plan  on  Visa  Liberalisation  (VLAP).  In  June  2010,
Moldova-EU  visa  dialogue  was  launched  and  half  a  year  later,  in  January  2011,
Moldova become the second EaP country to receive the VLAP from the EU. Parallel to
visa  liberalisation,  the  EU also reviewed and amended the  VFAs with  Ukraine  and
Moldova,  facilitating visa issuance for more categories of citizens.  Georgia was the
third EaP country to sign the VFA in June 2010 and to receive a visa dialogue with the
EU in June 2012 and a VLAP in February 2013. The EU has concluded the VFAs with
Armenia and Azerbaijan and negotiates such an agreement with Belarus.  
The  VLAPs  require  that  EaP  countries  implement  a  wide  range  of  reforms,  from
improving security of travel documents and effective migration management to fighting
against organised crime and corruption and protecting minorities.  The EaP countries
have to meet up to sixty benchmarks. By conditioning a visa-free regime on the success
of domestic reforms, the EU uses its visa policy as a tool to push for policy change in
the EaP countries that goes beyond migration control and border management. 
Unlike  in  the  case  of  the  Western  Balkans,  the road of  Eastern  European countries
towards visa-free travel to Europe has been bumpier. There is less haste on the EU side.
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First, these countries do not have an accession prospect. Second, having experienced
negative consequences of visa-free travel with the Western Balkan countries, the EU has
introduced a  more complicated process  of  visa liberalisation  (Trauner  & Manigrassi
2014; Hernández i Sagrera 2013). The VLAP has envisaged a more gradual, two-staged
process in which adoption of legislation would be followed by implementation. There
are also more specific and further reaching requirements on the adoption of reforms
than in the case of the Western Balkan countries (Hernández i Sagrera 2013). This was
done to ensure more rigorous checks of reform quality and provide the member states
which are sensitive to the opening of EU borders further to the East with more control
over the evaluation of reform process on the ground. In addition, upon the insistence of
a migration-wary member state, an additional check has been introduced: the European
Commission has to provide an assessment of migratory and security risks of future visa-
free travel. As a result, all these measures slow down the process of visa liberalisation.
In  November  2013,  the  Commission  concluded   in  its  fifth  progress  report  on  the
implementation  of  the  VLAP  by  Moldova  that  the  country  had  fulfilled  all  the
benchmarks and initiated the change of the Council Regulation 539/2001 to transfer
Moldova  onto  the  list  of  third  countries  whose  nationals  are  exempt  from  visa
requirement. In March 2014, three years after it had been granted a VLAP, Moldova
was transferred to the ‘white’ visa list and since 28 April 2014 Moldovan citizens with
biometric passports travelling to the Schengen countries for period up to 90 days do not
need  to  possess  a  visa.  By  September  2014,  over  200,000  Moldovan  citizens  had
benefited from this possibility (European Commission & High Representative 2015).
The EU decided to graduate Ukraine to the second stage of VLAP in June 2014, after
the Commission and the Council had positively evaluated the progress in adopting the
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legislation. Soon afterwards, in November 2014, Georgia caught up with Ukraine being
transferred to the second stage of the VLAP too.  In May 2015, the Commission issued
the  next  wave  of  progress  reports  on  Ukraine  and  Georgia,  however,  none  of  the
countries had fulfilled all the benchmarks.
This case study examines interest groups’ involvement and influence on EU visa policy
towards  the  Eastern  neighbours,  looking  at  the  two distinct  but  closely  intertwined
processes: visa facilitation as the process of concluding, implementing and reviewing
VFAs with Ukraine and Moldova and visa liberalisation as a policy process leading to
abolishment  of  visa  requirements.  The  next  section  will  overview  the  policy
environment in which interest groups operate.
1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures 
The structure of the section reflects the main elements of EU visa policy towards the
Eastern  neighbours:  visa  facilitation  process  which  consists  of  concluding,
implementing and reviewing the VFAs; and visa liberalisation which is centred on visa
dialogues  and VLAPs and finalised  with  the  amendment  to  the  Council  Regulation
539/2001 transferring a neighbouring country from the ‘black’ to ‘white’ visa list.
VFAs
Having  the  right  of  initiative,  the  Commission proposes  to  the  Council  to  initiate
negotiations  on  a  VFA or  an  agreement  amending  it.  Acting  upon  the  negotiating
mandate of the Council, the Commission conducts negotiations and signs the text of the
agreement which has to be approved through the consent procedure by the EP (before
the Lisbon Treaty – the EP was consulted) and then adopted by the Council by QMV.
In the Commission, the profile DG for visa issues is Home Affairs.6  There are different
6 Before  2010,  it  was  DG  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  that  was  split  into  two  DGs  (with  two
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Directorates in DG Home dealing with visa facilitation and visa liberalisation issues.
Until the end of 2014, the visa unit of Directorate for Schengen affairs dealt with VFAs
and implementation of EU visa acquis (Community Code on Visas), whereas the unit on
international affairs of Directorate responsible for Strategy dealt with visa liberalisation
and VLAPs.7
The Director of Visa Unit is chairperson of the Joint Committee for the implementation
of the VFAs from the EU side. The Joint Committee is established by the VFA and
composed of EU representatives (the Commission assisted by experts from the member
states) and representatives of a partner country. The Committee is tasked to monitor the
implementation of the VFA, suggest  amendments or additions to the agreement  and
settle disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the provisions in the
agreement. The body meets at least once a year or whenever necessary. In practice, it
convenes once a year in Brussels and once a year in the partner country or via a video-
conference (Interview 15). Member state representatives are invited to these meetings
and also briefed afterwards.  As a Commission official explained, the Joint Committee
on the implementation of VFA with Ukraine was usually more attended, while that with
Moldova, as a rule, drew interest mainly from Romania and Poland (ibidem).
In the Council, issues related to VFAs are first dealt with by the Visa Working Party.
The Visa Working Party agenda includes VFAs, amendments to VFAs and monitoring
of work of the Joint Committee for implementation of the VFAs (Interview 13). Other
Council bodies that may deal with VFAs are the High Level Working Group on Asylum
and  Migration  and  the  Strategic  Committee  on  Immigration,  Frontiers  and  Asylum
Commissioners) in the second Barosso’s Commission (2010-2014).
7 In Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission (2014-2019),  the DG Home Affairs was renamed into DG
Migration  and  Home  Affairs  and  reorganisations  of  directorates  and  units  within  the  two  DGs
occurred.
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(SCIFA). The latter prepares on a monthly basis the agenda of the Council of Ministers
for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA Council). When preparing a negotiating mandate, the
Council  working  groups  dealing  with  visa  issues  usually  consult  a  corresponding
geographic working party, which in the case of the Eastern neighbours is COEST –
Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia  (Council  2005a). Above SCIFA,
COREPER discusses and approves all agenda items for JHA Council meetings. In home
affairs, the role of the six-month rotating Presidency is key in forming the agenda of the
Council bodies (Interview 13).
In the EP, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) plays a
central  role  on  all  visa  policy  related  issues.  It  is  responsible  for  drafting  the  EP
recommendation  on the  conclusion  of  a  VFA.  Visa  policy  is  also  discussed  by the
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) that can be invited by LIBE to draft an opinion
on the conclusion of the VFA.
Visa dialogues and VLAPs
The  decision  to  offer  a  dialogue  examining  the  conditions  for  visa-free  travel  to  a
partner country is is taken by the EU Council.  The formal decision to launch a visa
dialogue is taken bilaterally. In the case of Ukraine,  it  was agreed at  a Ukraine-EU
Troika  meeting at  the  level  of  justice  and home affairs  ministers  in  May 2008 and
further  approved  by  the  EU-Ukraine  summit  of  9  September  2008.  In  the  case  of
Moldova,  the  intention  to  start  such  a  dialogue  in  2010  was  declared  by  the  EU-
Moldova Cooperation Council on 21 December 2009.
From the EU side, the visa dialogue is chaired by the Commission represented by the
Director of the Unit on International Affairs of DG Home. The visa dialogue has two
phases: an exploratory phase and operational phase. During the exploratory phase, the
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Commission in cooperation with experts  from the member states assess the relevant
factors for visa liberalisation structured in four blocs:   document security, including
biometrics;  illegal  migration,  including  readmission;  public  order  and  security;  and
external  relations.  This  evaluation  includes  on-site  visits  to  a  partner  country  and
dialogue  with  the  relevant  authorities.  It  allows  to  formulate  recommendations  for
setting  up  relevant  conditions  for  visa-free  travel  which  are  presented  in  a  “Gap
Analysis”  (Caras  2011).  This  report  is  discussed with the EU member states  at  the
Council working groups meetings. As a result of these discussions, the Council may
invite the Commission to draft a VLAP setting up conditions to be met by the partner
country before the possible establishment of visa-free travel regime. 
When the Commission presents the VLAP to the partner  country, the visa dialogue
enters  the  operational  stage.  The  Commission  is  responsible  for  monitoring  and
evaluation of the implementation of the VLAP by the partner country. The monitoring
and reporting on the first three blocks of a VLAP (document security, illegal migration
and public order and security) is carried out by the Unit on International Relations of
DG Home.  The EEAS is  responsible  for  monitoring  and drafting  the  report  on  the
implementation of the fourth block on external relations and fundamental rights. The
Commission and the EEAS also draw on reports of EU member states’ experts which
evaluate the progress of the partner country on the sets of benchmarks of the VLAP. The
experts are selected by the Commission and the EEAS from the proposals made by the
member  states.  The  experts  write  their  reports  based  on  findings  of  the  evaluation
missions in the country to which they go together with the staff of the Commission’s
DG Home and the EEAS (Interview 9).
The final report on the evaluation of implementation of the VLAP is drafted by the DG
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Home and after inter-service consultations is approved by the College (Interview 38).
The Commission submits reports to the EP and the Council and also publishes it on its
website. When the partner country fulfils the complete set of benchmarks of the first
legislation stage  of  the VLAP, the  Commission decides  to  move the  country to  the
second implementation stage. When Moldova was to be moved to the second stage of
the  VLAP in  2012,  there  was  a  dispute  between  the  Commission  and  the  Council
regarding the role of the Council in this process. The Commission argued that it should
be the decision of the Commission because it was the process of implementation of the
VLAP and there was no decision point for the Council. However, France and Germany
insisted that the EU member states to co-decide (ibidem). Thus, it was decided that the
Council takes the decision to launch the assessment of the benchmarks set out under the
second phase upon the Commission’s proposal (Interview 40). The Council does this by
adopting  Council  Conclusions.  In  the  case  of  Ukraine  and  Georgia,  this  rule  was
followed  (Council  2012a;  Council  2014b;  Council  2014a).  The  decisions  on  VLAP
issues are taken by consensus in the Council (Interview 40). 
While the member states base their decision on the Commission’s report, they may also
have some information coming from their capitals on the issues they are interested in
most (Interview 9).   In some member states’ embassies in the EaP countries, there are
staff in charge of internal affairs who monitor VLAP issues (Interview 24).
In contrast to visa liberalisation with the Western Balkan countries, in the case of the
EaP countries, there is a role for the EEAS and a bigger role of the member states who
have reserved the right to disagree with the Commission’s  assessment of the VLAP
implementation. This is a result of lessons learnt from the liberalisation with Western
Balkan countries: in the VLAPs there is more emphasis on the fourth block regulating
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fundamental rights, including protection of minorities, and the member states want to
ensure that they have control over the implementation process  (Trauner & Manigrassi
2014).
Amending Council Regulation 539/2001
When  the  Commission  concludes  that  a  partner  country  has  implemented  all  the
benchmarks and the Council endorses this conclusion (in the case of Moldova, there
was no separate Council Conclusions, but the decision was endorsed later by the EaP
summit  in  Vilnius),  the Commission initiates  the amendment of  Council  Regulation
539/2001 and drafts its proposal to the  EP and the Council who co-decide through the
ordinary legislative procedure (before the Lisbon Treaty the EP was consulted). The EP
votes upon the recommendation of LIBE committee which may also invite AFET to
give its  opinion.  The Council  decides by QMV, however, in  practice in  case of the
Western Balkan countries  and Moldova, the decision on transferring these countries
from the annex I (the ‘black’ visa list) to the annex II (the ‘white’ list) has been taken by
unanimity (Interview 1). 
In the Council, COEST and COPERER deal with visa dialogue and VLAPs. When an
amendment  of  the  Council  Regulation  539/2001 is  considered,  Visa  Working  Party
supported by SCIFA and High-Level Group on Asylum and Migration deal with the
issue (Interview 38).
1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy
Representatives of 24 groups have been interviewed. Of them, 10 are based in the EaP
countries and 14 are based in the EU. For nearly all groups, advocacy on EU visa policy
is just one direction of their activity.
122
The majority of the interviewed groups are public interests groups. Among these groups
there are think-tanks which do research and advocacy on European integration related
issues. EU visa policy towards European countries is an important part of their work
(e.g. European Stability Initiative, PASOS, Viitorul, Stefan Batory Foundation and Open
Society Foundations network). Rarely, they almost exclusively dedicate themselves to
the visa issues (e.g. Ukrainian NGO “Europe without Barriers”). 
There is also a group of youth organisations which promote youth mobility, including
visa-free travel to the EU (e.g. European Youth Forum, European Students’ Forum, the
Young European Federalists as well as their members in the EU and EaP countries).
Another set of public interest groups are NGOs who lobby on the issues covered by the
VLAPs  (e.g.  sexual  minority  rights,  fight  against  discrimination,  fight  against
corruption, fight against human trafficking).
Four  interviewed  groups  represent  business  interests.  Tourism  and  international
carriages services are those sectoral interests which advocate on visa facilitation and
visa liberalisation issues. Tourism associations are interested in minimising the role of
visas  as  an  obstacle  for  bringing  more  tourists  to  Europe,  while  for  road  carriers
associations  in  an  EaP  country  visa  is  “a  necessary  condition  for  conducting
international carriage business” (Interview 33). 
While  all  the  interviewed groups lobby on EU visa  policy, some of  them focus  on
horizontal (EU legislation on visas) rather than geographic solutions (EU visa policy
tools towards the Eastern neighbours). For example, Europe-wide youth organisations
such as Europe Youth Forum and AEGEE aim at facilitating travel and stay in the EU
for  young people.  Thus,  they  advocate  for  changes  to  the EU legislation regulating
Schengen visas (Visa Code) and long-term visas and residence permits for third country
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nationals coming to the EU for the purposes of studies,  pupil  exchange, training or
voluntary service. Similarly, EU-based tourist associations look for horizontal solutions
such as further simplification of visa issuance through the amendments to the Visa Code
which would cover all countries of origin of tourists.
Stronger geographic focus is common for groups that have a specific interest in the
Eastern Europe region. For example, umbrella business associations whose members
work with the East European countries or public interest groups such as foundations
who have partnerships with the Eastern neighbours tend to seek geographic solutions
such as visa facilitation agreements and visa liberalisation tools. Groups working in the
EaP countries are naturally interested in the geographic tools targeting their countries.
There  have  been  no  groups  identified  lobbying  at  the  EU  level  against  EU  visa
liberalisation with the Eastern neighbours. While anti-migration parties have been on
the rise in Europe (van Spanje 2010; van Spanje 2011), it seems that their influence is
not channelled via lobbying in Brussels and that interests of citizens who do not support
the  idea  of  a  more  open  Europe  are  mostly  channelled  via  national  politics.  The
interviewed policymakers and groups did not report lobbying at the EU level against
visa liberalisation with East European neighbours of the EU. While anti-migrant moods
in Europe have impact on EU policy on migration and asylum as the existing research
points out  (Hoffmann 2013), it  occurs not via EU-level lobbying, but rather through
electoral successes of anti-migration parties in the EU member states which either join
parliaments  and  in  few cases  governments  and  affect  positioning  of  other  political
parties on migration (on this issue see Alonso & Fonseca 2012; van Spanje 2010; Van
Spanje & Van Der Brug 2007; van Heerden et al. 2014), and also through the improved
results  of  anti-migration  parties  in  the  EP  elections  (Treib  2014;  Poenaru  2014;
124
Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2014). 
The lack of EU level lobbying can be explained by the fact that anti-migrant groups are
also largely nationalist and anti-EU in their rhetoric, thus they may avoid lobbying the
EU in order not to legitimise it, and  focus on the national channel instead given the EU
member states veto powers (see Vanhala 2009 on the influence of organisational identity
on choice of advocacy strategies). 
Among the two countries in focus, the interviewed groups and policymakers recognised
that groups were more active on lobbying on Ukraine than on Moldova.  This can be
explained by the fact that Ukraine is a bigger country, with a higher number of visa
applicants and has been a controversial case in terms of visa liberalisation due to its
foreign and domestic policy under Victor Yanukovych’s presidency (2010-2014).  
In the case of Moldova, much advocacy was done by the Moldovan government itself.
For  example,  Moldova’s government  organised  tours  to  the  border  for  EU member
states  diplomats  and  a  campaign  targeting  ‘old’ member  states  (including  visits  of
foreign  ministers  of  Benelux  countries  in  September  2013  to  Chisinau;  visits  of
Moldova’s foreign minister to European capitals and meetings with interior ministers).
The  Moldovan  groups  said  that  they  had  not  advocated  on  the  content  of  the
amendments to the EU-Moldova VFA leaving it to the government. 
In Ukraine, when Viktor Yanukovych’s administration had been reluctant to conduct
reforms  before  his  complete  withdrawal  from  the  conclusion  of  the  Association
Agreement with the EU in November 2013, interest groups actively advocated at both
the EU and Ukraine’s government level to push for VLAP-required legislative changes.
Given  Yanukovych’s  backlash  in  democracy  and  human  rights,  the  amended  EU-
Ukraine  VFA was  an  issue  of  debate  in  the  EU  at  least  twice.  In  July  2012,  the
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Commission  appeared  divided  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  as  the  vice-
president  Viviane Reding reportedly blocked it for political reasons, mainly due to the
continued imprisoned ex-prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko  (New Europe
2012).   Such  a  position  was  also  taken  by  the  European  People’s Party  in  which
Tymoshenko’s  party  is  an  observer.  The  Home  Affairs  Commissioner  Cecilia
Malmström defended the agreement arguing that it  would facilitate people-to-people
contacts  and  benefit  the  lives  of  ordinary  Ukrainians  (ibidem),  which  was  also  an
argument of Ukrainian NGOs lobbying for visa-free travel. In the end, the Commission
approved the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  on  23  July  2012  (European Commission
2012). In May 2013, the VFA became an issue of debate again when the EP was to give
its consent to the agreement. Human rights groups defending sexual minorities called on
the EP to pause the ratification of the agreement  because Ukraine’s parliament  was
considering discriminatory legislation against gay and lesbian people. After the arrival
of  a  pro-European  government  in  February  2014,  the  progress  in  the  fulfilling  the
benchmarks  of  the  VLAP by  Ukraine  accelerated  and  the  EU  decided  to  transfer
Ukraine to the implementation stage. Thus, non-state actor advocacy chiefly turned to
focusing on explaining the visa-related reform progress of Ukraine. 
2. Advocacy strategies
2.1. Advocacy objectives
On the  basis  of  the  overall  goals  which  are  fundamental  to  the  realisation  of  their
interests in EU visa policy and sometimes enshrined in their missions, groups formulate
more  specific  advocacy  objectives  which  they  try  to  achieve  in  their  day-to-day
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advocacy  work  or  through  specific  advocacy  campaigns.  All  groups  which  I  have
interviewed  for  this  study have  sought  a  policy  change.  Most  of  them aim at  visa
liberalisation  (e.g.  abolishment  of  visa  regime)  as  their  ultimate  goal  and  visa
facilitation  as  a  temporal  solution.  Some  groups  are  focusing  mostly  on  the
implementation issues, other seek changes to the EU legislation.
Organisations  that  represent  more  general  interests,  for  example,  the  interests  of  all
Ukrainian citizens or European business interests tend to set broader goals related to
visa liberalisation or visa facilitation law and practices. For think-tanks whose mission
is to spread knowledge and inform policy debate, some of their advocacy objectives are
long-term, for example, changing policy discourse. For instance, according to a Kyiv-
based  NGO  whose  mission  is  the  abolition  of  visa  barriers  in  Europe,  their  first
advocacy  goal  is  to  stimulate   policymakers  to  review  their  assumptions  on  the
consequences  of  visa-free  regimes  as  well  as  policy  instruments  and  arguments,  to
substantiate basic assumptions with facts and to have a more profound discussion on the
visa policy issue. Their second goal is to draw the attention of policymakers to human
rights in the context of visa policy, to freedom of movement and freedom of undertake
economic activity (Interview 18). For advocacy groups representing the tourist industry,
a  long-term objective  was  to  change discourse  on  EU visa  policy  by  incorporating
economic  interests  and arguments  (Interview 31).  Reacting  to  an event  or  trying  to
influence certain stages of policy process, an organisation may set out a narrower and
tactical advocacy objective. For example, the Ukrainian NGO Europe without Barriers
supported by its  partners in  Poland advocated for temporary suspension of  the visa
regime for Ukraine as an EU response to Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in 2013-2014
(Interview 29).
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Another  example  of  an  advocacy  objective  set  broadly  is  the  creation  of  political
coalitions to support visa-free travel. As a director of the No Visa Project which was
carried out by the coalition of EU-based and EaP countries based think-tanks stated:
“[Our advocacy goal was] to move the debate from readiness to the political will of the
EU member states. We aimed to make sure that certain key players – member states and
the Commission, [Commissioner for ENP] Stefan Fule’s team, are supporting visa-free
travel and that there is a political will [to introduce visa-free travel], if the technical
criteria are met by the EaP countries” (Interview 22).  A lobbyist who had been involved
in the advocacy campaign for the Western Balkans defined their goal as “designing the
climate of inevitability of visa-free regime for the Western Balkans: the question was
raised not if but how quickly visa-free travel would be introduced. We needed a critical
mass of Commission and member states officials, especially those with attention to the
Western Balkan countries” (Interview 35). 
Membership organisations which serve their members’ needs or represent the interests
of a certain well-defined constituency tend to set  very concrete advocacy objectives
related to changes in the legislation or implementation practices connected to the needs
of their members. Good examples of these are tourist organisations, international carrier
groups or youth associations that lobby for easier and cheaper procedures for obtaining
visas for their potential clients or members. For instance, the Ukrainian association of
international road carriers, while declaring visa-free travel as a strategic goal, focuses its
advocacy on such priority objectives as simplification and harmonisation of procedures
for obtaining visas for professional drivers and preventing the introduction of extra visa
expenses, e.g. fees for services of intermediaries. 
This  overview of  advocacy goals  suggests that  how they are defined influences  the
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choice of lobbying strategies. Groups with more ambitious advocacy objectives have to
define  more  comprehensive  lobbying  strategies  and target  actors  at  different  levels.
Groups which focus on EU visa policy implementation do not need to have such a wide
outreach of their advocacy activities and may opt for a narrow set of lobbying tactics as
will be discussed in the sections below. 
Advocacy objectives reflect the mission of the group, but they are also closely related to
other factors such as group resources and lobbying environment. Groups which have
more experience of lobbying at the EU level tend to set more realistic and achievable
objectives.  For  example,  a  representative  of  a  Brussels-based  European  association
advancing  sexual  minorities  rights  said  that  they  prefer  to  limit  their  advocacy
objectives to promotion of the VLAP benchmark on the prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in accordance with the EU acquis, while LGBTI groups
in  Moldova wanted to  see non-discrimination  on the basis  of  gender  identity  to  be
included too. The European association decided not to lobby for the inclusion of gender
identity as there was no EU acquis and it was recognised as an unrealistic advocacy
objective (Interview 8).
Defining advocacy objectives also depends on when or  at what stage of the  of policy
cycle groups engage in lobbying. For example, European Stability Initiative (ESI) had
advocated for many years for the abolishment of the EU visa regime with the Western
Balkan countries before turning its attention to Turkey, Kosovo and Eastern Europe.
They launched an active advocacy campaign when the implementation of Road Maps
for visa liberalisation with the Western Balkan countries started and aimed to make the
process  transparent  and  merit-based  (Interview 1).  Similarly,  Georgian  civil  society
groups engaged in more active advocacy when the VFA agreement entered into force
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and the VLAP was granted to their country. Their primary goals were transparency of
the  EU-Georgia  visa  facilitation  and liberalisation  process  and more  space  for  civil
society engagement (Interview 41). 
Looking forward to the section on the measurement of interest group influence, we can
see a direct relationship between how the groups define their advocacy objectives and
how they are able to measure their influence, i.e. whether they reach their objectives or
not.  If  objectives  are  concrete  points  such  as  costs  of  visas  or  ease  of  certain
administrative procedures of visa issuance, it can be easier for them to establish whether
they have achieved them or not. If an objective is long-term and broad such as a change
of EU visa policy discourse, the measurement can be more difficult as it requires a time
lag and it is more difficult to attribute influence to a certain group because many actors
and factors could contribute to it. Defining broad and long-term advocacy objectives,
groups also are less able to exercise control upon their achievement. 
In the previous section, I mentioned that there are a number of groups whose advocacy
goals are not related to achieving visa-free regime or visa facilitation, but using EU visa
policy tools to reach other objectives. They use EU conditionality related to visa policy
to promote policy change within the EaP countries. Thus, their advocacy goals at the EU
level relate to EU requirements for visa facilitation or liberalisation. While the major
bulk of their advocacy targets the EaP countries’ governments,  these groups also try to
influence the EU’s views on how conditions for the EaP countries are formulated and
advanced  by  the  EU,  and  how  progress  on  their  implementation  is  monitored  and
evaluated. For example, a representative of the Brussels office of a big international
NGO  says  that  his  group  does  not  advocate  on  visa  liberalisation  for  freedom  of
movement as such but as a tool to put conditionality related to democratic governance
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and rights on East European countries and Turkey. According to this logic, the NGO
“would advocate for VLAP for Georgia because it is a tool we can use for promoting
anti-discrimination laws, or Roma integration in case of Moldova, etc” (Interview 43). 
Given this link between abolition of the visa regime and domestic reforms in the EaP
countries,  these  groups  may  actually  work  against  visa  facilitation  or  liberalisation
lobbying for preserving the status quo as a temporal solution, as a tactic for pushing
policy  change  in  the  EaP  country.  Though  these  groups  are  not  against  visa
liberalisation, and in most cases whole-heartedly support it because it will bring benefits
for their constituencies too, they may opt to block or delay visa liberalisation in order to
achieve their primary advocacy goals. For example, human rights and LGBTI rights
groups  pushed  the  EP to  postpone  the  approval  of  the  amended  EU-Ukraine  VFA
demanding  the  EU  to  pressure  Ukraine’s  parliament  to  revise  their  discriminatory
legislation plans. However, as we will see from the sections below, these groups are
rarely named as opponents by pro-visa-free travel groups.
2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying
When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?
Frequently, interest groups become involved in advocacy at the EU level when certain
“Europeanisation  moments”  occur  –  when  the  EU  enacts  an  EU-level  policy  or
measure. For example, many interviewed groups state that they engaged in advocacy at
the EU level when the VFAs had entered into force or when visa dialogues and VLAPs
had been granted to their countries. The “Europeanisation moment” may also occur with
the transfer of national visa competences to the EU level. Poland-based groups, who had
initially lobbied at the national level for facilitation of travel to Poland for the East
Europeans, turned to the EU reacting to Poland’s EU accession which required changes
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in national visa policy and later accession to the Schengen zone (Interview 23). 
The “Europeanisation moment” may also spur creation of a domestic or transnational
coalition to facilitate lobbying at the EU level. In Ukraine, a coalition of NGOs “Europe
Without Barriers” was an attempt to pull together organisational resources and funding
to do monitoring of implementation of the Ukraine-EU VFA and visa liberalisation with
the EU. The Visa-free Europe Coalition that united NGOs in the EU and Eastern Europe
was also a reaction to the launch of an active stage of EU visa liberalisation process
towards the Eastern neighbours, though cooperation between its members had started
long before.
The start of advocacy activities can also be related to the domestic process in the EaP
countries. For instance, for a group lobbying for a policy change in the EaP country
envisaged by the VLAP, EU-level  advocacy starts  when discussion on fulfilling EU
criteria in the EaP country begins. Such engagement may be a two-way street: the EU
starts consultations with civil society and civil society starts targeting the EU bodies on
the issue of their interest within the VLAP.  
At which policy stages do they lobby?
The  interviews  reveal  that  groups  rarely  engage  in  lobbying  at  earlier  stages  of
policymaking,  such  as  agenda  setting  and  policy  formulation.  Many  groups  start
lobbying when there is a decision taken and implementation begins such as in the case
of the conclusion of a VFA, launch of a visa dialogue or granting of a VLAP. The
existence of norms in the bilateral relations and formal processes allow civil society
groups to act as watchdogs calling the parties, including the EU, to comply with the
agreed norms and principles  (see also Joachim & Dembinski 2011). Advocacy at the
implementation stage permits these groups to then engage in advocacy at the evaluation
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and policy reformulation stage (e.g. at the process of evaluation of the implementation
of VFA and revision of the agreement).  
A plausible explanation is that the initial policymaking stages involve to a great extent
the Council of Ministers –  “the least accessible” EU institution for lobbies. Groups who
say that they have been engaged in advocacy at the policy formulation stage did so
within the framework of  well-established legislation making process (e.g. revision of
EU Visa Code or EU directives) in which the Commission has the exclusive role of
legislative initiative and the Council is involved at a later negotiation stage. In the case
of bilateral EU visa policy tools such as VLAPs, the procedure is developed by the EU
institutions ad hoc, often as an exercise in the struggle for competences. For example,
even if it drew on the EU experience in the Western Balkans, a VLAP was an EU policy
innovation for Ukraine which was after passed to other EaP countries. In the case of
Moldova, a pioneer of visa liberalisation in the East, it took the Commission and the EU
member states a couple of months just to agree how the decision on the transfer of the
EaP country from the first to the second stage of VLAP implementation would be taken
(Interview 40). Thus, groups suffer from the tug-of-war between the EU institutions as
the lobbying environment is less clear and stable for them.
This  is  how a representative of  an EU-wide youth umbrella  organisation which has
lobbied for free of charge visas and a visa-free regime for young people since 2006-
2007  explains  their  advocacy  strategy:  “We were  trying  to  look  in  the  VFAs  with
Ukraine, Georgia, but as they were bilateral agreements, it was difficult for us to get
information about what was being negotiated.  Now the revision of the Visa Code is a
centralised process and it concerns the whole EU – it is all-European solution, so we
have decided to lobby” (Interview 32).
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Advocacy targets
The interviews show that groups mostly engage in advocacy both at the EU and the
member state levels.  The multi-level lobbying is  in line with the expectation of H4
outlined in the Chapter 2: EU visa policy  is the ‘easy’ case.
All  the  interviewed  groups  report  targeting  the  European  Commission.  This  largely
confirms the image of the Commission as the most lobbied EU institution within the
Community policy domains. This is also in line with the Commission’s role in EU visa
policy in which it has the right of legislative initiative and plays a key role in devising
and overseeing the implementation of bilateral tools such as VFAs and VLAPs. 
The groups working closely on EU visa policy towards the region mention that they
target Commission’s DG Home and its two units working on visa facilitation and visa
liberalisation. They also name  Commissioner’s for Enlargement and ENP cabinet and
Commissioner’s for Home Affairs cabinet as their advocacy targets. Business groups
say  that  they  have  approached  their  profile  DGs:  for  example,  DG  Enterprise  and
Industry  –  in  the  case  of  tourist  associations  and  DG  Transport  –  in  the  case  of
international  road  carriers  associations.  Groups working in  the  EaP countries  report
reaching out to Commission officials via the EU Delegations on the ground. 
Approaching the  European Commission  is  facilitated  by a  number  of  access  points
which the institution provides for interest groups. First, consultations with stakeholders
are run ahead of proposing legislative changes (e.g. online consultation for individuals
and groups “Improving procedures for obtaining short-stay ‘Schengen’ visas” held in
March-June 2013 in the preparation of evaluation of the Visa Code). Second, there are
consultations  with  experts  from  the  EaP  states,  including  those  representing  civil
society, within the process of evaluation of the VLAP implementation. Third, issues
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related to the VLAP implementation are also discussed within human rights dialogues
held  between  the  EU  and  the  EaP  countries  once  a  year.  As  a  rule,  the  EU
representatives  meet  with  local  and  international  human  rights  groups  prior  to  the
meetings with EaP government representatives and debrief them afterwards. In case of
Ukraine such a two-day-dialogue session is held within the EU-Ukraine Subcommittee
on Justice, Freedom and Security and its first day is dedicated to human rights issues
covered in the VLAP (Interview 24). Finally, in the case of Ukraine, there is also an
access point for interest groups involvement within the overseeing mechanism of EU
visa policy implementation – through the Joint Committee for implementation of the
VFA. The EU Delegation in Ukraine also organises briefings before and debriefings for
NGOs after  the  Senior  Official  meetings  at  the  level  of  Director  General  of  Home
Affairs and Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine (ibidem).  
Unlike on other policy issues in justice, freedom and security area (see Hoffmann 2013;
Poenaru 2014), the European Parliament is not heavily lobbied by groups on the visa
facilitation agreements  and visa liberalisation.  A possible  explanation  is  that  on the
issues of focus of this case study the  Parliament appears as a decision-maker at precise
points,  such  as  consent  (before  2009  –  non-binding  recommendation  through  the
consultation procedure) given to the VFAs and co-decision for amending the Council
Regulation 539/2001 when an EaP country moves to the “white” visa list. Moreover, the
EP is generally supportive of EU visa-free travel with the EaP countries. Groups report
lobbying the Parliament if they need to make amendments to the legislation (not the
case for policy issues of direct interest to us in this case), or when they want to promote
a certain issue in a policy debate. Routes to access the EP also pass through individual
members, for instance,  Polish MEPs advocating for visa liberalisation, or groups with
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interest in relations with a particular EaP country or issue such as Youth Inter-Group. 
In  one  particular  instance  the  EP was  more  intensively  lobbied  by  the  interviewed
groups.  It  was  when LGBTI groups asked to  pause the  conclusion  of  the amended
Ukraine-EU VFA as a leverage on Ukraine to halt  its  plans to adopt  discriminatory
legislation.  The groups managed to push the rapporteur from LIBE committee to call
for debate before the vote acting via ALDE group which is more sensitive to LGBTI
rights  and  individual  MEPs.  ALDE  insisted  on  a  referral  back  to  committee  and
postponement of the vote  (European Parliament 2013: 232). However, the majority of
MEPs still voted in favour of the agreement. 
Only one interviewed group mentioned that they lobbied the Council of EU bodies on
the issue of EU visa policy towards EaP countries (Interview 29). A couple of Brussels-
based groups did advocacy in the Council on other regions – the Western Balkans and
Russia. This confirms the image of the EU Council as the least accessible institution,
but  seems  also  to  be  connected  to  the  issue  of  resources  necessary  to  carry  out
systematic  advocacy  in  the  Council  and  its  bodies.  A Council  representative  also
explains limited contact with advocacy groups by the fact that the Council acts upon the
instructions from the capitals and that the information supplied by groups can go to
those policymakers in the capitals who draft these instructions (Interview 40). 
The Brussels office of a big international foundation approached the Council asking to
publish the  the Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel of Russia and EU
citizens (Interview 33). They did not succeed, however, and decided to bring this issue
to the European Ombudsman who investigates complaints about maladministration in
the institutions and bodies of the EU. After his intervention, the Council published the
text of the Common Steps.  Another EU-based NGO with representation in  Brussels
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reported briefing representatives of Working Party on Western Balkans and Working
Party on Visas as well as having individual meetings in the Council for their advocacy
campaign  for  visa-free  regime  with  the  Western  Balkan  countries  (Interview  1).
Opportunity to approach the Council bodies can be created by other EU institutions: for
example,  the  EU  Delegation  in  Kyiv   organised  a  NGO  briefing  for  the  COEST
members dealing with Eastern Europe during the visit of the EU evaluation mission.
Litigating  before the EUCJ was not reported, despite the powers of the Court in this
policy  area.  None of  the  groups mention  doing advocacy in  the  EEAS, apart  from
consulting an EEAS representative in the framework of the evaluation missions on the
VLAP  implementation  facilitated  by  the  EU  Delegation.  Nonetheless,  the  EU
Delegation on the ground is frequently the first advocacy target from groups from the
EaP countries. First, the personnel of EU Delegations usually nurture contacts with civil
society as CSOs are not only recipients of EU aid distributed via the Delegation, but
also recognised as important sources of information on domestic developments (e.g.
human rights, issues related to the Association Agreements) or progress in the VLAP
implementation. Usually, the EU Delegations run local civil society consultations on EU
funding tools. EU diplomats are also invited to meetings and events organised by civil
society organisations. For example, a director of an NGO in Chisinau reported that the
EU ambassador regularly attended meetings of the National Platform of the EaP Civil
Society Forum (EaP CSF) at which issues like EU visa policy were discussed (Interview
42). 
Second,  the  EU  Delegation  is  also  an  access  point  to  other  EU  institutions  as  it
organises  or  assists  in  visits  of  delegations  from  the  Commission,  the  EEAS,  the
Council  and  the  European  Parliament  that  may  wish  to  meet  with  civil  society
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representatives too. Importantly, the EU Delegation is in charge of organising meetings
with representatives NGOs and international  organisations during the EU evaluation
missions on the VLAP implementation. Moreover, apart from institutionalised practices,
informal consultations between local NGOs, the Commission and the EEAS are also
facilitated by the EU Delegation staff.  As an EU diplomat in Kyiv says: 
“When there is a piece of Ukrainian legislation adopted, its translation is sent to
Brussels, then a delegation of experts from the EU member states come to visit.
They draft progress reports. When these reports are drafted, we have meetings with
UNHCR,  anti-discrimination  NGOs  and  other  CSOs  at  which  they  have  a
possibility to express their opinions on the reports. We try to include them in these
documents. Our cooperation with NGOs is institutionalised, but it depends on a
person who works on the dossier in the EU Delegation. With me, groups have very
informal and very quick access. I am accessible on my mobile and via facebook. It
depends on the individual. Some are more reserved about talking to the groups”
(Interview 24).
Most groups recognise the importance of national level advocacy carried out in the EU
member states capitals, but only a limited few engage in it. They are mostly EU groups
that have resources for conducting activities in the member states or groups from EaP
states  in  partnership  with  groups  from EU countries.  These  groups  organise  public
events to which they invite policymakers in the EU member states capitals and also hold
individual  meetings  with  them.  They  report  targeting  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs
(MFA),  Ministries  of  Interior  and  Border  Guards  and,  in  fewer  cases,  national
Parliaments. 
Groups based in a member state usually do at least some part of their advocacy in that
member state.  One European youth association reported that their  national members
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approach national  governments  and parliaments.  Though national  groups may know
national decision-making structures and actors well, it is not always the case that such
an advocacy is easy to conduct. A Polish based NGO shares their experiences: 
“A year ago we had a meeting in the MFA – it was very painful, we are perceived
as a threat.  We also organised an exhibition in the Parliament and there was a
person from the MFA. He was very critical of us, he said that the MFA was doing
everything very well, and we just attacked them and we should not exist. But the
other day it was a different person who was much more open to our arguments. We
see it is a problem of the system: the MFA as an institution is very resistant to any
input or criticism from civil society. Sometimes they attend our meetings, but they
sit silently and do not say anything” (Interview 23).
National-level advocacy targeting decision-making in European capitals requires a lot of
resources, which is why many groups simply cannot afford it. A director of a Prague
based  NGO  running  an  advocacy  campaign  project  with  groups  from  other  EaP
countries said that they did not have many activities in the member states “due to the
budget restrictions” (Interview 22). 
Groups from the EaP countries target the EU member state embassies on the ground. As
a representative of a Moldovan think-tank explained: “The Commission has a positive
attitude [towards visa liberalisation], they are not needed to be convinced. There is a
need  to  convince  EU diplomats  working  in  the  EaP countries.  They  send  negative
reports to their capitals on the reform process in the EaP countries” (Interview 27). The
Visa-free Europe Coalition, which this group is part of, organised events to present their
monitoring reports on progress made by the EaP countries in Chisinau, Kyiv and Tbilisi.
The organisers say that representatives of several embassies attended the events. 
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A Kyiv-based NGO asserted that they pay great importance to work with consulates of
the  EU  member  states.  According  to  this  group,  “consulates  are  close  and  not
transparent bodies and it is difficult to maintain contact with them. If you work long,
build trust and loyalty, then the doors open” (Interview 18). A Georgian civil society
organisation working on visa liberalisation also complained about the non-cooperative
mood of the EU member state consulates: “They do not even come to the presentations
of our reports” (Interview 41). Among the interviewed EaP groups, only one Ukrainian
NGO is  invited  to  participate  in  Local  Schengen  Cooperation  meetings,  but  as  the
director says: “We are not allowed to attend the entire meeting, we are permitted to
come to present our view of the situation. Even the representatives of the Ukrainian
authorities  are  not  allowed  to  attend  these  meetings.  They  are  closed  meetings”
(Interview 18).
The NGO representative also adds that the group has initiated meetings with consulates
to  check  on  their  visa  statistics  which  they  use  in  their  monitoring  reports.  The
interviewee said that their first calls for such meetings provoked surprise, but in the end
the consulates agreed to meet, except several EU member states. According to the group
representative, the  first  three  countries  had  appeared  as  not  “friendly”  in  their
monitoring of EU visas issuance (namely, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK), while
in the case of another country (Sweden) it was due to the change of the ambassador.
However, in the end, the NGO managed to build trust with the Dutch consulate which
agreed on the meeting (ibidem). 
A representative of the Ukrainian association of international road carriers explains their
need to do advocacy at  the consular  level  by their  mission to  help members of the
association get Schengen visas for their drivers. The interviewee says that consulates are
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hesitant to maintain contacts with the association as a third party (Interview 33). The
association started a practice of having regular  meetings with consuls after  the EU-
Ukraine VFA entered into force. As a rule,  they hold bilateral  meetings, multilateral
meetings in the association or within the Joint Committee on Implementation of EU-
Ukraine  VFA and trilateral  meetings  at  which  a  representative  of  the  association,  a
consul and a representative of Ukraine’s MFA are present “in cases when the consulate
is not eager to have contact with us” (ibidem).
2.3. Advocacy tactics
The groups report using mainly inside lobbying strategies, with some exceptions. The
most widespread tactics are private meetings with policymakers. Groups based outside
Brussels occasionally organise advocacy tours to the EU institutions. The EaP based
groups try to  meet  regularly with EU and EU member states representatives on the
ground. The groups also report  sending position letters and appeals to policymakers
(mainly to the Commission, but also to consulates on the ground; and a Polish-based
group mentioned correspondence with Polish border guards). 
They also spread their monitoring and research reports. For example, a Ukraine-based
group publishes annual monitoring of EU visa policy in Ukraine based on sociological
surveys  of  visa  applicants  and  official  statistics.  The  Visa-free  Europe  Coalition
developed the Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalisation Index, a systematic and regularly
updated monitor of visa liberalisation between the EU and the six EaP countries which
serves for “evidence-based advocacy” both in the EU and in the EaP countries (Europe
without Barriers 2014: 6). According to the advocates, the Index is to “help to reduce
suspicions  about  visa-free  regime  by  showing  how considerably  the  EaP states  are
changing” and “to boost the pace of reforms in the EaP states by demonstrating what
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still needs to be done in each of the EaP states as well as by introducing an element of
competition” (ibidem: 6-7).
Another  frequently  mentioned  tactic  is  the  organisation  of  briefings,  seminars  and
conferences to which policymakers are invited. Sometimes public events are organised
in the EP in cooperation with MEPs. Groups usually hope that such events will attract
more  MEPs,  though  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Few groups  have  also  mentioned
participation in the events organised by third actors. An interviewee from a Chisinau-
based think-tank says: “We used all advocacy events as twin events. We tried to send
our products to the EU, on the one hand, underlying progress made by Moldova, and to
Moldovan government,  on the  other,  emphasizing  those  things  which  still  were  not
done. It was a stick for Moldova and carrot for the EU” (Interview 27).
Groups  use  various  consultation  tools  run  by  the  Commission  to  carry  out  their
advocacy. For VLAP implementation, the European Commission, the EEAS and experts
from the member states consult with experts from civil society during the evaluation
missions.  As  an  EEAS  official  explains  the  value  of  these  consultations:  “These
meetings with NGOs help us to be better prepared for the meetings with the Ukrainian
government, to ask them better questions” (Interview 9). The EU Delegation in the EaP
country organises  such sessions inviting experts  from civil  society and international
organisations or third country (mainly US) embassies. 
In  addition  to  these  sessions  during  the  evaluation  missions,  there  are  also  ad  hoc
consultations  which  allow for  additional  exchange of  information,  usually  done via
email and facilitated by the EU Delegation. A Commission official comments on this
instrument: “ Whenever I need something on a routine basis, I would turn to the EU
Delegation in Kyiv and the Delegation may ask NGOs, in addition to the authorities. So
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I see their input in what I get from the EU Delegation. For example, on Roma strategy
and action plan, there was the OSF plus 5-6 NGOs, plus the Council of Europe (CoE)
because this is an UN and CoE benchmark” (Interview 10). Most of the interviewed
groups who participated in such consultations claim that their views are largely present
in the Commission’s reports on the VLAP implementation.
For the issues covered by the block 4 of VLAP, the EU Delegation also does periodic
round tables.  Groups both from the EaP countries and the EU also mention that they are
de-briefed  on  human  rights  issues  by  the  Commission  before  the  meetings  of  EU-
Moldova Human Rights Dialogue and EU-Ukraine Subcommittee on Justice, Freedom
and Security. In Ukraine, at least two groups (one NGO and one business association)
reported  regularly  attending  the  meetings  of  the  Joint  Committee  for  the  VFA
implementation. This practice, however, has not been reported by groups in other EaP
countries.
The participation in  online consultations which the Commission usually  runs before
initiating changes into EU legislation has rarely been mentioned by groups. The groups
which  mentioned this tactic add that they try to send their contribution apart or organise
a private meeting with Commission officials to pass on their position. An interviewee
from a Brussels-based youth umbrella  organisation  is  rather  sceptical  of  this  tactic:
“Online consultations, a generally available tool, is used by the Commission to attenuate
the input from NGOs. When there are hundreds of inputs, it is difficult to say that they
have not done what was suggested. This is their method for legitimisation of their own
ideas. We encourage our member organisations to participate in the online consultations,
but  we  try  to  talk  to  the  Commission  directly”  (Interview 32).  A representative  of
another  youth  group  with  members  in  European  countries  believes  that  in  online
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submissions quantity matters more: “Usually, we sent one contribution from AEGEE
and then we ask our members to copy our message, because what really matters for the
Commission are numbers. If they see that one million of youth supports it,  this will
work”  (Interview  28).  The  importance  of  informal  meetings  with  policymakers
emphasised  by  the  interviewees  shows  that  the  lobby  groups  do  not  regard  online
consultations  run by the Commission as the main channel  of  their  influence on the
Commission.  For  researchers  of  lobbying  and  influence,  this  means  that   while
measuring interest group influence based on the analysis of online consultations  (see
Klüver  2013),  they  should  treat  their  results  more  carefully,  considering  that  some
groups  may  choose  to  advance  their  positions  informally  rather  than  through  the
formalised process of consultations. 
Outside lobbying tactics are less frequent. They include street actions mainly organised
by  youth  groups,  film  screenings  and  photo-exhibitions  and  media  outreach.  For
example,  in partnership with organisations from EU member states, Ukrainian NGO
“Europe without Barriers” organised a photo-exhibition “Visas? What’s the reason?” in
Brussels,  Warsaw,  Budapest,  Prague  and  Berlin.  It  presented  portraits  of  famous
Ukrainian journalists, sportsmen and academics who had been refused a visa or had
faced  difficulties  in  obtaining  permission  to  enter  the  EU.  The  director  of  the
organisation explains that they have tried to exploit the power of visual means. The
venues for the exhibition were chosen to try to target policymakers (e.g. in Brussels, the
exhibition  was  organised  in  the  European  Parliament  and  in  Warsaw in  the  Polish
Parliament). Targeting a larger public is costly: “In order to organise an exhibition for a
wider audience, one needs more funds and street format of pictures” (Interview 18).
Few groups say that they systematically work with European media.  Some mention
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writing  op-eds  for  Brussels-based  EU  media  outlets  targeting  policy  and  expert
community, but not to the national media targeting a wider public. One group explains: 
“We do not really work with media in Poland. In Poland, [visa policy] is not a very
successful  topic,  while in Ukraine it  is.  In Ukraine,  they write “our people are
beaten”, while in Poland they cannot write “we beat”. There was a meeting last
year and the MFA invited journalists, they made a critical report of the MFA, and it
was  more  an  obstacle  for  our  work.  It  is  easier  for  us  to  get  to  EurActiv  or
EUObserver. Polish commercial media are not interested in this topic. Sometimes
we may send something to people from PAP [Polish Press Agency]. It is easier to
get access to officials than to journalists, and journalists tend to write in  a biased
way” (Interview 23). 
Another interviewee from a youth organisation further  develops this rationale: “Visa
issues  are  not  very  popular  among  the  national  media,  they  are  interested  in  the
economic  crisis,  unemployment  etc”  (Interview  28).  The  experiences  of  European
groups doing advocacy campaign on visa-free travel with the Western Balkans are very
similar. The European Stability Initiative representative comments on media strategies:
“We did not want to make this issue public. In countries like Germany or France it is
very difficult to convince people on this issue, they fear organised crime or that their
jobs will  be taken by migrants” (Interview 1).  Another  lobbyist  resolves:  “We have
never tried to write op-eds in the newspapers. Visa is a technocratic issue that would
more benefit from direct pressure from officials” (Interview 35).
A Ukraine-based group refines their approach towards media saying that they mainly try
to target outlets such as EUObserver because “if one wants to have a policy change in
visa policy, it is a specialist and narrow audience. If we want to speak about human
rights in the context of visa policy, then we target national media for a wider public (e.g.
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a Polish radio or Finnish newspaper)” (Interview 18). Instead, EaP based groups work to
reach their national media to keep their societies informed on EU visa policy and the
progress on visa liberalisation related reforms and create pressure on their governments
to speed up the reforms (the same media strategy was chosen by European Stability
Initiative and its local partners in the Western Balkans). 
Street  actions  are  organised  by  youth  groups.  For  example,  the  Young  European
Federalists – JEF-Europe – organise annual visa actions: street actions attracting young
people in different member countries, sometimes combined with a conference. In 2011,
such an action was organised in Warsaw during the EaP summit. The objective of street
actions  are  two-fold:  according  to  a  group  representative,  they  are  “to  attract  the
attention of public to the topic, to promote visa-free travel in Europe and mobility for
young people” and to “attract people in the countries to this action” (Interview 6). The
youth group representative explains that street actions are key to mobilise its members
and national sections, while the group secretariat provides them with information and
public  relations  support  (ibidem).  Another  youth  association  says  that  they  rely  on
outside lobbying because they go for visibility which may also be connected to the
needs to compete for funds. This conforms with the literature arguing that advocacy
tactics should also be seen as a part of organisational maintenance (Lowery 2007). 
To  sum  up,  groups  prefer  inside  lobbying,  especially  face-to-face  meetings  with
policymakers; they also send letters and appeals and present research reports.  While
many interviewed groups participate in formal consultations run by the Commission and
the EU Delegation in the EaP countries, they emphasized the importance of individual
meetings with policymakers outside the consultation format in order to advance their
messages. When they employ voice strategies, they reach out to media, but still with a
146
preference to  the EU bubble outlets.  They may also organise photo-exhibitions,  but
again more as a means of appealing to the human nature of the policymakers rather than
the general public. Outside lobbying tactics such as street actions are used only by youth
member-based groups which rely on them for visibility  and the stimulation of their
members. 
2.4. Alliances
The groups from the EU and the EaP countries seek partnerships to lobby together. As a
director of a think-tank based in Chisinau states: “If we want CSOs in Moldova to be
better  equipped  to  influence  the  EU  and  EU  governments,  we  need  to  establish
partnerships with EU-based organisations” (Interview 42). Such partnerships help EU-
based  organisations  to  obtain  detailed  information  about  the  developments  on  the
ground which the EU institutions need, while EaP organisations can receive tools and
experience of how to do advocacy to the EU level, access to policymakers in Brussels
and the member state capitals and to resources for lobbying. 
Eleven public interest groups among the interviewed are united in the Visa-free Europe
Coalition. The coalition was created in November 2010 by 20 groups and by 2015 it had
grown to over 50 members, mainly from post-communist Europe on both sides of the
EU  border.  A representative  of  the  Stefan  Batory  Foundation  that  was  behind  the
initiative explains the main motivation behind establishing the coalition: “[W]e believed
that the voice of a number of organisations would be heard better and first members of
the  coalition  were  partners  of  the  Foundation.  There  is  a  financial  aspect.  The
Foundation has its own funds, whereas other organisations depend on opportunities to
get funding for their visa-free projects” (Interview 23). The coalition effect gives the
groups advocating on the same issue more credibility in the eyes of policymakers (both
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in the EU, but also in the EaP countries) and allows for the sharing of resources.
Meanwhile, as a Ukrainian member of the coalition said, there are few effective allies.
According to the interviewee, 4-5 members of the Visa-free Europe Coalition actively
engage in advocacy on this issue (Interview 18). Indeed, a number of the Coalition
members interviewed for this study stated that they support the coalition, but they are
not really involved as the focus of their key advocacy is different. 
The members of the Coalition wrote joint letters to the Commission on EU visa issues
and established the EaP Visa Liberalisation Index mentioned above. However, there are
still many advocacy activities which active coalition members conduct on their own. To
a certain extent, it is related to the need to preserve group identity through visibility
which is important when they compete for funds with other groups.
Business  groups  undertook  a  coordinated  lobbying  action  upon  the  initiative  of  a
German  industry  association  group  dealing  with  the  EU  Eastern  neighbours.  The
German organisation involved in the domestic advocacy campaign to lift visa barriers
for European neighbours published a position paper “Roads to Visa-Free Travel” about
the cost of visa barriers for business in  Europe based on a survey of their  member
organisations. Drawing on this position paper, a coalition of eight industry associations
across the EU countries adopted a common position paper “Economic Growth instead
of Visa Barriers” presented in Brussels and the member state capitals in July 2012 in
which it advocated for deregulation of business visas for Russia, Turkey, EaP countries
and Kazakhstan and the removal  of  business visa barriers  in Europe by 2018  (Ost-
Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2012). This action was coordinated by Business
Europe, though the name of this Europe-wide business umbrella group did not appear
on the position paper.
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Groups also tend to work in informal coalitions or partnerships, usually sector-based.
For  example,  EU-wide  youth  associations  tend  to  cooperate  and  publish  common
statements.  The  same  is  true  of  industry  associations  in  the  tourism  sector.  It  is
noteworthy that although public interest and business interest groups share the same
vision of a visa-free Europe, cooperation between them has been reported only in a few
cases and mostly based on personal relationships between group representatives. Civil
society  groups  may  acknowledge  that  some  business  groups  are  on  their  side,  but
seldom name them as their allies. Business groups are more open to name NGOs as
their allies. A representative of the German business association revealed that after they
had started to advocate on visa-free travel, they received positive feedback from NGOs:
“Then we joined forces with NGOs, we started to work with them, though they are
normally sceptical towards business. NGOs’ work helps me with arguments for visa
liberalisation and you need to work at European level on this issue too” (Interview 5).
3. Influence and its determinants
3.1. Measurement: degree and type
The overall  achievement of advocacy objectives appears partial  to the groups’  self-
assessment. None of the groups state that they have achieved all their objectives. Half of
the groups describe having achieved their objectives to a certain degree. Three groups
explicitly state that they were not influential and did not reach their goals. Some groups
could not give a definite answer about achievement of their advocacy goals.
Whereas  non-state  advocates  teaming  up  with  their  strategic  allies  in  the  EU have
contributed to promoting the issue of visa-free travel for non-EU European countries
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onto the EU agenda – first in the case of the Western Balkans and then in the case of the
Eastern neighbourhood, their involvement and influence is more visible at later stages
of the policy process – during implementation and evaluation.  For most of them the
Council bodies which take strategic decisions are simply not accessible. This is in line
with the literature on the participation of non-state actors in international organisations
and lobbying in the EU that show limited access to intergovernmental bodies.  
Influence  has  been  most  often  reported  on  technical  issues.  Groups  speak  of
achievement  of  their  objectives  as  related  to  the  transparency  of  EU  documents,
evaluation by the Commission of the progress made by the EaP countries in the VLAP
implementation, inserting provisions in the amended VFA, and certain aspects of visa
issuing practices by EU consulates. Influence on technical issues is also more traceable
and recognisable as groups can check whether the proposals they have made appear in
final  policy  documents  and  policymakers  can  also  state  which  groups  have  been
consulted on the given issues. 
The interviews with groups show that it is not an easy task for groups to assess their
influence and measure its degree. Most groups tried to avoid answering the question
about the degree of their influence when it was posed (“To what extent did you achieve
your advocacy objectives:  achieved all  of your objectives,  most,  about  half,  few, or
none?”). The semi-structured format of interviews does not favour them choosing an
option from the list. Instead most go for an open answer.
The most common difficulty for groups is an attribution of the policy outcome to their
advocacy  efforts.  While  recognising  that  the  desired  outcome  was  achieved,  the
interviewed groups often acknowledge that  they cannot say for sure whether  it  was
result of their advocacy or whether other factors intervened and were more powerful in
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determining the policy outcome. For example, a director of a Prague-based association
shares:  “After  the  recent  meeting  in  May  in  Prague  with  the  participation  of  our
Ukrainian partners  and representatives of the Czech ministry of interior, the Czechs
relaxed their visa rules. But we never knew whether it was our push or if they were
going to do this anyway” (Interview 22). In a similar vein, a representative of a Warsaw-
based group says: “A year ago we had a meeting in the MFA and we were trying to
suggest softly that Polish consulates had to issue more long-term multi-entry visas.  The
results somewhat improved, but only to a certain extent: before there were a few visas
from three to five years duration and now we have fifteen. It may be our success  that
they increased the number of this type of visas issued, but it is difficult to establish a
link”(Interview 23).
Especially,  on  more  strategic  issues,  such  as  the  change  of  policy  trend  or  issue
reframing, as in the case of economisation of visa policy or emphasising the human
rights aspect of visa policy, when there may be an array of factors influencing the shifts
in EU policy, the attribution to individual or even collective advocacy efforts is difficult,
if  possible  at  all.  This quotation  from a lobbyist  from  a Brussels-based EU tourism
industry association demonstrates the difficulty of attributing the policy outcome to a
single factor: 
“For many years ago I have followed the discussions in the Council on visa policy
as prior to this position I worked for the Portuguese Permanent Representation in
Brussels. There is a huge progress in how visa policy is viewed now. Before, the
economic vision was not  listened to.  The Council  and the Commission did not
listen to the economic interests. Now the Commission does listen and it is a huge
progress  that  along  with  security  reasons  they  take  into  account  the  economic
vision too. What has played a primary role in this change – the economic crisis in
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Europe or tourism industry advocacy? I think both. It has been a priority in the
agenda of the tourism industry” (Interview 31).
In some cases, talking to policymakers with which groups interact helps clarify to what
extent the policy outcome can be attributed to non-state actor advocacy, if at all. For
example,  an official  working in the EU Delegation in Kyiv believed that local civil
society groups are influential as they are the key sources of information to assess the
progress achieved by the Ukrainian government in the implementation of the VLAP
(Interview 24).  Though it  must  be acknowledged that  policymakers tend to  hesitate
speaking of influence of third actors on their decisions, especially if it concerns consuls
who issue visas upon their own discretion. 
The interviews also reveal that few groups conduct a systematic evaluation of their own
advocacy efforts. And even if they do so, they say that they have problems with work-
able indicators. In most cases, such evaluation is purely intuitive. As one group states:
“We do not assess every action in a mathematical way. What is most important for
us is that the issue is on the agenda, and it is important and it reappears all the time.
It is very difficult to assess our impact, oftentimes it is not possible. For example,
we do not really know if the fact that the Polish consul in Kyiv issues more long-
term multi-entry visas is a result of our action or not. What we know for sure that
when an official from the MFA takes fifty copies of our report to distribute in the
field (to Polish consulates abroad), it is an indicator that our voice is welcome. Our
aim is to get through with our argument. If we have got through, it is good. A
change of policy is not always palpable” (Interview 23). 
A  Brussels-based  advocate  shares  the  experiences  of  his  organisation:  “We  had
discussions at the foundation on how to evaluate the impact. In the end we decided that
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the most important is when it has happened. Most of the mechanisms of evaluation are
so expensive that it is better to dedicate efforts to promote the goal and if it happens, it
is good” (Interview 43).
The interviews have also shown that different methods of measuring influence can lead
to different results, something that was already highlighted in the literature (Dür 2008b).
For example,  if  one applies only process tracing method one may  ascertain that the
LGBTI  groups  were  not  able  to  achieve  their  declared  goal  to  postpone  the  EP’s
decision  on the  amended EU-Ukraine  VFA.  However when speaking to  the  groups
themselves and their partners one learns that what may appear to be a failed advocacy
may actually be deemed a success, as the publicly declared goal and the one that the
group  established  for  itself  as  desirable  differ.  The  groups  have  managed  to  ignite
parliamentary debate on their issue of concern, as well as highlight it in the press. In this
case the EP paid greater attention to the issue, talking to the Ukrainian counterparts, and
in the end the plans to approve discriminatory legislation in Ukraine were stopped. As
the group representative estimates their influence on the EP decision: “We were happy
with it. It was the best possible outcome. A few weeks later there was a delegation of the
Ukrainian parliament to discuss this issue in the EP” (Interview 8). A representative of
the partner organisation explains further: “One can ponder whether it was successful or
not, but in the end the issue has been put on the agenda - MEPs met with Ukraine’s
Ambassador  Yelisieiev  and raised  their  concerns  on  the  issue”  (Interview 43).  This
example shows that the assessment of attributed influence method can give a different
picture  to the process tracing alone, because how the groups set their goals and how
they assess their achievement may be different from the simple criteria of whether the
publicly declared goal was achieved or not.
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To conclude, groups partially achieve their advocacy objectives. Their influence is most
visible on technical issues dealt with by the Commission or EU Delegation during the
implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process. This, however, means that
non-state actors struggle to achieve more substantial influence on EU visa policy to-
wards the Eastern neighbours. Whereas the Commission and the Parliament are seen as
more in favour of visa-free travel, the national governments, in particular those of a
number of ‘old’ EU members, are more concerned with the security  risks of visa-free
travel and are more resistant to changes to the status quo. While pro-visa-free travel
groups have the support of the ‘new’ member states, given the fact that the Council re-
lies on de facto unanimity, the security-minded Council members have been able to in-
troduce procedural and substantive measures that are prolonging the visa liberalisation
process.  In  this case,  the  groups  advocating  visa-free  travel  focus  on  greater  trans-
parency of the visa process and merit-based assessment of the progress in visa liberali-
sation-related reforms made by the EaP countries, as well as the presentation of a wide
range of  arguments  explaining  why visa liberalisation  is  beneficial  for  the  EU as  a
whole.
3.2. Factors explaining influence
Expertise and information are the most frequently named factors determining interest
group influence highlighted by both groups and policymakers. This conforms with the
minimal conception of lobbying as “the informal exchange of information with public
authorities”  (Van  Schendelen  1994:  3). Given  that  the  groups  most  frequently
mentioned the Commission as a lobbying target and given the Commission’s needs in
technical expertise and information, this finding is in line with the literature. 
One group pointed out: “When we approach the European Commission, what matters is
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high-quality expertise, the language of data which they do not have, exclusive data (e.g.
on duration of multi-entry visas)” (Interview 18). A Commission official explained the
value  of  interaction  with  NGOs:  “They  have  information  on  the  ground  and  they
contextualise this information for us. Because in Ukraine we have a different political
culture to the EU member states, NGOs provide a reality check. I have to treat their
information with caution, though. They are not only NGOs, they also do advocacy, there
is  an  internal  logic  to  the  way they work  and why they  say  certain  things  to  me”
(Interview 10). An official working in the EU Delegation in Kyiv describes the role of
Ukrainian groups in a similar vein: “The  EU experts need insiders in order to know
details [about policymaking process on VLAP related legislative acts in Ukraine]. We in
the Delegation are not able to follow these nitty-gritty details, we do not have such
capacities. We would need to have a person who would be a diplomat – a lobbyist who
would  go  and  meet  the  members  of  the  Ukrainian  parliament...I  also  follow other
themes:  Ukraine’s  relations  with  Russia,  energy,  Maidan.  There  is  no  capacity  to
monitor this topic. That’s why we need experts from NGOs” (Interview 17). A MEP
summed  up  this  viewpoint:  “NGOs  often  deliver  information  you  cannot  get  from
politicians or the media” (Interview 39).  
Expertise  and  information  on  the  developments  in  the  EaP countries  are  important
resources which groups can pass to policymakers. What also matters is information that
helps groups to understand the policy process and know when to advocate, who to target
and with what kind of argument. As a Commission official put it: “You need to know
the context, the inherent logic of the process in order to put your small or big thing in”
(Interview 10). She here referred to an international organisation (not an interest group)
as  a  positive  example  of  an  advocate  understanding  the  peculiarities  of  the  policy
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process: “They want to use the VLAP as an engine for their cause to tackle deficiencies
of the asylum system. We explained them that the issues of their concern could be dealt
within the implementation stage of the VLAP. In the end, during our meeting with the
evaluation mission in Kyiv, they passed us a note in which they outlined those issues
which  concern  the  legislative  framework  and  it  appeared  in  our  report.  This  is  a
constructive attitude to see how your interests  can fit  into the system” (ibidem). To
emphasise  the  point  that  not  knowing  the  policy  framework  impedes  successful
advocacy, there is a negative example provided of interaction with advocacy groups by
another Commission official: “The data they presented was right, but they seemingly
did not understand what the VFA was about. It was when the new VFAs entered into
force, but they were presenting old cases and trying to apply the new rules to them”
(Interview 15).
Another factor of group-level characteristics which is often recognised as important for
successful advocacy is experience. Several groups mention that the transfer of advocacy
experience from other groups facilitated their work or that experience in lobbying the
EU facilitates the achievement of their objectives. A Brussels-based advocate reveals
that pushing for realistic goals and understanding the framework in which politicians
and diplomats work are among key factors defining the group influence (Interview 8).
Experience also enables groups to design a better advocacy strategy, learning how to
effectively use certain advocacy tactics, fully exploiting existing contacts and attracting
partners,  and  better  understanding  interests  of  policymakers  in  the  interaction  with
advocates. Several groups and policymakers mention a group’s credibility or reputation
as a factor explaining  advocates’ influence. Credibility often comes with experience of
interacting with policymakers and building relationships based on trust and with a good
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record of reliable information which groups provide.
As most of the groups are public interest groups, funding is also crucial for them to
undertake advocacy. These groups often depend on public funding coming from the
Commission or the EU member states or private funds. Several groups say that they
have failed to implement certain advocacy tactics which they envisaged (e.g. several
groups speak of making a website with personal visa stories for which they cannot find
funding; one group would like to create a documentary film or a big photo exhibition
for which they have not been able to attract funds yet) or important elements of their
advocacy strategies (e.g. lobbying at the member states’ level in the European capitals)
or have discontinued their  efforts due to the lack of funding. For EU-based groups,
funding also allows them to attract partners in the EaP countries where CSOs are less
resourceful.  Several  youth  groups  relying  on  volunteering  recognise  their  low
membership and lack of experience to undertake systematic advocacy on given issues.
Brussels-based  groups  acknowledge  that  their  presence  in  Brussels  facilitates  their
advocacy success. As one advocate reveals: 
“When one is sitting in Warsaw it is very difficult to understand what is going on
here, in Brussels. I thought the policy process was transparent and it was easy to
get the information, but then I realised how I get most of my information. It is
through private meetings with Ukrainian or Moldovan diplomats, or people you
know in the Commission. It is mostly due to informal networks. I knew X [desk
officer  for  Ukraine  and  Moldova  in  the  Commission’s  DG  Home  Affairs].  I
remember after the first meeting with her, I was sending her emails and she would
never reply. She would call me and then we would talk or we would meet for a
coffee. She did not want to put these things in writing. It is difficult to know all this
when you are not even based in Brussels and you do not have this kind of informal
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contacts. You cannot really influence the process” (Interview 43).
In  a  number  of  cases  interest  groups  acknowledge that  they  have  not  been able  to
achieve all or most of their goals due to the drawbacks in advocacy strategies. Advo-
cacy strategies include decisions on when to lobby, whom, how, what objectives to set
and what arguments and information to employ. For example, one group said that they
could not conduct advocacy in the EU member states reluctant to abolish visas while it
was necessary to approach their goal. Several groups acknowledge that their advocacy
strategy would benefit if they could introduce some elements of outside lobbying tac-
tics, allowing them to show the ‘human stories’ behind visa applications to a wider pub-
lic. However, in both examples, the groups claim that they did not have the resources to
implement a more effective – as they saw it –  advocacy strategy.  In some cases, despite
the fact that groups undertook advocacy, some elements of their strategy were mistaken.
This is well illustrated by an advocacy tour made by several NGOs from an EU member
state and EaP countries with the support of their Brussels-based partner organisation as
recounted by a representative of the latter:
“They said they wanted to do lobbying, but in a way the trip was organised, they
hardly can target the most important decision-makers now – the Commission, the
EEAS  and  the  Member  States.   First,  there  was  an  event  in  the  Parliament
organised by a Polish MEP. Why to approach the Parliament, if the Parliament has
no role about the process now? Now it is the Commission and the Council [taking]
the decision on Moldova. OK, they wanted to go to the EP because they have a
friend among the MEPs and they wanted to have an event in the EP. But in the end,
this MEP appeared there for only 15 minutes and left. He also did not fulfil his
promise of bringing other MEPs in. In the end, there was just few assistants and the
group can say it has convinced them. But it was an empty event. Next day they
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went  to  the  Commission  DG Home.  They  had  a  contact  with  an  official  who
gathered other people from Visa Unit and International Affairs Unit dealing with
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The meeting was OK, but they did not know all the
nitty-gritty details the Commission was interested in. They say: OK, Ukraine still
has to adopt an anti-discrimination and anti-corruption law, but the Commission
knows it. The Commission people asked them questions about what is going on
with these laws in the Parliament, at what stage they are, who is in favour and who
is against.  [The group from EU member state] could not answer these questions...
They did not really prepare, they did not do their homework” (Interview 43).
Two Commission officials share their impressions about the same meeting: 
“We were  quite  surprised  how they  are  not  mastering  the  process,  we  are  not
speaking the same language. Maybe it is a problem of human resources and that
there is a new person” (Interview 10).
“The data they presented was right, but they seemingly did not understand what the
VFA was about. ... Local NGOs from Ukraine are more accurate than NGOs from
the EU” (Interview 15).
From this illustration, one can see that designing an effective advocacy strategy is an
important part of achieving advocacy goals. Groups’ resources may limit their ability to
implement the most effective advocacy strategy, but even with the limited available
resources a well designed advocacy strategy may still give desired results.
Speaking  of  the  role  of  institutional  factors,  several  groups  refer  to  access  to
policymakers, personal relations with them and the culture of dealing with third parties
within the institutions they target. The groups underline that access varies greatly: while
it is easier to meet with representatives of the EU Delegation, Commission and the EP,
the EU member states consulates are usually closed and non-receptive to NGOs which
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impedes lobbying on Schengen visa issuance matters. This variation of access across
institutions  seem to  be  in  line  with  the  major  bulk  of  interest  group literature  that
presents  the  Commission  and  the  Parliament  as  relatively  accessible  venues,  in
comparison  with  the  Council  (Greenwood  2007).  The  literature  on  NSA access  to
international organisations also points to weaker access during the decision-making and
enforcement stages, as member states do not want to allow the involvement of outsiders
due to higher sovereignty costs (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014).
However,  even  having  access  to  the  decision-makers  does  not  always  guarantee
influence.  There  is  a  good illustration of  a  business  group which  has  access  to  the
Commission through the Joint Committee for the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine
VFA:
“In  2008,  when the VFA implementation  had started,  we  passed  the  list  of  all
breaches of the VFA by consulates (e.g. on extra fees, extra documents, limited
term of visas issued, or when consulates lower the category of visa issuing a  visa
with month or three-month validity after a visa with a year validity).  However,
there was no quick reaction from the Joint Committee. In 2009 we came to the next
Joint Committee meeting and inquired about the list,  but there was no reaction.
There was a new person chairing the Committee and he said that his predecessor
did not pass the list to him. Maybe in other spheres such as tourist visas, the Joint
Committee is helpful, but not in our sphere. We pass the information, but it gets
stuck” (Interview 33).
Finally, what is of interest for us in this study is the extent to which alliances with key
policymakers facilitate the achievement of advocacy goals (H2). Not many groups men-
tion this when listing factors influencing successful advocacy. However, a number of
them recognise that having “powerful sponsors at the governmental level”, “friends in
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the  EU  government”,  “common  interests”  with  decision-makers  or  the  “supportive
stance” of an EU institution or member state help them to achieve their objectives or fa-
cilitated their advocacy efforts. In the case of the Western Balkans, the two interviewed
NGOs acknowledged that support for visa-free travel among key EU institutions and
member states, or at least not facing strong opposition among the member states, made
the process to move faster (Interviews 1, 35).
Conclusion 
The EU visa policy towards the Eastern neighbours is not lobbied as intensively as other
Community-level  policy, for example,  related to  trade or  the internal  market.  Many
groups have chosen to advocate on horizontal solutions (e.g. visa facilitation through
changes  to  the  Visa  Code).  Geographical  focus  on  visa  facilitation  and  visa
liberalisation for the EaP countries is prioritised by the groups directly affected by the
existing visa regimes (e.g. groups coming from or having links with those countries ).
The interviewed groups advocate at both EU and national level, even the groups coming
from  EU  member  states  engage  in  multi-level  lobbying  which  reflects  the
communitarised nature of EU visa policy. This confirms the hypothesis H4 outlined in
Chapter 2. All interviewed groups seek policy change advocating for visa facilitation
and/or visa liberalisation, so it is not possible to conclude to what extent H3 hypothesis
holds. Nevertheless, it appears that pro-visa-free groups find it difficult to advance their
positions on more political  issues and move beyond the status quo protected by the
majority  of  the  member  states  who  favour  a  gradual  and  slow  process  of  visa
liberalisation. 
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There also exists a category of groups that use EU visa liberalisation as a tool to push
for domestic reforms in the EaP countries, for example, to fight against corruption and
discrimination and for the protection of minorities. These groups lobby in two different
arenas – the EU and an EaP country. While lobbying the EaP country government they
try to use the EU as an ally in domestic advocacy, therefore asking the EU to apply strict
conditionality towards the EaP government. Many of these groups are from the EaP
countries, thus while trying to use the VLAP as a reform tool, they are not interested in
delaying  visa  liberalisation.  Hence,  while  adopting  their  advocacy  strategies,  they
navigate between their demands of domestic reforms and the benefits of visa-free travel.
The Commission is the most lobbied institution in this domain, which is logical given
its powers over visa facilitation and the visa liberalisation process. The Parliament is
much less targeted, partly because its role comes at the very end of the process and
partly  because  it  is  largely  supportive  of  visa  liberalisation.  The  Council  is  hardly
lobbied  at  all,  while  more  advocacy  goes  via  the  national  route  which  reflects  the
powers the member states possess in EU visa policy across the entire policy cycle. The
diplomatic representations of the Union and the member states in the EaP countries are
targets for the groups based there. The Commission is also a relatively easy target to
lobby given the access it  grants to the groups. The same can be said about the EU
Delegation which has institutionalised practices of consultations with local groups. The
advocacy in the Council or the EU member states’ capitals requires more resources such
as presence in Brussels and advocacy trips to the EU capitals or partnerships with  EU-
based organisations. Many of the lobby groups come from the EaP countries or they are
NGOs stripped of necessary resources. Even for business groups, visas is usually one of
many issues they lobby on, so they also complain about the scarcity of resources in
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order to systematically target more actors across the EU.
The groups mainly rely on inside lobbying tactics. Media outreach is barely employed
and if it is, groups target mostly specialised Brussels-based outlets. Protest tactics are
employed by certain  types  of  groups  (i.e.  membership-based  youth  organisations  at
national  level)  and seem to serve more for  organisational  maintenance than to  seek
influence on policy outcomes. Groups tend to establish transnational partnerships and
coalitions uniting groups with similar interests from EU and EaP countries. However,
there are no cross-sector (business-civil society) pro-visa-free travel coalitions, though
cooperation  on  an  inter-personal  level  between  business  and  public  interest  groups
exists. 
Most groups report achieving partial influence on the issues which they have advocated.
The interest group influence has been traceable on technical issues (e.g. transparency of
EU documents, Commission’s evaluations of the implementation of VLAPs by the EaP
countries,  some  provisions  in  the  amended  VFAs,  certain  aspects  of  visa  issuing
practices by EU consulates). 
The research also reveals important methodological difficulties in measuring influence.
The interviews show that groups find it difficult to assess their influence as they often
cannot  attribute  the obtained policy outcome to their  advocacy efforts  or  define the
degree  of  their  influence.  It  also  comes  out  that  most  groups do  not  measure  their
influence  systematically.  Cross-assessment  by  policymakers  can  help  to  control  for
attribution,  but  it  should  be  taken  into  account  that  policymakers  are  sometimes
reluctant to speak of the influence of third parties on their decisions. Nevertheless, the
methodological triangulation – the combination of the assessment of attributed influence
with process tracing  – improves measurement. As we have seen in the case of lobbying
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the  EP  on  the  amended  EU-Ukraine  VFA,  the  application  of  two  methods  allows
compensation for the drawbacks of each of them, at least to a certain degree, and a
clearer picture of interest group influence. 
The  groups  do  not  report  counterlobbying  at  the  EU  level,  though  some  of  them
acknowledge that at the national level anti-migrant parties and public opinion are hostile
towards a more open visa policy. The groups mostly claim that the opposition – or the
other side –  are the member states or specific policymakers (e.g. ministry of interior)
and political actors (e.g. conservative parties in the national parliament) within those
member states. The Commission and the Parliament are generally seen as having a pro-
visa liberalisation stance as well as the ‘new’ member states, though the positions of
different  agencies  or  individual  members  are  nuanced  mainly  due  to  the  extent  of
conditionality attached to visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. Having powerful allies
among policymakers has been recognised as a  key factor  of advocacy success by a
number of groups (in line with the H2 hypothesis). Such allies may be institutions with
similar  interests  (e.g.  the Commission,  the European Parliament,  a  friendly MFA or
Ministry of Economy) or staff at these institutions who share information and are open
to group input. 
The analysis shows that despite communitarisation of this area since the Amsterdam
Treaty, EU visa policy is still firmly controlled by the EU member states which take part
in agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making and enforcement of the EU visa
policy  at  the  consular  level.  This  confirms the  results  of  other  studies  looking into
policy change in other areas of Justice and Home Affairs  (see Hoffmann 2013; Ripoll
Servent & Trauner 2014). While formally visa policy is under the Community method,
member  states  attempt  to  control  the  decision-making  process  and  restrict  the
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Commission’s autonomy as the inter-institutional dispute on the VLAP management in
the  case  of  Moldova  has  shown.  Moreover,  groups’  access  remains  restricted  to
decision-making in the Council  and enforcement stages (EU member state consulate
practices of visa issuance),  as it  has been predicted by the literature on institutional
access to international institutions which associates these stages with high sovereignty
costs for member states  (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). Despite some advocacy
successes, particularly those related to increased transparency and civil society inclusion
in the policy process and contributions to the evaluation of progress made by the EaP
governments in the VLAP implementation and facilitation of visa issuance practices, it
appears that civil society groups which have mobilised for visa-free travel advocacy
(and often sided with the ‘new’ member states and EaP governments) are not powerful
(resourceful) enough to resist decision-makers with more restrictive views on the visa
liberalisation policy. 
Public interest groups, the bulk of which are also concentrated in the EaP countries, do
not  have  enough  resources  to  design  and  implement  effective  lobbying  strategies,
especially when targeting the hesitant or neutral member states. Business groups claim
to  be  in  favour  of  visa-free  travel  for  the  Eastern  neighbours,  but  few  engage  in
systematic lobbying. The EU-based groups who engage in lobbying on EU visa policy
towards the Eastern neighbours in the majority of cases come from the ‘new’ member
states which are generally supportive of a more facilitated visa regime and smoother
process of visa liberalisation. 
Whereas the institutional factors explain the limits of overall interest group influence in
this case, group-level characteristics play a potent role in explaining the variation in
advocacy success among groups. Material resources, including presence in Brussels and
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funding,  previous  experience  in  lobbying  the  EU,  sector-based  expertise  and
information  on-the-ground  developments  are  seen  crucial  by  groups  to  be  able  to
advance  their  goals.  Learning  and  experience-sharing  also  appear  to  be  important
conditions of successful advocacy. 
The interviews with groups point out that experienced advocates tend to “maximise”
their influence by establishing “realistic” advocacy objectives, or in other words, seek a
lesser degree of policy change taking into account the policy framework. While de facto
playing a role of a technical ‘helper’ of the Commission may not lead to a significant
policy  change  in  the  visa  liberalisation  process,  the  small  issues  which  the  groups
succeed to push through can be presented as an advocacy success that the advocates also
need to justify their work to their members and sponsors. Thus, the ‘logic of support’ is
at times as important for groups as the ‘logic of influence’ (see Lowery 2007; Berkhout
2013).  This strategy could be captured only due to the application of assessment of
attributed  influence,  while  process  tracing  and  gauging  the  degree  of  preference
attainment hide this nuance.
This chapter adds to the literature on lobbying and influence of interest groups in the
EU by looking into a policy area which has so far received little scholarly attention. It
also  contributes  to  the  literature  on  policymaking  in  the  external  dimension  of  EU
internal  security  by  examining  the  role  of  non-state  actors.  In  sum,  it  seems  that
institutional context has a great potential to explain interest groups’ access and influence
in EU policymaking. Despite the fact that EU visa policy has been communitarised, the
member  states  still  remain  in  control  at  the  decision-making,  enforcement  and
evaluation stages,  whereas  access  of  non-state  actors  suffers  in  the areas  which  are
associated with high sovereignty costs. Moreover, in line with literature on non-state
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actors’ participation  in  policymaking,  security  policy  is  one  of  those  policy  fields
shielded from access to outsiders (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). This seems to be
the  case of  EU visa  policy which  has  suffered  from securitisation  of  EU migration
policy too. However, groups, including those coming from the EU neighbouring states,
become involved in EU lobbying trying to adopt multi-level advocacy strategies and
manage to achieve a certain degree of influence. In doing so, they try to secure alliances
with key decision-makers. However, in order to be able to say more as to what extent
policy regime can account for variation in interest group influence, we have to examine
the cases which are close to the intergovernmental method which will be analysed to the
next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4. EU policy of CFSP sanctions towards
Belarus
Introduction
In this chapter I examine advocacy strategies and the influence of interest groups on
CSFP  sanctions  towards  Belarus.  This  policy  case  is  situated  closer  to  the
intergovernmental  extreme  as  the  powers  of  supranational  actors  are  limited.  The
Commission can monitor the implementation of measures that fall within the scope of
the  Union’s  competence  and  has  the  right  to  propose  regulations  implementing
restrictive  measures  under  the  Union  competence  which  is  shared  with  the  High
Representative since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The EU Court of Justice has
judicial powers to monitor compliance when the Union measures are applied and, since
the Lisbon Treaty is in force, to review the legality of restrictive measures taken by the
EU against natural and legal persons.
According to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, I expect that interest  groups are
likely to achieve the lower degree of influence in EU sanctions policy towards Belarus
than in the case of EU visa policy towards Eastern partner countries, as this case is
closer  to  the intergovernmental  extreme (H1).  I  also expect  that groups which have
allies  among key decision-makers  are  likely  to  achieve  higher  degrees  of  influence
(H2). Furthermore, it is hypothesised that groups which seek to preserve the status quo
tend to be more influential than groups promoting a policy change due to the power of a
member state’s veto in the intergovernmental arrangements (H3). Finally, it is expected
that groups tend to adopt advocacy strategies targeting policy actors at both EU and
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member states level (H4). 
The literature on EU sanctions sets out a role for non-state actors in this foreign policy
area  (Giumelli  2013). NGOs and media are trying to influence EU sanctions policy
during the agenda-setting stage by raising the visibility and salience of certain events
such as human rights violations in third countries  (see also Murdie & Peksen 2012).
Their value for policymakers derives from their expertise and knowledge of the reality
on the ground (Giumelli 2013: 32). NGOs may also target private actors to push them to
introduce  private  sanctions  and  influence  public  opinion  in  order  to  demand  more
normative behaviour of states initiating sanctions  (Kowalewski 2013). Business actors
are  more  involved  when  sanctions  are  designed  and  may  try  to  block  restrictive
measures which are seen as negatively affecting them. They also may provide technical
expertise to policymakers that can enhance the effectiveness of EU sanctions (Giumelli
2013: 33). NGOs and the media are important during the implementation and evaluation
stages as they possess specific expertise on the impact of sanctions on third countries
and possible violations which does not exist at the EU level (ibidem). This literature
gives us certain assumptions as to what kind of groups will engage at which stages of
the policy  cycle and what advocacy strategies they are likely to adopt in our case study.
The history of EU-Belarus relations has been marked by EU sanctions since the country
slid into  authoritarian rule after  President Aleksandr Lukashenka came to power in
1994. Therefore, Belarus is chosen as a case to study lobbying on a CFSP-governed
issue  as  the  neighbour  of  the  Union  with  the  longest  record  of  being  under  EU’s
restrictive measures. Moreover, the EU has pursued a two-track strategy towards the
East  European  country,  limiting  relations  with  the  authorities  and  supporting  pro-
democracy non-state actors. Belarus has never become a signatory of the Partnership
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and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which the EU, a basis for contractual relations with
the post-soviet states in 1990s; it does not participate in the ENP and the EaP bilateral
track. Instead, the EU has increasingly supported Belarusian civil society groups.
This chapter looks at interest groups’ involvement in the current sanctions regime which
was initiated in 2004 and further modified in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2012 when new
categories or new types of measures were introduced. While the ambition of this chapter
is to overview the EU sanctions policy towards Belarus in 2004-2014, given the scarcity
of data on the earlier years, the focus will tilt towards the second half of this decade,
namely the events preceding and following the post-electoral crackdown of December
2010 in Belarus and the EU reaction to it with a new wave of sanctions. 
As a part of the field research for this case study, 50 interviews were conducted between
May 2013 and September 2014 with interlocutors in Brussels, Minsk, Berlin, Warsaw,
Vilnius and other locations. The interviews took place with representatives of interest
groups, policymakers, experts and donors to civil society in Belarus. The research also
draws on the analysis of EU policy documents, media reports and secondary literature
looking at the EU-Belarus relations (Bosse 2012; Bosse & Korosteleva-Polglase 2009;
Marin  2011;  Korosteleva  2012;  Portela  2011;  Giumelli  2013;  Jarabik  &  Rabagliati
2007), developments in Belarus  (Balmaceda et al. 2009; Wilson 2011; Сіліцкі 2012;
Korosteleva  2015),  EU  member  states  policies  towards  Belarus  (Fedorowicz  2012;
Fedorowicz 2009; Kłysiński 2013; Bošs et al. 2012; Potjomkina 2014) and the role of
non-state actors in EU policy towards Belarus (Kłysiński 2013; Зуйкова 2013).
The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section sketches the EU sanctions
policy  towards  Belarus  and  describes  key  policy  actors  and  procedures  of  CFSP
sanctions. It also overviews interest groups which have engaged in advocacy on CFSP
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sanctions on Belarus and who have been interviewed for this study. The second section
analyses advocacy strategies, including advocacy objectives, venues and targets, tactics
and coalition building. The third section provides findings on interest group influence in
the studied case and factors explaining it. The conclusion of this chapter summarises the
research results in the context of this thesis and the contribution to the literature.
1. Case description
1.1. Evolution of EU sanctions policy towards Belarus
Sanctions are “politically motivated penalties imposed as a declared consequence of the
target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligation by one or
more  international  actors  (the  senders)  against  one  or  more  others  (the  targets)”
(Giumelli,  2013:  7).  In practice,  they can also be imposed “in reaction to  forms of
behaviour  that  the  sender  considers  objectionable,  even  if  they  do  not  constitute  a
breach of codified norms” (Portela, 2010: 21).
The  EU applies  sanctions  under  two  legal  regimes:  first,  sanctions  can  be  decided
exclusively by the Union because they fall entirely within its competence and, second,
sanctions need to be agreed within the CFSP (Portela 2010: 27). The former cover the
withdrawal  of  GSP  preferences  and  the  suspension  of  financial,  development  or
technical aid, while the latter are agreed by the member states within the CFSP and
implemented either by the member states (e.g. arms embargoes, visa bans) or by the
Union (trade embargoes, financial restrictions)  (ibidem: 27-28). The Council  defines
CFSP sanctions  as  “restrictive  measures  […]  imposed  by the  EU to  bring  about  a
change in policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities
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or  individuals,  in  line  with  the  objectives  set  out  in  the  CFSP Council  Decision”
(Council  2012e).  Whereas  restrictive  measures  may  target  governments  of  third
countries, more often ‘smart’ sanctions are introduced  targeting non-state entities and
individuals  whereas  there are  clear  criteria,  tailored to  the specific  case  in  order  to
determine who should be on the list (European Commission 2008).
The  history  of  EU-Belarus  relations  has  also  been  a  story  about  sanctions.  Since
President Alaksandr Lukashenka took office in 1994, there were just a few periods when
sanctions were not in force  (for a detailed overview of EU sanctions against Belarus
Giumelli, 2013: 79-99; Portela, 2010: 87-94, 155-56; 2011). The first informal sanctions
were introduced as early as 1997 in reaction to an unlawful referendum amending the
constitution, whicht led to the concentration of power in the president’s hands and the
worsening situation with civic and political freedoms in Belarus  (Wilson 2011: 178-
184). The EU froze its technical assistance programmes and ratification of the PCA with
Belarus, limited political contacts and withdrew its support to Belarus’ membership in
the Council of Europe (CoE). These measures were informal, not adopted within the
CFSP framework. Some of these measures were temporarily lifted when Minsk agreed
to the establishment  of the Advisory and Monitoring Group of the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 which was tasked to assist the
government to promote respect for human rights and democracy (Wieck 1999). In July
1998, as a response to the diplomatic crisis between Belarus and EU states caused by
the unilateral  eviction of  European diplomats  from the residences  in  Drazdy by the
Belarusian government, the EU adopted a Common Position within CFSP introducing
an  admission  ban  on  130  government  officials,  including  President  Lukashenka
(Council 1998). The visa ban was repealed in February 1999 when the Drazdy incident
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was resolved (Council 1999).  
In October 2002, the Belarusian government effectively discontinued the presence of
the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk,  thereby expressing discontent
with  the  fact  that  the   organisation  had criticised  the  2000 parliamentary  and 2001
presidential election, which were not free and fair according to international standards
and led to a new crackdown on the opposition, independent media and civil society. In
November  2002,  the EU-15 discussed the imposition of  a  travel  ban on Belarusian
government officials, however, Portugal vetoed a Common Position on this issue. As a
result, fourteen member states decided to proceed with travel bans against Lukashenka
and  seven senior  members  of  the  government  (BBC News 2002).  These  restrictive
measures were removed in April 2003 after the opening of an OSCE office in Minsk
(Kreutz 2005: 38).
On 24 September 2004, the EU introduced CFSP sanctions against Belarus which are
still in place. The EU banned the admission of four Belarusian officials, three of whom
were figured in the Pourgourides Report passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
CoE  on  28  April  2004  (Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  CoE  2004) as  key  actors
responsible for the politically motivated disappearances of four persons in 1999-2000,
and  one  (the  then  Minister  of  the  Interior)  for  failure  to  initiate  an  independent
investigation  and  prosecution  of  the  alleged  crimes.  To lift  the  sanctions,  the  EU
demanded  that  the  Belarusian  authorities  investigate the  disappearances  fully  and
transparently and bring those responsible for the crimes to justice (Council 2004a).
Three months later, in  December 2004, the EU expanded the admission ban on the
officials  responsible  for  the  fraudulent  elections  and  referendum  in  Belarus  on  17
October 2004 and those responsible for severe human rights violations in the repression
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of peaceful protests against the electoral fraud. The Council added two new individuals
to the list, including the Central Election Committee chief (Council 2004b). The review
of restrictive measures was conditioned upon the reform  of the Electoral Code  in line
with OSCE and other international democratic standards and  “concrete actions by the
authorities to respect human rights with regard to peaceful demonstrations” (ibidem).
Following  the  presidential  election  of  March  2006  which  did  not  cohere  to  OSCE
standards and the arrests of peaceful demonstrators protesting against the fraud, the EU
decided to target via sanctions the “Belarusian leadership and officials responsible for
the violations of international electoral standards and the crackdown on civil society and
democratic opposition” (Council 2006a). Thus, the Council extended  the admission ban
to a further 31 persons, including President Lukashenka. The review of these measures
was conditioned upon “the speedy release and rehabilitation of all political detainees,
and in the light of reforms made to the Electoral Code to bring it into line with OSCE
commitments  and  other  international  standards  for  democratic  elections  as
recommended  by  the  OSCE/ODIHR,  the  conduct  of  future  elections  and  concrete
actions by the authorities to respect democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression and of the media, and the
freedom of assembly and political association” (ibidem). Moreover, the EU froze the
assets of 36 out of the 37 individuals on the admission ban list (except for Yury Sivakov,
ex-Minister  of  the  Interior  listed  in  2004)  (Council  2006c).  In  October  2006,  four
Belarusian officials were added to the admission ban and the asset freeze lists (Council
2006b). The restrictive measures were subsequently renewed in March 2007 and April
2008 for another 12-months period.
Parallel  to  this,  the Commission initiated a  policy approach to  engage with Belarus
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within the ENP. In the non-paper issued in November 2006, the Commission offered
Belarus the development of close people-to-people, economic and business links and
financial  assistance  conditioned  upon  the  fulfilment  by  Belarusian  government  of
twelve criteria. The conditions included the release of political prisoners and an end to
arbitrary detention, free elections, respect for freedom of media and association, labour
and  entrepreneurship  rights,  national  minorities  rights,  independent  judiciary,
investigation into the politically motivated disappearances of 1999-2000, abolition of
the death penalty and cooperation with the OSCE and other organisations promoting
human rights (European Commission 2006b). The non-paper brought more clarity to the
concrete steps which the Belarusian government had to undertake in order to establish a
fully-fledged relationship with the EU (Jarabik & Rabagliati 2007: 7). 
The Commission’s offer coincided with the deterioration of Belarus’ relations with its
key strategic ally and economic partner – Russia, spurred by a bilateral energy dispute.
This pushed President Lukashenka to seek economic and political support in the West.
Belarus agreed on the opening of the Commission’s Delegation in Minsk. Lukashenka
also promised to launch economic reforms, including privatisation. In August 2008, the
last  political  prisoners  were  released  and  a  large  OSCE  observation  mission  was
allowed to  watch  the  September  2008 parliamentary  elections.  Responding to  those
developments, in October 2008, while renewing the sanctions for another 12 months,
the  Council  decided  to  suspend  temporarily  (for  a  six-month  period)  the  travel
restrictions  (with  exception  of  persons  listed  in  2004  and  the  chief  of  the  Central
Election Committee) and restore a political  dialogue with the Belarusian authorities.
The continuation of the suspension was made conditional on the Electoral Code reform
and “other concrete actions” to respect democratic values, the rule of law, human rights
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and fundamental freedoms (Council 2008a; see also Council 2008b).
The  warming-up  period  in  the  EU-Belarus  relations  was  over  after  the  presidential
elections of 19 December 2010 and the resultant repressions against the opposition and
civil society.  Responding to these events, on 31 January 2011, the Council terminated
the suspension of the admission ban and imposed travel restrictions and an asset freeze
against “persons responsible for the fraudulent Presidential elections of 19 December
2010 and the subsequent violent crackdown on democratic opposition, civil society and
representatives of independent mass media” (Council 2011a). Under these criteria, 117
persons were targeted, and as a result the travel ban list was increased to 158 individuals
and the asset freeze list to 157 (Council 2011d).
As the situation in Belarus was further deteriorating with the ongoing trials and jail
sentences for the opposition and civil society representatives, on 21 March 2011, the
Council  added new individuals to the list  and updated some listings (e.g.  excluding
deceased  individuals)  (Council  2011e).  There  were  175  individuals  covered  by  the
admission ban and an asset freeze (ex minister of interior Yuri Sivakov was included on
the latter list too). On 23 May 2011, further 13 persons were added (Council 2011f). On
20 June, the Council introduced embargo on weapons and equipment which can be used
for  internal  repression  and  added  four  persons  on  the  list,  including  businessman
Vladimir Peftiev, “chief economic advisor of President Lukashenko and key financial
sponsor  of  the Lukashenko regime”,  as  the  EU reasoning stated,  and three  entities,
controlled by Peftiev(Council 2011b). On 10 October 2011, the Council added another
16 individuals  (Council  2011c),  and on 16 December 2011, two more persons were
added (Council 2011g), thus raising it to 210 individuals and three entities targeted by
the EU sanctions.
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On 23 January 2012,  the Council  decided to  introduce additional  criteria  for listing
extending restrictive measures “to persons responsible for serious violations of human
rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, in particular persons
in  a  leading position,  and to  persons and entities  benefiting from or  supporting  the
Lukashenka regime, in particular persons and entities providing financial or material
support to the regime”  (Council  2012b). On 28 February 2012, 21 individuals were
added  to  the  list  (Council  2012d),  and  on  23  March  2012,  12  more  individuals,
including  two  businessmen  associated  with  the  regime  –  Iury  Chyzh  and  Anatoly
Ternavsky  – and 29 entities controlled by the three businessmen (Council 2012e).  As a
result, the Belarus sanctions list peaked to 243 individuals and 32 entities.
In October 2012, stating that the September parliamentary elections in Belarus were
“inconsistent  with  international  standards”  and “the  situation  as  regards  democracy,
human rights and rule of law had not improved”, the Council extended sanctions until
31 October 2013 (Council 2012c). In May 2013, the Council removed from the list one
person and two entities  belonging  to  Vladimir  Peftiev  (Council  2013a). In  October
2013,  the  Council  extended EU restrictive  measures  against Belarus  for  another  12
months as “not all political prisoners have been released, no released prisoner has been
rehabilitated, and respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles has
not improved in Belarus”  (Council 2013c). Three persons were added, while several
persons and entities were de-listed as there were “no longer grounds for keeping” them
(Council  2013b).  In  July  2014,  the  Council  amended  EU sanctions  list  adding  one
person and taking off eight individuals (Council 2014d). In October 2014, the sanctions
were extended for another year, while the list was reduced to 201 individuals (among
others, two businessmen Vladimir Peftiev and Anatoly Ternavsky were removed from
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the list) and 18 companies (Council 2014c). 
While the EU imposed sanctions on the Belarusian authorities, it has continued a limited
dialogue at the technical level with the government and provided support to the social
needs of the Belarusian population as well as funding for non-state actors, including
NGOs, media and political activists.  In 2007-2013, the EU provided €22.5 million of
direct support for engagement with civil society, media and local authorities and for
targeted scholarship programmes in Belarus out  of  €94 million committed from the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument  (European Commission 2015a).
In  addition,  Belarusian  civil  society  receives  aid  from other  EU instruments  –  the
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Non-State Actors
and Local Authorities  (see Shapovalova & Youngs 2014). Since 2010, EU aid to civil
society increased fivefold (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre 2012). After the 2010 post-
electoral  crackdown,  the  European  Commission  provided  urgent  aid  to  political
dissidents and their families as well as civil society and relaxed its rules to provide aid
to  non-registered  organisations.  It  is  estimated  that  the  EU and  the  member  states
(among which Sweden, Germany and Poland are the largest donors to Belarus) give a
third of their aid to civil society in Belarus, while the US, another big donor to the
country, provides the major bulk of its support to nongovernmental actors (Zuikova &
Yahorau 2014: 34).
Apart  from  funding,  the  EU  and  the  member  states  also  politically  supported  the
Belarusian opposition, political prisoners and civil society activists: through frequent
statements, diplomatic pressure on the Belarusian authorities, high-level meetings and
consultations with opposition and civil society leaders and symbolic awards for human
rights  defenders.  In  March  2012,  the  EU  launched  a  European  Dialogue  for
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Modernisation involving the  EU representatives  and Belarusian  opposition and civil
society  to  develop  reform programme for  Belarus  and  ways  for  European  support.
Given that the authorities refused to participate in the initiative, it served as an EU tool
to empower non-state actors in Belarus. 
1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures
The central role in the decision-making process on CFSP sanctions is played by the
Council of the EU and its bodies. The political aspects and broader parameters of the
proposals for a Council Decision are discussed by the relevant regional working party
which is COEST in the case of Belarus. The Political and Security Committee (PSC)
can  discuss  the  proposals  and  provide  political  orientation  to  the  working  parties,
notably on the type of measures selected for further proceedings. The legal, technical
and horizontal aspects of the proposed restrictive measures are discussed in RELEX (the
Foreign  Relations  Counsellors  Working  Group).  Usually,  the  COEST  is  the  main
working group deciding upon proposals on criteria for imposing restricting measures,
what individuals or entities to be put on the list and what reasons for listing are, while
RELEX looks into  legal  details  and prepares  a  legal  act  (Interview 84).  Before the
Council adopts a formal decision, the COPERER reviews the legal act.  The Council
adopts a CFSP decision by unanimity. 
If  the  imposed  measures  fall  outside  the  realm  of  EU  competence  (such  as  arms
embargoes or visa bans), they are implemented directly by the member states, which are
legally  bound  to  act  in  conformity  with  Council  Decisions  (no  Council  Regulation
needed)  (Council 2012f). If the sanctions fall under the Union competence (e.g. trade
embargoes,  freezing  assets  and  investment  bans,  suspension  of  international
agreements), they require a Council Regulation adopted by QMV upon the proposal of
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the HR and the Commission under article 215 of TFEU (before the Lisbon, it was just
the  Commission  making  proposal),  preferably  simultaneously  with  the  Council
Decision imposing restrictive measures. The pre-Lisbon Commission had implementing
powers for Council Regulations to modify targets on an assets freeze list, now these
implementing powers are held by the Council. Since the Lisbon Treaty is in force, the
Council should inform the EP about its CFSP decisions which envisage implementing
measures falling under the EU competence.
Though  the  Lisbon  Treaty  envisaged  QMV  for  the  adoption  of  Council  acts
implementing  Council  Decisions  (“Council  Implementing  Decisions”  or  “Council
Implementing Regulations”) which modify the lists of targeted persons and entities, in
practice QMV is not used. As a Council representative explained, it is mainly due to two
reasons: first, there is a “gentlemen’s agreement” to take decisions by unanimity; and
second, when decisions need to be taken quickly, the choice is for unanimity, because
the Council Rules of Procedure envisage many possibilities for the member states to
block a decision taken by QMV for quite a long time (Interview 84).
At the level of the working parties the member states may decide on proposed listings or
de-listings using the silence procedure (a decision is deemed to be adopted at the end of
the period laid down by the Chair unless if a member state objects). Legal acts on a
urgent matter may be adopted by written procedure (again, if no objection is raised by a
member state, the decision is deemed adopted) (Council 2012f).
A proposal for sanctions, including who to put on the list, is made by the member states
or by the EEAS (Council 2012f). The Heads of Mission (HoM) of EU Delegations in
third countries are invited to provide their advice on proposals for restrictive measures
and specific listings or de-listings. They play a role of “competent brokers” (Giumelli
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2013:  27).  Since  the  HoM  are  in  the  field,  they  are  also  asked  to  evaluate  the
suggestions made by the member states. 
The EEAS participates in Council meetings and provides its expertise on the country
related issues (geographical department: in Belarus case – Directorate III B dealing with
Russia,  EaP, Central  Asia  Regional  Cooperation  and  OSCE)  and horizontal  issues
(Division K 3. for Security Policy and Sanctions). A representative of the EEAS chairs
COEST meetings, while EEAS experts from the Sanctions Unit participate in RELEX
meetings (chaired by the rotating presidency), assisting in drafting the text since they
hold the institutional memory of EU sanctions policy (Giumelli 2013: 27).
The annual review of sanctions starts with a report of the HoM in Minsk which covers
the political and economic situation in Belarus, developments in Belarus’ foreign policy
and focuses on the situation with human rights and political prisoners. The HoM also
provides  recommendations  and  suggestions  regarding  the  revision  of  restrictive
measures.  The  HoM  also  asks  member  states’  embassies  in  Minsk  for  their
recommendations. On the basis of the HoM report, the EEAS makes a proposal for the
COEST on the revision of restrictive measures.  The member states  can also initiate
proposals for revision through different Council  groups or the EEAS. In practice,  a
greater role of the member states in initiating the revisions of the list is played in the
period of between the annual reviews (Interview 59). Most initial proposals on listings
and de-listings come from the HoM (Interview 84). As one Council official said, “In
case  of  Belarus  sanctions,  the  HoM  is  very  active”  (ibidem).  Another  EU  official
mentioned  that  the  HoM’s advice  also  tends  to  be  sought  when  there  is  no  strong
consensus in Council (Interview 80).
Each listing should be legally sound, which implies that new entries should provide
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“accurate,  up-to-date  and defendable” statements  of reasons for listing based on the
criteria set  out in the CFSP decision upon which restrictive measures were imposed
(Council 2012f). However, as an EU official  explained, “[t]here is no clear division
between political considerations and legal arguments. Someone can use legal argument
for  political  reasons,  if  this  someone  does  not  want  certain  person  to  be  listed”
(Interview 84).
All interviewed EU officials dealing with Belarus sanctions underline that the EU aims
to  keep  its  sanctions  list  ‘alive’ to  reflect  EU  policy  and  changes  in  the  political
situation in Belarus. This implies revising it and making listings and de-listings. The
first  candidates  to  be  removed  are  legally  questionable  entries.  As  an  EU  official
explains: “We try to clean up the list, to remove former officials who have nothing to do
with the regime right now and do not correspond to the criteria stated in the Decision”
(Interview 59). Usually, cases considered by the Court of Justice are discussed.  The
Council  Legal  Service  presents  the  court  cases  and cases  of  individuals  who wrote
requests to the Council for delisting. The Council may need to provide information to
strengthen  the  evidence  for  the  listed  persons.  However,  as  one  EU  member  state
diplomat put it, “[i]t is also a political decision to judge whether the person should be
delisted or not” (Interview 84).
As  far  as  Belarus  sanctions  are  concerned,  admission  bans  and  arms  embargo  are
implemented  by  the  member  states  and  there  is  no  EU-level  body  supervising  the
implementation of such measures.  An assets freeze is also implemented by the member
states, though the Commission can hold them accountable and appeal to the Court of
Justice in line with Articles 259 and 260 of the TFEU,  but such action has not been
undertaken in the area of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 28).
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The EUCJ plays  a  key  role  in  the  shaping and making of  EU restrictive  measures
(Giumelli  2013:  29). The  Court  has  power  to  review  the  legality  of  sanctions
implemented through the Union measures (competence for the movement of capital and
trade matters)  and,  since  the  Lisbon Treaty, individuals  and entities  targeted  by the
CFSP sanctions can appeal to the Court of Justice to be delisted (Article 275 of TFEU).
After  Court’s  ruling  in  the  case  of  Kadi  I  (Kadi  and  Al  Barakaat  International
Foundation vs. Council and Commission 2008) and Kadi II (Yassin Abdullah Kadi vs.
European Commission 2010) and Jose Maria Sison (Jose Maria Sison vs. Council of the
EU 2009) in which the Court ordered to repeal EU restrictive measures, more and more
targeted individuals and entities use their right of appeal in the EUCJ (Giumelli 2013:
29).
The European Parliament plays no role, but takes an active position on the EU policy
towards Belarus adopting non-binding resolutions and recommendations. For example,
on 20 January 2011, ahead of the Council’s decision to renew and expand restrictive
measures against  Belarus, the EP adopted a  resolution calling for sanctions renewal.
This resolution received much press both in the EU and Belarus and provoked a fierce
reaction from Belarusian authorities.8 
Nonetheless, it comes out from the interviews with the EEAS and Council officials that
the EP documents are not read by them. As one Council representative mentioned, the
practice of the EP to call in their resolutions for sanctions against certain persons is
counterproductive, as it encourages potential targets to transfer their funds somewhere
outside  of  the  EU,  while  the  sanctions  list  should  be  kept  confidential,  until  it  is
8 Without mentioning the resolution or the EP, President Lukashenka  made a statement on the same
day calling the government to adopt measures in response any possible sanctions against Belarus and
to work to counteract the anti-Belarus campaign abroad (see  Naviny.by 2011b; Naviny.by 2011a).
The Belarus parliament also adopted a statement in response to this resolution, in which it criticised
the EP for ‘ignorance of objective facts’ and turning dialogue into pressure. 
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published (Interview 84).
The  EU  member  states  play  a  crucial  role  in  agenda-setting,  decision-making,
implementation and monitoring of restrictive measures. However, important parts of the
decision-making  process  are  done  by  Brussels-based  actors  –  the  EEAS  with  the
support  of  HoM  and  Council  bodies.  The  involvement  of  the  EU  supranational
institutions is limited, with the exception of the EU Court of Justice. The EP has no
formal role at  all,  but  it  is  a venue for political  debate.  Since the DG RELEX and
delegations on the ground were moved to the EEAS, the role of the Commission has
been reduced to monitoring of implementation of restrictive measures which fall under
EU competence (e.g. assets freeze), but in fact it has been little exploited in practice.
Through its case law, the Court of Justice has established itself as a key player in EU
sanction making. The  judicial review of EU sanctions against individuals and entities
seemingly has an impact on Council legal documents which have been complemented
by exemptions, exceptions and more specific procedures (Giumelli 2013: 31) as well as
concrete  decisions  on  listings  putting  legal  arguments  at  the  centre  of  Council
deliberations. 
1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy
The EU sanctions policy towards Belarus attracts all sorts of groups trying to shape it.
The peak of advocacy activities is connected to the crises in Belarus and EU’s decisions
to extend further sanctions. Within the period in focus, this happened in the aftermath of
the December 2010 elections  and the crackdown on civil society in Belarus to which
the EU responded by targeting an unprecedented number of individuals and companies. 
Not all interviewed groups that engage in lobbying the EU policy towards Belarus have
necessarily taken an explicit and clear stance on the CFSP sanctions. This may be due
184
the fact that over a decade in force the EU sanctions on Belarus have produced mixed
results in the evaluations of many groups. 
Groups which take a clear position on EU sanctions and engage in advocacy are public
interest  groups,  including  human  rights  organisations,  think-tanks  and  other  NGOs,
political  and  civic  activists,  and  business  groups.  The  large  share  of  all  groups
advocating on EU sanctions come from Belarus. These are NGOs, political opposition
groups, and relatives of political prisoners who  live in Belarus or in exile,9 usually in
one of EU member states. Public interest groups such as think-tanks or human rights
organisations tend to engage in continuous advocacy as they monitor developments in
the country. Business groups tend to mobilise at precise moments where their interests
are at risk. Such groups mainly try to block a decision which can affect them or their
interests negatively or to overturn them entirely. 
Groups lobbying on EU sanctions towards Belarus can be divided roughly into three
camps. In the first camp are those advocating for the tightening or at least maintenance
of the current  sanctions regime and its  consistent  application. They advocate no,  or
limited, dialogue with the authorities unless the conditions spelled out by the EU are
met  –  they  consist  of Belarusian,  European and international  human  rights  groups,
NGOs,  Belarusian  diaspora  groups  in  Europe,  Belarusian  political  opposition  and
relatives of political  prisoners.  The second camp are business  groups who advocate
against any EU sanctions and opt for EU engagement with Belarus. The third camp
consists of groups in the middle  –  there is small number of think-tanks and NGOs
denouncing EU sanctions policy as ineffective and lacking strategically. The debate on
sanctions seems to be strongly framed as a dichotomy, ‘Lukashenka vs. a free Belarus’,
9 For an overview of Belarusian diaspora groups see Astapenia (2013).
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thus as a result groups criticising EU sanctions are blamed for supporting ‘the regime’.
However, the reality presents a much more nuanced array of stances and arguments.
Within the first camp, there are groups which in the aftermath of the December 2010
events called on the EU to mount pressure on Belarus and impose tougher sanctions.
There are also groups supporting the EU’s current sanctions regime, but also calling for
engagement in a dialogue with Belarusian authorities to increase links between Belarus
and  the  EU.  Finally,  there  are  also  NGO  and  human  rights  groups  which  do  not
advocate concrete solutions, but bring information on violations of rights and freedoms
in the country and call  for an EU action and coherent and consistent application of
sanctions once they are introduced. 
Business groups from the EU and Belarus favour EU engagement with Belarus and
advocate against  any sanctions.  In most  cases,  they lobbied to avoid putting certain
business people and companies on the EU list or litigated against the imposed measures
before courts.  Unlike in the previous case of EU visa policy, there is a clear division
between public  interest  groups and the business  lobby, even if  some public  interest
groups criticize sanctions. They do not lobby together and they engage in very different
advocacy in terms of objectives, tactics and targets. 
For the purpose of this case study, representatives of 22 groups have been interviewed.
Most of them are groups founded by Belarusians or having Belarusian organisations or
individuals as members, based in Minsk or in the EU. Most EU-based groups are in the
countries with a stronger interest in Belarus and geographical proximity – the Eastern
EU member states and Germany. 
The majority  of  the interviewed groups are  public  interest  groups.  Two interviewed
groups  represent  industry  interests.  The  fact  that  more  public  interest  groups  are
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involved  in  advocacy  on  EU sanctions  against  Belarus  is  due  to  the  fact  that  this
population is more varied and tends to be more divided on the issue, while business
groups  are  united  in  national  and  European  associations  and  often  come  as  a
consolidated front against  sanctions. In addition,  unlike in the case of EU sanctions
against Russia, economic relations with Belarus are modest from the Union’s point of
view, since Belarus’ economy remains predominantly state-owned, with limited foreign
investment,  the bulk of which comes from Russia. Though EU-Belarus trade has been
continuously growing within the studied period, Russia has kept its position as the main
trade partner of Belarus (half of Belarusian foreign trade goes to this country, while a
quarter to EU28, as of 2013)  (see European Commission 2015b). Belarus counts for
0.3% of the Union’s trade with the world (compare with Russia – 8.4%, or even Israel –
0.9%), according to the European Commission.  Thus, stakes for European businesses
are significantly low which may explain much weaker business mobilisation than in the
case  of  EU sanctions  against  Russia.  Moreover,  I  should  add  that  major  European
business associations approached for an interview were not responsive to the request,
whereas  some national  business  associations  and  companies  mobilised  for  lobbying
could  not  be  interviewed  for  travel  reasons,  thus,  information  on  their  advocacy
positions and lobbying tactics was extracted from media reports where possible.
2. Advocacy strategies 
2.1. Advocacy objectives
Groups engaging in advocacy on EU sanctions towards Belarus set up their objectives
in different ways. Some define their goal as broadly as keeping the issue of Belarus on
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the  EU  agenda  or  “maintaining  Belarus  in  the  mainstream  of  political  and  public
debate” in their member state. Though these groups may have a position on sanctions
and advocate on the issue when it is opportune, it is rather secondary to their overall
goal. 
Another  subset  of  the  interviewed  groups  formulate  their  advocacy  objective  as
influencing the debate in the EU and member states on which direction the EU policy
towards Belarus should take. As a result their advocacy position on CFSP sanctions is
not isolated from other issues, such as the facilitation of contacts between the EU and
Belarus at different levels, support to civil society, liberalisation of EU visa policy and a
pro-active strategy of engagement with Belarus. 
There are also groups which have not taken an explicit position in favour of or against
sanctions  because  it  is  a  divisive  issue  for  their  members.  As a  representative  of  a
Belarusian diaspora coalition uniting different organisations explained their advocacy
task: “[We aim] to present a full picture that one part of us is for sanctions and what
their arguments are, and other part of us is for dialogue and what arguments we have.
We want to show all the sides, so diplomats and policymakers have a complete picture”
(Interview 48). 
Some groups abstain from taking a position on the EU sanctions  because they prefer to
advocate  the  EU  “to  do  something”  in  reaction  to  violations  of  human  rights  and
fundamental freedoms in Belarus leaving it  to  policymakers to decide what  kind of
pressure will be most effective. Some of these groups also focus on the coherence and
effectiveness  of  EU  sanctions  policy  (e.g.  sanctions  modalities,  uniform
implementation,  well-informed listing and delisting based on clear  principles) rather
than who should  be  targeted.  Others  pass  on  to  the  EU institutions  information  on
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human rights violations and perpetrators (“naming and shaming”) in order to increase
pressure on the Belarusian government in multiple ways. In such a way, these groups
influence the EU sanctions policy unintentionally  (see Murdie & Peksen 2012). I will
not include them in the last section on the self-assessment of advocacy objectives, as
they explicitly set their objectives not in terms of sanctions but in terms of mobilising
the EU to pressure Belarusian authorities towards  changing some aspects of the human
rights situation (e.g. release of political prisoners) or policy in Belarus. 
As  an  interviewed  representative  of  a  human  rights  organisation  says  “there  is  no
common  voice  on  the  issue  of  what  kind  of  EU  policy  measures  would work  for
Belarus. Nobody can say what works for Belarus. Neither theorists nor practitioners”
(Interview  54).  A  representative  of  the  Belarusian  Association  of  Civil  Society
Organisations shared: “We have over 300 members and each of them can express their
position individually. We never set it as a goal to have a united position on these issues.
The  only  thing  which  we  would  like  to  see  is  that  Europeans  use  this  mechanism
effectively. The EU should compose the lists carefully in order not to put unnecessary
people on them and there should be clear criteria whether these restrictions are eternal
or not. It is not logical that if the situation is changing, a person is excluded from the
list. He or she does not cease to be guilty” (Interview 81).
Advocacy objectives are fluid: they may change as the situation in Belarus changes and
the EU’s policy develops. So it would be easier to analyse them through the episodes of
EU’s sanctions policy towards Belarus. Before December 2010, most of the interviewed
groups  supported  the  EU’s  policy  of  engagement  with  Belarusian  authorities  and
suspension  of  CFSP restrictive  measures.  After  the  post-electoral  crackdown,  many
groups have taken a clear position on sanctions. The first voice was those calling for
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economic sanctions, namely against the state-run companies (such as the United States
introduced in November 2007 when imposed asset freeze and prohibited doing business
with Belarusian state-owned oil and petrochemicals company Belneftekhim10), as they
believe this kind of sanctions could have significantly influenced the behaviour of the
Belarusian authorities leading to the release of political prisoners and even precipitate
the disintegration of the regime, if they had been introduced during the economic crisis
in Belarus in 2011 (Interviews 47, 50). 
The second voice  encompassed those groups  which advocated to extend the existing
sanctions  regime  (visa  ban  and  asset  freeze)  and  target  individuals involved  in  the
repressions  against  civil  society and  individuals  supporting  the  regime,  but  avoid
introducing economic sanctions.  It was argued that sanctioning the state-run enterprises
would  hit  ordinary  Belarusians  and  lead  to  increased Russian  influence in Belarus
(Interviews 46, 51). Finally, they said that it was not realistic to expect the imposition of
economic sanctions because they would hit the interests of EU member states.
The third voice involved interest groups which opposed economic sanctions and the ex-
pansion of the existing sanctions regime, and the inclusion of certain individuals and en-
tities in it.  Above all, business groups opposed any measures  “that would cease or re-
duce cooperation in the business field” (Interview 94). There was also a group of NGOs
arguing that the extension of the list would not be effective in terms of improving the
human rights situation and would lead to further isolation of Belarusians and Belarus in
Europe (Interview 77). 
As  it  became  clear  in  2012  that  the  EU  would  not  change  the  sanctions  regime
significantly, as the sanctions had been evaluated as bringing mixed results in terms of
10 On U.S. sanctions against Belarus see Woehrel (2013).
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changing the  situation  of  political  prisoners  in  Belarus,  many groups  changed  their
focus  to  lobbying for  a  more  effective  use  of  the  current  measures.  They seek  the
change of modalities under which EU sanctions work. For example, a representative of
a  Belarusian  opposition  group  said:  “We would  like  to  see  these  visa  bans  half-
automatic, meaning that there is a rapid mechanism of reviewing sanctions, not just
through the slow Council meetings. Then if there is a political court decision, then the
judge is automatically put on the blacklist” (Interview 46).
Some groups have advocated to put new people on the list who are seen responsible for
ongoing violations (e.g. electoral fraud, illegal detention and mistreatment in prison,
police beatings, labour rights violations etc.) and better target business entities which act
as ‘major sponsors of the regime’. Other were saying that they would like to see more
clear  criteria  of  listing  and  delisting,  clear  and  measurable  benchmarks  for  lifting
sanctions,  more  precise  identifying  information  about  the  listed  persons  and  better
information  campaigns  from  the  EU  explaining  the  sanctions  to  the  Belarusian
population. Meanwhile, many groups also started to advocate for a conditioned dialogue
between the EU and Belarus  at  the governmental  level  and increased EU efforts  to
promote more people-to-people contacts. 
As one can see some groups sought a policy change, while other were trying to keep the
status quo. But after the EU decisions, these groups may shift their roles (for example,
status quo defending business groups started lobbying the EUCJ and the Council for the
removal  from the list,  once the Council  decision listing them had been taken).  The
degree of policy change sought also varies from seeking the sanctions regime change
(e.g.  introducing  economic  sanctions)  to  modifying  certain  modalities  under  which
sanctions are employed or amending the sanctions lists (e.g. introducing new names and
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statement of reasoning why certain people should be on the list). 
It  is  worth  mentioning  how  some  groups  justify  their  lobbying  goals  in  terms  of
organisational survival  (pursuing ‘logic of support’ and ‘logic of reputation’,  in  the
typology of Berkhout 2013). Several members of Belarusian opposition groups mention
that it is not in the opposition’s interest to advocate for EU sanctions against Belarus,
because these measures are unpopular among the Belarusian population. “When we are
talking  about  sanctions,  we are  distancing  ourselves  from people”,  one  interviewee
stated (Interview 46). An interviewed NGO representative said that some groups may
advocate for sanctions because if the EU and Belarus renewed a full dialogue at the
governmental  level,  there  would  be  less  attention  to  Belarusian  civil  society  and
opposition (Interview 48). A study on Belarusian NGOs and opposition positions on EU
sanctions also points out that not all positions are expressed publicly and that public
statements  regarding  restrictive  measures  do  not  necessarily  represent  an  advocacy
position, while different leaders of the same structure may express different opinions at
different times (Егоров & Шутов 2012).
Some  interviewees  were  pointing  to  self-censorship  among  Belarusian  opposition
members in the first half of 2011 when many of them were imprisoned, tortured and
sentenced to years in jail: “They were not speaking openly about sanctions. When the
first round of opposition leaders were released, they were afraid” (Interview 47). One of
the presidential candidates in the 2010 elections, Dmitri Uss, was even fined for calling
for economic sanctions against  Belarus  (Charter97 2012).  This is  not necessarily an
indicator that some Belarusian groups may feel pressed to hide their “true” advocacy
objectives, but it may explain to some extent the choice of their tactics: for example,
preference for private and confidential meetings with EU policymakers and avoiding
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public statements indicating their  position,  which will  be discussed in the following
sections. Another example is a case when a group of NGOs advocated for the reduction
of  the  sanctions  list  for  which  it  was  blamed  for  being  ‘KGB  collaborators’ and
‘Lukashenka regime lobbyists’ and, as a result  of this negative campaign, the group
decided to cease further advocacy efforts. In the next sections, it will be discussed how
advocacy goals are related to the design of advocacy strategies. Some groups who need
to preserve the status quo may just advocate at the level of one or two member states
hoping that a member state’s veto would block the EU decision, whereas groups who
seek a  more  far-reaching policy  change need to  build  broad coalitions  behind their
causes.
2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying
When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?
The first EU sanctions regime on Belarus spurred little advocacy by Belarusian groups.
Since the late 1990s – early 2000s, the question of sanctions became more important for
domestic  actors  who sought  EU support  in  their  fight  with  the  Lukashenka regime
(Interview 52). It was a time when the EU was still poorly engaged in Belarus, while
more  active  European  regional  organisations  were  the  CoE  and  the  OSCE.  At  the
beginning,  it  was  mainly  the  Belarusian  opposition  trying  to  influence  EU’s policy
towards Belarus through European party channels (Interview 51).
For Belarusian NGOs EU advocacy did not start until the mid 2000s. The human rights
organisations first targeted other venues such as the UN or OSCE. As one long-term
observer  of  Belarusian  civil  society  describes:  “Belarusian  NGOs  were  completely
passive before 2004-2005. There were no attempts to influence EU policies. They were
following the track of political parties or played a role of crowd scene by listening to
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and approving what has been decided” (Interview 87). Afterwards, with the increased
engagement in Belarus, the EU became considered by them as a leverage to change the
situation in the country.
Belarusian organisations  engaged in  more  systematic  efforts  to  influence  EU policy
when Belarus  was included in the EaP in 2008. Belarusian NGOs also received an
additional channel of communication with the EU through the EaP Civil Society Forum
(EaP CSF),  established in 2009, and the EU Delegation,  which opened in Minsk in
2008. However, for many organisations interviewed for this study, their advocacy on the
EU sanctions issue started in 2011 or later as a reaction to the December 2010 events in
Belarus and the subsequent wave of sanctions. 2011 and 2012 saw a peak of advocacy
activity on the CFSP restrictive measures towards Belarus.
At which policy stages do they lobby?
Advocacy  groups  are  involved  in  lobbying  during  the  agenda-setting,  policy
formulation and decision-making stages of policy cycle. At the agenda setting phase, in
line  with  the  literature  (Giumelli  2013;  Murdie  &  Peksen  2012),  groups  raise  the
visibility and salience of domestic events in Belarus such as human rights violations that
require an EU response. They also engage in debate on what kind of measures would be
most  effective  in  the  case  of  Belarus.  Moreover,  as  will  discussed,  the  EU  has
introduced formal and informal channels of communications with different advocacy
groups in order to receive on-the-ground information about developments in Belarus.
When restrictive measures are designed, human rights groups and pro-democracy NGOs
are instrumental in documenting human rights violations and this data may serve the EU
when reasoning why certain individuals or entities should be put on the list. Business
groups mobilise to prevent EU Council decisions on sanctions that would affect them
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(again as assumed in the literature Giumelli 2013: 33). The affected business groups and
individuals contract law firms to challenge Council’s decisions in the EUCJ.
Civil society groups also monitor the implementation of EU sanctions and share their
opinions on the impact and effectiveness of EU measures, though it seems difficult as
the restrictive measures are implemented by 28 member states, while coordination of
implementation and evaluation at the EU level appears to be rather weak. Still, groups
highlight cases of what they perceive as violations of the sanctions regime, point out
incorrect data in the sanctions list (e.g. mistakes in the identifying information on listed
persons) and report on how the EU’s policy affects the human rights situation in the
country. 
Advocacy targets
Most  groups  attempt  to  engage  in  multi-level  advocacy  approaching  both  EU
institutions  and  EU  member  states  governments.  Many  groups  name  the  EU
Commissioner for ENP Stefan Fule (2010-2014) and his cabinet and MEPs as their
advocacy targets, despite the fact that neither the Commissioner nor the EP have any
formal role to play in EU sanctions. This may be explained by the fact that both the
Commissioner Fule and the Parliament as an institution and some individual members
have been open to contacts with civil society and active supporters of pro-democracy
groups in Belarus. These two targets can put political and diplomatic pressure on other
policy  actors  to  advance  civil  society  causes,  for  example,  the  release  of  political
prisoners (they are the most receptive venues, in line with the interest groups literature,
which  also  act  as  advocates  themselves).  The Commissioner  attended the  EaP CSF
annual  assemblies  and  often  met  with  Belarusian  civil  society  and  opposition
representatives when they visited Brussels. Moreover, the Commissioner’s staff shared
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information with groups and provided advice on what other policymakers should be
targeted. 
For  groups  based  in  Belarus,  their  most  proximate  targets  are  those  frequently
approached – the EU Delegation and EU member states embassies in Minsk (again, in
line  with  the  interest  groups  literature).  During  their  visits  to  Minsk,  the  EEAS
delegations tend to meet with Belarusian civil society representatives. The Delegation is
not  large  and there  are  regular  meetings  with  civil  society  groups on  the  issues  of
funding, human rights situation or involvement of civil society in such initiatives as the
European  Dialogue  for  Modernisation.  Approaching  the  EEAS  headquarters  for
advocacy is mainly reported by EU-based groups.
Nearly all groups, regardless of their location, engage in advocacy at the EU member
states level, which underlines the fact that CFSP sanctions are still viewed as a policy
area  dominated  by  intergovernmental  arrangements.  They either  try  to  reach  out  to
foreign ministries in the key EU member states interested in Belarus or approach their
embassies in Minsk or in those European countries in which the groups are based (for
example, Poland or Lithuania). The fact that some Belarusian civil society groups and
opposition  members  had  to  leave  Belarus  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2010  events  and
opened  offices  or  settled  in  one  of  the  EU member  states  (most  often  Poland  and
Lithuania, but also Czech Republic and the UK) helps them to conduct advocacy at the
national level in the host countries. Some Minsk-based groups say that they try to reach
out to the EU member states indirectly through their EU-based partner organisations. 
Despite the fact that the Council of the EU is key in the decision-making process on EU
sanctions, few – only Brussels-based –  groups mention targeting the Council bodies. As
one  Minsk-based  NGO  explained:  “We do  not  understand  how  to  work  with  the
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Council. Civil society has relations with the member states. They have been inherited
from our cooperation experience. These relations are often with ministries and agencies
responsible for development aid” (Interview 86). This further confirms the image of the
Council as “the least accessible EU institution” (Hayes-Renshaw 2009), but also seems
to be related to lobbying capacity – most interviewed groups do not have offices in
Brussels.
An international human rights organisation which advocates the Council briefs members
of  COEST or  COHOM  –  the  Human  Rights  Working  Group  –  either  individually
(meeting members with interest in Belarus) or in a group. For human rights groups,
COHOM is also an important venue to influence EU position in the UN Human Rights
Council. As a group representative says, “If we had more capacity, we could develop
more advocacy for each member state – we partially do this: my colleague went to Italy
– but we did not manage to have this level of sophistication in our advocacy strategy.
We need more resources for that” (Interview 66).
Groups whose main activity takes place in the member states where they are based
report targeting national policymakers in the government and the parliament. A couple
of civil society groups based in Poland also say that they try to reach out to the general
public directly (e.g. through street actions) or via national media. National groups from
EU member states engage in advocacy at the EU level via partnerships with European
platforms  or  umbrella  organisations.  However,  some  groups  say  that  not  having  a
presence in Brussels makes EU level lobbying difficult. As representatives of a national-
level association explain: 
“Our task is to maintain contacts with German policymakers:  with Ministry of  Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Economy and the Federal Chancellery. We do not have an office in
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Europe. Our Managing Director often travels to Brussels. Sometimes we join the letters of
organisations like Business Europe, but it is not on the regular basis. Normally once a year
we have meetings in Brussels. [Our mother organisation] has an office in Brussels and is a
member of Business Europe. [In such a way], we get information from Business Europe.
We have contacts with Peter Balas [Deputy Director General] from DG Trade and with
people in EEAS and the last time we talked on Belarus issues too. We inform them and they
inform us. We are not lobbying. We need an office to do that” (Interview 74).
Of the numerous advocacy groups, the Belarusian political opposition enjoys access to
the highest levels of the decision-making structures of the EU institutions and member
states.  Belarusian  opposition  leaders  have  high-level  contacts  among  chiefs  of
government and foreign affairs ministers of EU member states with interest in Belarus
(Poland has been most frequently mentioned). They also meet the EU Commissioner for
ENP and high-positioned members of the European Parliament. Two opposition parties
in Belarus are members of the EPP, and Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the united opposition
candidate in the 2006 presidential election and the European Parliament Sakharov Prize
laureate,  are regularly invited to the EPP summits and maintain relations with other
political groups in the EP. Due to international contacts the Belarusian opposition not
only tries to influence EU policy towards Belarus and voice their position, but, as one
interviewee said, this activity is also “connected to obtaining resources which can be
spent  on  the  activities  in  Belarus”  and  “increasing  the  movement’s  popularity  or
significance  by meetings  top-level  politicians  from Europe such as  Angela  Merkel”
(Interview 53). Moreover, “for the more high profile groups from Belarus the contacts is
a specific protection”, as noticed by an EP official (Interview 72). Thus, there is also an
element of organisational survival in the advocacy of Belarusian opposition.
Aside from this, Belarusian citizens and business companies affected by sanctions with
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the support of law firms  approach national courts (in Lithuania, against the Lithuanian
government’s decision to freeze funds) and the EUCJ to appeal against the measures
imposed  by  the  Council.  In  particular,  all  three  businessmen  and  the  majority  of
companies connected to two of them litigated against the Council decision to freeze
their assets. A number of Belarusian  individuals targeted by the sanctions also wrote to
the Council Secretariat arguing why they should not be on the sanctions list or appealed
to the EUCJ hiring law firms.  
Advocacy at the European Parliament: “a coalition of the weak”, or advocating the
advocates
The EP attracts lobbyists due to its informal role in the EU’s policy towards Belarus and
openness  to  civil  society. While  the  EP lacks  a  formal  decision-making role  in  EU
sanctions policy, it has always been very outspoken on the issue of Belarus. 
The EP takes positions on EU sanctions towards Belarus mainly through its resolutions
and recommendations. The resolutions are frequently adopted in the urgency mode on
cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and human rights and they find support
among all political groups. In the course of 2011-2012, the EP in its resolutions called
for  extension  of  EU sanctions  and welcomed such EU moves.  For  example,  in  the
resolution of 15 September 2011 on the arrest of human rights defender Ales Bialatski,
the  EP  called  “to  extend  the  restrictive  measures  against  the  Belarusian  regime,
including by imposing targeted economic sanctions, in particular against state-owned
enterprises”(European Parliament 2011). In its resolution of 5 July 2012 on Belarus, in
particular the case of Andrzej Poczobut, the EP called “the Member States to evaluate
the  efficiency  of  the  existing  restrictive  measures  against  Belarus  and  to  consider
broadening the existing sanctions by expanding the list of Belarusians subject to a visa
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ban and asset freeze” (European Parliament 2012b). The Paleckis report – the European
Parliament (2013)  recommendation on EU policy towards Belarus – in which the EP
attempted to revivify the EU policy debate on the issue provoked an intense discussion
in the Parliament and attracted attention of advocacy groups and media.
Political  groups and MEPs also try to influence EU policy towards Belarus through
submitting  written  questions  to  the  Commission  and  the  EEAS,  organising  and
participating  in  public  hearings,  conferences  and  private  consultations  on  Belarus
related issues, and by commissioning studies (e.g. on impact of targeted sanctions on
Belarus published in 201211). The EP Presidents Jerzy Buzek (July 2009– January 2012)
and  Martin  Schulz  (since  January  2012)  were  outspoken  on  Belarus’ human  rights
situation. The EP Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to Belarusian
civil society actors twice: to the Belarusian Association of Journalists in 2004 and to
Aliaksandr  Milinkevich  in  2006,  and  the  Parliament  and  individual  members  keep
relations with the laureates. Contacts with advocacy groups depend upon specific MEPs
– there are several MEPs who maintain continuous interest in Belarus. Most of them are
from Poland or Lithuania where Belarus features high in public and political debate –
“almost a domestic issue”, as one interviewee put it (Interview 72).
Since the EP does not recognise the Belarusian parliament as democratically elected,
there are no official contacts with the Belarusian legislature and members of the EP
Delegation for relations with Belarus have not been able to travel to Minsk since 2012
(European  Parliament  2012a).  Thus,  the  EP has  built  up  relations  with  Belarusian
opposition and civil society groups to reach out for first-hand information about Belarus
11 According to  an  interviewee in  the  EP (Interview 82),  this  study  was  commissioned  by the  EP
Delegation for Relations with Belarus and the demand came from three MEPs active on Belarus. The
original idea of the study was to map businessmen and business entities connected to the regime, but
it has resulted in an impact assessment of potential targeted sanctions against sectors of Belarusian
economy.
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developments.
Representatives  of  the Belarusian  political  opposition,  civil  society  and  relatives  of
political  prisoners,  European and international  NGOs,  along with the Commissioner
Fule and representatives of the EEAS, are invited to the meetings of the EP Delegation
for relations with Belarus which take place every one or two months. Another channel
of  access  for  interest  groups  is  the  Working  Group  on  Belarus  of  EURONEST
parliamentary assembly for relations with six EaP countries which was constituted in
2011.  The  EURONEST does  not  have  an  official  representation  of  the  Belarusian
parliament and the Working Group discusses ways  to  involve Belarus.12 The  Working
Group invites  civil  society, journalists  and  opposition  from Belarus  to  its  meetings
which take place three times a year. 
Groups use MEPs to submit written questions to the Commission and the EEAS (only
during  2012,  several  submissions  addressed  the  issue  of  sanctions,  for  instance,
regarding an alleged violation of arms embargo by German and Austrian firms, France’s
admission of the blacklisted minister of interior, and economic costs of sanctions). For
example,  MEP Marek Migalski’s  question  about  arms embargo reflects  information
given by the NGO “Belarusian Tribunal”.  
A member of a Minsk-based NGO explains why the group advocates the EP, despite the
fact  that  it  lacks  decision-making  powers  in  EU  policy  towards  Belarus:  “Our
organisation sees the sense in interacting with the European Parliament. The Parliament
sets a certain political canvas for the EU relations with Belarus and we would like to
12 As one interviewee at the EP explained, “the initial idea with EURONEST was to invite civil society,
because the EP does not recognize the Belarusian Parliament. But the Belarusian authorities did not
agree. Then the formula was offered 5+5: five representatives of the Belarusian parliament and five
of civil society. But again the Belarusian authorities did not agree. As a result, there was a decision to
leave these 10 places empty” (Interview 82).
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keep  this  canvas  from  turning  into  very  primitive  in  understanding  Belarus,  from
reaching the two extremes – either isolate the dictatorship or lift  the sanctions.  The
Paleckis report was an important catalyst. The last version was adequate and sober and
it was balanced” (Interview 86).
A representative of a Belarusian human rights organisation provides another account of
why lobbying the Parliament is important: “When the EP prepares its resolutions, we try
to make accents from the point of view of human rights. The EP is not important for our
authorities,  but  on  the  other  hand,  the  Pourgourides  Report13 in  which  key  actors
responsible for the disappearances of four well-known persons in Belarus in 1999/2000
were named was very  important.  The EP resolutions  are  important  as  a  reaction  to
what’s going on in Belarus” (Interview 88).
Groups ally with the EP to lobby other EU institutions. This is a “coalition of the weak”
as  mentioned in the interest groups literature  (Kohler-Koch 1997). Having no formal
powers in EU sanctions policy, MEPs behave as advocates themselves by calling EU
institutions and their own governments to act (or serve as “door openers” – see also
Kowalewski  (2013) on  NGO  lobbying  in  case  of  Burma).  Significantly,  few  MEP
offices  active  on  Belarus  noted  that  they  organise  advocacy  events  such  as  expert
discussions and round-tables with  the  participation of civil society groups not only in
Brussels, but also in their home capitals – Warsaw and Berlin. 
2.3. Advocacy tactics
Private meetings with policymakers are a primary tactic used by all groups. These can
be  individual  face-to-face  meetings,  group  meetings  organised  with  other  advocacy
13 Approved by the Parliamentary Assembly’s of the Council of Europe on 28 April 2004 Pourgourides
report had impact on the EU policy towards Belarus as on 24 September 2004 the Council imposed
sanctions on the persons mentioned in the report as responsible for disappearances. See section 1.1.
of this chapter.  
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groups  or  policymakers,  briefings  or  in-camera  hearings  or  talks  at  the  margins  of
diplomatic receptions or conferences. 
Interest groups distribute position papers and monitoring reports among policymakers.
Many groups report having the mailing lists of European politicians, policymakers and
opinion makers, but they believe face-to-face contact to be more effective. Indeed, the
interviewed policymakers,  especially  in  the  EP, report  receiving  hundreds  of  emails
daily. Thus, they pay attention only to those which are directly related to their work. As
a member of staff of an MEP office states:  “It  is  important for advocacy groups to
remind us about their activity: to invite for coffee, to shake hands, to hand in  reports.
Human rights organisations  often send emails.  We get 400 emails  a day, this  is  not
spam, these are emails with content. We cannot read them. Newsletters, even if there
was a lot of effort put into them, lose value. We are not able to work on it” (Interview
60).
Groups also organise and participate in conferences in Brussels and EU member states.
Many say they appreciate informal talks on the margins of such events. It is also helpful
for  building networks  and preparing future  contacts.  Groups from Belarus  use their
partners in Brussels and other European capitals to help them carry out advocacy tours
in the EU that typically include both public events and private meetings with officials.  
Tactics are usually combined. An international human rights NGO give an example of
their  multi-level advocacy campaigns: “Through a network of sections in EU member
states, we call our lobbyists in EU members to call their governments for action. We
organise this kind of multi-level campaigns. When there was a report issued on civil
society in Belarus, our activists in the EU member states were called to contact their
governments, to arrange meetings with MFAs, and at very least to send them the report”
203
(Interview 64).
Many  of  the  interviewed  NGOs  and  opposition  movements  reported  sending
amendments to the Paleckis report on EU policy towards Belarus. The rapporteur, a
Lithuanian MEP Justas Vincas Paleckis from the Socialists and Democrats group, met
with civil society representatives during his visit to Minsk to prepare the draft and also
sent the first draft “to 6-7 NGOs to have their amendments”, according to his assistant
(Interview 68). However, the report in which the MEP argued for renewing dialogue
with  Belarusian  authorities  provoked  a  heated  debate  in  the  Parliament.  The  EPP,
ALDE, Greens/EFA and ECR  groups had a harsher stance on Belarus – and a strong
criticism of civil society groups who picked up some controversial phrases such as “an
improvement of the situation of human rights was discernible in 2012” or “consider the
suspension of key officials from the EU visa ban list with a view to broadening the main
and  essential  diplomatic  communication  channel  with  Belarus,  also  in  view  of  the
Eastern Partnership summit” (European Parliament 2013b).
As a result, many groups passed their amendments to the report via a rapporteur or via
other  MEPs.  With  the  support  of  a  Green  MEP,  Belarusian  groups  organised  a
conference in the Parliament to discuss the draft report. The Human Rights Committee
Secretariat also organised a hearing on human rights to which the rapporteur and human
rights groups were invited. A representative of a Belarusian NGO describes their tactics
for amending the parliamentary report:
“We participated in the development of Paleckis report on EU policy towards Belarus. I had
been an intern in his office before, so I knew his team. We talked to his assistant informally,
they sent us the draft for comments. Our partner, a human rights organisation from Belarus
[the name omitted on purpose – author], sent recommendations to the second draft of his
report themselves. Moreover, they made a media campaign in Belarus. Later, our partner
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organisation also sent their recommendations through myself. When Paleckis drafted the
first draft, he went to Minsk. He chose himself whom to meet. For example, he met our
Chairman of the Board. We also worked with the office of MEP Werner Schulz [German
Green Party]. Our Chairman has a good relationship with him. Schulz is more eager to
work with us than Paleckis. We also organised a round-table discussion on EU’s policy
towards Belarus in the EP premises in Brussels in June 2013 before the second draft was
adopted. It was attended by around 40 people. The MEPs mostly sent their staff, only one
MEP came in person. There was a hearing on Belarus that day, so most MEPs, including
Werner Schulz, preferred to go there. There were also people from the Commission, the
EEAS and Brussels-based NGOs. Amendments on the role of civil society were inserted in
the draft not by Paleckis, but by other MEPs” (Interview 45). 
Many groups were consulted in the process of preparation: “There were Belarusian,
international, European NGOs, such as Viasna, FIDH, Amnesty, Belarusian journalists
(Belsat  TV),  the  opposition.  Paleckis  met  with  the  opposition  in  Minsk and during
hearings organised either by the EPP or the EURONEST Working Group on Belarus.
Jacek Saryjusz-Wolski organised a meeting and the opposition came”, says an AFET
Secretariat official involved in the process (Interview 70). 
Given the EUCJ’s powers of judicial control over CFSP sanctions against natural and
legal persons, litigation strategies have been used mainly by Belarusian businessmen
and their companies to appeal against EU measures. In most cases, litigation strategies
followed unsuccessful attempts to block the Council decisions to list these individuals
and companies associated with them. Apart from corporate actors and business people,
only two other individuals used litigation before the EUCJ which may also suggest that
this  strategy requires resources to hire experienced lawyers, while the costs of legal
defence may only be reimbursed in case of judicial victory.
About half  of the interviewed groups report using outside lobbying tactics. Working
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with media is the most common tactic. Many NGOs and Belarusian opposition groups
give comments and interviews to national and European media. A lot of them also have
frequently-updated  English  versions  of  their  websites  and a  mailing  subscription  of
materials to offer. A few Belarusian groups in exile have their own media resources in
English. International human rights networks through their sections in the EU member
states and Brussels have access to national media and outlets which focus on EU policy
issues (such as EUObserver). One human rights group reported writing and publishing
op-eds on behalf of MEPs (Interview 66). Some groups also turn to social media such as
Facebook and twitter.  
One group reported having a database of contacts with 1300 addresses of individuals in
the European and national parliaments working on Belarus, foreign ministries, think-
tanks and NGOs, foreign journalists and international donors to Belarus. They also run a
competition for Western journalists  writing on Belarus.  A group representative says:
“Due to this competition we have a group of engaged journalists and we work together
on themes because it is difficult to write on Belarus all the time” (Interview 92).
Street  actions  are  organised  mainly  in  the  member  states  where  public  interest  in
Belarus  is  particularly  prevalent.  A  Poland-based  youth  NGO  mentions  organising
annual concerts for Belarus which are broadcasted on national TV stations. The most
recent reportedly gathered 3000 people. Politicians are invited to speak at these street
events (Interview 73).  
Belarusian diaspora groups organised several protests in Brussels on the days when key
decisions were to be taken by the Council of the EU: “We organised three pickets in
Brussels. The first was on the 31st of January 2011 in front the Council building on the
Schuman roundabout. There were “Poles” [Belarusians living in Poland] coming and
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sister of jailed opposition presidential candidate. The second was on the 23th of May of
2011 also on the Schuman roundabout and it was also initiative of the “Poles”. In 2011,
we also picketed Deutschebank’s office, because they bought bonds from Belarusian
government, as well as BNP Paribas bank and other” (Interview 93). However, the tactic
is not seen to be effective by the group, even for the sake of organisational maintenance:
“I see little benefit  from these pickets. There must be continuation.  People get tired
going out here. It is not like in Belarus that people decided to go out every month. You
cannot  do  it  here.  You  need  other  types  of  activities,  otherwise  people  burn  out”
(ibidem).
If organised well and timely, street actions attract media attention to a cause which the
group wants to promote. TV reports showing the Council meetings are likely to show
the  protesters  gathering  in  front  of  the  building,  thus  such  gatherings  provide  an
additional opportunity to raise the salience of the issue. As the interviewee mentioned,
street actions should not be in isolation. Advocacy groups combine them with other
tactics to keep group members and supporters involved (pursuing ‘logic of support’),
such as petition writing, talking to media, organising photo exhibitions, film screenings,
public debates and charity evenings. 
An  interviewee  from  an  international  human  rights  network  stated  gathering  over
60,000 signatures on their petition for the abolition of the death penalty in Belarus. They
also organised a  letter writing campaign for the release of a Belarusian human rights
defender (Interview 64). Such campaigns reportedly mobilise hundreds of thousands of
people globally, raising public awareness about human rights in the affected countries.
Other outside lobbying tactics include film screenings. As one advocate shares their
experience: 
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“The  elections  are  always  a  factor  in  the  West’s  agenda  on  Belarus.  So  I  seized  the
opportunity and supported by Polish MFA we organised a cycle of press-conferences and a
short four minute film about the [December 2010] events in Belarus in European countries.
We went to Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the US.
The route was made on the way. It had a good media effect. We did not allow the wave of
interest in Belarus to disappear. 
When we saw a good effect from the short film, we made a full-length film “Belarusian
dream”.  It  was  shown  in  twenty  countries,  in  many  cases  there  were  local  activists
organising premiers. 
The second wave of press-conferences was organised after the trials against the opposition.
And the next year it was a different format, as there was less media attention to the issue, so
we  organised  in  camera  round-tables  with  experts  and  policymakers  and  diplomats
participating” (Interview 92).
Typical outside lobbying tactics are often used to target policymakers. Film screenings
and photo exhibitions are often organised in the EP to deliver an emotional message to
politicians. MEPs often use opportunities to host such events. As an assistant to a MEP
recounts: “The events on Belarus which organised here in Brussels are mainly aimed at
attracting  the  attention  of  other  MEPs  towards  Belarus,  to  inform  them  about  the
situation in Belarus to make it easier later to gather for EP resolutions and reports on
Belarus. [...] We also organised movie screenings. Last week we showed a movie ‘Viva
Belarus!’” in order to show the situation in the country. Sometimes we discuss Belarus
in  the  context  of  other  Eastern  countries.  For  example,  there  was  a  screening  of
documentaries on human rights in different states to the east (Belarus, Kazakhstan etc)”
(Interview 82). 
An unknown group trying to attract EU attention towards the death penalty in Belarus
employed a creative tactic by posting packages with plastic sacks for the corpses of
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executed Belarusian prisoners. An EP official who demonstrated this artefact to me said
that it was “quite memorable, because of the emotional message” (Interview 72).
Business  groups mainly  rely  on  inside  lobbying.  As  a  representative  of  an  industry
association says: “We are not lobbying against sanctions at public level. In media here,
the view of Belarus is just one option. It is not possible to lobby on this issue via media.
The press is not very interested in Belarus. If we send a press release arguing against
sanctions, the press would put pressure on the industry” (Interview 74). An exception is
a Latvian business group that gave figures to the press on Latvian-Belarusian economic
cooperation and the estimated losses of potential  economic sanctions,  supposedly to
influence public opinion and increase pressure on the Latvian government  (Kłysiński
2013).
The press material against business interests on the issue of sanctions often framed the
situation as one of human rights  vs.  money. According to a Council  official,  media
coverage may play against  a  member state  which tries to protect  a  certain business
interest, if the press learns about it, as happened in the case of Slovenia vetoing EU
sanctions  in  order  to  keep  Belarusian  businessman  Iury  Chyzh  off  the  list:  “It  is
inconvenient, it  gives a different flavour to the discussion. A member state does not
want to be seen as a blocking state” (Interview 84).
2.4. Alliances
EU sanctions on Belarus is an overcrowded advocacy field in comparison to the case of
visa policy towards Eastern neighbours examined in Chapter 3. However, despite the
many Belarusian and EU organisations involved in lobbying, few broad coalitions exist.
The business interests stand out as more united. First of all, the interviewed business
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groups were already united in the national-level industry associations. Furthermore, they
are  members  or  partners  with  BusinessEurope  at  the  EU  level.  Finally,  Belarusian
business  groups are  connected  to  national  industry  associations  in  a  number  of  EU
member states via bilateral business councils. 
Belarusian  human  rights  organisations  have  lasting  partnerships  with  international
networks and counterparts  in the EU member states. Aside from this, other Belarusian
NGOs are less connected with European umbrella organisations or platforms. There are
partnerships  with  EU-based  donor  organisations  and  NGOs  which  help  Belarusian
groups to lobby in the EU,  but large and stable coalitions are lacking. 
Belarusian NGOs are interlinked via the National Platform of the EaP CSF, but the
Platform did not take a common position on EU sanctions. Belarusian opposition groups
have also taken different positions on the issue. Belarusian diaspora groups and EU-
based Belarusian organisations merely reflect the inside-Belarus reality. They may share
the same office, as six Belarusian organisations in Warsaw united in Belarusian House
do, but hold different views on the EU sanctions issue. Apparently this is not merely due
to the nature of the issue. The majority of Belarusian groups and their foreign donors
recognise that civil society in the country is divided. A representative of the Belarusian
NGOs association points out that it is difficult for  Belarusian organisations to come
forward as a united front: “We do not communicate very well inside the civil society
sector in Belarus. If human rights issues are concerned, there is private consensus that
human rights organisations are specialists and professionals in this field. But if other
topics are discussed, we do not have such unanimity. We also have a sector of political
parties and movements which communicate poorly with us and between themselves”
(Interview 81). 
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The  lack  of  unity  within  Belarusian  organisations  is  also  seen  as  an  obstacle  to
participation  in  European  platforms.  A  representative  of  the  Belarusian  National
Platform of the EaP CSF discusses this problem: “There is a need for Belarusian civil
society to develop relations with big civil society platforms in Europe and the National
Platform would be more convincing in this role. But for that we need a consolidated
position  and  delegation  of  voice.  Everybody  wants  to  be  a  leader  in  their  own
organisation  rather  than  to  delegate  a  part  of  the  authority  to  an  independent
force”(Interview 86). Efforts to establish a network of Belarusian diaspora offices in
Europe existing in Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Switzerland have
not been successful (Interview 93).
The  unfavourable  climate  for  associational  life  in  Belarus  and  reliance  on  foreign
funding seem to be among the reasons for the division. Belarusian organisations try to
preserve their group identity as they compete for funds and attention from European
policymakers (see also Ash (2014) who argues that opposition is fragmented as result of
electoral contestation and subsequent post-electoral repression, whereas competition for
foreign aid creates a need among Belarusian opposition leaders to demonstrate their
ability to mobilize support through electoral campaigns). Belarusian NGOs working in
the country are critical of groups working in exile because  funding for Belarusian civil
society is being pulled out of the country.  The groups in exile argue that certain donors
prefer working with registered organisations and they are “accountable to [the donors]
and further spread funds to Belarus” and “that before Belarusian organisations  appeared
abroad,  Polish  or  Lithuanian  organisations  had  been  taking  the  donor  money  for
activities  in  Belarus” (Interview 48).  The competition for  the attention of  European
policymakers divides the opposition, which is illustrated by the following remark of one
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of its representatives: “Our possibility to influence  [EU policy] decreased because a
part  of  the opposition did not  recognise  Aliaksandr  Milinkevich.  The EU follows a
parity  rule  and  invites  other  opposition  politicians  too.  The  attention  enjoyed  by
Milinkevich induced other opposition politicians to want taking his place on Belarusian
and international arena” (Interview 46). A diaspora group says of being approached by a
chairman of one of the Belarusian opposition groups: “He asked us ‘Why do you exist
here? Join us while it is still not too late’. They look at us in the context of competition
for political attention and resources” (Interview 93). 
3. Influence and its determinants
3.1. Measurement: degree and type
As in the case of EU visa policy examined in the previous chapter, advocacy groups
find it difficult to estimate their influence. Some groups avoid answering the question at
all. Among those groups who attempted to answer the question about the achievement
of their  advocacy goals,  most  were speaking about partial  influence which was still
difficult to attribute clearly to their advocacy efforts as many actors have been involved
in advocacy and policymaking process.
Civil society groups seem to be most successful in putting and keeping the issue of
Belarus on the EU agenda. They present information on human rights violations in the
country and maintain the frame of Belarus authorities as severe human rights violators,
calling on the EU to protect international law and human rights standards. This goes in
line with the literature on sanctions (Giumelli 2013; Kowalewski 2013) that expects
non-state actors to play a role during agenda-setting process by providing information
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from the ground and raising salience of the issue. This also conforms with the literature
on non-state actor access to international organisations which emphasises the need of
international bureaucracy to have information about local conditions, especially in the
human  rights  field  (Steffek  2010;  Tallberg  et  al.  2014).  However,  the  fact  that
Belarusian civil society and opposition are divided on the issue of sanctions weakens
their influence in the EU as the EU member states and other actors can pick up opposing
arguments in this debate. In this context, groups which take a more moderate (visa ban
and asset freeze, but no trade embargo) and “realistic”, as they said, position appear as
the most successful. The groups who  lobby for  dramatic policy changes, namely the
introduction of economic sanctions, have failed to gain the support of the Council. The
same goes for groups who lobby against extending sanctions to Belarusian business or
other domestic actors.
Several  groups said that  they  had provided policymakers  with the names of  people
involved in repression in Belarus in order for them to be included in the EU sanctions
list.  However, all  the groups stated that  it  was not very clear  for them upon which
criteria the EU lists are formed and that not all people from their lists appeared in the
Council decisions. As one Belarusian opposition politician described their experience:
“Our party and human rights NGOs submitted their views on who had to be in the list,
however, some people got there and other did not. There is a lack of clear criteria what
people can get to the list and how they can be excluded” (Interview 51). A Warsaw-
based NGO reported of  having passed the list  of  people involved in  repressions  in
Belarus to Polish MFA several times, including upon the explicit request of diplomats,
but again the success was partial: “There must be 10% of those persons from our Black
List on the EU blacklist” (Interview 81). It is a question whether ten percent of people
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on the EU list automatically translates into ten percent of advocacy objectives achieved
by an NGO. It can be a part of an advocacy tactic that NGOs compose very extensive
lists showing the scale of human rights violations in Belarus. 
Whereas it is difficult to capture influence at the decision-making stage in the Council, a
number of Belarusian and international groups were confident of their influence at the
EP, thus contributing to the political debate on Belarus in the EU. They spoke of their
proposals for amendments being copy-pasted to the texts of EP resolutions and reports.
The success of the advocacy efforts of public interest groups to generate pressure on the
EU and fill in the EU sanctions list is also confirmed by policymakers. NGOs were
reported  to  be  particularly  influential  during  the  first  half  of  2011  when  the  EU
sanctions list increased to nearly two hundred individuals in the aftermath of the post-
electoral repression. An official from the EU Delegation in Minsk says that during that
period “NGOs were influential in terms of advising on whom to include”. However, he
adds that they are selective in terms of whose views to take on board: “We look at who
is  talking,  at  people’s backgrounds,  from where  these  people  are  coming,  if  this  is
because of their personal revenge, or there is a wave in the society. It’s a restrictive
measure after all and we have to be careful on the criteria we use” (Interview 80).
In  the  aftermath  of  the  2010 crisis  in  Belarus,  the  EU’s reliance  on evidence  from
Belarusian advocacy groups for information about those involved in repressions was
due to “difficult working conditions in the repressive country”  (Rettman 2011). As a
result  the  first  list  approved  on 31 January  2011,  to  which  the  Council  added  117
individuals in addition to renewing previous sanctions, was based on the reports posted
on  the  internet  by  Belarusian  human  rights  and  democracy  activists  “because  EU
diplomats could not conduct interviews with victims of the post-election crackdown. In
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many cases, EU structures do not know what Belarusian officials actually do beyond
their  official  titles or even how old they are” (ibidem). While  the sanctions list  are
decided by Brussels-based diplomats from the EU member states, they have to rely on
information ultimately originating from Belarus, which may come via reports from their
capitals, the EU delegation and EU member states embassies in Minsk who all consult
human rights and advocacy groups on this issue.
The EU policymakers recognise that they are interested in listing related information
coming from NGOs such as “companies, belongings, or concrete information to update
the reasons for listings or identifiers” of the targeted individuals (Interview 59). There
are also legal grounds for this. As explained by an EU member state diplomat working
in  the  RELEX,  the  Council  cannot  rely  only  on  intelligence  coming  from the  EU
member states. In its decisions, it needs to refer to publicly available information when
it puts the evidence against the sanctioned persons and entities because if they appeal to
the EUCJ, the Court cannot deal with classified information and the case is likely to be
lost. This explains why information coming from open sources, such as the media or the
websites of Belarusian NGOs is useful (Interview 84).
Interest groups also lobbied against the inclusion of certain individuals and entities on
the EU sanctions list. Such advocacy was mainly done via EU member states given their
right of veto in the Council, but groups also targeted the EEAS officials who propose
the listings. Mainly business groups were involved in lobbying against, though some
NGOs also  advocated  against  expanding  the  EU sanctions  list  and  keeping  certain
categories of individuals off the list. 
The evidence of  their  influence is  mixed.  On the one hand,  the media report  when
lobbied by business groups, certain member states vetoed the listing of a number of
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Belarusian  businessmen  and  entities  which  were  considered  by  the  Council.  For
example, a media report quotes the then French foreign minister Alain Juppé saying that
Slovenia  vetoed  the  inclusion  of  one  daughter  company  of  Iury  Chyzh,  Belarusian
businessman, in the sanctions list. The firm associated with Chyzh, Elite, has a contract
worth around €100 million with Slovenian company Riko Group to build a luxury hotel
in Minsk (Rettman 2012a; Rettman 2012c). Latvia also reportedly vetoed the listing of
another  of  Chyzh’s  companies,  Belneftegaz  (Rettman  2012b), which  exports  oil
products via Latvia (Nielsen 2012b).
On the other hand, the interviewed groups are less positive about the achievement of
their  advocacy  objectives.  They  say  that  their  advocacy  efforts  to  keep  certain
individuals off the list or prevent new listings were unsuccessful (Interviews 74, 77).
The media reports support this mixed picture. Different business groups from a number
of member states, including the above-mentioned Riko Group from Slovenia, lobbied
their governments not to list businessman Iury Chyzh, a known associate of President
Lukashenka. However, despite numerous efforts, he was included, though not during the
first  attempt  in  the  Council.14 A Council  official  explains  that  when  information  is
leaked to the media, it is more difficult for a member state to defend the interest of
business groups as it does not want to be seen a spoiler (Interview 84). Thus, bigger
coalitions are still needed even to protect the status quo.
There have also been several successful litigation cases brought to the national courts
(Lithuania) and the EU Court of Justice by individuals and companies targeted by the
14 Slovenia and Latvia were reported to veto the inclusion of Iury Chyzh and his entities to the list of
EU sanctions in February 2012. A business group from Slovenia Riko Group who had business with
Chyzh’s companies was seen as the main cause behind Slovenia’s veto.  German, Lithuanian and
Latvia business groups also report lobbying against the inclusion of Czych, however, only Latvia was
reported attempting to block the issue to the Council. In 23 March 2012, Chyzh and his companies
were included on the EU sanctions list (see Rettman 2012c). 
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EU sanctions.  In  2012,  a  court  in  Lithuania  ruled  out  in  favour  of  the  blacklisted
businessman Vladimir Peftiev, ordering the unfreezing of his money to pay legal fees to
the  Lithuanian  law firm LAWIN representing  him and his  companies  in  the  EUCJ
(Nielsen 2012a). The Court of Justice preliminary ruling was favourable on this matter
(EUCJ  2014a).  In  2014,  there  were  also  five  judgements  of  the  General  Court  on
appeals against the Council Decisions, of which four were in favour of the appealed
individuals and business entities. In September 2014, the General Court ruled in favour
of Belarusian journalist Aliaksei Mikhalchanka, annulling his listing in 2011 and 2012
on the grounds of an error  in assessment  of his  role  (EUCJ 2014g; see also Lester
2014a; Ругайн 2014), whereas the Council removed him from the list in October 2014.
The Court, however, left in force the listing of Deputy Chairman of Central Electoral
Commission Vadzim Ipatau (EUCJ 2014f).
In  the  case  of  Vladimir  Peftiev  vs.  Council,  in  December  2014  the  General  Court
annulled Mr Peftiev’s listing in 2011 and in 2012 Council Decisions ruling out that the
Council  could  not  substantiate  the  grounds  on  which  Peftiev  was  listed  –  a  close
associate of Lukashenka and his family, financial supporter of the regime, including
through BelTechExport, an arms exporting company, and provider of economic advice
(EUCJ 2014d). Whereas the judgment did not concern the relisting of Peftiev in the
2013 Council Decision, the Council removed Peftiev from the list in October 2014. The
Council also lifted sanctions against another businessman, Anatoly Ternavsky, though
his  appeal  to  the  EUCJ to  suspend sanctions  against  him as  interim measures  was
dismissed  in  2012  (EUCJ  2012).  In  addition,  the  General  Court  annulled  Council
Decisions listing three companies associated with Peftiev – BT Communications, Sport-
Pari and BelTechExport (the latter one on the grounds that the right of defence has been
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breached) (EUCJ 2014c; EUCJ 2014e; EUCJ 2014b; see also Lester 2014b). However,
by the time of the EUCJ judgements BT Communications, Sport-Pari as well as another
twelve companies associated with businessmen Vladimir Peftiev, Iury Chyzh or Anatoly
Ternavsky had been delisted by the Council in May 2013, October 2013 and October
2014.15 The interviewed EU officials  insist  that  the sanctions against  the companies
were lifted  due to the ownership change. It cannot be however ignored that the ongoing
trials as well as the previous EUCJ rulings on other sanctions regimes led the Council to
revise the evidence more rigorously and resulted in delistings ahead of eventual Court
rulings. The listing of BelTechExport was annulled in the Council Decisions of 2011
and 2012 and recognised as inadmissible for the Council Decision of 2013 due to the
application  time.  However,  the  Council  relisted  BelTechExport  in  October  2014 on
amended grounds as a company which “benefits from the regime as a main exporter of
arms  and  military  equipment  in  Belarus,  which  requires  authorisation  from  the
Belarusian authorities” (Council 2014c).
Several  groups  speak  of  their  influence  in  terms  of  luck  or  aligning  with  the  EU
position. As one group representative said, “The time has passed and their position is
changing towards ours. The sanctions did not influence anything, they only irritated the
authorities and froze the dialogue” (Interview 57).  The interviewed business groups
report lobbying for the suspension of EU sanctions against Belarusian foreign minister
Uladzimir Makei, however, it is difficult to attribute the influence to them, as the EU
member states were also eager to have a channel for a formal dialogue with Belarus and
were behind this  initiative,  including Lithuania’s Presidency in the EU who wanted
Belarus to participate in the Vilnius EaP summit in November 2013.
15 LLC Delovaya Set, CJSC Sistema investicii i inovacii, PUC Sen-Ko, PUC BT Invest, 
Tekhnosoyuzpribor.
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The reduction of the sanctions list in late 2013-2014 saw little lobbying activity from
the pro-sanctions camp. The majority of groups that had advocated for tightened EU
sanctions in 2011-2012 hardly opposed the move. It is likely that this also comes as a
result of internal reflection among Belarusian and international civil society groups. The
EU restrictive measures have not led to the release of all political prisoners and human
rights improvements. While the sanctions regime has remained in place, other issues
have come forward both in Belarusian and European policies. On the one hand, the EU
launched new attempts to engage in dialogue with Belarusian authorities, partly reacting
to  the  low effectiveness  of  sanctions  policy  and partly  to  the  changing geopolitical
context of the region after Russian aggression towards Ukraine.  On the other  hand,
Belarusian  authorities  have  changed  their  rhetoric  in  favour  of  the  EU,  showing
eagerness to cooperate in an attempt to resist Moscow’s pressure (Korosteleva 2015).
This study focuses on lobbying and interest group influence at the EU level. It remains
beyond the scope of this research to consider how member states’ positions are formed
and the extent to which they are influenced by national interest groups. This aspect does
remain salient given the direct impact it has upon EU agenda-setting. For example, one
can hypothesise that EU member states did not consider economic sanctions against
Belarus due to influential business actors in their member states. As a result, national
business  actors  may have  succeeded in  keeping the  issue  off  the  EU agenda – the
‘second face of power’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). Experts interviewed for this study
believe  that  in  some  cases  business  groups  did  not  influence  the  position  of  their
governments (such as Germany) as there are no important economic dependencies with
Belarus, while in other cases (such as Latvia) the dependencies exist and they are seen
to define the member state’s position to a greater extent. However, to shed the light on
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the  question  of  interest  group influence  on  the  domestic  arenas  in  the  EU member
states,  one  needs  to  open  a  blackbox  of  national  foreign  policymaking  which  is  a
research exercise of its own. 
Finally, some methodological remarks. First,  the question concerning their  influence
appeared to be a sensitive issue for few groups which were not ready to speak about it
openly.  Second,  this  case  study  has  further  proved  the  benefits  of  methodological
triangulation. While business groups are often reported to be powerful by the media,
they do not always estimate their influence positively when the question  is directly put
to them. They report the achievement of their advocacy objectives only to a very limited
degree.  They  may  be  successful  in  averting  economic  sanctions,  but  they  did  not
manage to prevent certain individuals from being listed and the EU sanctions list from
expanding.  One  should  bear  in  mind  that  business  groups  lobby  not  only  against
economic  sanctions  or  measures  affecting  businesses,  but  against  any  restrictive
measures because the spoilt EU-Belarus relations also restrict the groups’ ability to do
their business in Belarus. If one did not ask the groups about their objectives and their
self-assessment,  one could come to a different outcome based on media reports, for
example. 
3.2. Factors explaining influence
Group-level characteristics, particularly  connected  to  group’s  resources  such  as
funding, network, office in Brussels and a capacity to design and implement an effective
advocacy strategy, come forward in advocates’ own assessment of factors contributing
to their influence or lack thereof. For Belarusian organisations, regardless of where they
are based, one of the most frequently mentioned factors determining influence is the
presence of a broad coalition advocating the same goal and having allies among other
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groups, especially international partners, to make their voice heard in the EU. 
An NGO representative from Minsk believes that the weak influence of Belarusian civil
society organisations on the EU sanctions policy is due to the lack of a consolidated
position among Belarusian organisations:  “On the contrary, they had contrary, polar
opinions” (Interview 87). In a similar vein, another Belarusian advocate stresses that
successful advocacy depends on the ability to mobilise other groups: “whether it is just
one  think-tank  speaking  or  the  National  Platform,  or  the  six  plus  coalition  of  the
opposition, or it is civil society, parties and think-tanks all together” (Interview 57).
Belarusian groups emphasise the importance of having international partners who are
based  in  the  EU,  who  are  more  experienced  in  EU-level  advocacy  and  with  an
understanding of the policy process and a network of policymakers to which they can
communicate. Such partners help  Belarusian organisations to organise advocacy tours
or  events  in  Brussels  and  other  European  capitals.  They  also  share  important
information on the intricacies of decision-making and bear a part of the advocacy costs.
Most groups both from the EU and Belarus speak of access to policymakers and “good
relationship” with them as an important factor defining influence. Some groups speak of
access and of the fact that policymakers themselves approach the group for information
as a proxy of influence. For example, one representative from a Warsaw-based NGO
says: “We are contacted and listened to, we are asked about our opinion – it is also a
criterion of our success. We are invited to meetings. If Polish governmental think-tanks
write something, they often use our opinion in their analysis. Poland’s MFA gives our
contacts to diplomats of other countries” (Interview 48). Another member of a Minsk-
based  group  shares:  “Interested  EU member  state  embassies  periodically  ask  us  to
clarify our position, for example with regard to political prisoners. We also send them a
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lot  of  materials,  monthly  monitoring  reports.  The  embassies  are  eager  to  use  our
materials. There is also a practice when all ambassadors are gathered together and we
speak of current problems and trends. I guess this influences them in a certain way”
(Interview 88). 
Brussels-based  groups  are  seen  in  a  beneficial  position  in  terms  of  access  to
policymakers.  An  EP  official  stresses  the  importance  of  presence  in  Brussels  for
advocacy groups: 
“Those who are in Brussels, they have access, they know which MEPs to approach and
how. If you know the process,  it  is  easier to lobby. Even the EEAS did not know the
process. You do not lobby the members in the same way. Brussels-based NGOs have this
knowledge, experience and skills. NGOs based in Minsk do not have resources to pass
message to Brussels. I received hundreds of open letters also addressed to MEPs. But these
open letters from Minsk that say something about the regime do not work for MEPs. There
is a need in concrete amendments, with names mentioned, with references. There is a big
difference between well equipped and trained NGOs, mainly here in Brussels, and less
resourced NGOs” (Interview 70).
A member of an international human rights organisation shares the view that having an
office in Brussels is  key for building relationships with policymaking bodies:  “Very
often it is policymakers who come to us to obtain information rather than us going to
them”  (Interview  64).  This  confirms  the  relationship  between  group  resources  and
access to EU policymakers, which is in line with the interest group literature, which
points out that resourceful groups are better prepared to lobby at the EU level. 
Having allies among policymakers is also mentioned as one of the factors conditioning
advocacy success,  while  not having them at all  impedes successful advocacy. Some
groups named allies who are not powerful, but eager to listen to their views and take
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them on board such as MEPs or Commissioner’s Fule office, who are rather advocates
themselves on the issue of EU sanctions on Belarus. Others named the member states
that have a strong interest in Belarus and have driven EU policy towards the country
(for example, Poland, Germany and Lithuania). An international human rights group
said  that  their  allies  are  mainly  those  governments  for  whom human  rights  are  an
important part of their agenda (for instance, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands,
Germany). 
Both groups and policymakers speak of the necessity of understanding the complex
decision-making process of the EU that often comes with experience. A Vilnius-based
NGO member believes that “it is important to know the institutional design of those
bodies which you target, but not a theory which is written somewhere, but practical
things, for example, when to hold an event, after or before launch, to have a coffee
break or not, how to hold your audience for three hours” (Interview 54). Several groups
also  stress  the  importance  of  timing  in  order  to  have  more  impact  on  the  future
decisions. This view is also reflected by an adviser in the EP: “It is important to know
what is being prepared, e.g. a report,  who is the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs,
whom to approach, what is the stage of preparation, or if it is about organising a hearing
or an event. It is important to have a concrete message about the topic they want to
advocate on” (Interview 60). 
Understanding the EU policy process on Belarus sanctions also allows groups to set up
realistic  advocacy objectives.  As a  representative  of  the Belarusian  opposition says,
“Our chairman knows the situation in the EU very well. We could not expect a radical
political position of the EU. That’s why our position on what EU policy should be and
the EU position often overlap” (Interview 46). An interviewee from an international
223
human rights group speaks in a similar vein: “You have to be strategic. You cannot just
say the EU is stupid, but to be more constructive, telling to policymakers: “It is hard for
you to do this, but maybe this or that is an option”. Not coming with a big flag to them”
(Interview 66).
In  contrast  to  the  previous  case  of  EU visa  policy, groups  have  talked  less  of  the
importance  of  information.  Only  human  rights  groups  stress  the  importance  of
presenting well-researched and credible information as a factor of successful advocacy.
However, information scored high for policymakers when interacting with the groups.
They  report mainly seeking information about developments in Belarus and new ideas
for  the  EU  policy.  Whereas  the  EEAS  and  the  Council  working  groups  designing
sanctions  value  information  helping  them to  compile  the  listings,  to  “calibrate  EU
sanctions”, the EP looks for information which helps them to understand Belarus and
Belarusian society better and “concrete data that helps to fine-tune MEPs’ views on
Belarus” (Interview 68) as well as new ideas on what the EU can do for the country. The
reputation  of  an  advocacy  group  matters  for  policymakers  based  on  their  previous
experiences of interactions and the value of the information it provides. 
Advocacy  experience  and  understanding  of  the  policy  process,  on  the  one  hand,
constitutes  a  group  resource,  meaning  that  it  is  usually  a  characteristic  of  an
organisation  that  has  access  to  information  and  to  policymakers  and  engages  in
advocacy systematically. On the other hand, it is an important requisite when designing
an effective advocacy  strategy, which is frequently named by the groups as a crucial
factor of advocacy success. An effective advocacy strategy includes a clearly defined
message and goals, an understanding of who to lobby, when and how. One human rights
group representative described this factor very well:
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 “You have to  present  a  clear  message.  To have  a  clear  task what  you would like  to
advocate for. Your task can be just to keep the issues on EU agenda or to have the mandate
of UN special representative on human rights for Belarus prolonged until next presidential
elections. 
You have to formulate a strategy and involve as many organisations in a coalition. Nobody
will lose their independence, but it is important to have a common message, not everybody
going and telling their things. It is important to know the specifics. In the UN we do not use
the word regime in order not to grow opposition from certain countries. There is an art of
diplomacy.
You need to have international partners who understand to whom to talk, when, and how
[decision-making] mechanisms work. One must understand that there is no quick result of
advocacy efforts. Some issues take a year or two of advocacy efforts.  While people in
Belarus  say  “we went  there  two times,  but  nothing  come out”.  Again,  it  is  because  a
strategy is lacking” (Interview 54).
The interviewee believed that an effective advocacy strategy is dependent on group’s
resources and that Belarusian groups often suffer from a lack of resources to engage in
advocacy in a systematic way (Interview 54). 
As another Belarusian advocate summed up “the problem of resources is a key. We live
through projects, while doing advocacy in the EU is very expensive” (Interview 45). It
is noteworthy that while assessing the influence of other advocacy organisations, many
respondents underline such factors as contacts at the high level, access to policymakers,
offices in Brussels and financial resources.
Conclusion
Interest group lobbying and influence on CFSP sanctions towards Belarus have been
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examined in this chapter. This policy area is characterised by strong intergovernmental
arrangements with the  dominance of the EU member states and the Council of the EU
in agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation stages, while the involvement
of  supranational  institutions  is  limited,  except  for  the  EUCJ  powers  to  review  the
legality of restrictive measures imposed on natural and legal persons. 
This institutional design has been reflected in the advocacy strategies of the interviewed
groups.  Most  of  them target  the  EU  member  states.  However,  the  majority  of  the
interviewed  groups  also  engage  in  lobbying  at  the  EU  level  using  all  the  venues
accessible to them and not necessarily reflecting the formal powers of policymakers.
Groups target the EEAS and the Delegation in Minsk given their role in the preparation
of sanctions and review process and the EUCJ which has judicial powers on sanctions
targeting  physical  and  legal  persons.  Nonetheless,  groups  also  lobby  the  European
Parliament and the Commissioner’s for the ENP office which do not have formal power
over EU sanctions policy. 
This is in line with the assumption that interest groups approach institutions receptive to
their demands as a means of strategic empowerment. The case of litigation in the EUCJ
is illustrative because the Court’s rulings have impact on the Council decision-making
on CFSP sanctions  as  legal  arguments  are  increasingly  important  in  the  process  of
designing the list of targeted persons and entities. Lobbying the European Parliament
and the Commissioner for ENP is more about lobbying powerful advocates, with a hope
that  they will  further  influence the  policy  debate  in  the EU member  states  and the
Council.  Some  groups  have  also  used  the  right  of  democratic  oversight  of  the
Parliament through addressing questions to the Commission and the EEAS related to
the  EU  sanctions  against  Belarus.  Therefore,  our  expectation  about  interest  groups
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involved in multi-level lobbying (H4) has been confirmed.
As in the previous case study of EU visa policy, few interviewed groups target  the
Council of the EU and its bodies. This confirms the reputation of the Council as the
least accessible EU institution and is largely in line with the literature on NSA access to
international  organisations,  which  demonstrates  the  most  limited  access  to
intergovernmental bodies during the decision-making stage. All the institutions which
the groups target have informal mechanisms of consultations with non-state actors (the
EP, the Commissioner’s office, the EEAS and EU Delegation in Minsk as well as EU
member  states  embassies  in  Minsk  but  also  in  other  EU  members  states).  Such
mechanisms do not  exist  at  the Council  level.  Moreover, lobbying the Council  also
incurs advocacy costs. Only groups with offices in Brussels that being able to invest in
building  relationship  with  diplomats  from  EU  member  states’  Permanent
Representations can afford to target the Council bodies systematically. 
Groups of all kinds have engaged in lobbying at the agenda-setting and decision-making
stages. At the implementation and evaluation stages public interest groups, following up
the cases  of possible  violations  of EU sanctions  by EU member states,  pointed out
factual  mistakes  in  the  lists  and  shared  their  views  on  the  effectiveness  of  CFSP
sanctions on Belarus. 
Alliances with key decision-makers are seen by the interviewees as an important factor
determining influence on EU policy. Certainly, lack of allies is considered as the main
reason  for  the  failure  of  advocacy  efforts.  First,  groups  with  allies  among  the  EU
member states exploited (and in some cases – successfully) them as veto players in the
Council  to block unwanted listings.  For other groups, allies among the EU member
states were important for making proposals for listings when sanctions were designed,
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and for putting the issues on the Council’s agenda. Second, the EU institutions and the
member states who need information about developments in Belarus appear as strategic
allies for those groups who are ready to provide them with it. Thus, having allies or
common  interests  with  key  policymakers  corresponds  to  higher  degrees  of  interest
group influence, in line with H2.
Not all the groups were able or willing to answer the question about achievement of
their advocacy goals. Those groups who attempted to answer this question spoke of
partial,  minimal or zero achievement (H1) and some of them underlined that it  was
difficult for them to estimate their impact on the policy outcome. Most groups spoke of
their influence on calibrating the EU sanctions regime (e.g. on the EU implementing
decisions on the listing and delisting and providing information related to it) rather than
altering it (e.g. on blocking the Council decision to extend the sanctions list, introducing
different types of measures). However, it  appears from interviews with policymakers
and expert observers that groups seem to underestimate their role in agenda-setting and
keeping  the  issue  of  human  rights  in  Belarus  in  the  EU’s  spotlight.  This  can  be
explained  by  the  fact  that  it  was  the  result  of  collective  lobbying  rather  than  an
individual effort.
The right of veto of a member state in the Council  has been instrumental for some
groups  to  preserve  the  status  quo.  However,  a  number  of  groups  that  have  been
promoting  a  policy  change  also  reported  similar  degrees  of  achievement  of  their
advocacy goals, thus the H3 cannot be fully confirmed.
The  access  to  policymakers  is  seen  by  the  groups  as  a  crucial  factor  determining
influence or even a proxy of it. Belarusian groups also pointed out the divisions within
civil society and opposition groups as a reason for the lack of influence and emphasise
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the  presence  of  a  broad  coalition  of  Belarusian  groups  as  well  as  international
partnerships as a key factor for advocacy success. Generally, group-level characteristics,
especially resources, are considered of utmost importance for an effective advocacy at
the EU level. This does not necessarily mean that business groups always win. But it
implies that only resource-rich public interest groups can engage in systematic advocacy
and achieve advocacy success and that poorer groups have to pool their resources in
coalitions in order to be effective.
Finally,  several  methodological  remarks.  The  combination  of  process-tracing  and
assessment of attributed influence has led to research results which could not have been
obtained had only one method been applied. The self-assessment method helps us to see
how groups themselves define their advocacy objectives and evaluate their influence,
thus  revealing  nuances  one  would  not  become aware  of  if  only  relying  upon open
sources, interviews with policymakers or observers. At the same time, the problem with
applying  self-assessment  is  that  groups  are  not  always  comfortable  to  reveal  their
influence and they lack the full  picture of what  their  influence was.  Moreover, this
method cannot take into account lobby groups which did not take an explicit position on
the EU sanctions, but whose advocacy on human rights violations in a country to which
sanctions are considered or applied can indirectly influence decision-makers. 
Unfortunately  even the  combination  of  two methods leaves  the  question  of  interest
group influence in penumbra. The groups say that it is difficult for them to trace their
own influence, even on more ‘technical’ issues. It is easier when lobbying takes place at
one  institution  (e.g.  the  European  Parliament  or  the  Court  of  Justice)  or  at  a  very
specific moment of the process, but decision-making in the Council is still blackboxed
with too many actors involved (28 member states in different working party groups and
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levels  of  seniority,  representatives  of  the  EEAS,  sometimes  Commission  and  the
Council Legal Service). For a researcher of interest group influence in EU policy areas
driven by intergovernmental arrangements, it  means that influence is not necessarily
absent, but that it is difficult to trace and attribute to a concrete advocacy effort.
The research also reveals that there is a strong relationship between advocacy strategies
and organisational  survival,  which has been little explored in the previous literature
(Lowery  2007).  This  is  not  just  about  lobbying  tactics,  but  also  about  formulating
advocacy goals and entering lobbying coalitions. In some cases, the interviews revealed
a difference between publicly declared advocacy objectives and those which the groups
actually try to pursue. Moreover, the extent to which advocacy objectives of Belarusian
actors depend on their donors is a question for further research. Given that sponsors of
Belarusian non-state  actors  and key decision-makers  are  sometimes the  same actors
(e.g. EU member states), could it be the case that the EU member states empower non-
state  actors  out  of  strategic  calculation  to  gain  additional  leverage  in  the
intergovernmental  decision-making,  in  line  with  power-oriented  institutionalist
explanations (see Tallberg 2010)?
This  chapter  contributes  to  the  literature  on  interest  groups  in  the  EU,  examining
lobbying and group influence in a contested area of EU foreign policymaking. In light
of the recent sanctions regime imposed by the EU on its neighbours, including Russia,
and deteriorating human rights situation in the neighbourhood, the influence of non-
state actors on EU restrictive measures is worth exploring in greater depth, as it can add
to our understanding of why the Union decides to impose restrictive measures in some
cases, but not in other, as well as choice of measures and targets. The chapter also adds
to our understanding of EU foreign policymaking in the case of sanctions, highlighting
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the role of different EU policymakers in practice (e.g. growing role of EUCJ and its
impact on Council decisions and of EU diplomacy) and their relationship with non-state
actors. Finally, this chapter also adds to the literature, more broadly on non-state actor
participation in international organisations,  and more specifically on the international
sanctions  regime.  On  the  one  hand,  it  confirms  the  previous  findings  showing  the
greater access that non-state actors have to international organisations in the field of
human rights  (Steffek 2010; Tallberg et al. 2014);   on the other hand, it goes a step
further in showing the relationship between access and influence, and the role of for-
profit  non-state actors, who are frequently overlooked by the literature  (Kowalewski
2013; Murdie & Peksen 2012). 
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Chapter 5. Civilian CSDP in the neighbourhood
Introduction
This  chapter  focuses  on strategies  and the influence  of  groups lobbying on the  EU
policy of  conflict  resolution and civilian crisis  management  looking in  particular  at
CSDP missions. The CSDP is a text-book example of the strong intergovernmentalism
in EU foreign policy. The supranational institutions are excluded from the CSDP, while
EU member states decide upon and implement  policy. 
In line with the theoretical assumptions, advocacy groups are expected to achieve the
least, if any at all, degree of influence (H1). In addition to intergovernmental decision-
making, potential influence will be cumbersome due to policy issue characteristics such
as time frame  – CSDP missions are often launched as a reaction to crises or armed
conflict which may shorten the decision-making period to a matter of weeks or even
days, leaving little room for interest groups’ advocacy. If any influence is achieved, it is
due to alliances with key decision-makers (H2). Groups interested in keeping the status
quo are expected to be more influential  than those seeking a policy change due the
requirement of unanimity (H3). Finally, it is hypothesised that groups tend to advocate
at both the EU and member state level (H4). 
Three CSDP missions – EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah in Palestine and EUMM
Georgia are in focus of this case study. Having three missions in two different conflict
contexts will enable us to better explain factors beyond engagement and the influence of
non-state actors in the civilian CSDP. 
CSDP missions are just  one, albeit  very prominent, tool of EU policy for managing
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crises and dealing with conflicts. They often go together with other tools at the Union’s
disposal  from  the  CFSP  or  other  policy  areas  of  intergovernmental  or  mixed
competence  nature  (e.g.  diplomatic  engagement  and  mediation  by  EU  Special
Representatives, by EU presidencies or groups of member states, Union’s participation
in  multilateral  peace  talks,  humanitarian  aid  and  development  assistance,  specific
funding with conflict prevention or mitigation focus provided via the Instrument for
Peace  and  Stability).  This  research,  however,  aims  at  examining  the  impact  of
institutional factors on interest group advocacy and influence, and thus, while having a
broader picture in the frame, it zooms in on the civilian CSDP. 
The rapidly expanding literature on the CSDP mentions the role of non-state actors en
passant. In a book-length volume, Ginsberg and Penksa (2012) recognise the inputs of
“interest groups, NGOs and political parties within the union who have special foreign
policy interests that are pursued at the EU level” in EU foreign policymaking, however,
they  do  not  provide  in-depth  analysis  of  their  strategies  to  provide  inputs  or  their
influence.  They see international  NGOs as  seeking “to influence the making of  EU
foreign  policy  (e.g,  Amnesty  International  and  Human  Rights  Watch)  and/or
subcontracted  by  the  EU  to  implement  its  humanitarian  programs  (e.g.,  Oxfam,
International Rescue Committee)” (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 38). Scattered throughout
the book are examples which narrate the quite limited engagement of non-state actors
with CSDP structures. Analysing the politics of CSDP missions, the authors conclude:
“While CSDP field operations have modestly increased their consultation with NGOs
and  civil  society  (e.g.,  BiH,  Georgia,  Kosovo,  and  DRC),  the  CSDP planning  and
conduct process in Brussels is less inviting of outside feedback”  (Ginsberg & Penksa
2012:  95).  The  authors  underline  the  importance  of  engagement  with  local  actors,
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including civil society actors, in enhancing the external effects of CSDP missions as
“[c]ivil society provides valuable knowledge for multinational operations and has an
essential  role  in  consolidating  democracy  in  post-conflict  countries”  (Ginsberg  &
Penksa 2012: 116).
The only exceptions to the literature are articles by Joachim and Dembinski examining
civil society participation in the case of arms exports control and as a remedy to the
democracy deficit in the EU (Dembinski 2009; Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Dembinski
& Joachim 2014). Several policy papers produced by advocacy groups also address the
issue  of  CSDP engagement  with  civil  society  (Gourlay  2006;  Weitsch  2008;  Palm
2010), one of which focuses on EUPOL COPPS as a case study.  These papers analyse
the existing record of CSDP structures’ openness and engagement with non-state actors
from perspectives of both the CSDP missions and non-state actors. What comes out
through in the academic literature and policy reports is that CSDP structures do engage
with non-state actors, mainly NGOs, think-tanks, community groups and media, but this
engagement is not systematic and varies case by case. 
The case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia when an NGO – the
Crisis  Management  Initiative  of  the  former  Finnish  President  Martti  Ahtisaari  –
brokered the peace agreement and played a prominent role in early warning, decision-
making in the Council and the planning of the CSDP mission stands out as exceptional,
also due to the personal background and experience of Ahtisaari and his access to and
relationship with the then High Representative Javier Solana  (Gourlay 2006; Dijkstra
2013:  124-144).  In  the  case  of  EUPOL COPPS,  a  study  reveals  that  co-operation
between the mission and civil society organisations takes place “on a largely ad hoc
basis” and depends “to a certain extent on the personal engagement of individual staff
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members” which can have “a negative impact on the long-term sustainability of the
Mission’s co-operation  with  CSOs”  (Palm 2010:  20-21).  The  same pattern  of  non-
systematic cooperation holds for the mission’s contacts with women’s organisations as a
part of gender mainstreaming work when women’s CSOs are occasionally involved in
training provided by the mission for Palestinian police or asked for feedback on police
accountability and oversight (Sundin & Olsson 2014). In the case of EULEX, the largest
civilian CSDP mission with over 2000 people on the ground and executive mandate,
civil society organisations were involved at the planning stage and invited to participate
in  the  evaluation  of  the  mission’s performance,  EULEX’s contacts  with  them were
“largely informal and unstructured” (ibidem: 4). Thus, apart from contributing to the
main objectives of the comparative study on advocacy and influence in EU foreign
policy, this  chapter  will  also be a  unique study in the nascent  academic and policy
debate on non-state actor participation in CSDP policymaking and engagement with
CSDP missions. 
The chapter builds upon 67 interviews conducted between June 2013 and January 2015
with  policymakers,  group  representatives  and  experts  in  Brussels  and  London  in
Europe,  in  East  Jerusalem,  Ramallah  and  Jericho in  Palestine,  and in  Tbilisi,  Gori,
Mtskheta and Zugdidi in Georgia. The fieldwork for this study has been bounded by the
dividing  lines  that  separate  conflict  areas.  These  boundary  lines  do  not  only  affect
populations living in the conflict zone by hindering  their freedom of movement and
access to basic services and development, but also limit access for outsiders to the areas
behind the division line.  Due to these reasons, it  was impossible for me to conduct
interviews in Gaza, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus perspectives of advocacy groups
from these areas maybe under-represented in this study. 
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The research has been enriched by the secondary literature looking into policymaking in
CSDP (Dijkstra 2013; Koutrakos 2013; Ginsberg & Penksa 2012; Grevi et al. 2009);
role of non-state actors in the EU policy of dealing with conflicts  (Tocci 2011; Irrera
2010;  Irrera  2013);  the  EU policy  towards  the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  and state-
building in Palestine (Bouris 2014; Bulut 2010; Musu 2010; More 2008; Dosenrode &
Stubkjær 2002; Tocci 2010) and towards the conflicts in Georgia and EUMM’s role
(Popescu 2011; Simons 2012; Freire & Simão 2013; Whitman & Wolff 2012; Crombois
2010; Bosse 2011; Sasse 2010; Martin 2010). 
This  study also draws on EU policy documents,  media reports,  position papers  and
reports produced by advocacy groups. It has not been possible for me to reach out to EU
policy documents beyond those available for the public, for in the CSDP more than in
any other policy area, all policy documents on the missions are confidential. So I have
largely had to rely on my interviews with policymakers to compare what is written in
the  documents  and  what  is  done  in  practice  in  terms  of  their  relations  with  non-
governmental actors. The benefit of such limitation is that it puts me in the same shoes
that advocacy groups have to wear, helping me better understand obstacles which they
must overcome when engaging into the CSDP. 
As with the previous two chapters, this one is divided in three sections. The first section
overviews  three  CSDP  missions  within  the  context  of  EU  policy  of  dealing  with
conflicts  in  its  neighbourhood  and  describes  key  policy  actors  and  policymaking
procedures.  It   also overviews  groups which  have  advocated  on the  CSDP and the
conflict  issues  and which  have  been interviewed for  this  study. The second section
analyses  advocacy  strategies  focusing  on  decisions  to  engage  or  not,  advocacy
objectives, venues and targets, tactics and alliances. The third section provides findings
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on group influence and factors explaining advocacy success. I conclude summarising
the research results of this chapter and contribution to the literature.
1. Case description
1.1. Civilian crisis management in Georgia and Palestine
The two conflict contexts in which the CSDP missions have been deployed are very
different, however, in terms of EU engagement they share a number of similarities from
the institutional point of view. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is long-standing and
internationalised,  the  conflicts  in  Georgia  are  more  recent  and have  rather  regional
impact,  though  their  international  dimension  came  to  light  with  Russia’s  military
intervention in Ukraine. In both cases, the EU has been a relative late-comer following
other international players. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the EU is still
seen to play a secondary role after the US, while its more active engagement started
after the Oslo accords with the deployment of a Special Envoy (later named Special
Representative) to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and provision of aid for state-
building in Palestine, scaled up after the Second Intifada of 2000-2005 with two CSDP
missions.  In  the  case  of  Georgia,  the  EU became more  engaged in  2008 when the
French  presidency  mediated  the  six-point  ceasefire  agreement  between  Russia  and
Georgia which envisaged an international presence to monitor the implementation and
the  EU subsequently  took  this  role  deploying  EUMM. The  EU also  dispatched  its
Special  Representative (EUSR)  for the crisis  in Georgia (in  addition to the existing
EUSR dealing with South Caucasus since 2003) in September 2008.16 Through EUMM
16 Since 2011 two posts are merged in a single EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.  
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the EU has become the only international security actor in the conflict, since UN and
OSCE which were present on the ground since early 1990s discontinued their mandates
due to Russia’s veto. Moreover, in both conflict contexts the EU has been reluctant to
introduce sanctions against the occupying state. To sum up, in Georgia and in Palestine,
the EU deployed a similar array of conflict resolution tools: CSDP missions, EUSRs,
humanitarian,  development  and  other  financial  aid  as  well  as  participation  in  the
multilateral peace talks.
The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia has been a part of the EU response to
the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two  regions
which broke away from Georgia after civil wars in the early 1990s. However, it was not
the first EU attempt to get involved in conflict resolution in Georgia via CSDP. The first
CSDP mission to Georgia – EUJUST Themis – was deployed in July 2004-July 2005.
The small mission of ten experts was tasked to  assist the newly elected pro-European
Georgian government who came to power as a result of the Rose Revolution to carry
out criminal justice reform. While the mission signalled the EU’s political support to the
Georgian government, it was rather a contribution to stability and democratic transition
rather than conflict resolution as Tbilisi had wished  (Helly 2006; Kurowska 2009; Di
Puppo 2009). As the Themis mandate was approaching the end, in May-June 2005 the
EU  considered  another  ESDP  mission  to  step  up  the  OSCE  Border  Monitoring
Operation on the Georgian-Russian border which was discontinued due to Russia’s veto.
While Georgia was “literally begging for the EU to take over from the OSCE” (Lynch
2006),  the  Council  was  divided  on  the  issue,  with  the  UK  and  the  Baltic  states
supportive,  and the  Southern  member  states,  France  and Germany opposing such a
move (Helly 2006: 95; Popescu 2011: 75). Instead, the Council expanded the mandate
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of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and his support team to include border monitoring,
though the EU kept the profile of the EUSR border support team as low as possible in
order not to antagonise Russia (Huff 2011: 19). In April 2007, the proposal to extend the
mandate of the border support team to cover Abkazia and South Ossetia was vetoed by
Greece, who was probably tacitly supported by a number of other member states that
preferred not to upset Russia (Popescu 2011: 82). 
Deploying  EUMM,  the  EU  aimed  to  contribute  to  long-term  stability  throughout
Georgia and the surrounding areas and short-term stabilisation reducing the risk of a
resumption of hostilities. The EUMM mandate includes four key tasks: (1) stabilisation:
the mission monitors, analyses and reports on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation
process,  centred  on  full  compliance  with  the  six-point  agreement,  including  troop
withdrawals,  and  on  freedom of  movement  and  actions  by  spoilers,  as  well  as  on
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; (2) normalisation: the
mission monitors, analyses and reports on the situation pertaining to the normalisation
process  of  civil  governance,  focusing  on  rule  of  law,  effective  law  enforcement
structures  and  adequate  public  order;  (3)  confidence-building:  it  contributes  to  the
reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other
confidence building measures; and (4) informing European policy (Council 2008c).
Despite its Georgia-wide mandate, EUMM has never got access to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Moreover, Russia has never implemented the six-point agreement fully. It has
not withdrawn its troops to pre-war positions, but occupied additional territories after
the war (Akhalgori and the Kodori Gorge). The access to humanitarian aid is restricted
by Russia and the de facto authorities  of South Ossetia  and Abkhazia.  After  Russia
unilaterally  recognised  the  independence  of  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  it  has
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established a long-term military presence there.  In 2010, Russian  troops started the
process  called  borderisation  –  erecting  fences,  barbed  wire  and  placing  additional
guards  along  the  Administrative  Boundary  Line  (ABL).  On  24  November  2014,
Abkhazia and Russia signed the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership which
envisages coordination of foreign policies and the creation of a common defence and
security space, including joint armed groups and border patrolling. Moscow signed an
even more far-reaching Treaty on Cooperation and Integration with South Ossetia on 18
March 2015, the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
The mission has headquarters in Tbilisi and three field offices in Gori, Mtskheta and
Zugdidi.  The  field  offices  share  responsibility  for  monitoring  the  ABL.  While  the
Zugdidi office is responsible for the ABL with Abkhazia, the field offices in Gori and
Mtskheta are responsible for the ABL with South Ossetia. Each FO has three teams. The
ABL/Confidence Building Team monitors the security regime and the safety and living
conditions of the local population, including crossings via the ABL. The Compliance
Team monitors Georgia’s military and law enforcement facilities to ensure compliance
with the Memoranda of Understanding signed between the mission and the Georgian
ministries of defence and internal affairs. The Human Security team is the main point of
contact with civil society groups and local communities as they monitor human security
issues, such as safety and human rights, freedom of movement and access to services,
including the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returned individuals.  
EUMM attempts  to build confidence with the parties through the so-called Incident
Prevention and Reaction Mechanisms (IPRMs), approved at the  Geneva International
Discussions, a diplomatic forum to address the consequences of the 2008 conflict in
Georgia co-chaired by the OSCE, the EU and the UN and in which Georgia, de facto
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authorities of the breakaway regions, Russia and US participate. While IPRM meetings
facilitated by EUMM and OSCE regularly take place with Georgian, Russian and South
Ossetian representatives,  the IPRM with the Abkhaz side was discontinued with the
Abkhaz side in 2012. A 24-hour telephone hotline system has been established attached
to the IPRM to quickly address specific incidents. 
At its peak, EUMM had over 400 staff, including 274 international staff, coming from
23 EU member states. EU monitors have civilian, police and military backgrounds. The
mission’s budget exceeded €26 million  in the 2013-2014 financial year. All Heads of
Mission were civilians with diplomatic backgrounds coming from Germany, Estonia
and  Lithuania,  with  the  exception  of  a  Polish  army general.  The  initial  12  months
mandate of the mission was extended for another year in July 2009 until 14 September
2010, and subsequently prolonged in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Most recently, in December
2014, the Council extended the EUMM mandate for two years.
The mission is widely seen as a success for its quick deployment and contribution to
ease tensions and prevent outbreaks of violence. For Georgia’s government, EUMM is
important  as  an  international  presence  on  the  ground  (Interview  146),  Russia  also
appreciates the mission, though non-publicly, as it reinforces the status quo (Boonstra &
Melvin 2011: 15). However, given the size of the mission  and the lack of access to the
breakaway regions, there have been discussions in Brussels to scale it down in order to
save resources. As an EU diplomat unveils, the division is between the member states
who want to maintain the mission on the same scale and amount of staff – the new
member states are in this group – and those who want to reduce the mission, among
them  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  (Interview  118).  While  the  EU
dropped the idea of resizing EUMM during the strategic review of 2014, as it would
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send “a bad signal” to Russia amidst its intervention in Ukraine, certain scaling down is
taking place on the ground. The mission’s budget was reduced to  18.3 million for the
first year of its renewed mandate and there is a staff reduction up to 20%.
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and EU Police
Mission for  the  Palestinian  Territories  (EUPOL  COPPS) have  been  deployed  to
enhance the EU’s contribution to state-building in Palestine within the logic of two state
solution adopted by the EU ( see more Bouris 2014: Chapter 3). Since the mid 1990s the
EU has become the largest donor to Palestinian police counting for over one third of all
aid and the EU northern member states were also high on the donor list (Lia 2007:147).
After the Roadmap for Peace was adopted and Mahmud Abbas became the Palestinian
Authority (PA) President after Yasser Arafat’s death, the EU seized the opportunity to
upgrade its aid. Launched during the UK presidency in 2005, the CSDP missions aimed
to enhance visibility of the EU in the international conflict resolution mitigating against
the Union’s image of “the payer, not the player”.
EUPOL COPPS is a police and rule-of-law mission based in Ramallah with a satellite
office in Jericho. The deployment of EUPOL COPPS was built on UK-led efforts to
identify areas for support to Palestinian civil policing and on the establishment of a EU
Coordinating Office  for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) in April 2005 at the
Office of the EUSR for the MEPP (Bulut 2009b: 289).
The  support  to  Palestinian  police  is  based  on  the  logic  of  “A Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, better
known as the Roadmap for Peace, developed by the US, in cooperation with Russia, the
EU, and the UN (the Quartet) in 2003. According to it, the fate of Palestinian statehood
is dependent on the reform of its security forces. The Roadmap was an echo of the
242
Second  Intifada  erupted  in  2000 in  which  the  Israeli  army fought  not  only  against
Palestinian militias and terrorists groups, but also the PA security organisations which
were completely destroyed afterwards. Israel convinced the US that any progress in the
MEPP should  depend  on  the  PA’s ability  to  fight  against  terrorism and  ensure  the
security of Israel, and this demand was subsequently endorsed by the Quartet  (Bouris
2014: 104).
The EUPOL COPPS mandate initially consisted of three dimensions: (1) assisting the
Palestinian  Civilian  Police  (PCP)  in  the  implementation  of  the  PCP  development
programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP, and specifically senior officials at
District, Headquarters and Ministerial level; (2) coordinating and facilitating EU and
Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP; and (3)
advising  on  police-related  Criminal  Justice  elements  (Council  2005b).  In  2008  the
mission’s mandate was expanded to include strengthened action in the area of rule of
law (Council 2008d), which reflected emphasis on the continuum between policing and
justice (Bulut 2009b: 292). Within the rule of law area, EUPOL COPPS provides advice
to  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  the  Courts,  the  Prosecution,  the  Correction  and
Rehabilitations Centres Department as well as the Bar Association of lawyers and the
Independent Commission on Human Rights (EEAS 2014). 
The initial three-year mandate of the mission was extended for another two years in
2008, and for another year in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Despite the fact that the
EUPOL COPPS mandate covers all Palestinian territories, in reality it is limited to the
West Bank, since the EU does not cooperate with Hamas government in Gaza. As of
July 2014, the mission had 71 international staff and 41 local staff and its annual budget
has boosted up to €9.8 million (EEAS 2014). EUPOL COPPS has two main operational
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pillars: a Police Advisory and a Rule of Law Section (since 2008) which enlist police
officers,  magistrates  and  experts  from  19  EU  Member  States  and  third  countries
contributing to the mission (Canada,  Turkey and Norway) (ibidem). All  six  EUPOL
COPPS  HoMs  were  police  officers:  four  from  the  UK  with  service  experience  in
Northern Ireland, one from Sweden and one from France. 
EUBAM Rafah is  a border  mission launched with the aim to provide a  third party
presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) linking Gaza with Egypt, to facilitate the
opening of the border crossing point and to build up confidence between the Israeli
government and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The mission is a EU contribution to the
implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access of 15
November 2005 brokered by the US after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in
August-September 2005 (Asseburg 2009: 84).
The  EUBAM  Rafah  mandate  includes  three  dimensions:  (1)  actively  monitoring,
verifying  and  evaluating  PA  performance  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of
agreements  concluded  between  the  parties;  (2)  contributing,  through  mentoring,  to
building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah; (3)
contributing  to  the  liaison  between  the  Palestinian,  Israeli  and  Egyptian  authorities
regarding the management of the RCP. The mission does not have an executive role at
the border and its enforcement powers are limited to baggage checking (Bulut 2009a;
Pirozzi 2006). 
However, EUBAM has worked for only seven months. After the kidnapping of Israeli
soldier  Gilad  Shalit  in  June  2006  the  EUBAM  operation  was  hindered  as  Israel’s
Government maintained the RCP frequently closed and after Hamas came to power in
Gaza in June 2007, the mission was suspended. Nevertheless, the EU decided to keep
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the  mission  on  the  ground,  though  of  reduced  size  and  budget,  and  reiterated  its
readiness to reactivate the mission ‘once political and security conditions allow’ (Bouris
2012: 263). As an EEAS official explained, each time there is a crisis in Gaza, EUBAM
Rafah is “back on the table”, however, the return of the PA to Gaza and the agreement
of Israel are necessary conditions for reactivation (Interview 136).
The number of EU staff at the mission was reduced from 57 in 2007 to 18 in 2008 and
13 in 2011. Initially 21 member states were contributing to this mission.  Since 2012,
EUBAM employs 4 EU staff plus 5 local (Bouris 2014: 117). The mission’s budget also
dropped significantly from €7 million in 2005-2007 to an annual €940.000 in 2014. The
EUBAM headquarters moved from Israeli resort town Ashkelon to the EU Delegation
to Israel in Tel-Aviv. Three HoM of EUBAM were police officers from Italy, two from
France and one from Germany. 
The EUBAM operational stage was broadly viewed as effective until its suspension in
2007. The mission was deployed rapidly and allowed for the crossing of over 443.000
passengers through the RCP  (Bouris 2012; Bulut 2009a). However, the EU authority
was seen undermined when EUBAM could not operate for 81 per cent of time because
Israel often kept the crossing closed in the period of June 2006-June 2007  (Faber &
Kaldoser 2010: 108). Furthermore, there was lot of criticism, including by advocacy
groups,  about  the  necessity  of  maintaining  this  mission  after  2007.   Currently, the
mission supports the work of EUPOL COPPS at technical level, while local staff in
Gaza monitors the situation on the ground. A merge of EUBAM Rafah with EUPOL
COPPS has been proposed by the PSC, but no formal decision has been taken by the
Council (Bouris 2012: 264). The merger requires the agreement of Israel which from the
very beginning was rather reluctant to support EUBAM Rafah (Bouris 2014: 114). 
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EUPOL COPPS has been recognised by the EU and member states, Israeli government
and the  PA as  a  success  (Bouris  2014:  112-113).  However, the  EU is  criticised  by
scholars  and  civil  society  groups  for  putting  attention  on  technical  training  and
infrastructure building, while missing the link with non-reformed political institutions
that underpin security sector in Palestine and a broader political  strategy of conflict
resolution and support to building a viable Palestinian state (Kristoff 2012; Bouris 2014;
Bouris 2012; Bulut 2009b). The danger of an overly technical approach to police reform
is  aggravated by the  fact  that  Palestinian society  largely distrusts  security  agencies,
including police, and sees security sector reform (SSR) as an externally-owned process
serving the occupier’s interests, rather those of Palestinian society (author’s interviews;
Friedrich & Luethold 2008; Kristoff 2012). As one scholar summed up the EU progress
in aiding SSR in Palestine through the two civilian missions, “[t]he pitfall has been that
the overall EU approach is mainly technical while it should be fundamentally a political
one” (Bouris 2012: 268).
The missions enjoy the broad support of all member states, with the main contributors
being  Germany,  France,  UK,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Denmark  (Bouris
2014). The new member states are hardly involved in terms of personnel.  However,
unlike in the case of EUMM, there was a wide agreement of the member states that the
Palestinian missions should be kept. As an EU official revealed, some member states
had doubts about EUBAM Rafah, but it has a small budget, while the political signal to
be sent out by its closure will be “bad” (Interview 118).
1.2. Decision-makers and decision-making procedures
The CSDP is firmly in the hands of the EU member states. The Council plays the key
decision  making  role  adopting  decisions  upon  the  launch  of  CSDP operations  and
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missions by unanimity, while the EU states are responsible for implementing them. As
Ginsberg and Penksa (2012: 61) write, “A CSDP operation is launched when member
states calculate that is is in their political interest to have an EU-level, member-state
controlled, CSDP operation where there is political visibility for the EU and a perceived
need for a union-level response to insecurity”. 
Being an integral part of the CFSP, the CSDP has a distinct institutional architecture.
Under the responsibility of the Council  and of the HR, the PSC at  the level of the
member  state  ambassadors  exercises  the  political  control  and  strategic  direction  of
CSDP  operations  and  missions.  The  Council  may  authorise  the  PSC  to  take  the
necessary decisions  in the course of a crisis  management  operation,  such as the re-
appointment or replacement of the Head of Mission (HoM) (Koutrakos 2013: 65). 
On civilian missions, the PSC is advised by the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management (CIVCOM), composed from member states officials coming from foreign
affairs,  interior  and justice ministries  (Cross 2010: 12).  With the Lisbon Treaty, the
Council committees dealing with crisis management have permanent  chairs appointed
by the HR.  The role of CIVCOM is quite influential since in practice the PSC very
rarely goes against the decisions approved by it (Cross 2010: 8). In general, the work of
the  Council  committees  working  on  the  CSDP  is  characterized  by  the  culture  of
negotiation and compromise (Juncos & Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2011; Cross 2010). 
The Council Secretariat before the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS afterwards is delegated
with three major functions related to CSDP missions: agenda management, operational
planning  and management  and  external  representation  (Klein  2011:  74). The  Crisis
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the EEAS is responsible for political
and strategic planning and review of civilian missions and military operations, while the
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Civilian  Planning  and  Conduct  Capability  (CPCC)  is  responsible  for  civilian  crisis
management  (Koutrakos  2013:  66). The  CPCC  became  operational  in  2008,  after
reorganisation of the Council Secretariat DG E-IX (civilian crisis management). The
CMPD integrated the former DG E-VIII (defence) and IX (civilian crisis management)
along with the former Civilian and Military Planning Cell in 2009. The director of the
CPCC is also EU Civilian Operations Commander. The CMPD and CPCC directors
both report directly to the HR. As the number of CSDP civilian missions is growing,
civilian planning capacities are under-resourced  (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 77; Klein
2011:75). 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the HR has the right of initiative on the CSDP shared with the
member states. However, even pre-Lisbon, it was not difficult for the HR Javier Solana
(1999-2009) and his staff in the Council Secretariat to put issues on the EU agenda via
the Council Presidency and like-minded states (Dijkstra 2013: 79). The EUBAM Rafah
mission was “the result of intense entrepreneurship by Solana himself” (ibidem: 80).
When  the  Council  decides  to  deploy  a  CSDP mission,  the  PSC agrees  on  a  Crisis
Management  Concept,  which  is  drafted  by  the  CMPD on the  basis  of  advice  from
CIVCOM and  the  EU Military  Committee  (EUMC) (Koutrakos  2013:  66;  Dijkstra
2013: 83-84). This concept includes an analysis of the situation on the ground, the EU’s
political objectives with the intervention, and a proposal for a course of action. The
preparation  of  the  Crisis  Management  Concept  may  be  preceded  by  a  fact-finding
mission consisting of the EEAS officials (regional departments, Division for Conflict
Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation, crisis management structures) and member
state representatives (Dijkstra 2013: 82-83).
On the basis of the Crisis Management Concept formally approved by the Council the
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CPCC  prepares  civilian  strategic  options  (general  possibilities  for  engagement)  to
achieve  the  EU’s  objectives  set  out  by  the  Council.  Upon  the  comments  of  the
CIVCOM (and the EUMC, if military strategic options are considered) the PSC drafts a
decision outlining the various options, which is submitted to the Council  (Koutrakos
2013: 66; Dijkstra 2013: 86). 
Given that a civilian CSDP mission is financed from the EU CFSP budget, more in-
depth planning takes place in order to calculate its costs before the Council Decision
establishing the mission is adopted (Dijkstra 2013: 87). The CPCC drafts the Concept of
Operations (CONOPS), a much more detailed plan of the mission outlining the manner
in which the Ho M is expected to fulfil the mission’s mandate. The CONOPS is to be
approved by the PSC and the Council. In parallel, in consultation with the EEAS, the
Commission prepares the mission budget which is then discussed by the member states
in the RELEX group  (Dijkstra 2013: 87). After this planning, the Council approves a
formal decision on establishing the mission and its mandate, appointing the HoM and
setting  out  functional  (e.g.  structure,  participation  of  third  states)  and  financial
arrangements. The principle of ‘constructive abstention’ (a member state may abstain
but not block a decision) allows the adoption of a decision to deploy a mission without
strict unanimity (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 63). The member states are also free not to
provide personnel (not to bear the costs of salaries of seconded national staff) for a
civilian CDSP mission.
After  the  decision-making  phase  is  concluded  with  the  Council  Decision,  the
operational planning starts in order to launch the mission on the ground.  The CPCC
develops the Operation Plan (OPLAN) together with the appointed Head of Mission and
sends it for the approval of the member states (Koutrakos 2013: 67; Dijkstra 2013: 91). 
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Since 2014, as a result of the change of civilian crisis management procedures, there are
two Council decisions adopted to launch civilian missions. This was done to allow for
more  space  for  planning  and  preparing  the  mission.  As  the  CIVCOM  member
explained, after  the adoption of the first Council  decision creating the mission,  it  is
deployed on the ground, staff are recruited and CONOPS and OPLAN are drafted on
the ground and approved by the Council. Then the second Council decision formally
launches  the mission with the staff in  the operational  capability  (Interview 107).  In
2014,  two civilian  missions  were  deployed this  way:  the  EU Advisory  Mission  for
Civilian Security Sector Reform to Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) and EUCAP Sahel Mali.  
The planning process does not follow a strict sequence or a specific deadline. Some
missions  took  but  a  few  weeks  to  establish,  while  others  required  several  months
(Koutrakos 2013: 67). In the case of Georgia, it took a few weeks from the decision of
the  extraordinary European Council  of  1  September 2008 to dispatch a fact-finding
mission to prepare EU’s engagement under the then European Security and Defence
Policy to the EU Council decision establishing EUMM on 15 September 2008 and to
the launch of its operational phase on 1 October 2008 (Fischer 2009; Freire & Simão
2013). EUBAM Rafah also started its operations after just three weeks of preparation,
on 25 November 2005, while the formal decision establishing it followed later on 12
December 2005  (Pirozzi 2006). In contrast, EUPOL COPPS outgrew EU COPPS, an
initiative to  coordinate  European aid to  Palestinian police under  the EUSR’s office.
Since April 2005, EU COPPS worked closely with the PA to produce the Palestinian
Civil Police Development Programme for 2005-2008. The success of EU COPPS was
recognised by the Council which in July 2005 decided to turn it into a CSDP mission
(Bouris 2014: 109-110), established on 14 November 2005.
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At  the  implementation  phase,  the  HoM  is  a  key  figure  on  the  ground  and  gets
considerable autonomy from the EEAS  (Klein 2011: 79-81; Dijkstra 2013: 93).  The
mission regularly reports  to the Brussels based structures. Brussels officials (EEAS,
CIVCOM,  PSC)  also  visit  the  mission  to  monitor  the  implementation,  while  the
member  states  are  additionally  kept  informed  via  their  embassies  on  the  ground
(Dijkstra 2013: 94).
Other EU actors on the ground, such as the EU Delegations and EUSRs, play a role in
coordinating  various  EU  external  relations  tools,  including  CSDP  missions.  For
example, the EUSR for MEPP “provided support to deal with highly political issues of
the missions work, for example, on extensions of the mission or change of the mandate”
(Interview 158). The EUSRs also participate in international conflict resolution forums:
the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia represents the EU in the
Geneva International Discussions,  while the EUSR for the MEPP contributes to the
Quartet Special Envoys meetings. 
In the middle of the mandate of a CSDP mission, there is a strategic review with the aim
of informing the Council before the decision whether to extend, amend or terminate the
mission’s  mandate.  The  strategic  review  is  a  political  document  drafted  by  EEAS
structures and then discussed and approved by the member states  (Dijkstra 2013: 96-
97). 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission is no longer “associated with CFSP”
and does not have a seat on the PSC without the right of initiative, as it used to have
before. Nevertheless, the Commission provides humanitarian aid and civil protection
through ECHO and development assistance, managed by DG DEVCO, and furthermore
exercises financial  powers (EU budget and procurement) through the Foreign Policy
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Instruments Service,  which reports  directly  to  the High Representative  (Ginsberg &
Penksa 2012: 25). The Commission has its own crisis management tool – the Instrument
contributing to Stability and Peace (before March 2014 – the Instrument for Stability, or
IfS) which focuses on a broad range of issues, such as support to mediation, confidence
building, rule of law, transitional justice, independent media, prevention and combating
of  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  pre-  and  post-crisis  preparedness
capacity building. This tool, along with EU development and humanitarian aid, has been
employed  in  both  conflict  contexts.  As  many  grants  made  by  the  Commission  are
managed locally by the EU Delegations, they are turned into potential advocacy targets,
despite the fact they have no formal role in the CSDP.
The role of the European Parliament on CSDP issues is extremely limited. It has the
right to be informed, which is put into practice via the Council’s briefings, meetings
with the High Representative and annual reports of CFSP/CSDP activities. Interaction
between  the  EP and  the  Council  and  the  EEAS has  reportedly  improved  since  the
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (Interview 122).  
Though the EP has budgetary powers over the CFSP budget, through which civilian
CSDP missions are funded, it has never used them. As an EP official explained, “For
civilian missions, you can withdraw the money, but that bullet cannot be used twice, it is
a nuclear weapon. It is much better to use pressure on the Head of Mission” (Interview
157).  The  Sub-Committee  on  Security  and Defence  (SEDE)  is  a  key  committee  to
conduct  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  CSDP  missions.  The  committee  networks  with
officials  from  the  CSDP  structures  in  the  Council  and  has  an  important  role  in
information  gathering  and  research  on  CSDP  (Ginsberg  &  Penksa  2012:  26).
Parliamentary scrutiny is also conducted through Joint Consultation Meetings, which
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convene the EP representatives from the Budgetary Committee, AFET and SEDE and
officials from the Commission, the Council and the EEAS (Interview 122).  However,
this tool only seems to be employed to a limited extent. As the EP official explains,
political scrutiny in the committees is “much better, because it is public” and allows for
the confrontation of officials with “a researcher’s opinion” (Interview 157). 
The  CSDP  missions  in  Georgia  and  Palestine  are  routinely  mentioned  in  the  EP
resolutions on the situation in Georgia or South Caucasus and on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. For example, in the case of Georgia, two months before the August 2008 war,
the EP issued a resolution on the situation in Georgia, calling  the Council to consider
sending a ESDP mission to bolster its presence (European Parliament 2008). MEPs also
pose parliamentary questions to the EEAS and the Commission on CSDP missions and
CFSP budget related issues.
The EU Court of Justice is not involved in the CSDP. It can merely rule on the inter-
institutional  disputes,  which define  the competences  of  EU institutions  (such as  the
2008 ruling in  the case of the Commission vs. Council on the small arms and light
weapons in West Africa)  (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 26). An EU institution which has
been paid almost no attention to in the academic literature on EU foreign policy or
lobbying  in  the  EU  is  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA),  the  EU’s financial
watchdog. In 2012, using its right conferred by the TFEU to submit observations in the
form of special reports, the ECA produced a report on the EU Assistance to Kosovo.
This concerned the rule of law, and examined the effectiveness of the EULEX and the
Commission’s funding via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (ECA 2012). It
was the first time that a CSDP mission was scrutinised in the ECA report. As a result of
the corruption scandal involving EULEX, which erupted in the autumn of 2014 (Borger
253
2014), the political role of the ECA in the evaluation of EU expenditures through the
CSDP may increase, turning this institution into a potential lobbying target for groups
working on transparency and the effectiveness of EU aid.
To sum up, the EU member states play a dominant role in CSDP agenda-setting, policy
formulation,  decision-making  and  implemention.  However,  Brussels-based  EU
bureaucracy – since 2010 in the form of the EEAS, and the Council Secretariat before –
plays  an  important  function  in  the  agenda-setting,  policy  formulation  and  decision-
making (the mission’s planning)  phases.  In  the case of  civilian CSDP missions,  the
HoM  and  his  staff  on  the  ground  and  the  EEAS  officials  play  a  key  role  in  the
implementation  of  the  mission  mandate  and  evaluation  of  its  impact.  As  Dijkstra
explains, the importance of Brussels-based bureaucracy is due to the scattered expertise
of civilian crisis management in the capitals. EU resources enjoy a relative advantage in
terms of resources for civilian missions, in comparison with those of the member states,
not  to  mention  the  time  factor  –  Brussels-based  bureaucrats  enjoy  much  earlier
involvement in the early planning stages of CDSP missions, than the majority of their
member state counterparts (Dijkstra 2013). Thus along with the Council, the EEAS is a
potential lobbying target for the groups. Meanwhile, the traditional targets of interest
groups  –  the  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament,  despite  the  fact  that  they
possess budgetary powers, are excluded from the policymaking process.
1.3. Overview of groups which have engaged in advocacy
The number of interest groups involved in advocacy on civilian CSDP seems limited
when  compared  to  the  previous  two  case  studies.  This  conclusion  comes  from
interviews with EU policymakers and groups themselves. Interviewed officials involved
in decision-making and planning of the CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine report
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that their engagement with advocacy groups is not frequent and limited to certain kinds
of  groups,  mostly  think-tanks  and  NGOs.  An  EU  official  explains  this  by  the
institutional  characteristics  of  the  CSDP:  “The  CSDP  is  a  weird  instrument,
intergovernmental,  decisions  are  taken  by  consensus.  The  centre  of  gravity  are  the
member states acting by  consensus with EU institutions providing building blocks. It is
a very Brussels-based process” (Interview 107).
The picture is  slightly  different  for  EU staff  working in  the CSDP missions on the
ground. Though contacts with advocacy groups vary depending on a number of factors,
as  we  will  see  below,  the  mission  staff  dealing  with  human  rights,  gender  and
humanitarian issues (where the EU has some competences and normative base) report
more frequent interaction with local civil  society and international NGOs present in
these countries than Brussels-based interviewees in the crisis management structures. 
The group most frequently mentioned by Brussels-based interviewees is the European
Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). EPLO is the platform of European NGOs, NGO
networks, and think-tanks which are “committed to peace-building and the prevention
of violent conflict”.17 Its mission is to “influence the EU to be more active at promoting
peace  and  preventing  violent  conflict  throughout  the  world”.18 As  the  group
representative explained, EPLO has deliberately chosen to focus on civilian CSDP due
to  a  number  of  factors:  “First,  due  to  the  organisational  factors:  a  number  of  our
members  are  pacifist  organisations.  Second,  the  majority  of  the CSDP missions  are
civilian. Third, we are trying to provide a counterbalance in policy debate in which there
are millions of research workers in Brussels who work on CSDP as a military policy and
then come to defence issues. EPLO fills this gap” (Interview 125).
17 From EPLO leaflet.
18 Ibidem.
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EPLO also runs the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN), a mechanism for dialogue
between EU policymakers and civil society on peace and conflict related issues. The EU
provides funding for the CSDN network through the Instrument for Peace and Stability.
Some EPLO members  such as  the  International  Crisis  Group,  Oxfam International,
Crisis Management Initiative, International Alert, Saferworld, Conciliation Resources,
Kvinna till Kvinna, Berghof Foundation have also  been mentioned  quite often  by EU
officials working on Georgia or Palestine. 
As a CIVCOM member described: “We have regular contacts with EPLO. They have
the best outreach in Brussels. They either come to us and we have working breakfasts,
or we attend their meetings with their guests. For example, we attended a meeting at
which the International Crisis Group was talking about Ukraine, or Amnesty was talking
about  Kosovo.  These  meetings  are  usually  dedicated  to  specific  topics  or  general
discussion, for example, about SSR. Regular contacts with them is a normal practice”
(Interview 118). An official from EEAS sees EPLO as “a one-stop shop for coordinating
events  where  we  can  pass  a  single  message  instead  of  passing  many  to  different
audiences. It is a kind of clearing house: they do the job to get right people” (Interview
154).
While  interests  of  technology  and  defence  industry  may be  a  factor  explaining  the
growth  and  development  of  the  CSDP  (Keukeleire  &  Delreux  2014:  195),  and
especially the focus of the EU’s agenda on the military CSDP,19 they have been less
visible  in  EU  policymaking  on  civilian  CSDP  missions.  Within  the  scope  of  this
research, I could not identify any business group interested in the CSDP missions in
19 See EPLO (2013a). Moreover, Bechtel and Scheiner find out that defence industry profits from 
intensified CSDP as their data shows that financial markets react positively to the European Council’s 
decisions that consolidate EU military capabilities (Bechtel & Schneider 2010),  while Mai’a K. Davis 
Cross shows the industry interests had a notable influence on the integration of security research in the 
EU (Cross 2011). See also Andersson (2013) for  an overview of defence industry lobby in the EU.
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question.  Though  private  security  companies  reportedly  approach  policymakers
working for the CSDP, their advocacy is less intense than that of public interest groups
and  seems to  focus  on  the  advertisement  of  their  services  (e.g.  logistics,  transport)
which  can  be  procured  by  the  missions.  As  an  EU  official  working  in  the  CSDP
structures stated: “[Private security providers] come to ask about needs in equipment, to
understand better what we need, and they also come to sell their services. There are not
so many security  providers  who approached us  as  compared with  NGOs and other
actors” (Interview 158). A similar account comes from the European Parliament: “The
private security companies are less visible in terms of lobbying. It is more others who
are  concerned with  the  EU using  private  security  companies  who raise  their  voice.
Obviously, more regulatory approach is dominant. The spotlight is more on whether
there are money coming for technology and research in defence industry” (Interview
122).
Indeed,  European associations  representing  the  interests  of  private  security  industry
such  the  European  Organisation  for  Security  (EOS),  European  Corporate  Security
Association (ECSA) and the Confederation of European Security Services (CESS) have
primary focus  on  EU-level  market  regulation  of  their  services,  EU internal  security
issues  and  their  external  aspects  (e.g.  border  control)  and  EU  funding  of  security
research rather than the civilian CSDP. This can be compared to Voltolini’s mapping of
non-state actors lobbying on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: less than
30% of them are business groups (Voltolini 2013: 105). Moreover, business lobbying is
“almost exclusively on specific pieces of legislation or on the framework of EU policies
that affect their sector of activity”, while “on most occasions, business groups tend to be
‘silent’” (ibidem: 106).
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The  conflict context also seems to affect to what extent advocacy groups engage with
CSDP/CFSP structures and the missions. In the case of Palestine, while there are over
two hundred groups lobbying on the EU’s policy towards the conflict  (Voltolini 2013;
Voltolini 2012), few groups focus on the CSDP missions as a policy issue and as a target
of their advocacy or the MEPP in which the EU is engaged. Instead, they focus on very
different issues which do not always hit the core of the EU’s engagement into conflict
resolution and crisis management via the CFSP/CSDP. 
Having approached some of those advocates which are defined as a ‘core group’ by
Voltolini   consisting mainly of Brussels-based NGOs and partly NGOs on the ground
with constant contacts with policymakers (Voltolini 2013: 123), I have ascertained why
CSDP missions  do not  feature  on  their  lobbying agenda.  As  a  representative  of  an
international NGO coalition working in Brussels on the EU policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict put it, “The NGOs do not focus on the CSDP missions because it is
a  marginal  issue  on  the  ground”  (Interview 139).  Whereas  the  NGO advocated  for
international  pressure  to  lift  the  blockade  of  Gaza,  EUBAM Rafah  did  not  feature
among  their  priorities:  “Lifting  the  blockade  is  a  precondition  for  activation  of  the
EUBAM Rafah.  And we fear  that  the EU may want  to  step in  in  activation of the
mission  with  Israel  without  really  lifting  the  blockade.  EUBAM Rafah  reactivation
debate happens during every  crisis:  ‘What  should  we do? We should  reactivate  the
mission’. This is not the answer. The mission can be a small chip. Once the blockade is
lifted, then it is useful as the offer on the table is to reactivate the crossings, not just in
Rafah. It is a tiny bit. The focus of the EU should be on politics, rather than on the small
technical  element.  First,  the  EU  should  not  be  complicit  in  the  international
humanitarian law violations, which take place according to the reports of recognised
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organisations such as ICRC. Second, the EU should stay out of perpetuating of unfair
solutions. The EU should step in when the blockade is lifted” (ibidem). Similarly, NGOs
also see the MEPP as of little relevance for their work as “it does not represent the
realities on the ground” (Interview 105).
Instead, the bulk of advocacy by Palestinian, Israeli and international groups is about
trying to influence EU policy towards Israel – to put pressure on Israel or to block EU
attempts to mount such pressure. Many interviewed representatives of the ‘core group’
advocate for the EU to pressure Israel in order to prevent international human rights and
humanitarian law violations in Israel and the OPTs and raise the costs of occupation for
Israel. They want the EU to challenge Israel’s settlement policies and exclude illegally
occupied enclaves from EU-Israel relations, to push Israel to lift the Gaza blockade and
allow freedom of movement for Palestinians within Israel and the OPTs, as well as to
bring Israel’s government to accountability for “gross human rights violations in Gaza”.
State-building in Palestine, to which the EU seeks to contribute via the CSDP missions
is a secondary question at best, as the vast majority of advocates see it as a ‘no-go’ in
the context of Israel’s occupation.  
In the case of EU policy towards the conflicts in Georgia, there is a limited number of
groups active at the EU level, but their advocacy touches upon the core of the EU policy
of conflict resolution and crisis management conducted via the CFSP/CSDP. In most
cases, these are European and local NGOs who conduct projects in Georgia and the
breakaway entities, and their work is very relevant to what the EU does on the ground.
They work to build confidence between the parties at civil society and also semi-official
levels, tackle the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and help communities to
decrease  tensions  and  prevent  the  re-escalation  of  violence.  Moreover,  some
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international and local NGOs have been doing their job for two decades, so the EU
officials highly value their work and engage with them regularly. Furthermore, the EU
and member states often come as key donors to these groups. Just like in the case of
EPLO, several international NGOs working in Georgia have been long-term receivers of
EU funding. So in a way, they are also implementers of the EU conflict resolution and
crisis  management  policy.  As  an  interviewed  policymaker  put  it,  “These  are  the
prolongation of the EU arms” (Interview 158).  Thus, even though fewer groups are
involved in EU policy towards the conflicts in Georgia in comparison with the case of
Palestine, there is a tight network of policymakers and non-state actors working hand in
hand.
Unlike in  the case of CFSP sanctions in Chapter  4,  where advocacy groups can be
divided in two opposing camps, there is no such battlefield in the case of civilian CSDP
missions. Most often groups compete for the attention of, and access to, policymakers.
Their  advocacy usually  touches  upon decisions  or  policy implementation  which  are
hidden from the public agenda. In many cases, they work with one policymaker, unit or
mission  staff  on  a  small  issue  of  interest,  or  what  Lowery  calls  “casework”  –   “a
relatively quiet interaction between single or a few organizations and single or a few
politicians” (Lowery 2007). Many interviewed groups do not even call it advocacy, but
information sharing. In many cases, there would be CSDP missions themselves reaching
out to groups for information, consultation or other services which groups can provide.
For this case study, representatives of 31 groups have been interviewed. Nearly half of
the interviewed groups focus on the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and the half on the EU’s policy towards the conflicts in Georgia. Few groups work on
both  conflicts  or  deal  with  cross-cutting  issues  related  to  EU  policy  of  conflict
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resolution  and  crisis  management.  Not  all  the  groups  focus  on  the  CSDP. All  the
interviewed are public interest groups – think-tanks, NGOs and associations of NGOs.
Thirteen groups are international or European organisations, nine of which are either
Brussels-based or have offices in Brussels. The majority of the interviewed groups are
based in the third countries where CSDP missions are deployed and most interaction
between  policymakers  and  non-state  actors  related  to  the  work  of  CSDP missions
appears to take place. Since EUBAM Rafah has been in stand-by mode since 2007, it
has been very difficult to collect evidence of interest group engagement in the case and
some  advocacy  instances  related  to  this  mission  may  be  missed  by  my  research.
Furthermore,  I must also mention that few big international human rights NGOs who
have been identified as extremely relevant for this study did not respond to the repeated
interview requests (most likely due to limited resources as the Brussels-based staff of
these organisations usually cover numerous EU foreign policy portfolios). Given the
scarcity of groups engaged in advocacy on CSDP missions, this may have impact on
research findings. 
2. Advocacy strategies
2.1. Advocacy objectives
The advocacy objectives  of  the  groups  involved in  the  civilian  CSDP vary  greatly.
Generally, it can be said that most of the groups, especially on the ground, strive simply
to  get  access  to  CSDP structures  and  obtain  more  information  on  the  work  of  the
missions,  as  well  as  more  participation  in  what  they  do.  For  EPLO, improving the
access of civil society groups to policymakers in the CSDP is a cross-cutting goal and
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the core part of what the group does via its projects supported by the EU, for example,
through the CSDN. In other cases, access to the mission helps local or international
groups to implement their key mandate (e.g. provide services to communities), to exert
influence  on  their  own governments  (  e.g.  using the  mission  as  an ally  in  pushing
through  domestic  reforms  or  decisions)  and  to  fundraise  (part  of  their  survival
strategies).
The EU-based groups with interest in conflict prevention and resolution tend to have
two kinds of objectives:  they aim to draw the EU’s attention to a crisis,  conflict  or
thematic issue and push it to intervene or act (agenda-setting), or they would like the EU
to improve its existing policies or structures (policy formulation, implementation and
evaluation). In terms of the case of EU involvement in Georgia and Palestine through
the CSDP, the interviewed groups mainly work within the second type of objective.
One of EPLO’s broad advocacy objectives is “to ensure that conflict prevention and
peace-building are prominent within the policies and structures of EU external affairs”.
As the EPLO representative explains, within this objective EPLO aims to “increase the
effectiveness  of  the  civilian  CSDP missions,  by  which  we  understand  the  way  the
missions  are  planned,  prepared,  carried  out  and  evaluated;  and  to  increase  the
accountability. Under accountability we understand accountability to the member states
and people in the  member states, but primarily to populations of the countries in which
CSDP missions operate” (Interview 125).
More specifically, EPLO aimed to contribute to the discussion on civilian CSDP during
the preparation of the European Council meeting in December 2013 which, among other
issues, focused on the effectiveness and impact of CSDP.  EPLO produced a policy
paper  on  the  civilian  CSDP of  March 2013,  in  which  the  group outlined  the  main
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reforms  they  would  like  to  push  for.  The  reforms  envisaged  integration  of  CSDP
missions  into  overall  EU  country  or  regional  strategies;  revision  of  civilian  CSDP
concepts;  integration  of  conflict  analysis  into  mission  planning;  rigorous  and
participatory evaluation of CSDP missions; improvement of the relationship between
CSDP missions and local populations (EPLO 2013a).
As the EPLO representative describes, “discussions on CSDP were overshadowed by
defence issues. The military CSDP received most attention in the preparations to the
Council  – in  the way that  the baskets  were put  together  and on what  issues  in  the
baskets they were looking at. The member states such as France were interested in it.
EPLO did  damage  limitation.  We were  trying  to  support  the  member  states  on  the
civilian side, to encourage them to be active. We tried to do so and push the idea of
deliverables” (Interview 125). While for the military CSDP, specific “deliverables” –
i.e. decisions to be taken by the member states such as regarding pooling and sharing of
resources and funding to the European defence industry were discussed in the course of
the preparation to  the European Council,  EPLO suggested such deliverables  for the
civilian CSDP (EPLO 2013b).
Apart from the EPLO objective to reform civilian CSDP, the group also aims to “open
up” CSDP structures to interaction with, and input from, civil society. Nearly everything
done by the group in terms of advocacy – conveying meetings with CIVCOM members,
organising roundtables on specific conflicts or cross-cutting issues and meetings with
EU policymakers related to the planning or strategic review of CSDP missions – is
guided by this overarching objective. As EPLO reveals: “With these meetings we have
two objectives: to provide recommendations and to build trust, to show that working
with civil society can be useful” (Interview 125).
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In the case of the EU missions to Palestine, the key group advocating for policy change
towards the two missions was the Brussels-based Quakers Council for European Affairs
(QCEA), an EPLO member. QCEA seeks to influence the EU’s approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the parties to this conflict based on the rights based approach
rather  than  advocating for  a  specific  solution of  one or  two separate  states  (QCEA
2013). The basis for the QCEA’s advocacy on EU crisis management in Palestine was a
briefing paper on the two EU missions published in 2011.  QCEA lobbied the EU to
close EUBAM Rafah “in light of the serious concerns regarding the legal basis of the
mission  since  June  2007” and  dedicate  the  money spent  on  the  mission  to  a  more
effective means of bringing peace in Palestine and Israel  (QCEA 2011). For EUPOL
COPPS, QCEA advised the EU to keep the mission in place, but to enhance its visibility
both locally and at the EU level (ibidem). 
As a group representative explained, given the limited resources of the group, the focus
of advocacy was on the EUBAM Rafah mission “because it was about what the EU was
not doing” (Interview 140). As the interviewee continues, “I felt it was a strategic and
tactical mistake that the EU is participating in a big pretence at someone’s expense. That
because of the Israel’s position and that the EU cannot give a politically astute response
to  it.  My position  was  the  mission  should  be  shut  down until  we can  make a  real
difference. In terms of EUPOL COPPS, the situation was different, they were equipping
Palestinian  police.  It  is  a  common  theme  for  all  CSDP missions  is  that  they  are
pretending to be more significant than they are are, they are a part of the pretence”
(ibidem).
Whereas  many  NGOs  involved  in  peacebuilding  are  pacifist,  advocacy  for  military
CSDP solutions is rather rare. An example is advocacy by a member state-based think-
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tank  which, along with broadening the resources available for two civilian missions in
Palestine,  also  argued  for  deployment  of  a  Gaza-Israeli  military  border  mission  to
“facilitate Israeli- Palestinian security coordination, and [to] also create the possibility
for EUBAM Rafah to expand its civilian capacity to the other Gaza-Israel crossings as
well  as to the “safe passage” between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”  (CITpax
2006).
In  the  case  of  Georgia,  advocacy  groups  have  been  generally  very  supportive  of
EUMM, thus focusing their advocacy on the implementation issues. One of the EU-
based groups involved in advocacy with EUMM is the UK NGO Saferworld. In 2009,
Saferworld advocated for the introduction of more effective monitoring techniques that
would engage the local communities. The group tried to make EUMM aware of their
impact  on  the  local  level  conflict  dynamics,  whether  positive,  such  as  stimulating
contacts  across  the  conflict  division  line  or  negative  such  as  contributing  to  local
population’s sense of insecurity (Saferworld 2010: 19). As part of this work Saferworld
conducted an assessment of the EUMM’s approach for engaging with communities, and
has  advised  EUMM on how to implement  its  recommendations.  Saferworld  experts
developed and delivered a training course on effective community monitoring to the
EUMM monitors. 
Moreover,  together  with  its  local  partners,  Saferworld  advocated  for  cooperation
between communities living on the ABL between Shida Kartli and South Ossetia, local
police and EUMM on infrastructure or other development issues in order to improve
safety and reinforce links between the communities and security providers (ibidem).
Saferworld  aimed  to  include  the  views  of  local  communities  to  the  EUMM work,
including confidence building measures such the IPRM between Georgians, Russians
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and South Ossetians facilitated by EUMM. Moreover, Saferworld and its local partners
wanted the EU to push the Georgian government to take up this confidence building
measure (Interview 104). 
A number of Georgian NGOs working with IDP communities or population living along
the ABL have been continuously working with EUMM in order to help solving human
rights issues and improving economic and social welfare and the security of the conflict
affected  population.  The  issues  they  have  advocated  often  concern  funding  to
infrastructure projects or the solution of pressing needs of the population in the conflict-
affected areas. The groups have lobbied the EU and other international organisations to
increase monitoring of international funds to the Georgian government on the IDPs or to
put pressure on the Georgian government regarding certain specific issues related to the
Georgian  policies.  EUMM is  seen  by  the  Georgian  NGOs  as  an  ally  for  domestic
advocacy of issues such as water supply along the ABL, safer return of IDPs to their
houses, registration of property rights for returnees and so forth.   
Whereas  EUMM  is  not  a  donor  to  civil  society  groups,  the  EU  through  the  EU
Delegation  in  Tbilisi  and  the  European  Commission  are.  Engaging  in  information
sharing  with  EUMM  can   help  local  organisations  to  improve  their  fundraising
strategies. A representative of a Georgian NGO said that thanks to the advice of EUMM
staff,  they successfully  applied for EU funding for their  confidence-building project
(Interview 161). Moreover, since EUMM has some small budget for public relations,
some groups can even seek funding with EUMM directly. A representative of an NGO
involved in confidence building work for journalists recounted that they lobbied EUMM
to support some activities of their project bringing together journalists from the sides of
the conflict (Interview 135).
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2.2. Advocacy targets and levels of lobbying
When do groups engage in advocacy at the EU level?
The  development  of  the  CSDP,  especially  its  civilian  dimension,  served  as  “the
Europeanisation moment” for groups working on non-violent conflict and civilian crisis
management to start lobbying in Brussels. EPLO, founded in 2001 by 17 organisations
from  EU  member  states,  provides  a  good  example.  As  its  representative  says,  the
establishment of EPLO “was a reflection of developments at  the EU level with EU
foreign policy coming towards a common policy of EU member states. The member
state-based organisations wanted to work at the EU level too. It also coincided with the
Swedish presidency and its programme [the Swedish presidency in the Council put a
great  emphasis  on  civilian  CSDP  and  conflict  prevention  –  author20].  Then  9/11
happened” (Interview 125).
For QCEA, an active EPLO member, interest in the CSDP missions in Palestine grew
out of their general interest in civilian crisis management and their work in Israel and
Palestine. As the group representative explains the start of their advocacy on the issue,
“We  felt  the  necessity  to  engage  with  the  Council  rather  than  the  Commission.
CIVCOM was our entry point, though it was not easy to engage with. As a group we
also had the necessary expertise on civilian crisis management. In 2009, QCEA started
work on Israel/Palestine and on the EU’s role in the conflict and we were analysing
what has been done and what issues were not covered by what others had been doing.
We figured out that most people in Israel/Palestine do not know about the missions
existence” (Interview 140).
In the case of Georgia, most of the advocacy organisations were working on the conflict
20  See more Jakobsen (2009).
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long before EUMM was deployed. They worked with EU actors outside the CSDP: the
European Commission and its delegation in Tbilisi, the EUSR for the South Caucasus
and EU member states. Often EU policymakers turned to non-state actors for certain
expertise. In some cases, non-state actors were provided with EU funding to advise both
the  EU and Georgian  government  (Interview 99).  It  is  an  example  of  how the  EU
machinery reaches out to NGOs to advance things which it cannot advance on its own
(e.g  the  EU funded a  project  providing advice  to  the  Georgian  government  on  the
strategy of engaging with breakaway entities; the EU supports international NGOs to
engage with  actors  in  Abkhazia  to  which  the  EU,  apart  from the  EUSR, otherwise
would not have access).
At which policy stages do they lobby? 
Groups attempt to lobby at all stages of policymaking, however, the absolute majority of
the interviewed groups were active at the implementation stage. This can seemingly be
explained by the fact that the CSDP structures exclude outside actors during agenda-
setting, planning and decision-making, and during the evaluation and strategic review of
the missions.  At the same time, CSDP missions reach out to non-state actors at  the
implementation stage. As we will see, this access varies depending on various factors,
including the mission’s mandate,  the organisational  culture of the mission,  which is
often dependent on the mission’s leadership and staff, and the conflict context. As one
EU official put it “At the implementation stage, interaction with non-state actors partly
depends on the mission mandate and the people you have there”(Interview 107). But in
general, there is more interaction with advocacy groups on the ground than in Brussels. 
On the one hand, in Brussels, the EU limits its interaction with civil society actors by
channelling it  through ‘one-stop shop’ such as EPLO. On the other hand, unlike in
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foreign policy areas analysed in the previous chapters, there are no formal mechanisms
of consultation with non-state actors in the CSDP. Thus, much more than in other fields,
in the CSDP,  access depends on informal relations between groups and policymakers.
The  interaction  of  CSDP  structures  with  civil  society  is  guided  by  the
“Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs)  and  Civil  Society  Organisations  (CSOs)  in  the  Framework of  EU Civilian
Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention” adopted by CIVCOM in November 2006.
Such cooperation  should  be driven by the goal  of  operational  efficiency  (CIVCOM
2006). The three-page document proposes CSDP structures to engage NGOs and CSOs
via informal exchanges at the PSC and CIVCOM in the Council; during fact-finding
and pre-planning missions; in view of mission evaluation and lessons learnt process; via
the  establishment  of  NGO/CSO  liaison  officers  in  the  missions  and  the  Council
Secretariat (EEAS) and defining modalities for routine information exchange with civil
society in the field (ibidem).  It appears from the interviews that these guidelines are
implemented in a not very systematic way. A lot seems to depend on an EU official
interpreting and applying them. For example, the EUMM personnel working with civil
society say that the guidelines are vague, whereas their superiors in charge may not be
open to information exchanges with civil society. 
Still, there are instances of lobbying at the earlier stages of policy cycle. Few Brussels-
based groups made efforts (in some cases, successfully) to put issues on the EU agenda
by drawing  attention to conflicts, asking for intervention or feeding their points into the
Council discussions on the civilian CSDP. EPLO, for example, tried to pushed the idea
of deliverables for the civilian CSDP ahead of a European Council meeting. Another
Brussels-based group working on conflicts claims success for the EU intervention in
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Congo in 2003.21 The group had worked on the conflict analysis and arguably knew
more  about  the  events  on  the  ground  than  some  EU member  states.  As  the  group
representative says, “If there were no ICG in 2003, Africa would have had the biggest
genocide in its history. A colleague prepared research on this conflict.  Our president
talked to Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General. We had a two hour briefing with
the UN Security Council. And then we also talked to the Africa advisor to President
Chirac, we had maps open on the table, and ICG knew a lot more about what was going
on on the ground then French intelligence and military intelligence. France decided to
move. We later learnt that at that time Kofi Annan had also called Chirac. Nobody was
looking at that part of the world at that time, it was the first month of the Iraq war”
(Interview 96).22 In the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, NGO Crisis Management
Initiative (CMI),  played a crucial  role in  putting the issue on the Council’s agenda,
decision-making  and  planning  (Gourlay  2013;  Gourlay  2006).  However,  these  two
examples are exceptional. Both groups – ICG and CMI – enjoyed a high level of access
to the Council (in the case of ICG to the French president and in the case of CMI to the
HR Javier Solana and UK presidency in the EU)  due to the group leadership (former
Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari was a founder of CMI and chairman of ICG, while
ICG president was former Australian foreign minister at that time). Moreover, in both
cases groups possessed some knowledge or other resources (access to the peace talks as
a mediator in case of the CMI) which the EU did not. 
During the planning stage, the contact with non-state actors is extremely limited. As a
CIVCOM  member  says,  even  EPLO  is  not  involved  in  the  planning  process  of  a
21 On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted the Operation Plan and the Decision to launch a Military
Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Arthemis, first military mission outside
Europe and independent of NATO. The Operation ended officially on 1 September 2003.
22 France contributed 90% of troops to that military operation.
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particular mission (Interview 107). The only time when the EEAS structures involved in
the mission’s planning reached out to EPLO was during the planning process of the
EUAM  Ukraine.23 A two-hour  meeting  with  civil  society  groups  was  organised  in
Brussels by EPLO and attended by the CPMD and CPCC staff as well as the EUAM
staff.  However,  the  large  part  of  the  meeting  was  dedicated  to  convincing  the  EU
officials  of  the  value  of  cooperating  with  civil  society  on  the  ground  by  bringing
examples  of  civil  society  involvement  in  SSR  in  Ukraine  and  other  transition  and
conflict  contexts.  Without  having  any  access  to  the  planning  documents  or  even
discussions, the NGOs found it difficult to make any substantial contribution to the EU
debate.
There is no systematic involvement of non-state actors in the evaluation of the mission’s
impact or strategic review process. As a CIVCOM member stated:
“The real evaluation is done in the strategic review which done by the EEAS and
CMPD. They do try to reach beyond the strict circle, but it is still limited. They
could be coming to the country to do the review there, for a week or so, limits on
amounts of contacts, mainly governmental and international actors, not much time
for outside actors” (Interview 107).
An EPLO representative confirms this account: 
“Together with OSI we thought that strategic review could be an opportunity for us
to engage with crisis management bodies. We started information meetings with
the  crisis  management  structures  of  which  no  one  would  know  that  strategic
planners meet  civil  society, we would go to the Cortenbergh building and then
leave  in  secrecy,  so  the  member  states  would  not  know. It  started  with  DRC
23 Presentation  by  Catherine  Woollard,  EPLO  Director,  at  the  EPLO  event  “EUAM  Ukraine  and
Effective Security Sector Reform: input from civil society”, 11 September 2014, Brussels.
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mission [EUPOL Congo]. Now we have more established process. We also do it
through the CSDN. It allows us to cover our time and also to bring civil society
experts from outside Brussels. Before it was only people who were based here and
there are not many, because we did not have funds to bring them” (Interview 125).
A staff member of an international organisation based in Ramallah shares their
experience of being consulted for the EUPOL COPPS evaluation:
“This winter the EU commissioned an internal assessment of impact on the ground
of EUPOL COPPS. There were very informal consultations. We did not provide
much information to  them because we  thought  that  the  way in which we were
consulted was unprofessional. We were at another meeting and we were called from
it to other room, and without any warning or explaining to us what was going on,
we were just asked “What do you think of EUPOL COPPS?” (Interview 160).
EPLO and its members participated in the meeting with CSDP structures during the
EUMM strategic review. However, an interviewed EEAS official found this meeting
“superficial” (Interview 137). This may have to do with the fact that the groups do not
have much information on those specific issues which the EEAS would like to discuss
in order to provide a meaningful input. 
Strategic planners may have contacts with local and international NGOs on the ground
during  their  fact  finding  missions.  In  the  preparation  of  the  first  strategic  review
preceding the extension  of  the EUPOL COPPS mandate to  the rule  of  law, several
NGOs were consulted; moreover, the assessment also included a mapping of local civil
society actors relevant for the mission’s work (Irrera 2013: 109). An EEAS official who
led the strategic review process admits that the Crisis Response Team met with “all
kinds of CSOs and people” during their assessment in the field (Interview 143).
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Another planner narrates a similar experience of interacting with non-state actors in the
preparation of the strategic review for EUBAM Rafah: 
“We are not allowed to meet with state actors – Hamas, so we drew on information
from civil  society,  from Palestinian  think-tanks,  NGOs,  business,  few industry
representatives to get a feeling of how Gaza looked at that moment.  At my level,
such contacts are annual. It was for the preparation for strategic review. What kind
of information are we looking for? To have a genuine ground truth on the situation
on the ground, to see the difficulties which they experience and what visions for
future they have. I used this information for briefings here in Brussels” (Interview
154).
To  sum  up,  Brussels-based  CSDP  structures  remain  largely  closed  for  non-state
advocates. There are no formal mechanisms for interaction between policymakers and
outside groups. Furthermore, confidentiality of the policy documents starting from the
planning  documents  to  the  mission’s  reports  further  limits  the  potential  input  of
advocacy  groups.   Most  contacts  happen  on  the  ground  as  EU  officials  seek  for
information from local and international NGOs, business groups and other non-state
actors, or the missions need to engage with civil society in order to implement their
mandates in a more effective manner. In the next section, we will analyse in greater
detail why the groups may find it easier to target the staff in the CSDP missions with
their advocacy. 
Advocacy targets
Nearly all groups I interviewed try to lobby at both EU level and member state level,
which supports  the H4 hypothesis  outlined in Chapter  2.  Given that the CSDP is  a
Brussels-based process led by the EU member states, Brussels-based groups working on
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conflict prevention target the Council at the level of the PSC and CIVCOM. They also
approach  EEAS crisis  management  structures  as  well  as  geographic  structures  if  a
certain country or region are at stake.
In the case of Georgia, the EUSR is probably one of the most targeted actors by both
EU-based and Georgia-based groups. The EUSR for the South Caucasus is based in
Brussels, but it has an office in Tbilisi and its staff travels in the region. It is the only EU
actor with access to Abkhazia. The group’s reports mostly target the EUSR through its
political advisers be they in Brussels or in Tbilisi. In the case of Palestine, at the time of
conducting  interviews,  the  EUSR  for  the  MEPP  was  already  abolished.  However,
Brussels-based groups working on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do
not report targeting the EUSR for the MEPP in the past.
The Commission is reported as a lobbying target in cases when trade or aid issues are at
stake, not on the CSDP, which is logical as it does not have any competences. The EP is
not  a  target  either.  Among  the  interviewees,  only  one  Brussels-based  think-tank
mentioned  systematically  targeting  friendly  MEPs  from SEDE or  AFET (Interview
109). As an interviewee from a Brussels-based NGO explained: “MEPs are not that key
when it concerns a foreign policy issue. They are allies of ours, they took many of our
reports:  copy-paste  from  our  reports  on  the  South  Caucasus  in  their  resolutions”
(Interview 121). In a similar vein, a representative of a Brussels-based group working
on  the  EU’s  policy  towards  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  argued:  “The  European
Parliament is a big boat, huge cargo. Many MEPs do not have a clue about what they
do. It is good to have a few friends in political groups, in the secretariats and few MEP
assistants. Time is limited. Five MEPs and two political advisers is enough. We do not
waste time influencing EP resolutions” (Interview 95).
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Few other groups say that they may approach MEPs on occasion as a means of getting
through  to  other  institutions.  For  example,  QCEA  used  a  friendly  MEP  to  pose
parliamentary  questions  to  the  crisis  management  structures  to  get  information  on
EUBAM and EUPOL COPPS (Interview 140).
Lobbying the national capitals is recognised as important by EU-based groups, however,
their  resources are  scarce.  Thus,  groups either choose to  focus on few key member
states such as Germany, the UK, France and sometimes other countries key for their
regions  or  issues,  or  to  tackle  the  opponents,  for  example  Czech  Republic  or  the
Netherlands in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Membership-based associations
try to use their members in the EU capitals to target MFAs and other policy actors,
however,  it  is  challenging,  since  member  organisations  are  not  always  skilled  in
advocacy and able to understand intricacies of policy process and to follow the EU
agenda closely. An EU-based NGO representative shares their experience which is also
common for groups which do not have offices in Brussels, but carry out activities on the
ground: “We target EU member states in Georgia, not so much in Brussels and not in
the capitals” (Interview 127).
In Georgia and Palestine, local groups target the EU Delegation, in particular political
section,  including  staff  liaising  with  civil  society  and  human  rights  groups,  and
operational  section  staff  dealing  with  funding.  Advocacy  groups,  both  local  and
international, also lobby EU member states embassies which is also connected to their
fund-raising strategies.
While in Georgia, EUMM is an advocacy target for nearly all groups I have interviewed
– both local civil society organisations and international NGOs and think-tanks, which
is not the case for Palestinian and international NGOs. While EUBAM Rafah is  on
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stand-by since 2007, only few groups in Ramallah say that they engage with EUPOL
COPPS. Meetings with the mission representatives usually take place at roundtables and
seminars on SSR and justice reform issues funded by donors. Four NGOs were selected
as  partners  in  the  implementation  of  the  UNDP- EUPOL COPPS Joint  Programme
“Strengthening Internal  Police  Accountability, National  Anti-Corruption  and Civilian
Oversight” co-funded by the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium. Through this
programme  EUPOL  COPPS  has  sought  to  encourage  internal  and  external
accountability  of  the  PCP,  also  in  a  reaction  to  the  criticism  of  Palestinian  and
international NGOs of human rights violations by security agencies and corruption in
the PA. External accountability is seen as important in the absence of the parliamentary
oversight  when  the  mandate  of  the  Palestinian  Legislative  Council  has  expired.
However, the Palestine police was reluctant to be placed under external oversight and
EUPOL COPPS has worked to help set up mechanisms of internal accountability, while
promoting the openness of the police to civil society actors and supporting awareness
raising by selected NGOs on civilian-police cooperation and culture of complaints and
monitoring activities (Interview 123). 
Based on a mapping study on civilian oversight over the PCP and anti-corruption bodies
commissioned  by  the  UNDP and  EUPOL COPPS  (Buttu  2013),  four  NGOs  were
chosen, of which two work on security issues and two on the fight against corruption.
During the first phase, between the end of 2012 and 2014, the grants were provided to
the NGOs to conduct their activities. The EUPOL COPPS interactions with civil society
were guided by the Joint Programme: 
“At  each  milestone  within  this  programme,  we  would  have  exposure  to  civil
society.  At  joint  events,  police  presented  what  they  were  doing  and  the  CSO
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community would give their opinions. Police does outreach in districts and they
hold townhall meetings with local CSOs. These activities are supported by donors
through the UNDP” (Interview 123).
In the case of Georgia, EUMM pro-actively seeks contacts with civil society groups.
This is due to the fact that this is a monitoring mission, and so relies on different sources
of information, including non-state actors. At the same time, NGOs also reach out to the
mission as a “source of unbiased information” and to solve practical issues concerning
safety and security of communities along the ABL or of IDPs by sharing information,
liaising with international donors or raising the issue with Georgian authorities.  The
mission’s personnel in Gori and Zugdidi are an important element of local communities.
In the field, EUMM is the only international actor on the ground. The mission staff not
only are in frequent contact with NGOs, but also with schools who ask to come and
speak with presentation on the EU, Europe or EUMM. In Ramallah, overcrowded with
international organisations, EUPOL COPPS whose staff mainly works with government
agencies is  a  far less visible actor. More importantly, unlike in the case of EUPOL
COPPS, EUMM has a number of communication mechanisms with civil society groups
in Georgia.
In EUMM, a number of staff in HQ and Field Offices (FO), such as political advisers,
human rights advisers, gender advisers, analytical capability analysts, press and public
information  officers,  human  security  staff  in  the  FO and  hotline  coordinators  have
regularly  (ranging  between  daily,  weekly  and  monthly)  contacts  with  civil  society
organisations to enable the exchange of information and views. In the case of EUPOL
COPPS, contacts with civil society are concentrated in the Rule of Law section, mainly
at the level of human rights and gender advisers who keep regular (on a weekly basis)
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contact with civil society as a partner to mainstream gender and human rights within the
official counterparts. There are also contacts at the level of press and public information
officer.
Moreover, the EUMM HQ and FO officers have a number of institutionalised practices
of  communication  with  civil  society. The FO in  Zugdidi  holds  information  sharing
meetings with local civil society every four weeks. The FO in Gori runs monthly post-
IPRM briefings by the Head of FO to which local NGOs are invited. At the time when
the interviews were conducted, the FO in Mtskheta was planning to establish regular
consultations with local civil  society. EUMM ran the 16 days of activism campaign
against gender based violence in which the EUMM gender advisers and monitors met
police officers, and also with  NGO and local communities representatives across the
country. The mission’s Press and Public Information Unit set up the EUMM Prize for
Peace Journalism as a means “to reconnect with media” and to reach out to the South
Ossetian, Abkhazian and ethnic Georgian journalists working on the conflict (Interview
98).
While EUMM and EUPOL COPPS differ in mandate and structures within the mission
to engage with civil society, there is also a difference in perception of the role of the
CSDP mission by local advocacy groups. Though neither in Georgia nor in Palestine the
missions are seen as a part of a conflict resolution solution. In Georgia EUMM is widely
viewed as a security provider, especially by the population living along the ABL, while
in Palestine the EU’s assistance to security sector, including EUPOL COPPS, though to
a lesser extent than US assistance, is perceived to focus mostly on the security of Israel,
not  the  security  of  Palestinian  citizens.  Both  international  and  Georgian  NGOs  are
generally positive about the role of EUMM and conduct projects which are relevant to
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the EUMM activities. Palestinian and some international organisations work on the PA
police reform, but there are other issues much higher on their international advocacy
agenda. As a representative of a Ramallah-based NGO explains: 
“We are working on various fronts: on the internal front we are talking to the international
community about Palestinian violations, and on the external,  we are talking about Israeli
violations. But we cannot compare them: Israeli violations are much higher [in numbers and
scale] as Israel is an occupier. With the violations by Palestinian security forces we do not go
to the international organisations or international human rights organisations, we go directly
to senior personnel in the Palestinian security forces, we make statements and talk to media.
On Israeli violations, we go to international bodies such as the UN, EU, [we speak to the]
international community” (Interview 150).
A director of a Palestinian NGO defending media freedoms adds another perspective
underlining the fact that EUPOL COPPS mandate is narrow, focusing on the PCP, while
the PCP is less involved in violations of journalists’ rights and access to information
than other security agencies in Palestine (Interview 145).
In Georgia, international NGOs together with their local partners have been working for
years  on  confidence  building,  IDPs and other  conflict-related  issues.  In  the  case  of
Palestine,  CSO oversight over the police force is  “ad hoc” and “of limited nature”,
despite significant attention paid by civil  society to the performance of the security
sector  agencies  (Buttu  2013).  In  the  fight  against  corruption,  CSO oversight  of  the
Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission and the Corruption Crimes Court is conducted
largely  by  one  NGO,  AMAN  –  Coalition  for  Integrity  and  Accountability,  the
Palestinian chapter of Transparency International (ibidem).
2.3. Advocacy tactics
Inside  lobbying  prevails,  with  face-to-face  meetings  with  policymakers  being  most
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frequently reported. These can be individual meetings or meetings together with other
groups such as briefings, working breakfasts or informal conversations at the margins of
the  other  events.  Most  groups  also  report  distributing  policy  briefs,  research  and
position papers among policymakers and diplomats, inviting them to conferences and
seminars, and attending events organised by other groups or convened by policymakers.
Brussels-based  NGOs  say  that  they  do  not  organise  events  such  as  roundtables  or
conferences  themselves.  First,  Brussels  is  already  saturated  with  events.  Few
policymakers or group representatives can dedicate their time to a day or half a day long
event. Second, organisation of events is seen as very time consuming exercise which
does not necessarily generate satisfactory impact. So Brussels-based advocates prefer
smaller one or two hour long meetings with targeted groups of policymakers and their
partner organisations. In Georgia and Palestine, advocacy groups tend to rely more on
public  events  or  conferences.  These  meetings  also  provide  opportunity  to  talk  to
European diplomats and to get to know recently arrived staff. More importantly, this
also gives visibility to groups, which is important for fundraising work.
Groups working on the ground in Palestine and Georgia very often report participation
in civil society consultations to promote their advocacy points. In Palestine, the majority
of  groups mentioned participation  in  the  consultations  run by the  Office  of  the EU
Representative  in  advance  of  the  meetings  of  the  EU-PA Subcommittee  on  Human
Rights, Good Governance and the Rule of Law. In addition, the EU delegations run
consultations  on  aid  priorities.  In  Georgia,  there  are  also  consultations  on  thematic
issues such as IDPs rights, run by UNHCR and attended by the EUMM representatives.
In Georgia, groups attend consultations run by EUMM (information sharing meetings,
post-IPRM briefings) and meetings with civil society with the EUSR during his visits.
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NGOs in Georgia also mention that EUMM, EUSR and EU Delegation representatives
come on visits to share information, learn about their activities and to gauge opinions on
the developments.
Brussels-based advocacy groups are much more strategic in the way they lobby and
apply different tactics compared to non-Brussels based groups.  An advocate in Brussels
explains their lobbying in the EU Council: 
“We did a briefing to the EU member states:  for  a few who could convey the
message and the most powerful ones. I tend to send things to people I know. I do
not  attribute papers,  do not  put  our logo.  First,  I  need an agreement of all  my
members for putting a logo. But without the logo the impact is the same. I do it
with 3-4 most important members of the organisation and it is sent out. For the EU
member states it  is also good when they see not-attributed papers. It  empowers
them. It looks like the ideas come from them. It is the best way to make them
believe that these are their ideas. No branding” (Interview 95).
Another Brussels-based advocate says that when they produce their policy reports, they
try to come up with specific recommendations for different policy actors. Then they are
able to meet with specific actors whom they target and discuss their recommendations
with  (Interview  121).  A group  representative  lobbying  on  EU’s policy  towards  the
Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  explains  that  “blockers  [of  more  conditionality-driven
approach towards Israel among the EU member states] are better targeted by bringing
Israeli NGOs talking to them rather than us or Palestinian groups” (Interview 139).
Approaching  media  is  the  only  outside  lobbying  tactic  applied  by  the  interviewed
groups. Most Brussels-based groups use media in parallel to inside lobbying to push
some issues on the agenda. Press in the EU member states is mostly approached, while
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the EU bubble media are targeted on very specific policy issues for experts. A group
representative shares their approach to lobbying through media:
“When the member states do not want to do more, we try to make our point to the
media.  We  mostly  approach  media  through  TV  presence  and  op-eds  in  the
newspapers. We do not cover that much on European press but rather on the press
in the member states and Russia. Social media are a new tool, but in order to be a
part of the debate, you have to have a full time job doing that. 
Before the economic crisis, when you have a demonstration in Bratislava before
the prime minister office against the Darfur atrocities, then we could write to media
in the member states, for example, Le Monde in France, on this issue because there
was public attention. With the economic crisis, the foreign policy issues are less
picked up by media. The leverage of public opinion is less strong” (Interview 96).
None of the interviewed groups reported the usage of outside lobbying in the form of
protests,  street  actions  or  demonstrations.  As  a  representative  of  an  NGO coalition
lobbying  in  Brussels  explains:  “Public  mobilisation  is  difficult.  You  saw  the
demonstrations on Gaza. First, it would be organised any way. Second, there are many
people there with whom we do not want to be associated” (Interview 139). 
This contrasts with the wave of public protests in Western European countries against
Israeli air strikes on Gaza in the summer of 2014 or against European involvement in
the US-led international operations  in Iraq or Afghanistan in early 2000s.  However,
protests which are often organised by solidarity movements or diaspora groups seem to
have  little  link  with  professional  advocates  focusing  on  EU’s  policy  of  conflict
resolution  and crisis  management  (see  also  Voltolini  2013).  However,  a  number  of
Brussels-based  advocates  mention  the  importance  of  grassroots  movements  and
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solidarity  groups  in  obtaining  a  change  in  the  EU’s policy  towards  the  conflict.  A
representative of a Brussels-based NGO stressed that this is one of their objectives:
“We try to produce change in solidarity groups, in public opinion.  There is  new
generation to come that will not accept the EU policy towards Israel. The pressure is
too big, too costly for the EU to support Israel at any cost. We are small wheel in the
bigger wheel. The change will come from the grassroots. I try to give them tools,
information to feed in their campaigns, like to UK solidarity movement” (Interview
95).
Whereas public demonstrations protest against a military invasion or war, or demand a
principled EU/EU member state position in the conflict, they are not about  a specific
course of  action  within EU civilian crisis  management.  Civilian  crisis  management,
unlike military operations, do not provoke much of public attention and seems to be
non-visible and non-controversial issue. 
The EUMM press and public  information officer reported a group of demonstrators
gathering in front of the Gori office and demanding Georgian membership of the EU.
While  local  grassroots  groups  may  not  be  aware  of  the  limitations  of  the  CSDP
mission’s mandate, it seems more likely that they  chose the EUMM office as the only
place with an EU flag in town, as a representative body of the EU, not as an expression
of EU crisis management policy.
2.4. Alliances
As conflict prevention and crisis management is a field where groups very frequently
compete for the attention of policymakers to their issues or conflicts rather than between
themselves, advocates often lobby in coalitions.
EPLO  is  an  example  of  a  coalition  of  groups  united  in  a  membership-based
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organisation. The EPLO members constitute a wide mix of different NGOs and think-
tanks: working on peace-building, conflict prevention and mediation, research-oriented
organisations,  peace  forces  and  multi-mandate  organisations  with  a  development
background, like Oxfam which works in conflict-affected areas.  Despite the need to
invest a lot of time in getting consensus on the EPLO positions and publications, the
broad base of EPLO is “good for legitimacy” and it also benefits sustainability allowing
reliance upon larger membership fees (Interview 125). 
In the case of EU policy towards the conflict in Georgia, the three UK-based NGOs
(International Alert,  Conciliation Resources  and Saferworld) are  also lobbying in  an
alliance. They team up between themselves and their local partners. A representative of
them explains:“We mutually support each other and have regular coordination meetings
to discuss what we do and when we do it, as we also share the same partners. There has
been an element of division of labour: we work with women, you work with youth”
(Interview 127).
Advocating alone is a resource-consuming effort. A QCEA representative who lobbied
on the CSDP missions in Palestine said that the group had to focus their advocacy on
EUBAM Rafah partly because of scarce resources and a lack of interest from other
Brussels-based groups on their issue: “The NGOs working on Israel/Palestine issues
were  not  interested  in  the  CSDP  missions,  they  are  coming  from  a  development
background and for them it a very technical issue to delve into” (Interview 140). 
For  groups  coming  from Palestine,  Georgia  or  breakaway  entities,  partnership  with
European organisations is empowering. Firstly, EU-based groups often support them
with resources and secondly, they help local organisations get access to policymakers in
Brussels and the various member states. 
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In Georgia, the EUMM representatives stated that they often share information between
local civil society groups, encouraging them to cooperate on the same or similar issues.
This is often connected to the fact that it is easier and time saving for policymakers to
deal with more organised civil society groups, which come as a common platform with
a common message rather than deal with dozens of individual advocates.
On the ground, local groups also often team up around thematic issues: IDPs and the
population living along the ABL in Georgia or monitoring of  the security  sector  in
Palestine.  Such coalitions are  often supported by EU policymakers and through EU
funded projects. A representative of AMAN, a Palestinian organisation that initiated a
coalition of 12 NGOs to monitor the security sector and serve as a bridge between civil
society organisations and the security sector, said that when the EU heard about this
initiative, they expressed interest in building the capacity of the network and supporting
its plan (Interview 120).
3. Influence and its determinants
3.1. Measurement: degree and type
Among the groups which have advocated on the issues related to the civilian CSDP and
the missions in Georgia and Palestine and been able to assess the degree of achievement
of their objectives, answers vary between most and few reached objectives. However,
types of objectives differ significantly.
In  most  cases,  the  issues  at  stake  were  about  the  implementation  of  the  mission
mandate: improvement of EUMM’s monitoring practices, focus of accountability and
oversight mechanism over the civil police and anti-corruption bodies in the EUPOL
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COPPS assistance, securing the EUMM support in solving practical issues along the
ABL or getting a partnership with EUMM on a project for journalists writing on the
conflict. These issues are technical, they are not affecting the EU policies. In one case, a
group has achieved a change in policy environment claiming the success in opening the
CSDP structures up to outside actors, which is also confirmed by policymakers. 
In the advocacy case on the closure of EUBAM Rafah, the group says that it achieved
half of its objectives by getting the mission’s staff and budget reduced, which at first
sight may be a technical issue made at the political level but which can be interpreted as
a political message to the third parties also. As a group representative put it:
“The mission did not close, but what it is now is not really a mission. Given that I
did it  almost on my own, as there was little  interest among other civil  society
groups in the issue, it was a part of the success.
 I went to see all possible actors in the Council Secretariat, in Germany’s MFA, in
other MFAs. They saw the point I was making. A political intention was to close
down EUBAM Rafah, but it was about big fishes, Heads of Governments and so
on  who  did  not  want  to  upset  Israel.  So  I  managed  to  take  the  issue  at  the
operational  level  and  effectively  the  mission  was  shut  down,  while  political
closure was not possible. While maybe I achieved half of my goals – the mission
was not closed down, but at least it stopped wasting so much money” (Interview
140).
Through interviews with EU officials I could not trace the EU decision to scale down
EUBAM Rafah in 2012 to the advocacy efforts of this group, it seems more likely that
this group contributed to the internal discussion within the CSDP structures on the fate
of EUBAM Rafah supporting the actors in favour of scaling down. 
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In several cases, influence on policy outcome by advocacy groups has been reported by
policymakers. For example, an EU official reported the role of NGOs in Palestine in
helping to determine better police equipment needs (Interview 158). In another instance
civil  society  was named instrumental  in  expanding the  EUPOL COPPS mandate  to
criminal justice.  This is  an example of a piecemeal influence on EU policies which
cannot be attributed to any single group and seemingly is a result of  long term efforts of
civil  society  in  Palestine  and  elsewhere  to  draw  attention  to  the  need  for  a
comprehensive approach to SSR in EU aid. An EU official describes:
“Most of the information that we get from NGOs and CSOs does not end up in the
strategic review as such. It serves to situate the mission – are we doing the right
things? But it is absolutely essential be in touch with civil society on whether and
how Palestinian Civil Police are reforming, how they perceive the justice side, not
only the police side. What we heard from civil society influenced the mission’s
mandate to be more extended to the justice side. Now it is a common pattern that
not  only police  but  the  wide rule  of  law is  included and particularly  the  link
between police and prosecutors. The rule of law is a chain and if the link between
police and prosecutors does not work, this chain has no meaning. Now much effort
goes to ensure that this link works” (Interview 143).
It  is  noteworthy  that  influence  is  assessed  differently  by  the  EU policymakers  and
advocacy  groups.  The  EU  officials  see  a  key  success  of  Palestinian  NGOs  who
complained about human rights violations and demanded more openness of the police
towards the society in pushing the mission to focus on accountability and oversight
mechanisms  (Interviews  123,  128).  In  their  turn,  while  Palestinian  advocates
acknowledge that the EU has become more attentive to the voice of civil society and the
views of Palestinians about their security forces and consult the more on aid priorities,
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they still see the EU as uneager to put more pressure on the Palestinian authorities to
introduce  more  transparency,  e.g.  demand  unrestricted  access  of  human  rights
organisations  to  detention  centres,  or  to  make EU aid to  Palestinian security  sector
conditional upon the respect of human rights (Interviews 120, 152). Whereas Palestinian
human rights groups would like to see the EU more committed to their cause, the EU
representatives on the ground care not to endanger relations with their key counterparts
– Palestinian authorities. As an EU official put it:
“NGOs come with criticisms [of police] too. These are very political questions. We
say them that we make reports, we take notes, we internally consider them in order
to set priorities, however a lot of criticism goes beyond our scope of work: we work
with civil police, and we do not have a monitoring mandate. 
What we do is to raise issues with our counterparts – with police, with prosecutors,
with Bar associations, courts, as even is someone is detained by Preventive Security
Agency or other security agency out of our scope, there are still lawyers appointed
and the case goes to courts. But we raise these issues in a non-confronting way. We
cannot say that we know that someone is tortured as they would ask us for facts,
how do we know. We cannot say that we have heard that someone is tortured as
they would ask from whom have we heard it. Thus we say ‘Could we do something
to prevent torture?’. But this information does not go to the outside world. Yes, EU
member states can read about it in our reports, but not further” (Interview 123). 
In a nutshell,  group influence on policymaking  appears very limited in the civilian
CSDP. As  in  the  previous  cases,  groups  find  it  much  easier  to  attribute  the  policy
outcome to their advocacy efforts in the case of technical issues involving one policy
actor. There have been many more instances when groups said that they were consulted
or advocated on a certain issue, but it was difficult for them to see the result of their
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work in policy or practice. 
As  in  the  previous  chapters,  only  few  groups  –  Brussels-based  NGOs  –  reported
conducting an assessment of their advocacy in a systematic manner. Most groups judged
upon their success upon results – whether a change they sought has occurred or not.
Finally, a few lines on methodology. In the case of the CSDP, I found it difficult to
triangulate the data, and, more than in other cases, I had to rely on the interviews and
documents  produced  by  interest  groups  because  EU  documents  such  as  strategic
reviews, OPLANS and the Mission Implementation Plans are classified and it is not
possible  to  check  how  the  EU  modified  its  policies  or  approach  towards
implementation, what arguments were used in favour or against such modification and
whether they resonated with the arguments made by the lobbies. While the interviews
allow us to grasp the changes in EU policy, they often pose additional questions as
policymakers sometimes present a brighter picture of how they take account of civil
society views than it is viewed by civil society groups. Moreover, due to frequent staff
rotation  in  the  missions  and  in  Brussels  it  has  been  difficult  to  verify  information
concerning advocacy instances  dating  years  back (that  is,  during the  early  years  of
EUMM or EUPOL COPPS).
To sum up,  this  chapter  demonstrates  that  the civilian CSDP does not  attract  many
interest groups. Their engagement with EU policymakers is rather limited, partly as a
result of the difficulty of getting access and information. In the instances in which the
interviewed  groups  did  engage  in  advocacy  and  reported  some  degree  of  goal
achievement, it happened on the technical issues concerning the implementation of the
mission mandate. 
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3.2. Factors explaining influence
One of the most frequently named factors that influence interest group engagement into
CSDP is access to policymakers and transparency of the policymaking process. The
importance of institutional factors is no surprise since as one EU diplomat put it, “the
CSDP is an island itself. While the Commission and the EEAS are more open to outside
actors, CSDP is very much member states oriented, turned inwards” (Interview 107).
That’s why a number of groups see their advocacy objectives as  increased transparency
and the opening up of crisis management structures towards the input of civil society
and local communities.
A group representative shares their experience of advocating on the CSDP: 
“People are very sceptical  of  engaging with external  actors,  not only with civil
society, but with other people working in the EEAS.  There is a perception of a
secretive environment in which they work and that they have to negotiate with the
member states,  so that  they do not  want to reach out  to other actors.  But  then
everybody says here that there is a poor planning of civilian CSDP missions, that
there is a weak theory of change of the situation on the ground” (Interview 125).
Another group representative also emphasises that the lack of transparency and access is
a major obstacle to successful advocacy on the CSDP missions: “It took me time to
extract information from the Council on what they were doing in these two missions,
financial information, before I could write the [advocacy] paper” (Interview 140). A
Brussels-based think-tank member, while complaining about the secrecy of the CSDP,
stresses the variation in openness to civil society among different institutions, bodies
and member states: 
“We do not get information from the CSDP structures in EEAS headquarters, they
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see it  secret,  confidential information and they do not want to share. It  goes to
slowly. We get information, for example, on the personnel breakdown from the
missions or the EU member state representations in Brussels, not from the EEAS.
Sweden,  Scandinavian  countries  and Germany are  more  open minded.  But  the
Eastern member states do not want to say anything on what they do” (Interview
109).
An EU official  also stresses  the CSDP culture  of  secrecy  as  the reason for  limited
contacts with non-state actors: 
“I can give you a very visual example. CSDP departments sit in the Cortenbergh
building, this is an extra secure building with additional security checks. This gives
you an idea of inaccessibility. When we were there, we would accept PhD students.
But there is a lot more of culture of secrecy, as there are more sensitive issues, more
information that may not be disclosed” (Interview 158).
The openness of CSDP missions to non-state actors seems to depend on the mandate.
While  EUMM  is  a  monitoring  mission  tasked  with  collecting  and  analysing
information,  civil  society  groups  are  viewed  as  another  source  of  information.
Moreover, the mission also sees a value of engagement with civil society actors on the
normalisation and confidence building aspects of its mandate. In the case of EUPOL
COPPS, the engagement with non-state actors is more limited. The mission’s primarily
task is to assist the PA bodies. Though the mission’s personnel work with civil society
says  that  communication  with  local  NGOs provides  a  complementary  vision  of  the
police and justice sector in the absence of a monitoring mandate, in the absence of such
a mandate there is no need to constantly gather information from local actors. 
The  mandate  of  the  mission  determines  what  kind  of  personnel  is  recruited  to  the
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mission. While EUMM consists of people with military, police and civilian background,
including people who used to work for  or with civil society organisations (e.g. in the
national ministry of education), the EUPOL COPPS staff mainly comes from a police,
prosecution and judiciary background. This also influences the culture of the mission.
An EU official shares his insight: 
“EUPOL COPPS is a very inward looking mission. It is organisationally looking
towards police, there is a police culture, a culture of not sharing information. We
keep together even if we come from different countries. If you share too much
information,  you  risk  not  having  authority.  They  –  police  –  need  authority”
(Interview 123).
Moreover, the leadership of the mission has freedom to interpret the mission’s mandate
and thus define the modalities of sharing information, reaching out to media and non-
state actors. For example in the case of EUMM, both EU staff and advocates agree that
NGOs’ ability to influence the mission’s work has varied over time depending on the
HoM in  place.  The  period  when  the  mission  was  led  by  a  person  with  a  military
background is characterised by the lack of access of NGOs who were seen as “Russian
spies”, in the words of one interviewee. With the arrival of a civilian chief, the mission
also became more open to civil society, mechanisms of consultations and outreach to
civil  society  have  been established,  the  concept  paper  on how to  engage with  civil
society was drafted by the mission.
Given the lack of transparency and institutionalised channels of interaction with non-
state actors, information exchange between groups and EU officials largely depends on
the discretion of the latter and on the ability of the former to build relationship of trust.
In such a situation, having allies among EU staff is the way for groups to circumvent the
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lack of formal access and the culture of secrecy. Moreover, given the central role of the
Council, it is also important to seek allies among member states to get insights in what
is going on and push issues onto the Council agenda. No wonder that the majority of
advocates  report  that  having allies  among policymakers  is  a key for  their  advocacy
success and they spend a large portion (if not most) of their time on lobbying allies
(which corroborates the H2 hypothesis).
A Brussels-based group representative said: 
“Having allies among policymakers is absolutely key for the success. It is about
supporting people,  giving them ammunition,  so they are not  feeling themselves
alone, it is about energising them, supporting them and also getting their strategic
advice. We spend more time with allies than with the opponents. From Brussels it
is difficult to get a change of the position of the opponent member states, they get
their instructions from the capitals” (Interview 139).
Another  advocate  also  underlined  the  importance  of  building  alliances  with
policymakers:
“Allies is a key in advocacy. Who’s going to put your message? You need people in
different  institutions  to  support  this.  We  come  with  ideas,  suggestions,
recommendations which can be taken by the member states and institutions. We
provide them with ideas and recommendations and we encourage them to be more
active. It is informal work with them.
[…] Some member states also put pressure on the crisis management bodies to be
more open to us. Plus our allies (persons) within the crisis management bodies,
they offer us this service – to have discussions with civil society” (Interview 125).
Among resource-related  factors information,  analysis  and  expertise  are  the  most
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frequently named by the groups and of the top value for policymakers. A Brussels-based
advocate emphasises the importance of their analytical work for advocacy success: 
“Analysis is important: thorough, comprehensive, from the field. High quality of
our reports gives us firm ground for advocacy. Unlike other think-tanks that often
produce opinion based pieces, based on experts views, our reports,  though they
also reflect our opinion, are well footnoted and based on interviews with all sides
involved. And this gives us good credibility” (Interview 121).
Another group representative put it this way: 
“You have to know your stuff,  you have to know who is  who in the decision-
making world.  I read a lot  of legal texts,  the legal  basis documents,  factsheets,
financial information, I knew who the heads of missions were. So later when I
talked to people in the Council Secretariat, I gave a correct impression that I knew
the stuff I was talking about” (Interview 140).
A group doing advocacy with EUMM shares  their  formula  of  cooperation with  the
mission:  “We have more information about perceptions. Maybe we have little factual
information, but we know more about perceptions” (Interview 147). This is confirmed
by an EUMM representative saying that they get a lot of information about Georgian
society through meetings with NGOs and information that they cannot get through other
monitoring tools (Interview 117).
In the conflict contexts, when access to some areas is limited for EU officials or where
the party in the conflict is represented by ‘de facto authorities’ or ‘terrorist groups’ with
which the EU does not have a formal relationship, information brought by non-state
actors is often the only source of information for EU policymakers to learn about local
views and developments. This stands for  Abkhazia and South Ossetia to which the
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EUMM does not have access, despite the fact that its mandate covers these regions, and
for Gaza since 2007. In these cases EU officials  are extremely interested in  getting
information from NGOs who have access to  these territories,  societies  and political
actors. 
Resources such as funding, personnel and time dedicated to advocacy are also seen as
important in conditioning interest group influence. In the case of the CSDP, presence in
Brussels is key if one wants to influence early stages of the policy cycle. Groups also
benefit from high-level leadership such as presidency and board of directors who may
open doors to policymakers due to their reputation and contacts.
Finally, apart  from information  or  analysis,  there  are  other  types  of  services  which
groups provide  (see also Paffenholz 2010 on civil society functions in peacebuilding)
and in exchange for which they get access to policymakers. Such resources can be, for
example,  confidence-building  events  organised  by  NGOs  that  bring  together  civil
society representatives and, at  times,  officials,  even though in their  private capacity,
representing the conflict parties in the case of Georgia. First, the EU officials benefit
from the environment which is more conducive to a dialogue which such groups try to
create. Second, they also participate in such meetings as observers to get a better sense
of conflict dynamics or ideas for their interventions, including through funding. 
Local media and information distribution networks are another resource of this kind.
For example, EUMM cooperated with a local NGO which ran a radio station reaching
out to the population  in Abkhazia to disperse myths about the EUMM mandate and its
activities. The mission supported an NGO working with journalists across the divide
lines to promote confidence building. A Brussels official also see a potential role of civil
society in the exit strategy which consists of taking some EUMM tasks in monitoring
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across the ABL communities inspired by a civil society project (Interview 137). 
In the case of Palestine, civil society monitoring of the security sector and cooperation
with security agencies serves to  “legitimise partner institutions” of EUPOL COPPS in
the  context  of  the  absence  of  a  legitimate  parliament.  The funding to  support  such
activities often comes from the EU or other European donors, but non-state actors do
the job which the EU policymakers cannot carry out themselves.
Among strategy-related  factors,  groups  underline  knowledge  of  the  policy  process
which includes approaching ‘the right people’ at ‘the right time’ with ‘clear messages’
as  well  as  persistence  in  their  advocacy  efforts.  An  extremely  important  factor  of
influence  is  a  group’s ability  to  set  realistic  advocacy  objectives.  The  interviewees
among  groups  stress  that  the  clearer  and  more  concrete  and  achievable  advocacy
objectives are set, the more influence they tend to achieve. As one group put it, “we try
to be low to the ground. We are part  of the wider machine,  we are a small  wheel”
(Interview 95). Groups see themselves as more influential  when their  objectives are
“smaller”  and  when  they  lobby  on  rather  technical  issues on  which  the  EU  has
competences and the EU’s leverage is strong, as opposed to broader objectives which
require the agreement of the whole Council or where the EU’s action is conditioned by
third parties. Groups underline the need to interact with policymakers, to be a part of
“real world” policy and come with a perspective informed by policy in order to provide
realistic recommendations that can be used by policymakers. This also implies that they
have to be “more constructive in order to not be perceived as too critical” and achieve a
middle  ground  between  what  they  consider  “an  ideal  world  solution”  and  what  is
feasible from the EU policy perspective.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined the case of lobbying on the civilian CSDP, focusing in particular
on EU missions in Georgia and the Palestinian territories. In line with the theoretical
assumption outlined in the Chapter 2, the CSDP is the ‘hard’ case for interest group
influence  as  it  involves  intergovernmental  decision-making  with  no  role  for  the
supranational institutions. 
There has been limited engagement of non-state actors. The active advocates are mainly
public  interest  groups  such  as  NGOs  and  think-tanks.  Critical  perceptions  of  EU’s
contribution to conflict  resolution through the CSDP also led to that fact that many
groups lobbying on EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reluctant to
engage on the CSDP missions seeing them as a too marginal and technical issue. In
Georgia, perceptions of EUMM as a security provider by local communities makes the
mission a relevant target and advocacy issue for Georgian and international groups. 
Most  groups  have  focused  on  the  implementation  stage,  approaching  the  CSDP
missions. Brussels-based groups engage in earlier stages of the policy cycle, however,
interactions between EU policymakers and groups are less intense in Brussels than at
the theatre level. Groups lobby both the EU and the EU member states (in line with H4).
The  EU-based  advocates  primarily  target  the  Council  and the  EEAS,  while  groups
based  in  Georgia  and  Palestine  approach  local  EU  Delegations,  EU  member  state
diplomatic representations and CSDP missions. Lobbying national capitals is usually
carried out in a targeted way due to the limited resources which groups possess for
multi-level lobbying. 
Advocacy groups report achieving their objectives to some extent (varying from most to
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few) and,  as a rule, on rather technical issues which are often not really about EU
policy, but related to the implementation of the mandate or promoting a more conducive
environment  for civil  society involvement  (H1).  There were no groups mobilised to
defend the status quo. Though this fact makes assessment of H3 difficult, it seems in
line  with  the  theoretical  expectations  that  status  quo  is  protected  through  the
institutional design in which each member state has a veto power. 
Institutional factors explain to a greater extent the limited lobbying and group influence
on  the  CSDP. The  confidential  character  of  EU policy  documents  and  the  mission
reports and the lack of institutionalised practices of consulting with civil society are
significant obstacles for groups’ engagement into the CSDP. While some groups have
access to the Council due to contacts with member state officials, these relations are
informal and depend on the good will of EU diplomats to share information. Access to
the EEAS crisis management departments is also limited, especially if it is compared
with  geographical  departments.  The crisis  management  structures  have inherited  the
culture of secrecy from the Council Secretariat. Much of the interaction between non-
state actors and CSDP structures is channelled via “one stop shop”, the CSOs coalition
working on conflict prevention and peace-building supported by the EU.  
At  the  level  of  the  CSDP missions,  contacts  with  non-state  actors  depend  on  the
mission’s mandate, which largely defines what kind of structures are in place in the
mission to deal with civil society and what kind of personnel are recruited (whether staff
come from military, police or civilian backgrounds). Openness of the missions to local
civil society also depends on the leadership of the mission. Thus, intensity of contacts
between groups and missions  may vary over  time and,  given their  largely informal
character, such contacts are fragile and sensitive to rotation of the mission leadership
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and key staff. 
In order to circumvent the lack of access and transparency of the CSDP, advocates put a
lot of efforts into building relationships of trust with their allies among policymakers
and  mission  staff.   Allies  among policymakers  is  seen  as  a  key  factor  of  lobbying
success by the interviewed groups (supporting H2). Such allies can be member states
which are more forthcoming to cooperation with civil society in general (e.g. Northern
EU  members)  or  to  the  issues  which  groups  advocate  on,  or  individuals  holding
positions in the crisis management structures or the missions which often have previous
experience of interacting with non-state actors.
Advocacy  groups  rely  on  inside  lobbying  tactics,  mainly  engaging  in  face-to-face
meetings with policymakers. Outreach to media is used by some groups in parallel with
access strategies. Other voice strategies have not been reported by the groups, though
we  know  from mass  media  that  protest  actions  take  place  in  the  EU  capitals,  for
example, to call European leaders to “stop the war in Gaza”. However, it seems that
professional advocacy and grassroots movements are the worlds apart. Though some
Brussels groups recognise the importance of European  public opinion and solidarity
movements to change the EU foreign policy in a substantial way, there seem to be no
links between them. 
Groups do not report counter-lobbying on their issues by other groups, at least not that
they are aware. Indeed, many issues on which they advocate are tiny in scope and of a
technical nature. Moreover, getting attention of policymakers for their issues is the most
difficult exercise. Thus, advocates quite easily merge in coalitions with other groups to
make their voices louder and to share resources. Groups coming from the neighbouring
countries seek alliances with EU-based groups which help them with both resources and
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access to EU policymakers.
Among the factors defining their advocacy success, resources play an important role.
Information and analysis are the most traded goods between EU staff and advocates in
the civilian CSDP. This is also confirmed by policymakers: they need information and
perspectives from non-state actors to do the reality check of what the missions do and
their impact, to ‘access’ the other side of the conflict which EU policymakers cannot
enter physically, and also because information gathering is an inherent part of what EU
missions and Brussels bureaucrats do. Presence in, or ability to travel to, Brussels is also
critical as it allows groups to follow the EU agenda closely, understand the intricacies of
the EU policy process and build relationships with policymakers. Brussels-based groups
tend to develop more sophisticated lobbying strategies, also learning from their past
experiences. Advocates underline the ability to establish realistic advocacy objectives
and  come  forward  with  “constructive”,  EU  policy-informed  recommendations  as  a
crucial factor defining their influence. This factor has also come forward in the previous
chapters.  Socialisation and learning seems to be an important  determinant  of  group
influence in EU policymaking to which little attention has been paid by the interest
groups literature.
As in the previous chapters, groups found it difficult to answer the question concerning
the degree of achievement of their advocacy objectives and attributing a policy outcome
to their advocacy efforts. Cross-assessment of group influence based on interviewing
policymakers has not been able to fully solve this difficulty. Policymakers and groups
tend to assess group influence differently, as the example of EUPOL COPPS shows. In
this  case,  the positive effect of the method triangulation was less visible due to the
difficulties in triangulating the data. Given that EU policy documents on CSDP missions
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are classified, I had to rely on interviews with policymakers more extensively than in
other cases to trace the policy process.
This chapter has focused on advocacy and group influence in the intergovernmental
case of the CSDP, thus contributing to the literature on lobbying by exploring a new
area  of  European  integration  and  furthermore  to  the  literature  on  EU  foreign
policymaking by examining the involvement of non-state actors in the area of conflict
resolution and crisis management.  Its findings are consistent with those received by
Mérand  et  al.  (2011)  through  network  analysis  of  the  CSDP showing  the  strategic
positions  of  Brussels-based  EU  member  state  actors  as  gatekeepers  for  domestic
government  arenas  and  marginal  positions  of  interest  groups  and  think-tanks.  The
research results also corroborate previous research on non-state actor participation in
international  intergovernmental  organisations  in  the  policy  field  of  security  (Mayer
2008; Steffek 2010) showing that access for outside actors in security policy is limited
which can be explained by high sovereignty costs  associated with this   policy field
(Tallberg et  al.  2014).  In the field of development,  inputs from non-state  actors  are
welcome during the implementation and evaluation stages, but outsiders are shielded off
when strategic decisions are made (Steffek & Nanz 2008). At the same time, when non-
state  advocates  are  welcome  it  is  mostly  connected  to  institutions’  demand  for
information and analysis which can help policymakers and implementers to understand
the  local  context,  impact  and  perceptions  of  the  EU  on  the  ground.  Studying  the
engagement of local actors, including civil society groups and community organisations,
helps  us to  better  understand how the EU as a security actor  is  perceived by those
societies in which the Union is actively trying to promote change and build peace. 
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Conclusions
This thesis has explored how and to what extent interest group influence EU foreign
policy. Interest group involvement and influence in this policy area has received very
little attention from researchers of EU lobbying. This may be partially explained by the
fact  that  this  policy  area  is  relatively  weakly  integrated  at  the  European  level  and
dominated  by  intergovernmental  arrangements,  whereas  multi-level  lobbying  is
expected in the communitarised policy areas in which the Union produces legislation
affecting  organised interests  across  the Union and beyond its  borders  and in  which
supranational institutions exercise significant powers. Non-state actor involvement has
also been devoid of the research interest of EU foreign policy scholars. Meanwhile,
studying lobbying can help us to better understand the nature of European integration
and policymaking in the foreign policy area.  Non-state actor involvement at the EU
level is one of the signs that policymaking in this area can be explained through a multi-
level  governance  approach  characterised  by  the  multiplication  of  decision-making
centres,  Europeanisation  of  national  foreign  policies,  the  growing  role  of  informal
arrangements and common norms and values, and the increasingly visible identity of the
Union in the international arena. By engaging in EU-level lobbying and calling for the
EU to act externally, non-state advocates perceive the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Carrying out an empirical study of the strategies and influence of non-state advocates in
EU foreign policy, I have examined the impact the EU institutional context on lobbying.
This issue is central to the academic debate on determinants of advocacy strategies and
interest group influence. At the beginning of this study I asked: Is intergovernmentalism
an obstacle to interest group involvement and influence in the EU, or have they found
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ways to  (successfully)  represent  their  interests  at  the  EU level  despite  the  apparent
absence of a multi-level governance framework in some areas of EU foreign policy such
as the CFSP and the CSDP? I have investigated the extent to which our knowledge
about lobbying and interest group influence in the EU is valid for intergovernmental
policymaking.
In order to address the main research question of this thesis, I conducted a comparative
case study of the lobbying and influence of interest groups in the EU across three sub-
policy areas. The sub-policy areas were chosen deliberately to represent variation in the
policy regime: whereas EU visa liberalisation policy is close to the Community method
of decision-making, CSFP and CSDP are situated on the intergovernmental extreme of
EU policymaking. I have argued that the proximity of a foreign policy issue to one of
these  two  extremes  determines  to  what  extent  interest  groups  can  access  the
policymaking process and, thus, their ability to influence.
In the next sections I will present the empirical findings of this study answering the key
research  questions  of  how and to what  extent  interest  groups  influence  EU foreign
policy and whether the institutional set-up matters. I then will discuss the theoretical
implications of this study and its contribution to the relevant literatures. I will also share
my thoughts on the methodology of measuring interest group influence. Finally, I will
advance the broader implications of this study for EU foreign policy governance and
charter areas for future research.
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1. Empirical findings: how and to what extent interest groups 
influence EU foreign policy
Firstly, this study demonstrates that interest groups are not ‘alien actors’ in EU foreign
policy. There are a variety of different groups engaged in EU foreign policy lobbying –
NGOs and  think-tanks,   business  interests,  diaspora  organisations,  advocacy  groups
from EU member states, international non-state actors and groups from third countries
affected by the Union’s policies.
Multi-level lobbying: reaching out to the ‘most’ and ‘least’ accessible institutions
In all three cases of EU foreign policy, advocacy groups have engaged in multi-level
strategies lobbying both EU institutions and member state governments, as hypothesised
in  H4.  Many  groups  started  to  lobby  the  EU  in  the  wake  of  a  particular
‘Europeanisation moment’: European integration in the policy area, accession of their
country to the EU, or an EU decision which had an impact on the organisation. The
groups targeted supranational actors if they had formal powers (as in the case of visa
liberalisation)  and  when  they  did  not  (as  in  the  case  of  CSFP sanctions  or  CSDP
missions). 
In the case of CFSP sanctions (Chapter 4), affected business groups litigated before the
EUCJ which reflects the growing importance of the case law on EU policymaking on
restrictive measures against physical and legal persons. Whereas one can see an inertia
from other  policy  areas  as  many  groups  lobbying  EU foreign  policy  come from a
development  or  trade  background,  there  are  also  some strategic  reasons  as  to  why
groups lobby receptive but not powerful venues such the European Commission and the
European  Parliament  in  the  CSFP/CSDP.  The  Commission’s  DG  International
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Cooperation  and Development  is  responsible  for  EU aid  which  many lobby groups
working on CFSP/CSDP issues receive, while the office of the Commissioner in charge
of the ENP is seen as a potential advocate of groups interests at other EU venues. The
European Parliament is also seen by interest groups as an important arena for public
political debate or as “the door opener” to other EU institutions. On CFSP and CSDP
issues,  interest  groups  also  approach  the  EEAS,  an  institution  that  is  irrelevant  for
lobbies outside EU foreign policy. This reflects the growing role of EU bureaucracy and
diplomacy in agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation of EU
foreign policy.
The study also shows that groups outside the EU lobby the Union because policies
produced by it affect their interests. Groups active in the EU neighbouring countries
most  often  lobby  the  most  proximate  venues  –  EU  Delegations,  member  state
diplomatic representations and CSDP missions. They also build partnerships with EU-
based and international groups to target policymakers  in Brussels  and member state
capitals. 
The  reputation  of  the  Council  as  “the  least  accessible”  EU  institution  has  been
confirmed,  in  line  with  the  literature  on  EU  lobbying.  However,  it  is  not
unapproachable. Mostly Brussels-based groups lobby the Council and its thematic or
geographic  working  groups  and  committees.  It  appears  that  in  the  absence  of
institutionalised mechanisms for consultations, lobbying the Council requires building
up  relationships  of  trust  with  diplomats  from  EU  member  states’  Permanent
Representations in Brussels. 
In  the  Council,  advocacy  groups  tend  to  choose  the  most  receptive  member  state
delegates. This could be due to the fact that it is difficult to “change an EU member
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state position from Brussels”. Thus, advocacy groups seek to empower their allies to be
advocates  of their  issues  among other  member states  and institutions.  Moreover, an
important part of lobbying in the Council is related to receiving information about the
policy  agenda,  timing,  proponents  and opponents,  the  main  arguments  and lines  of
division. 
Lobbying  EU member  state  governments  is  seen  as  an  important  part  of  advocacy
strategies in all three cases which is a reflection of the key role the member states play
in EU foreign policy regardless of institutional arrangements. At the member state level,
groups  seek  to  target  governments  less  receptive  to  their  demands.  However,  most
groups, even those more resourceful find it expensive to conduct advocacy in the EU
member states. Thus they try to focus on key capitals and team up with groups from the
member states in order to share advocacy costs. 
Inside vs. outside lobbying
In terms of lobbying tactics, foreign policy is very similar to communitarised areas of
EU governance in  which outside lobbying is  rare  (Mahoney 2008).  Inside lobbying
prevails, with the dominance of face-to-face meetings with policymakers as the most
frequently used tactic. Individual meetings with EU officials grow in importance when
there are few opportunities to voice  positions through institutionalised consultations.
Among voice strategies media outreach has been most often reported in all three cases.
Lobby groups target EU specialist media and press in EU member states. Moreover,
groups  use  informational  lobbying  mainly  to  complement  other  tactics  and  they
underline the importance of resources in conducting systematic work with the media.
Other voice strategies such as street actions or letter campaigns are rare in EU foreign
policy. Whereas instances of outside lobbying have been reported in the case of visa
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liberalisation and CFSP sanctions, groups which engage in EU-level lobbying on the
CSDP and  conflict  related  issues  do  not  use  voice  strategies  other  than  occasional
exposure to media. Indeed, even when access to decision-makers is difficult to obtain,
advocates do not employ voice strategies. Next to the low salience of foreign policy
issues  and  the  institutional  context,  group  identity  seems  to  define  the  choice  of
lobbying tactics (see also Uhlin & Kalm 2015). Outside tactics such as street actions or
petition  signing  have  been  mostly  reported  by  groups  which  rely  on  individual
membership  –  for  example,  youth  groups  or  diaspora  organisations  –  and  in
combination with other advocacy tactics. Moreover, coalition-based groups find it more
difficult to speak to the media on behalf of their members and leave this right to them.
This finding is in line with the literature explaining advocacy not only through the logic
of influence, but also the logic of support (Lowery 2007; Berkhout 2013). 
Venue shopping strategies of groups also show that access to powerful decision-making
actors varies across the three cases.  It seems relatively easy in the case of EU visa
liberalisation policy because the European Commission and the European Parliament –
EU institutions traditionally open to interest groups – have formal powers. It is very
difficult in the case of the CSDP in which member states in the Council set the agenda
and take and implement decisions and where the EEAS crisis management structures
seem to have inherited the organisational culture of the Council Secretariat  (see Carta
2012; Duke 2012) and appear less accessible for non-state actors in comparison with
those  departments  which  have  been  transferred  from the  Commission.  Importantly,
without access to the Council,  which is involved in intergovernmental policymaking
from the  early  stages  of  the  policy  cycle,  groups’ ability  to  exert  influence  on EU
foreign policy is significantly debilitated. Even though groups attempt to be active from
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the earlier stages of the policy cycle and in some cases they are successful in putting and
keeping  issues  on  the  EU  agenda,  they  frequently  find  themselves  involved  at  the
implementation  and  evaluation  stages  –  when  the  Commission,  the  EEAS,  EU
Delegations  or  CSDP  missions  use  civil  society  groups  in  policy  implementation
(“prolongation of EU arms”) or seek information about on-the-ground developments in
order to assess the effectiveness and impact of EU policies or to comprehend the wider
context in which EU policies are implemented. Moreover, there is another aspect such
as  access  to  policy  documents  which  significantly  affects  groups’ engagement  with
different institutions across sub-policy areas. In the extreme case of the CSDP missions,
most policy documents are classified which means that non-state advocates dealing with
conflict resolution and crisis management have limited knowledge of the CSDP agenda
and struggle to develop advocacy strategies in this area. 
Intergovernmentalism hinders influence, but can be surmounted
Whereas it  was hypothesised in  H1 that the closer an issue was situated toward the
intergovernmental  extreme,  the  less  likely  it  would  be  that  interest  groups  would
achieve high degrees of influence,  the data provides a more nuanced picture. If one
takes into account the degrees of influence based on self-assessment only, lobby groups
mostly see themselves as partially influential with little variation across the three cases.
This can be explained by the fact that  groups adjust to the unfavourable institutional
context when designing their advocacy strategies. Advocates tend to “maximise” their
influence by setting “realistic” and “policy informed” advocacy objectives, or in other
words, they seek a lesser degree of policy change. In practice,  it  means that groups
expect less: they rather go for smaller steps which are often intermediate on the way to
their  overall  goals  or aim of improving the lobbying environment by increasing the
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transparency of the policy process and promoting the EU culture of openness to civil
society,  rather  than  setting  up  ambitious  objectives  which  are  seen  as  difficult  to
achieve. Defining “realistic” advocacy objectives has been very frequently named by
successful groups as a factor conditioning their goal achievement in the self-assessment
responses.
The process tracing reveals that there is a variation of influence between the cases. The
cases of visa liberalisation policy and sanctions are rather worlds together, whereas the
CSDP case is an outlier. While we could have expected more similarities in terms of
influence between the CSFP sanctions and CSDP mission cases due to the limited role
of supranational institutions, the CSDP case clearly stands out, as both non-state actor
engagement and influence in this policy area is limited mainly to the implementation
stage and technical issues.  At the same time, CFSP sanctions and visa liberalisation
cases have similar patterns of access and influence, despite the important differences in
institutional design between the two. One explanation may be that despite differences in
formal rules, in practice EU member states are very zealous to keep control over visa
policy and unanimity still  rules in the Council just as in the case of sanctions. This
seems to be a limiting condition for group influence during earlier stages of the policy
cycle and decision-making in the Council. At the same time, despite the fact that there
are less formal channels of consultations in the case of CFSP sanctions, policymakers
provide informal access to interest groups because they are in need of information that
they can provide. The CSDP appears as an institutional island within intergovernmental
EU  foreign  policymaking  to  which  outsider  access  is  not  welcome.  Moreover,  an
explanation borrowed from the literature on non-state actor participation in international
organisations stipulating that a policy field is also accountable for variation of access
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can be used in the context of the CSDP: EU member states have higher sovereignty
costs in the case of security policy. CSDP missions are also perceived as too ‘technical’
an issue for many groups who lobby on EU conflict resolution policy. Whereas EU visa
liberalisation policy and sanctions seem to bring more immediate costs and benefits for
organised interests, CSDP missions do not resonate in the same way with constituencies
of many EU-based groups.
Furthermore,  examining the  issues  upon which  groups report  advocacy success  and
validating their  reports  through cross-assessment by policymakers,  we see that  most
issues on which groups achieve their goals are of a technical nature and not central for
the policy. Political relevance is clearly the lowest in the case of the CSDP which is also
reflected in the fact that groups are excluded from earlier stages of the policy process. 
In  the  case  of  EU visa  liberalisation  policy  (Chapter  3)  groups  have  succeeded  in
increasing  the  transparency  of  the  visa  liberalisation  process,  getting  their  views
reflected  in  the  Commission’s  assessments  of  the  progress  achieved  by  the  EaP
countries and contributing to facilitation of visa issuance practices. Moreover, if there
was  no  continuous  advocacy  from  pro-visa-free-Europe  groups,  member  state
governments  would  be  more  willing  to  postpone  their  commitments  to  visa
liberalisation  for  the  EU’s  Eastern  neighbours.  However,  groups  are  not  powerful
enough to resist the status quo defenders in the Council which have introduced many
procedural measures to keep the process slow and under the firm control of the member
states.
In  the  case  of  CSFP  restrictive  measures  (Chapter  4),  civil  society  groups  have
successfully promoted the issue of sanctions onto the EU agenda, pushing the Union to
keep its normative stance towards Belarus. They have also influenced who is targeted
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by EU sanctions through suggesting names of human rights violators and providing
argumentation as to why they should be put on the list. A number of business groups
have been effective in keeping certain business entities off the list by using the veto
power of member states in the Council. However, for both civil society and business
lobbies the goal achievement is  seen as partial  as both camps strove for more.  The
division among civil society groups on the issue of sanctions has also contributed to
their assessment of influence as partial or very limited. In general, the case of CSFP
sanctions shows that interest groups can be influential despite the fact that the policy
area is ruled by intergovernmental arrangements.
In the case of CSDP missions (Chapter 5), groups are active mainly on the issues of
implementation,  on  which  they  report  partially  achieving their  advocacy  objectives.
Their involvement is very limited, or non-existent during the agenda-setting, planning,
and decision making stages. Still,  some groups claim being partially influential.  The
CSDP  case  provides  a  vivid  example  of  how  intergovernmentalism  can  limit
participation  of  non-state  actors  in  the  EU policy  process.  Shielded  from access  to
Brussels-based  institutions  and  having  little  information  about  the  CSDP missions,
interest groups find it  difficult  to get engaged in lobbying, define their position and
develop a lobbying strategy. 
Significance of allies among key decision-makers
It  was  also hypothesised in  H2  that  interest groups with allies among key decision-
makers  are  likely  to  achieve  a  higher  degree  of  influence.  This  expectation  finds
confirmation  across  all  three  cases.  Having  allies  among  key  decision-makers  is
reported as a crucial factor of goal achievement, especially when the sub-policy area
moves  to  the  intergovernmental  extreme.  Groups  need  policymakers  who  not  only
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sympathise  with  them on  policy  substance,  but  who  also  pro-actively  seek  tactical
support vis-a-vis internal opponents on the given issue. Allies in power allow groups to
be informed about the policy process and bring their issues onto institutional agendas.
The lack  of  institutionalised  access  and consultation  mechanisms are  substituted  by
informal  arrangements  which  are  based  on  personal  relationships  between  group
representatives  and  office  holders.  Advocates  underline  the  importance  of  building
“good relations” with EU officials and complain that a change of the office holder, for
example, the head of a CSDP mission, can strip them of the limited access which they
previously enjoyed. 
Status quo defenders vs. promoters of policy change
There is no conclusive evidence in favour of or against the H3 hypothesis, namely that
the  intergovernmental method of policymaking mostly favours groups that defend the
status quo rather than promote change. Though given that in each of the three cases,
most groups which have mobilised are those that desired a policy change or a change in
policy implementation, one can infer that the status quo defenders have their interests
better guarded in the intergovernmental  arrangements and do not need to mobilise at
the EU level. This is also reflected in the fact that many groups see ‘the other side’ as
EU  member  states  opposing  a  policy  change.  In  the  case  of  CSDP  missions,  all
mobilised advocates tried to shift EU policy. In the case of visa liberalisation, though
there were groups who defended the status quo as a temporary measure to insist on
tougher  conditionality, the  main  line  of  division  seems to  be  between an  advocacy
coalition supporting swifter liberalisation to which most non-state advocates belong and
an advocacy coalition consisting of mainly ‘old’ EU member states which try to make
this  process  gradual  and  controllable.  Only  in  the  case  of  CFSP sanctions  was  the
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division between organised interests which mobilised to defend the status quo – mostly
business  groups – and groups lobbying for   a  policy  change – tougher  sanctions  –
clearly visible, given the costs of sanctions to business. The status quo defenders were
able  to  use  the  right  of  a  member  state  veto  in  the  Council  to  block unfavourable
decisions. However, they did not win systematically. When the sanctions were imposed
by the Council, many business groups affected by them turned to the EUCJ to appeal
against the Council decisions. This case shows that the status quo protectors may have
easier victories given the unanimity rule in the Council, but groups promoting a policy
change have their goals achieved too. 
Other determinants of influence: the importance of group-level characteristics
Apart from institutional characteristics, group resources appear as an important factor of
advocacy success. Though there is a variation of access which may hinder interest group
involvement  as  a  policy  dossier  moves  from  the  Community  method  to  the
intergovernmental method, access does not equal influence. The within-case analysis
allowed  us  to  see  other  factors  and  configurations  of  factors  under  which  access
translates into influence. Group-level characteristics play an important role in a group’s
ability  to  invest  in  getting  access  and  building  effective  strategies  for  successful
lobbying. Groups underline expertise and information, strength of advocacy coalition
and  partnership  networks,  presence  in  Brussels,  understanding  of  the  complex  EU
decision-making process and lobbying experience needed to design effective advocacy
strategies as crucial determinants of their success. In this sense, there is an important
difference  between  EU-based groups,  especially  those  with  offices  in  Brussels,  and
groups coming from the neighbouring countries. Whereas the latter are seen as those
representing the interests  of the societies which the EU tries to assist,  they are less
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knowledgeable about the intricacies of the EU political universe and less endowed with
the resources needed to influence EU policies than groups from the EU. Just as the
literature on Europeanisation of interest groups in the EU shows that richer domestic
groups are better equipped to represent their interests at the EU level  (Dür & Mateo
2014b; Eising 2004; Fairbass & Jordan 2002), this study also shows that resourceful
groups  are  also  better  prepared  to  adapt  to  the  complexity  of  intergovernmental
policymaking.
2. Theoretical implications and contribution to the literature
Whereas in this thesis I have focused on three specific dossiers of EU foreign policy
toward the neighbouring countries, the findings of this study are informative beyond the
studied cases,  especially  given the fact  that  a  broad variety of  interest  groups from
Brussels, EU member states and third countries were interviewed. In many aspects my
findings corroborate previous research results  (Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Voltolini
2013). First of all, the study demonstrates that interest groups are not “foreign” to EU
foreign policy. Second, they achieve their policy goals despite the difficulties of access
to  policymaking.  Similar  to  the  study  by  Joachim  & Dembinski  (2011) on  NGOs
involvement  in  the  CSDP,  I  emphasise  the  lack  of  institutionalised  consultation
practices and information as a detriment to lobbying and the presence of allies as a key
condition for advocacy success. 
Despite a different theoretical framework, many of my findings are also similar to those
of Voltolini in the case of EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  (Voltolini
2013).  In  her  theoretical  framework,  groups lobbying the  EU adopt  consensual  and
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median  rather  than  controversial  roles   and  use  technical  and  legal  frames  when
engaging in interaction with EU policymakers. In contrast,  at the member state level
they more often play controversial roles and apply political frames. Indeed, successful
interest  groups  are  reliant  on  access  rather  than  voice  strategies,  and  they  adopt
“realistic” advocacy goals and “constructive” demands using technical expertise, hard
evidence and detailed knowledge of legal and political  realities in third countries in
order  to  support  their  arguments.  Controversial  roles  expressed  through  protest
strategies are rare at  the EU level.  However, this thesis also underlines the strategic
calculations of interest groups and policymakers. Whereas groups strategically adapt to
different institutional environments, policymakers need interest groups to perform their
functions. In such a way, the study highlights the power of rationalist based accounts in
explaining lobbying and influence in the EU.
This thesis makes a distinct contribution to the literature on lobbying and interest groups
in the EU by exploring institutional determinants of influence. Exploring lobbying in an
intergovernmental area of EU policymaking, I have shown that interest groups achieve a
certain degree of influence and it is not necessarily true that only status quo protectors
win in EU foreign policymaking. Thus, intergovernmentalism is not an insurmountable
obstacle to lobbying and influence at the EU level, though in combination with other
factors,  such  as  the  type  of  policy  field,  it  restrains  access  for  interest  groups  to
participate in the policy process and influence policy outcomes. 
However,  formal  institutional  arrangements  of  EU  policy  modes  are  not  the  only
characteristics  of  political  opportunity  structures  responsible  for  groups’  access  to
policymakers. Whereas access to powerful policy actors is limited in intergovernmental
policymaking, access is not a fixed institutional characteristic. Access can be granted by
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allies  among  policymakers  (who  share  a  common  interest,  hold  similar  policy
preferences, or seek information or other services which groups can provide). Hence,
even if access is a necessary pre-condition of influence, it can be obtained even in an
institutional  setting  that  is  unfavourable  to  interest  group  involvement.  One  should
therefore look at access not as fixed, but as a dynamic (constructed) characteristic of
political opportunity structures.
The institutional context of lobbying also matters as it affects groups’ strategies. Groups
adjust their advocacy goals, tactics, and choice of lobbying targets to the institutional
context.  In  a  number  of  cases,  they  set  intermediate  goals  aimed  at  improving  the
transparency  of  the  policymaking  process  and  inclusion  of  non-state  actors,  thus
creating a more favourable lobbying environment (see also Uçarer 2009).
Advocacy groups adapt to complex decision-making, uncertainty, the prevalence of the
status quo and the lack of access by setting up more “realistic” objectives, building
transnational advocacy coalitions, investing in informal channels of access and teaming
up with policy actors on “their side”. In other words, they are learning. Exposure to
lobbying in Brussels and previous experience of EU-level engagement seems to be an
important factor of advocacy success. Knowledge about the EU policy process allows
non-state  advocates  to  devise  more  effective  lobbying  strategies.   In  line  with  the
constructivist view on lobbying (Voltolini 2013; Voltolini forthcoming), I find that there
is a value in paying more attention to the role of socialisation and learning in the design
of lobbying strategies and influence. These aspects have been largely omitted by the
interest  group  literature.  Groups  learn  to  adapt  to  the  unfavourable  institutional
environment, gain or keep their access to policymakers and showcase their advocacy
success to their members and supporters. However, I could not find any evidence that
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EU lobbying  changes  group preferences  and  identities,  as  the  “thick”  constructivist
account posits (Voltolini 2013). On the contrary, the case studies analysed in the thesis
show that groups try to preserve their identities even if this raises the costs of advocacy.
What’s more, group identity  affects their decisions in terms of what kind of advocacy
strategy to choose.
Groups do not change their preferences, even if they are against the EU mainstream. For
example, the groups that lobbied for harsh economic sanctions for Belarus did not drop
their  demands even when they knew that  there was no support for them in the EU
Council;  neither did the groups that were against any sanctions. Both camps merely
revised their arguments and tactics. In the case of EU visa liberalisation policy, groups
experienced  in  EU  lobbying  still  voiced  ‘unrealistic’ and  difficult-to-achieve  goals
despite the way that they were perceived by the EU. Whereas lobby groups do not like
to “lose” and want to appear successful, it does not mean that they alter their interests
under the EU’s influence, unless the EU is key to their organisational survival. 
If  we look  at  the  policymakers  side,  we observe  the  power  of  functional  accounts
adopted in the literature on NSA access to intergovernmental organisations  (Tallberg
2010; Tallberg et al. 2014)  and also EU lobbying  (Bouwen 2004a) in explaining why
and under what  conditions access  is  granted to  outside groups and to  what  kind of
groups. The Parliament uses groups to boost their own role in policymaking, especially
in the areas in which it lacks formal powers. The Commission, the EEAS and the EU
Delegations  need  technical  information  and  expertise  related  to  policy  formulation,
implementation or evaluation of the impact of EU policies. Access for groups and their
influence rises when policymakers lack their  own eyes on the ground (such as in a
conflict zone with restricted access or in a post-crisis situation), when they are under-
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resourced to get information on legislative or other political developments in targeted
countries themselves, or when they consider that non-state actors are better positioned
to execute certain tasks in the implementation of EU policies. 
The  CSDP  provides  a  good  example:  whereas  Brussels-based  crisis  management
structures provide limited access to non-state advocates, CSDP missions need local civil
society groups to assist in performing their tasks. However, even at this level there is a
variation based on functional needs, organisational culture and individual members of
staff. Whereas a bigger mission with a monitoring mandate relies more on civil society
as another source of information, a smaller police training mission is more closed to
non-state actors. The mission mandate also has an impact on what kind of personnel is
recruited (police/military vs. civilian) and professional background seems to affect the
personal culture of engaging with civil society. In this regard, this study adds to the
literature  on  NSA  participation  in  international  organisations  by  pointing  to  the
importance of organisational cultures and the role of individuals as additional factors
conditioning the access of non-state actors to institutions within the organisations.
One of the most distinct features of EU foreign policy is that groups tend to rely on
informal channels of interaction with policymakers.  Whilst there is a growing number
of  institutionalised  consultations  undertaken  by  the  Commission  and  the  EU
Delegations, the EEAS has only recently started to introduce such a practice and the
Council is overtly secretive. In the case of CSDP missions, decision-making actors are
prescribed to  talk to  NGOs and civil  society, but  not  much is  put  into practice.  So
groups  need  to  make  their  way  forward  by  pushing  the  boundaries,  finding  allies,
engaging in informal talks and creating their own space where they can exchange views
with policymakers. 
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While these tactics allow groups to circumvent the lack of formal access or consultation
mechanisms, informal practice seems to be fragile as it depends too much on personal
relations.  With  the  change  of  leadership  in  the  office  or  the  CSDP mission,  or  the
change of personnel, policy towards outside groups may change and advocates can find
themselves on building access from scratch. The CSDP case shows that in EU bodies
which have not incorporated consulting with non-state actors in their policy practices,
organisational  cultures of exposure to  outside groups are  in  flux and the politics of
informality plays an important role.
This thesis also points to the importance of paying attention to a broader organisational
environment  context  which should  also be taken into  account  (see  Lowery & Gray
2004).  Interest  organisations  rarely  live  off  lobbying.  They also compete  for  funds,
members and supporters, political attention and other goods (e.g. physical security in
the case of Belarusian dissidents). Organisational survival and maintenance may explain
the design of their advocacy strategies, including formulation of advocacy objectives,
choice of tactics, allies, and utilisation of resources. Lobbying has a signalling function
for  group’s constituencies  or  sponsors  and rationalist-driven explanations  attempt  to
account for different logics of lobbying (Lowery 2007; Berkhout 2013). 
3. Methodological reflections
This  study  reveals  once  again  the  methodological  difficulties  of  measuring  interest
group influence. The methodological triangulation has proven useful as it allows the
presentation  of  a  more  nuanced  picture  of  influence  and  lobbying  success.  Self-
assessment helps to understand better the nature of interest group influence as defined
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by groups themselves and strategies to seek it:  experienced groups tend to reach “a
higher degree of influence” by establishing more “realistic” advocacy goals, or in other
words, seek a lesser degree of policy change taking into account the policy framework.
This highlights a difference in conceptualisation of goal achievement and influence as
control over policy outcome. Groups may achieve their advocacy goals but still have
little influence in the policy process. By establishing “realistic” advocacy objectives,
they tend to focus on small steps and technical issues, leaving controversial political
issues aside. 
The  main  problem with  measuring  influence  through  self-assessment  is  that  groups
often do not know whether their advocacy efforts have led to a desired policy outcome.
Or in other words, they face similar difficulties of attribution which most researchers
do. This is especially true in the case of complex issues involving a multitude of policy
actors  and  decision-making  in  the  Council.  However,  it  is  also  the  case  on  more
technical issues. Furthermore, while groups report on individual goal-achievement, they
are often unaware of the results of collective action (‘lobbying sides’). 
Speaking to policymakers and expert observers can help to improve the picture. Using
process tracing, researchers can also try to take into account a counterfactual analysis.
They can do it by asking stakeholders – groups, policymakers and observers – whether
the policy outcome would be the same if not for lobbying. It is also about perceived
influence, but it helps to distinguish between “the luck factor” and lobbying influence. 
An additional challenge of studying interest group influence in EU foreign policy is that
policy  documents  (especially  in  the  case  of  CSDP)  and political  debate  in  the  key
decision-making body – the Council of the EU – are hidden from the public eye. Thus,
it  is often difficult  to cross-validate the data on perceived influence that come from
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interviews or media reports against some ‘harder’ evidence. Thus, while methodological
triangulation improved the measurement, it cannot eliminate all the difficulties.
The main advantage of studying lobbying during a longer time period and across the
entire policy cycle as has been the case in this thesis is that it allows us not to limit the
study  of  influence  to  a  particular  moment  and  trace  the  changes  in  policy  in  time
controlling for other possible factors. However, a longer timeframe also makes it more
difficult to gather all the necessary information to trace the policy process, especially
given  the  prevalence  of  interviews  as  a  key  method  of  data  collection.  First,
policymakers tend to be rotated frequently and it is more difficult to find and arrange an
interview  with  a  policymaker  who  used  to  work  on  the  given  dossier  in  the  past.
Second, groups may not remember all the details of what occurred in the past and prefer
to speak about newer instances of lobbying.  
In general, potential interviewees were responsive to interview requests and willing to
discuss the issues raised in this study. However, it was difficult to get access to some
types of groups and policymakers. Access to bigger NGOs and business associations in
Brussels and higher levels of decision-makers was the most challenging to obtain. Many
group representatives and policymakers seem not to have time to deal with research
requests coming from outside. Such difficulties were reported in previous studies (e.g.
Voltolini  2013).  The way of circumventing this  obstacle  is  investing more time and
effort in building gateways to important actors needed to be interviewed.
The studied cases do not represent the most lobbied cases in the EU’s policy towards
neighbours.  Interest  group  influence  may  differ  on  more  controversial  and  lobbied
foreign policy issues. Ideally, one would also need to examine the relationship between
interest group influence and institutional conditions looking at the EU’s policy towards
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the same country across a variety of policy dossiers. However, in practice, the selection
of such cases proves difficult due to the limited universe of cases.
4. Implications for governance in EU foreign policy
This  study has not tried to  tackle the question of the role of interest  groups in  EU
democratic governance in the foreign policy area. Nonetheless, it can give us some food
for thought. The study of lobbying shows that EU foreign policy seems very distant
from European citizens – only professionalised groups are engaged in direct lobbying at
the EU level and, in order to increase their chances for success, groups have to establish
representation in Brussels. While one can say that national governments are the main
channels  of  representation  and participation  of  domestic  civil  society  groups  in  the
intergovernmental EU foreign policy, we also see that EU foreign policy, including the
CSDP, is increasingly made by Brussels-based officials which have little contact with
groups from the member states. Moreover, the policy process is hidden from the public
eye, and there is little transparency and public debate on where the EU sends state-
building or post-conflict stabilisation missions to, or how effectively it supports human
rights in a neighbouring country. In this sense, the role of the European Parliament is
important: the case of EU sanctions policy towards Belarus shows that this institution
has turned into an arena for public political debate. 
Furthermore,  EU foreign  policy  seems very distant  from citizens  of  those countries
which it strives to assist in building democracy and state institutions, peace and security,
and developing a more open and prosperous society. It  is  distant  from the societies
which it tries to change through its interventions. Whereas the EU bureaucracy provides
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support for civil society groups from third countries and increasingly includes them in
consultation processes, local groups are still poorly endowed in terms of resources to
understand the complex process of EU decision-making, to have access to key actors, to
build  partnerships  with  stronger  EU-based  groups  and  thus  influence  EU decisions
which have direct impact on them. Instead, local civil society groups are given the role
of implementers of EU policies on the ground or helpers of the EU bureaucracy to
understand the complexities of the local context. At the same time, local NGOs and
business associations are voices of their societies and they can bring information to the
EU that can potentially help to develop more effective policies. Moreover, as this study
shows, they are frequent allies of the EU in promoting changes in the neighbouring
countries. The EU should be more aware of the fact that state actors are not the only
counterparts of the Union abroad.
The question this thesis also raises is whether funding which the EU provides to civil
society groups has an impact on their advocacy objectives. In several instances, the link
between  financial  support  which  groups  received  from  the  EU  and  their  lobbying
position or tactics was revealed. This issue deserves further investigation. 
Moreover, whereas the EU supports the development of advocacy skills among civil
society groups in the neighbouring countries (for example, through the Neighbourhood
Civil Society Facility and other aid instruments), EU policymakers should be aware that
advocacy capacity is a function of  organisational development. Those groups that are
more  resourceful,  better  organised,  more  experienced  and  more  integrated  into  the
policy  universe  tend  to  be  better  equipped  to  design  effective  advocacy  strategies,
however, the balance between the group professionalisation and the link with domestic
constituencies is not always easy to strike when civil society groups largely depend on
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EU or other international donor funding.
5. Future research agendas 
This thesis contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU by
focusing on a policy area which has received little scholarly attention and by examining
the relationship between influence and institutional factors. It also adds to the literature
on  participation  of  non-state  actors  in  international  organisations  by  making  a  step
further  and  exploring  whether  access  translates  into  influence.  Examining  the
interaction of non-state actors with decision-makers also advances our understanding of
how  EU  foreign  policy  is  made.  However,  this  study  also  leaves  many  issues
unexplored and points to many important areas for future research. 
First, this study did not aim to examine how member state preferences in the Council
are  formulated  and  what  influence  lobby  groups  have  on  them.  This  is  an  area  of
potential research inquiry. One can also compare lobbying strategies and influence at
the EU level and at the member state level in terms of tactics, venues, issue framing,
and the impact of such factors as public opinion, media interest and electoral politics
which are less visible at the EU level.
In addition, in order to explore the lobbying context and the role of institutional factors,
one can compare interest group involvement in foreign policymaking in the EU and the
US on the same issues (e.g. sanctions, military intervention). Lobbying strategies and
group influence on such issues as peacekeeping or international sanctions can also be
studied by comparing intergovernmental policymaking within the EU with that of other
international organisations such as the UN.
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Furthermore, across different policy domains (not only in EU foreign policy), we still
know very little  about  lobbying the Council  of the European Union and Permanent
Delegations of the EU member states in Brussels and how it is linked to lobbying in the
EU capitals. 
In  this  context,  there  is  also  potential  to  explore  the  role  of  interest  groups  across
different stages of the policy cycle in greater detail. For example, what is the impact of
non-state  actors  in  EU  foreign  policy  agenda-setting?  How  does  non-state  actor
involvement at the implementation and evaluation stages (often through EU funding)
translate  into  influence  on  these  policies?  Analysing  these  aspects,  constructivist
approaches  can  complement  rationalist-based  accounts.  For  example,  constructivist
approaches can help in understanding the role of interest groups in the emergence of
ideas,  their  dissemination,  legitimation  and  influence  on  policy  outcomes  (see
Saurugger 2013). 
Second,  to  advance  our  understanding  of  lobbying  and  group  influence  in
intergovernmental areas of EU governance, one can look into other policy fields, for
example economic and monetary governance or employment and social protection and
other  areas covered by the Open Method of Coordination.  One can test  and further
develop hypotheses explored by the literature on the institutional access of non-state
actors in international organisations in the case of the EU, for example, on the role of
normative and material incentives (functional needs) of policymakers to engage with
outside groups.
Third, interest group scholars could enquire into the impact of socialisation and learning
and organisational environment on lobbying strategies and influence. There is a need to
improve  our  understanding  of  how  groups  design  their  strategies,  set  advocacy
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objectives, utilise their resources, and how they understand and define what constitutes
advocacy  success  and  political  influence.  For  interest  organisations,  defining  their
advocacy  objectives  and  assessing  advocacy  success  can  be  an  important  part  of
organisational maintenance as they need to show their members or sponsors how they
spend their organisational resources. Such a research inquiry also implies changing our
analytical lens to view interest groups as organisations (see Halpin 2014).
Finally, we witness that groups from the neighbouring countries, but also EU-based and
international groups are often involved in lobbying in multiple arenas – the EU, third
country governments and other international organisations. For interest groups coming
from neighbouring countries, their governments are the main advocacy venue, but due
to the lack of access or receptivity to groups’ demands, they turn to the EU as an ally to
boost their leverage. On the one hand, this is the boomerang effect of which  Keck &
Sikkink (1998) speak in their seminal work on norm diffusion through transnational
advocacy networks.  On the other hand, domestic advocacy groups serve as a factor
explaining EU-promoted policy change in the neighbourhood countries as they can act
as veto players in the domestic political process (see Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein &
Börzel  2013) and  diffuse  European  norms  through  participation  in  cross-border
networks and organisational learning (see Turkina & Postnikov 2012). The literature on
Europeanisation in the neighbourhood and EU external governance can benefit  from
paying greater attention to the role of non-state actors and their transnational networks
in explaining and understanding policy outcomes and drivers of norms export outside
the EU. 
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Annex. List of interviews
1. Group representative, Brussels, 6 June 2013
2. Group representative, Skype interview, 10 October 2013
3. Group representative, Vilnius, 30 April 2014
4. Group representative, Chisinau, 4 October 2013
5. Group representative, Berlin, 16 May 2014
6. Group representative, Skype interview, 15 October 2013
7. International organisation representatives, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
8. Group representative, Brussels, 6 November 2013
9. EU official, Brussels, 25 October 2013
10. EU official, Brussels, 28 November 2013
11. Group representative, Madrid, 13 November 2013
12. Moldovan diplomat, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
13. EU member state diplomat, Warsaw, 26 June 2013
14. EU agency representative, Warsaw, 28 June 2013
15. EU official, Brussels, 22 October 2013
16. Group representative, Kyiv, 14 January 2014
17. EU official, Kyiv, 10 January 2014
18. Group representative, Kyiv, 3 May 2013
19. Moldovan diplomat, Chisinau, 1 October 2013
20. Group representative, Skype interview, 12 May 2013
21. EU member state diplomat, Kyiv, 13 January 2014
22. Group representative,  Brussels, 12 June 2013
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23. Group representatives, Warsaw, 2 July  2013
24. EU official, Kyiv, 23 April 2014
25. EP official, Brussels, 17 May 2013
26. EU member state official, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
27. Group representative, Kyiv, 10 September 2013
28. Group representative, Brussels, 2 September 2013
29. Group representatives, Brussels, 17 June 2014
30. Expert, Warsaw, 24 July 2013
31. Group representative, Phone interview, 17 December 2013
32. Group representative, Brussels, 29 July 2013 
33. Group representative, Kyiv, 14 January 2014
34. Group representative, Kyiv, 23 April 2014
35. Group representative, Brussels, 4 June 2013
36. Group representative, Kyiv, 15 January 2014
37. Group representative, Warsaw, 25 June 2013
38. EU official, Brussels, 24 October 2013
39. MEP, Brussels, 5 November 2013
40. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 3 April 2014
41. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
42. Group representative, Chisinau, 2 October 2013
43. Group representative, Brussels, 27 May 2013 and 24 October 2013
44. Ukrainian diplomat, Brussels, 29 July 2013
45. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
46. Group representative, Minsk, 25 September 2013
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47. Group representative,Warsaw, 27 June 2013
48. Group representative, Warsaw, 25 June 2013
49. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014
50. Group representative, Warsaw, 27 June 2013
51. Group representative,Minsk, 25 September 2013
52. Expert, Minsk, 25 September 2013
53. Group representative, Minsk, 27 September 2013
54. Group representative, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
55. Expert, Berlin, 12 May 2014
56. EU member state diplomat, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
57. Group representative, Minsk, 27 September 2013
58. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 13 June 2014
59. EU official, Brussels, 18 June 2014
60. Advisor to MEP, Brussels, 4 December 2013
61. Group representative, Berlin, 14 May 2014
62. EU officials,  Minsk, 24 September 2013
63. Expert/Group representative, Brussels, 18 June 2014
64. Group representative, Skype interview, 11 July 2014
65. EU official, Brussels, 8 September 2014
66. Group representative, Brussels, 11 September 2014
67. Group representative, Berlin, 13 May 2014
68. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 7 November 2013
69. Expert, Warsaw, 26 June 2013
70. EP official, Brussels,  7 November 2013
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71. Experts, Vilnius, 29 April 2014
72. EP officials,  Brussels, 23 October 2013
73. Group representative, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
74. Group representatives, Berlin, 16 May 2014
75. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 18 October 2013
76. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014
77. Group representative, Brussels, 8 May 2014
78. Expert, Warsaw, 17 July 2013
79. Expert,  Berlin, 13 May 2014
80. EU official, Minsk, 24 September 2013
81. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
82. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 25 October 2013
83. Assistant to MEP, Brussels, 5 November 2013
84. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 9 June 2014
85. Group representative, Warsaw, 24 June 2013
86. Group representative, Minsk, 25 September 2013
87. Expert, Minsk, 24 September 2013
88. Group representative, Minsk, 26 September 2013
89. Group representative, Warsaw,  29 June 2013
90. Expert,Vilnius, 30 April 2014
91. Group representative, Berlin, 14 May 2014
92. Group representative Warsaw, 25 June 2013
93.  Group representative, Brussels, 5 June 2014
94. Group representative, Vilnius, 28 April 2014
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95. Group representative, Brussels, 7 October 2014
96. Group representative, Brussels, 5 June 2013
97. EUMM official, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015  
98. EUMM officials, Tbilisi, 13 January 2015
99.  Group representative, Brussels, 16 December 2014
100. EU official, Brussels, 30 October 2014
101. EU officials, Tbilisi, 21 January 2015
102. Group representative, Brussels, 12 October 2014
103. EU officials, Brussels, 14 October 2015
104. Group representatives, London, 7 November 2014
105. Group representative, Brussels, 20 October 2014
106. EP official, Brussels, 30 September 2014
107. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 21 October 2014
108. EP official, Brussels, 8 October 2014
109. Group representative, Brussels, 12 October 2014
110. Group representative, Ramallah, 26 November 2014
111. EUMM officials, Mtskheta, 22 January 2015
112. EP official, Brussels, 20 October 2014
113. Group representatives,   Zugdidi, 17 January 2015
114. Group representative, Tbilisi, 20 January 2015
115. Expert, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015
116. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015 
117. EUMM officials, Gori, 21 January 2015
118. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 10 October 2014
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119. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
120. Group representative, Ramallah, 26 November 2014
121. Group representative, Brussels, 22 May 2013
122. Group representative, Ramallah, 24 November 2014
123. EUPOL COPPS officials, Jerusalem, 26 November 2013
124. EU official, Jerusalem, 27 November 2014
125. Group representative, Brussels, 22 October 2014
126. Group representative, Tbilisi, 22 January 2015
127. Group representative, London, 7 November 2014
128. Former EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS official, Jerusalem, 23 November
2014
129. Group representative, Gori, 21 January 2015
130. Group representative,Ramallah, 24 November 2014
131. EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2014
132. Group representative, Jerusalem, 27 November 2014
133. Group representative, Tbilisi, 23 January 2015
134. International organisation representative, Ramallah, 30 November 2014
135. Group representative, Tbilisi, 23 January 2015
136. EU official, Brussels, 8 October 2014
137. EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2014
138. EP official, Brussels, 9 October 2014
139. Group representative, Brussels, 9 October 2014
140. Group representative, Skype interview, 6 October 2014
141. EUMM official, Gori, 21 January 2015
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142. EUMM officials, Zugdidi, 16 January 2015
143. EU official, Brussels, 28 October 2014
144. Group representative, Tbilisi, 15 January 2015
145. Group representative, Ramallah, 25 November 2014
146. Georgian diplomat, Brussels, 30 October 2014
147. Group representative, Gori, 23 January 2015
148. Expert, Jericho, 29 November 2014
149. EP official, Brussels, 15 October 2014
150. Group representative, Ramallah, 25 November 2014
151. EP official, Brussels, 21 October 2014
152. Expert, Ramallah, 1 December 2014
153. EUMM official, Tbilisi, 12 January 2015
154. EU official, Brussels, 6 October 2014, Brussels
155. Group representative, Brussels, 23 October 2014
156. Group representatives, Tbilisi, 21 January 2015 
157. EP official, Brussels, 8 and 16 October 2014
158. EU official, Brussels, 1 October 2014
159. EU member state diplomat, Brussels, 29 October 2014
160. Group representatives, Ramallah,  26 November 2014
161. Group representative, Tbilisi,  15 January 2015
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